If the Iranian regime survives, what comes next is not a choice between proxies and nukes. It is the recognition that nukes are now the only rational security option.

A recent summit at Gdansk furthers Warsaw’s quest for credible deterrence while demonstrating the sort of intra-European industrial cooperation that will be needed if the continent is to ever achieve credible strategic autonomy.

Türkiye’s Akkuyu nuclear power plant reinforces an emerging reality in the Eastern Mediterranean and surroundings: critical infrastructure projects are no longer neutral economic assets, and the struggle for energy independence comes layered with new vectors of external vulnerability.

Preserving the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is not about ceremonial remembrance alone; it is about anchoring contemporary policy in the concrete realities of human suffering, systemic breakdown, and climate vulnerability.

By applying insights from the height of Cold War nuclear competition – prioritizing survivability, ambiguity management, and alliance institutionalization—South Korea can build a deterrence structure capable of stabilizing the Korean Peninsula, even as North Korea expands its nuclear arsenal.

Messaging surrounding Russia’s latest failed test launch of its RS-28 “Sarmat” suggests that this ‘peerless’ next-generation ICBM is more propaganda tool than strategic gamechanger.

Examining how Israel’s nuclear program came to be shrouded in secrecy, and what strategic ambiguity means in the present geopolitical context.

The “New York-for-Paris” dilemma won’t be going away, but it can be mitigated by a “Paris-for-Berlin” approach, which is more credible due to geographic proximity and a shared European identity.

The European drive to develop a homegrown nuclear deterrent capacity neither resolves the ‘New York-for-Paris’ dilemma nor offers a viable alternative.

The destruction of Iran’s buried uranium enrichment facility at Fordow is central to Israel’s war plans. But success won’t come easy, nor will it last very long.

In engaging in the kind of economic coercion explicitly forbidden by the Budapest Memorandum, the Trump administration has undermined decades of nonproliferation efforts, eroded US diplomatic credibility, and set a precedent that weakens the power of any future US assurance.

South Korea attempted to develop a domestic nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, and for reasons that remain highly relevant in contemporary geopolitics.

The INS Arighaat, the Indian Navy’s latest nuclear submarine, is a step toward creating a credible multifaceted nuclear deterrence, but there’s still work to do.

The Russia-DPRK pact falls short of being a geopolitical game-changer, but it is reflective of an evolving Asia-Pacific security framework.

European attitudes toward nuclear deterrence are changing in the wake of the Ukraine war.

Nuclear power can be helpful, and already is, but it is not always the preferred choice.

Calls in the United States to reassess strategic patience reflect major advances in North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy.

Despite geopolitical landscape changes, one strategic dictum endures: the best way to avoid war is to increase its potential costs.

Iran nuclear deal stakeholders are scrambling to evade or circumvent looming US sanctions, but there’s one major hurdle they must clear: the US financial system.

North Korea leader Kim Jong-un garnered universal praise when he announced a halt of nuclear tests. It turns out he never had a choice in the matter.