At the end of March 2026, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa arrived in Berlin for his first official visit to Germany since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024. After being received by President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, al-Sharaa held talks with Chancellor Friedrich Merz – a meeting that placed the question of Syrian refugee squarely at the center of the European political agenda. As of early 2026, Germany is currently host to 900,000 to 1 million Syrian nationals, and following the meeting, Merz announced that the two leaders had agreed that around 80 percent of the Syrians in Germany should return to their homeland over the next three years. Sharaa also outlined a proposed “circular” migration model that would enable Syrians to contribute to reconstruction without necessarily giving up the stability they have built in Germany. The meeting crystallized a broader tension that has been building across Europe since December 2024; between the political pressure in host countries to accelerate returns on one hand, and the reality that conditions for safe, voluntary, and sustainable repatriation remain far from fully in place on the other.

Over the 13 years of the Syrian war, millions of Syrians were forced to flee their homes, either becoming internally displaced or seeking refuge beyond the country’s borders in hopes of a better life. When armed rebels seized control of Syria’s capital, Damascus, on 8 December 2024, and the country’s dictator, Bashar al-Assad, fled to Russia, an estimated 7.4 million people were internally displaced within Syria, while 4.9 million refugees were residing in neighboring countries. A further 1.3 million had settled elsewhere, primarily in Europe. In the immediate aftermath of the rebel takeover, several European countries decided to suspend the processing of Syrian asylum applications, affecting tens of thousands of pending cases. Although the Assad regime fell over a year ago, Syrian refugees currently in the region still face no clear prospect of return, as the conditions necessary for safe and dignified repatriation are frequently absent. Many live without adequate support or resources, and as time passes their living conditions continue to deteriorate, while mounting pressure is placed on them to return to Syria. A significant number of Syrians in the European Union have acquired European citizenship, and according to recent surveys, their desire for return is decidedly lukewarm.

Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries

The majority of Syrian refugees remained within the region, seeking shelter in neighboring countries. As the civil war escalated, millions fled to countries such as Türkiye, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan, where shared borders, cultural proximity and lower barriers to travel made it easier to find immediate refuge. This regional concentration placed considerable social and economic pressure on the host communities, many of which were already struggling with limited resources.

Türkiye

Türkiye, owing to its shared border of over 900 kilometres with Syria and its initial open-door policy, quickly became the primary destination for Syrian refugees. As the conflict intensified, particularly from 2013 onwards, the number of arrivals rose dramatically. Despite being a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, Türkiye applies a geographical limitation that excludes non-European asylum seekers. Ankara therefore granted Syrians not formal refugee status, but a special form of temporary protection, which allowed them to enter and access basic services while stopping short of the full rights associated with permanent residency or asylum. By the mid-2010s, hundreds of thousands of refugees were living in well-equipped camps established by the Turkish government, but the number of arrivals soon exceeded camp capacity. Over time, therefore, most Syrians moved to various cities across the country (most notably Istanbul, Gaziantep near the Syrian border, Hatay and Şanlıurfa), where they integrated into local communities and the labor market to varying degrees.

By the early 2020s, Türkiye was hosting the world’s largest refugee population, with the number of registered Syrians rising to approximately 3.7 million. While many Syrians had built their lives and businesses in Türkiye – often in informal or precarious employment – others struggled with the limitations of temporary protection, administrative instability, and growing public hostility. Numerous studies have found that, despite these challenges, Syrians gradually adapted to urban life, formed social networks, participated in the local economy and showed certain signs of social integration. Nevertheless, uncertainty about the future remained a persistent source of concern, as the long-term prospects for legal stability were far from clear.

In late 2024, the political changes in Syria – including the fall of the Assad regime – prompted a significant shift. As the security situation appeared to improve in parts of Syria, the Turkish government began reporting increasing numbers of returnees; by mid-2025, official figures indicated that several hundred thousand people had returned to Syria since December 2024. These figures were also confirmed by the UNHCR. Ankara characterised these returns as voluntary and supported them through the expansion of Syrian consular and administrative structures. The government emphasised a narrative of safe and orderly return, framing repatriation both as an opportunity for Syrian stabilisation and as a relief for host communities in Türkiye. Human rights organisations, however, questioned whether all returns were genuinely voluntary, pointing to pressures such as growing anti-refugee sentiment in Türkiye, increasingly strict administrative controls, and mounting difficulties in registering and accessing services. The situation of those who remained in Turkey also changed in several respects, with new challenges emerging around legal protection, integration prospects and social cohesion.

Lebanon

Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Lebanon has hosted one of the largest per capita Syrian refugee populations in the world. According to the UNHCR, approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees (along with some 11,000 refugees of other nationalities) were present in Lebanon as of mid-2024. Syrian refugees in Lebanon – along with many Lebanese citizens – face increasingly severe hardships. Living conditions are significantly worsened by the country’ protracted economic crisis, and Lebanese society continues to bear the consequences of several recent shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the aftermath of the 2020 Beirut port explosion, and renewed regional instability. According to the UNHCR, approximately nine in ten Syrian refugees in Lebanon require humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs, while many lack valid residence permits, making access to education, healthcare, stable employment and civil documentation extremely difficult.

In the wake of the December Damascus events, a new dynamic has begun to reshape the refugee situation. Driven by the political changes in Syria and the expansion of voluntary return programs supported by the Lebanese government and UN agencies, more than 200,000 Syrian refugees have left Lebanon to return home. In July 2025, a voluntary return program was launched to assist refugees wishing to return to Syria, providing information, legal counselling, transport and financial support (USD100 per returning family member), with the aim of ensuring that returns are voluntary, safe, and dignified. However, as international contributions to the organization have declined, only 26 per cent of financial needs are currently covered, forcing the UNHCR to reduce or discontinue its programs providing healthcare, shelter, and financial assistance – posing a serious threat to access to life-saving care and basic survival support. A study examining the impact of drastic cuts to USAID funding for the UNHCR concluded that Syrian refugees currently face greater risks of mounting debt, child labor, untreated illness, school dropout, eviction, and other forms of growing insecurity. Overall, the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon remains deeply uncertain: while significant numbers have begun returning to Syria, many continue to live in poverty, legal vulnerability and social instability, dependent on international aid in a country that itself stands on the brink of political and economic collapse.

Jordan

Jordan has been one of the most significant host countries for Syrian refugees since the early years of the civil war. At its peak, Jordan registered over 650,000 Syrian refugees, many of them concentrated in the Zaatari and Azraq camps, which became some of the largest refugee settlements in the world. In practice, the majority of Syrians in Jordan lived outside formal camps, settling in urban areas – particularly Amman, Zarqa and Mafraq – where they eked out a living in the informal economy under conditions of significant legal and economic insecurity. Successive Jordanian governments walked a difficult line between humanitarian obligation, international donor pressure, and the socio-economic anxieties of a domestic population facing high unemployment and stretched public services.

Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Jordan has experienced a notable acceleration of returns. The registered Syrian refugee population stood at approximately 411,760 as of April 2026 – a substantial decline from the pre-2025 figure – reflecting the uptake of voluntary repatriation since the political transition in Damascus. To manage this shift, the UNHCR and the Jordanian government launched an “Assistance for Voluntary Return” pilot program in spring 2026, providing returnees from Zaatari and Azraq with legal counselling, civil documentation support, and one-time reintegration grants. A significant obstacle for returnees, however, is the absence of functioning property registries in Syria: many Syrians who left properties behind lack the documentation needed to prove ownership, leaving them vulnerable to unlawful seizure or unable to reclaim homes that were destroyed or occupied during their displacement. These are not marginal concerns but structural problems that will take years to address even under the best circumstances.

Despite the pace of returns, those remaining in Jordan face acute socio-economic pressure. Over 70 percent of refugee households live below the poverty line, burdened by accumulated debt and the phasing out of food and health subsidies as international funding tightens. The 2026 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) operates under a funding requirement of $2.8 billion – itself already a 40 percent reduction from 2025 – yet donor fatigue remains high. In response, Jordan has increasingly pursued a “localization” strategy, devolving greater responsibility to national NGOs such as the Jordan National NGOs Forum (JONAF) to manage residual humanitarian needs. The picture that emerges is therefore a dual one: a significant return movement is underway, but conditions in Syria make those returns precarious, while those who remain in Jordan find their circumstances deteriorating alongside the withdrawal of international support.

Iraq

Iraq presents a distinct trajectory. Unlike Türkiye, Lebanon or Jordan, Iraq did not become a primary destination for Syrian refugees during the war’s peak years; its own political instability, sectarian violence, and the emergence of the Islamic State made it a difficult environment in which to seek refuge. Nevertheless, Iraq currently hosts approximately 300,000 Syrian refugees, the overwhelming majority – over 90 percent – residing in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The relative stability and distinct administrative structure of the KRI, which maintained functioning institutions during the worst of the IS period, made it a more viable refuge than Arab Iraq. Camps such as Domiz, near Dohuk, have over time evolved into semi-permanent urban settlements rather than temporary emergency installations.

The Iraqi response in early 2026 emphasizes long-term integration over return. The Iraqi government has increasingly included Syrian refugees in its national development frameworks and social protection schemes, moving away from camp-based parallel service delivery. While some Syrians – particularly Kurds from north-eastern areas such as Hassakeh and Qamishli – have opted to return following the change of regime in Damascus, many remain in Iraq due to family ties, established livelihoods, and ethnic or linguistic affinity with KRI communities. The humanitarian focus for 2026 is on what the UN terms “resilience-building”: ensuring that both refugees and their host communities have access to vocational training, credit mechanisms and basic services sufficient to sustain a fragile but functioning stability. The KRI’s own economic volatility – compounded by long-running budgetary disputes between Erbil and Baghdad – nonetheless makes this objective difficult to achieve in practice.

The EU’s Largest Host Countries

The so-called migration crisis of 2015 represented the largest movement of people in Europe since the Second World War, with more than 1.3 million asylum seekers arriving in the EU+ (at the time: EU28, Norway and Liechtenstein). Syria was the most common country of origin among asylum seekers; Syrians accounted for 27 percent of all applications (nearly 370,000 individuals). According to data from the European Asylum Support Office, the preferred destination countries for Syrian asylum seekers were Germany and Sweden – hardly a coincidence, as both countries were well known for strong social support systems, including housing, education, and healthcare. Several additional factors also made both countries more attractive as destinations: in the case of Sweden, an undoubted draw was the decision by the Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) to revise its assessment of the Syrian conflict in 2013, as a result of which all Syrian asylum seekers were granted permanent residence permits rather than the temporary ones that had previously been issued.

Germany

In Germany’s case, a similarly attractive factor was the announcement by Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2015 that Germany would suspend the application of the Dublin Regulation for Syrians – meaning they would not be returned to the first EU country they had entered. This was widely interpreted as a signal that Germany was willing to welcome Syrians and process their applications fairly. In the years that followed, Germany received roughly half of all asylum applications submitted within the EU between 2015 and 2017, with 1.1 million applications in 2015 alone. A full decade after the so-called migration crisis, approximately 948,000 Syrian nationals are residing in Germany (as of September 2025). The number of Syrians in Germany has thus decreased by 3 per cent compared to the previous year. This decline is partly attributable to the fact that a significant number acquired German citizenship during this period, while some Syrian nationals have also returned to Syria.

Among Syrian nationals resident in Germany, the Federal Statistical Office records approximately 713,000 asylum seekers – representing 22 percent of the 3.3 million asylum seekers in Germany, making them the second-largest group after Ukrainians (33 percent). Approximately 2 percent of Syrian asylum seekers were born in Germany. In 2025, Syrian nationals continued to form the largest single group, accounting for 21.9 percent of the roughly 87,000 people who lodged their first asylum application in Germany between January and September. Since 2015, approximately 163,000 Syrians have been granted German citizenship. The overall employment rate of Syrians stood at approximately 42 percent in September 2024, representing an increase of more than 30 percentage points since 2016.

Sweden

Sweden has been home to one of Europe’s largest Syrian-origin diaspora communities since the early 2010s. In 2024, approximately 196,152 residents of Syrian origin were living in Sweden, a figure exceeding the population of Sweden’s fourth-largest city. The majority of Syrians arrived during the civil war, and Sweden was among the first countries in Europe to grant Syrians permanent residence permits and family reunification rights in 2013. This policy very likely contributed to the large-scale influx of 2015, when an estimated 163,000 people sought asylum in Sweden. Given that Sweden’s recognition rate for Syrian asylum seekers has historically been high – frequently exceeding 80 percent, and sometimes even 90 percent, over many years –, most Syrians remained in the country, becoming part of Sweden’s foreign-born population, which by 2024 had grown to represent 20.5 percent of the country’s total population, with Syria figuring among the primary countries of origin. Up-to-date employment data for persons from Syria is not available; a 2021 study found that one third of Syrians aged 25 to 64 in Sweden were self-sufficient, although the category covered not only those born in Syria but also individuals with at least one Syria-born parent. No data is publicly available on the precise number of Syrians who have been naturalized since 2013 or 2015.

The above makes clear that since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, both Sweden and Germany have taken in large numbers of Syrian asylum seekers, providing them with protection, residence permits and opportunities for integration. In Sweden, Syrians benefited from early policies of permanent residence and family reunification. Germany, which is host to Europe’s largest Syrian population, has over time achieved a higher employment rate among refugees, though challenges remain in terms of full economic integration. In the wake of the political changes in Syria – and the strengthening debate around repatriation – voluntary returns have begun, but the numbers remain low, and there is currently no indication that the majority of Syrians in Sweden and Germany intend to return home in the foreseeable future. In light of this, it seems likely that any return will be limited and highly selective.

The Suspension of European Asylum Procedures and Repatriation Efforts

The question of repatriation depends to a large degree on whether the receiving country is deemed safe. Syria’s current security situation remains fragile, and events over the year since the fall of the former regime suggest that ensuring safety in several parts of the country continues to present serious challenges. Syrian authorities and the new president continue to reiterate their commitment to a responsible, inclusive, and peaceful process led by Syrians; nevertheless, violent incidents have broken out on several occasions, including mass killings of civilians and sectarian violence, further destabilizing what is already a precarious situation. Reconstruction, particularly the rebuilding of public infrastructure, is under way, but the needs are enormous. The EU, Türkiye and the Gulf states are investing in large-scale infrastructure projects, though the pace at which these can advance and the extent to which they can meet the needs of the civilian population remain open questions.

Reliable public data on the number of Syrian refugees repatriated from EU member states to Syria since December 2024 is difficult to obtain. As outlined above, available reports focus primarily on returns from neighboring countries (such as Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan). The UNHCR holds limited data on actual returns from EU member states, but its estimates suggest that the number of Syrians intending to return to Syria from the EU is considerably lower than in neighboring countries, given their more favorable circumstances there. Furthermore, according to a UNHCR survey conducted in March–April 2025, more than 80 percent of Syrian refugees living in the EU do not intend to return to Syria within the coming year, though a significant number hope to do so one day if conditions improve. Respondents were Syrian refugees and asylum seekers living in 14 European countries.

According to publicly available EU information, very few Syrians have voluntarily returned from EU countries so far. Frontex, for example, reports that by May 2025 just over 1,000 Syrian nationals had voluntarily returned to Syria with the assistance of EU member states. It is also important to distinguish between Syrians who hold valid residence permits in the European Union and choose to return home, on the one hand, and Syrian nationals who have been issued a return decision and are therefore obliged to leave the EU, on the other. The summary below focuses on the latter group – that is, Syrians who hold a return decision and therefore have no legal right to remain in EU member states.

In the EU, 12,365 return decisions were issued against Syrian nationals during the period January–June 2025, representing a 12 percent increase compared to the same period in 2024. During the same period, 3,135 Syrians returned to Syria on the basis of a return decision, a threefold increase compared to the same period a year earlier (1,025). In January–June 2025, the number of voluntary returnees rose significantly (2,905, compared with 240). Given that EU member states expressed interest in resuming returns of Syrian nationals subject to return decisions following the change of regime in Damascus, Frontex resumed its support for member states in assisting voluntary Syrian returnees from March 2025 (note: Frontex currently does not support forced returns to Syria). Between 17 March and 15 September 2025, 3,398 voluntary returns to Syria took place with Frontex support.

Germany, which is home to the EU’s largest Syrian diaspora, announced on the day following the armed opposition’s seizure of power in Damascus that it would suspend the processing of Syrian asylum applications due to uncertainty surrounding the situation in Syria. According to Chancellor Friedrich Merz, “Syrians no longer have reason to seek asylum in Germany now that the civil war in their country has ended”. Merz emphasized that reconstruction would not be possible without them, and raised the prospect that Syrians residing in Germany who refuse to return to their country could be subject to expulsion in the near future. Similarly, Austria announced the suspension of the processing of all Syrian asylum applications. Syrians constitute the largest group of asylum seekers in Austria, with nearly 14,000 applications registered in 2024. The Austrian Interior Minister also ordered a review of previously approved asylum cases and halted family reunification procedures. The latter measure affects those who have been granted protected status, and means that they are no longer permitted to bring close family members from abroad. This has a significant impact on Syrians, who had previously constituted a substantial proportion of family reunification cases in Austria. Sweden, the second-largest destination country for Syrian asylum seekers, also suspended decision-making and enforcement in respect of Syria in light of the December Damascus events. This meant that the authorities suspended the taking of decisions on Syrian asylum cases and halted deportations and expulsions to Syria. The enforcement moratorium was lifted on 10 March 2025; the decision-making moratorium was subsequently also lifted in September, meaning that the processing of Syrian asylum applications has resumed. Similar steps have been taken in recent months by the United Kingdom, Norway, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark and Greece.

Conclusion

To summarize the above, the UNHCR’s assessment of the situation in Syria indicates that the conditions for a ‘safe, dignified and sustainable’ return – for both internally displaced persons and refugees abroad – have not yet been met, and that numerous obstacles stand in the way of return, including issues of protection and security, destroyed homes, unexploded ordnance, and a range of humanitarian and economic considerations. The moderate level of interest in return among Syrian refugees with protected status in the EU is therefore understandable for the time being. EU leaders, on the other hand, are showing considerably more enthusiasm for the opportunities presented by the change of regime in Syria in terms of repatriation: the shift in Syria’s political situation has led certain member states to take the view that circumstances now permit forced returns. To this end, they have taken active steps to resume forced repatriation for certain groups – at a minimum, those posing a security risk and convicted criminals. If only this group were to be repatriated (which in itself is doubtful, given the historically low success rate of European repatriations), that would offer little promise for the reconstruction of a severely fragmented, impoverished post-conflict society. Far greater need exists for the return of Syrians who have acquired various professional skills in Europe and accumulated substantial knowledge and experience – those who are committed to the rebuilding of their country.