US naval superiority can deter escalation, but it cannot deliver dependable passage through the Strait of Hormuz without a workable understanding of Iran's capabilities, incentives, and red lines.

The question is not whether a sixth-generation fighter can be built. It’s whether these aircraft will be able to operate effectively in the environment they are being built for.

Since the outbreak of the war, Ukraine has assembled the most combat-tested air defense network in the world, drawing important lessons for future conflicts.

The risk faced by the United States in the Strait of Hormuz mirrors Israel’s War of Attrition against Egypt: What presents as a contained skirmish may actually be setting the stage for a future regional war.

EU governments are racing to develop drone warfare capabilities with the help of Ukraine. These efforts will help boost European strategic autonomy in the short term, but from a deterrence standpoint, drones are only half the answer.

Mine clearance in the Strait of Hormuz is not a matter of post-conflict cleanup. It is a defining element of the current phase of the conflict and will resonate on the question of who controls the Strait going forward.

In the heartland of ancient Persia, the lines in the sand of West Asia’s geoeconomic map are being redrawn.

With a reported range of 400 km, China’s PL-17 air-to-air missile puts enemy AWACS and ISR platforms in play, potentially upending longstanding military certainties across the Indo-Pacific.

Instead of competing in a race-to-the-bottom where adversaries enjoy an advantage in low-end mass manufacturing, the West could play to its strengths by forcing drone warfare to a higher frequency band. Here is a thought experiment on what that might look like.

The Venezuelan operation vividly illustrates how 21st century warfare is increasingly defined less as a clash of forces than as an asymmetric competition between decision architectures.

France’s plans for a domestic medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) program might be a source of national pride, but they could also be a point of contention with European partners and there are better alternatives available.

By applying insights from the height of Cold War nuclear competition – prioritizing survivability, ambiguity management, and alliance institutionalization—South Korea can build a deterrence structure capable of stabilizing the Korean Peninsula, even as North Korea expands its nuclear arsenal.

The Iron Beam is a new laser-based system that hopes to narrow the cost asymmetries between cheap drones and expensive interceptors. If it lives up to the hype, it could usher in a new era in air defenses.

Russia’s 9M730 Burevestnik is being touted as a technological breakthrough, but the technical details don’t add up.

In an era of intensifying geopolitical competition, rising crises, and heightened maritime tension, the A26 and similar submarines illustrate that undersea warfare is no longer the exclusive domain of nuclear powers.

Across the narrow strait separating Taiwan from China lies a question that could define the century: what happens when deterrence fails? This article examines how a war could play out.

Conventional air defense has been disrupted in an age of drone warfare, where sophisticated and expensive systems risk being overwhelmed by mass strikes. But military and civilian authorities are now beginning to adapt on the defensive side, and a new equilibrium is forming.

The fight for control of the air littoral is a pivotal domain in the Ukraine war, one where success brings advantages in battlefield awareness, artillery suppression, maneuverability, and attrition. It represents an entirely new paradigm, and it is changing the face of modern warfare.

Beijing’s ideal unification scenario is a ‘war without harm’ – Taiwan’s unconditional surrender in the face of overwhelming hybrid warfare and military pressure. Here’s what this scenario might look like, and what Taipei can do to prepare.

For twelve days in June 2025, Israel and Iran traded attacks as the world held its breath and watched, wondering how this geopolitical game of chicken was going to end. What can Europe’s military planners learn from the conflict?