What remains of the Obama administration’s Asia Pivot?
The policy foresaw a free trade push via the TPP, and a shift of US military and naval assets to the Pacific theatre in order to assure US allies in the region and contain a rising China. To help achieve these goals, the United States was to disengage from the Middle East by extricating itself from that region’s cascading conflicts. Yet under the watch of the Obama administration and its Asia Pivot, China embarked on an aggressive policy of land reclamation in the South China Sea, greatly expanding its power projection capabilities toward key shipping lanes via the Strait of Malacca. President Obama’s response was limited to ‘freedom of navigation operations,’ symbolic gestures of US defiance that were just that: symbolic. At the end of Obama’s term, the FONOPS appeared to have no effect in deterring China from its ongoing land reclamation activities.
Now enter President Trump, who campaigned on taking a much harder line on China, both in terms of trade issues and the South China Sea dispute. Trump Doctrine could signal a steep downturn in US-China relations, but with the TPP now dead in the water – will the US have any allies left to rely on in the region?
Impact
The Trump administration seems to be positioning itself for conflict with Beijing. There’s the brewing trade war, with President Trump’s comments on the campaign trail: ‘currency manipulator,’ ‘they’re raping our country,’ etc. And the now famous threat to slap a 45% tariff on all Chinese exports to the United States. There’s the South China Sea dispute, where Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had the following to say to China at his confirmation hearing: “the island building stops, and your access to those islands is not going to be allowed.” Should the Trump administration actually follow through on this rhetoric, it would put the US Navy and PLA Navy on a path to direct confrontation. And finally there’s Trump’s flirtation with disavowing the One China policy, which can’t be understated since this policy is the basis of all US-Chinese relations over the past 40 or so years.
The death of the TPP will limit President Trump’s options. The geopolitical fallout from the death of the TPP has been covered extensively on Geopoliticalmonitor.com. In sum, the trade deal was to be the economic rationale for East Asian states like Vietnam, Australia, and perhaps even Taiwan eventually to throw their lot in with Washington and balance Chinese expansion. Without it, these states will be less willing to risk an economic break with China should US-China tensions boil over. This dynamic is evident in the recent thaw in China-Vietnam relations. After years of defense planning and diplomatic positioning meant to counter China’s moves in the South China Sea, Vietnam’s Communist Party chief, Secretary-General Nguyen Phu Trong, visited Beijing in late January. The trip produced a warm communique that the two countries will uphold mutual trust and deepen their all-around strategic cooperation in the years to come. It suggests that the spat between Vietnam and China over the South China Sea has already reached its peak, and that Hanoi has calculated that it has more to lose from antagonizing its giant neighbor.
The art of the deal. It appears as though the ‘dealmaker in chief’ is positioning the United States for some geopolitical horse trading with China – and everything is on the table. This would explain some of the early, extreme positions being taken by the president: a 45% tariff, questioning the One China policy, threatening to blockade China’s new man-made islands in the South China Sea, etc. Trump may actually find a willing negotiating partner on the Chinese side. Although it’s true that a trade war would certainly harm both countries, the harm would come at a bad time for Beijing as the Chinese economy is struggling to get back on track and the 19th National Congress of the CPP – which will help determine the make-up of the next Chinese administration – will be held in late 2017. So far as President Xi Jinping is concerned, now is not the time for a major disruption in the US-China trade relationship.
Japan and South Korea in the brave new world of Trump. It’s yet unclear what exactly Trump Doctrine means for US relations with its two key allies in East Asia. So far it appears that, despite the chest thumping, blasé nuclear nonproliferation policy, and accusations of an unfair US military basing burden on the campaign trail, relations will be business-as-usual – at least on Washington’s end. After a rough election campaign, all the usual assurances are now being made: Prime Minister Abe is among the first leaders to visit with Trump, and Defense Secretary Mattis, whom one Tokyo daily described as ‘the only sensible person in the Trump administration,’ recently visited the two allies and assured both of the continuing US commitment to their security, including the defense of the Senkaku Islands (continuing an Obama-era policy).
