India’s Great Nicobar project has been in the news for the last few weeks. The project blends port development, civilian infrastructure, and military strategy. The Great Nicobar Island is located in the Andaman Nicobar Island chain between Myanmar and Indonesia. It is the southernmost island. The chain is located closer to the Strait of Malacca, which is the world’s second largest oil-trade chokepoint after Hormuz. The project seeks to build a slew of infrastructure: trans-shipment hub, a civil and military airport, gas and solar power plants, and a new township. To be sure, the Andaman Nicobar Islands already host a tri-service military command, and new infrastructure will add another durable layer to these existing facilities. The project will be completed by 2047 in three phases, at an expected cost of $9-11 billion.
The Great Nicobar project has been roundly questioned by domestic political parties in India. The international media has also raised doubts over the project. Key issues include the viability of the trans-shipment hub, environmental impact of the project, as well as the impact on local population. In response, the government has mounted a defense of its plans, pointing to its clearance by the National Green Tribunal. The explainer put out on the official Press information Bureau devotes unusual space to the environmental concerns.
The strategic importance of the project stems from its economic and geopolitical rationale. The trans-shipment hub is designed to reduce India’s dependence on other major, deep-water ports in the region like Colombo and Singapore. New Delhi has already developed a new port at Vizhinjam in Kerala. However, a growing Indian economy and expanded international trade will require more facilities. India is ideally located for attracting global container and shipping traffic passing between the Middle East and East Asia.
There is a certain geopolitics of port development at work as well. China has been developing ports across the Indian Ocean littoral – in East Africa, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. However, in the era of weaponization of economic interdependence, New Delhi will have to find alternatives in the region. The Vizhinjam in the South, Vadhvan in the West, and the Great Nicobar in East will serve different regions within India, aligning with Maritime Vision 2030 and Sagarmala initiatives, both of which have envisioned port-led development. The deep-sea ports will position India well in the Indo-Pacific economic future.
The geopolitical importance of the project cannot be underestimated in the aftermath of the Iran war. The Strait of Malacca is a lifeline for East Asia’s energy and economic flows. The Chinese strategists have long debated the ‘Malacca Dilemma’. Beijing has made efforts such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) to reduce dependence on the Malacca and access the Indian Ocean via alternative routes. The Great Nicobar project solidifies India’s strategic position near the entrance of the Malacca Strait.
The Malacca strait serves as a gateway for Chinese merchant as well as the PLA Navy. The Chinese spy ships routinely traverse the Indian Ocean and study the operating environment of the region. The military base at Djibouti and dual-use facilities like Gwadar have enhanced China’s ability to project its influence in the Indian Ocean. The Malacca route has been used by the Chinese spy ships that monitor Indian activities such as the missile tests.
For India, China is a structural challenge. It is a country with which India has an unresolved boundary dispute. Despite the recent thaw, India’s China challenge is growing. The Great Nicobar project has will enhance India’s ability to monitor and watch over the Strait of Malacca. Like Iran, India will be able to bring geography into the strategic matrix in the event of a contingency. The project will expand New Delhi’s strategic reach deep into the Southeast Asia, serving as a forward operating base for India’s greater military presence in the Indo-Pacific region.
In the Indian Ocean geopolitics, forward military presence by a major power on a remote island is a routine occurrence. Britain and the US hold Diego Garcia. France has its military bases in the Southwest Indian Ocean. Australia too holds Christmas and Cocos Islands. The Great Nicobar will join these military sites. Afterall, for an emerging economy, having a military base on a remote Island is a norm of the regional geopolitics.
Sankalp Gurjar is an author of The Superpowers’ Playground: Djibouti and Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific in the 21st Century.
