The fragile ceasefire that followed the recent US-Iran confrontation has brought temporary operational calm to the Gulf, but it has not restored regional peace and stability. Beneath the surface, something far more consequential has shifted: the complete collapse of trust between Iran and its Arab neighbors.

For decades, Gulf states navigated a difficult but pragmatic relationship with Tehran, balancing deterrence with engagement and rivalry with de-escalation. That equilibrium is now clearly broken.

This conflict did not merely escalate tensions. It redefined Iran’s role in the regional security architecture, from a revisionist competitor to a direct, systemic threat to regional stability and safety.

The implication is increasingly unavoidable, and it is building up to the fact that the current Iranian regime is no longer compatible with the long-term security of the Gulf, as evidenced by its aggressive actions and support for proxy groups that destabilize the region.

A War That Redefined the Battlefield

The defining feature of this conflict was not simply that Iran retaliated; it was how and where it chose to do so. Rather than focusing exclusively on its primary adversaries, Iran deliberately expanded the battlefield to include the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. According to recent analysis, approximately 83% of Iranian missile and drone strikes were directed at Gulf states, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) emerging as the most heavily targeted country.

This is not collateral spillover. It is the typical doctrine of destabilization. Iranian strikes hit energy infrastructure, ports and desalination facilities, airports and data centers, and civilian-adjacent economic zones in the GCC. Over 660 attack events were recorded across the Gulf states during the conflict, including strikes on critical oil and industrial infrastructure. Even more telling, these attacks occurred despite Gulf states not being participants in the war. Rather, they have called for de-escalation, in addition to hosting US-Iran negotiations months before, like Oman did.

The Strategic Logic Behind Targeting the Gulf

One must recognize that Iran’s actions were not irrational; they were strategically coherent. Tehran pursued a doctrine of horizontal escalation, where it made it clear that if it were attacked, it would expand the conflict geographically, targeting its Arab neighbors, as well as raise the cost of war beyond the battlefield to increase international pressure on the US.

The Gulf was not an accident. It was the center of gravity. By targeting GCC states, Iran aimed to disrupt global energy markets, force Gulf capitals to push Washington toward de-escalation, and pressure US allies economically and politically.

Accordingly, the Strait of Hormuz became the ultimate lever. Even during the ceasefire, Iran continued to manipulate maritime flows, attack, seize vessels, and create uncertainty around shipping lanes, triggering global economic disruptions and oil price volatility. This was coercion by design.

The Collapse of Trust

For Gulf states, the consequences are not theoretical. They are clearly operational, economic, and existential. Thousands of missiles and drones were intercepted over major Gulf cities. Furthermore, energy exports were disrupted, and air defense systems were strained because of Iran’s continuous erratic attacks. This is not a manageable threat. It is a systemic risk to regional security and stability. Even more damaging is the political signal: Iran demonstrated that it is willing to target neighboring states, even when they are not combatants. This breaks a foundational principle of regional coexistence and trust

According to different estimates, Iran’s ballistic missiles and attack drones’ capabilities remain intact along with the continuous rhetoric and threats to the GCC. In addition, Iran continues to seize and attack commercial vessels in Hormuz, causing maritime disruption. This results in a strategic hindrance to the flow of maritime trade. The maritime disruption has stranded over 230 loaded oil tankers in addition to over 800 commercial vessels, creating uncertainty in shipping flows and energy markets. In this respect, the US assesses that clearing maritime threats such as sea mines could take up to six months, even after the war ends. This is not stability; it is a managed crisis environment, and the ceasefire currently in place has not resolved these dynamics. It has merely paused them.

The Problem Is Structural

It would be a mistake to interpret these developments as a temporary escalation or miscalculation.

The issue is deeper where Iran’s strategic model is built on asymmetric warfare, proxy networks, economic coercion via Hormuz, and missile and drone proliferation. These are not merely last resort measures; they are the fundamental instruments of Iran’s statecraft. As long as this model remains intact, regional security remains under threat. Even if Iran offers assurances, Gulf states and the international community now understand a critical reality where capability plus intent equals persistent threat. And both unfortunately remain unchanged until now in Iran’s case.

This brings us to the central and uncomfortable conclusion that if the current Iranian regime defines regional security through coercion, treats neighboring states as pressure points, and embeds escalation into its military doctrine, then the issue is not simply threatening behavior; it is the system itself. Especially with the growing speculations of the increasing diversion between the government and the IRGC in Iran, with the latter appearing to be the main body holding the power.

From a strategic perspective, the situation raises a question that the regional and international community must address; can lasting regional security coexist with Iran in its current form? Increasingly, the answer appears to be no.

Iran’s regime collapse will very likely produce state failure, militia proliferation, and uncontrolled weapons flows. However, ignoring the current critical position of Iran carries its set of high risks, because the alternative is accepting a status quo where most of the Gulf cities remain within missile range, energy infrastructure is permanently targetable, and maritime chokepoints are weaponized. In effect, permanent strategic instability.

What “The Regime Must Go” Actually Means

The phrase should not be interpreted narrowly as military overthrow, but rather, it reflects a broader strategic reality that the current Iranian system must either fundamentally transform or be contained until it no longer defines regional behavior.

This can take multiple forms. The first option is internal transformation where political evolution within Iran takes place and then recalibration of its foreign policy doctrine. The second option is strategic containment via sustained military pressure on missile and drone capabilities, neutralization of proxy networks, and enhanced maritime security enforcement. The third option is a long-term systemic shift where gradual erosion of the regime’s ability to project power takes place along with internal political change over time.

At this stage, returning to the previous model where structural changes do not occur, alongside periodic escalation and temporary de-escalations; is surely no longer viable.

A Point of No Return

In practical terms, Gulf states led by the UAE have demonstrated clear resiliency and are already adjusting effectively and efficiently. The war has accelerated integrated air and missile defense architecture, deeper security coordination with external partners, diversification of energy export routes, and investment in the resilience of critical infrastructure.

But defense alone is insufficient, because this is not just a military challenge; it is a strategic incompatibility problem. The most important outcome of this war is not the ceasefire; it is the emergence of a new regional baseline where Iran is no longer viewed as a manageable competitor but a persistent threat actor that must be contained. That shift will shape alliance structures, regional defense spending, and geopolitical alignments for the next decade.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com