The prospect of a US military strike against Iran over its violent crackdown on protests has laid bare a shift in Middle East geopolitics—one marked by the unexpected upending of long-standing rivalries between Iran and regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

When protests erupted in Iran on December 28, 2025, few anticipated that they would reveal deep-seated geopolitical anxieties in Riyadh and Ankara. As the demonstrations spread across the country and drew warnings from US President Donald Trump of possible military intervention in support of the protesters, Saudi Arabia and Turkey—along with Qatar and Oman—unexpectedly rallied behind the Iranian regime, primarily due to concerns about the potential consequences of a regime change in Iran.

To be fair, prior to the Iranian protests, relations between Tehran and its rivals Riyadh and Ankara were not tense; in fact, they were moving toward closer engagement, with Saudi Arabia following up on the Chinese-brokered agreement with Iran and Turkey even planning a presidential visit. The protests, by highlighting the fragility of Iran’s political order, triggered new threat perceptions in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, leading both countries to lobby the Trump administration to refrain from military action against Iran.

Israel: A Common Concern

While Turkey and Saudi Arabia hold differing views on Iran, they share a rarely highlighted concern: Israel’s potential influence in a post-Islamic Republic Iran. Both initially assessed that the protests were unlikely to topple the regime, yet the emergence of Reza Pahlavi—and his January 8–11 calls that drew massive crowds to the streets—heightened their anxieties. Monarchist chants calling for the return of the Pahlavi dynasty dominated the protests.

Reza Pahlavi, who has built strong relations with Israel, is far from a unifying figure in Iran’s polarized political landscape. His rise has unsettled non-Persian communities and devout segments of the population. Yet, from the perspectives of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the surge of pro-Pahlavi chants across Iran suggested that Israel and the United States could expand their influence if the regime were to collapse. Amid the protests in Iran, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan went so far as to accuse Israel of orchestrating the unrest, highlighting Ankara’s deep concerns about instability in Tehran. Notwithstanding, Saudi Arabia and Turkey were almost certain that Iranian protests, if left to their own devices, would not succeed in toppling the Iranian regime. US threats of a potential military strike in support of the protesters, however, radically changed risk assessments in Riyadh and Ankara.

The Ethnic Pandora’s Box

Fears of a potential Pahlavi reinstallation and its geopolitical ramifications were not the sole reason for Saudi-Turkish support of the Iranian regime, given the relatively low likelihood of a Pahlavi return to power, even in the event of a US military strike (the US president himself expressed doubt that Pahlavi could muster real support within Iran).

Iran is a multi-ethnic country with a long history of ethnic conflict. Its major ethnic groups––Azerbaijani Turks, Arabs, Baluch, Turkmen, and Kurds––each have experienced repression since the establishment of the modern Iranian nation-state in 1925, under both the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic regimes. Historically, the first Kurdish and Azerbaijani modern political entities were not established in Iraqi Kurdistan or the present-day Republic of Azerbaijan, but within the current borders of Iran, in Mahabad and Tabriz, respectively. This does not even mention the oil-rich semi-autonomous emirate of Arabistan, which was annexed to Iran in 1925 and later renamed Khuzestan.

The most recent nationwide ethnic conflagration took place in 1979, during the revolution that toppled the Pahlavi dynasty. Following the overthrow of Pahlavi rule, Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen engaged in ethnic activism, only to be brutally suppressed by the new regime. Since then, they have been subjected to a multi-layered system of repression that succeeded in quashing many ethnic revolts. However, this does not mean ethnic conflict is gone; rather, it is only festering beneath society. Once Iran’s robust security grip unravels—whether through regime collapse or foreign intervention—it is very likely that the country will witness renewed ethnic conflict, with some even arguing that Iran may descend into civil war. Hence the Saudi-Turkish concern.

For Turkey, this political mayhem poses a direct national security threat, given its own Kurdish problem. Iran has a sizable Kurdish population, estimated at between about 7 million and 15 million people. During both the 12-day Iran–Israel war and the recent protests, Turkey sought to prevent Iranian Kurds from gaining a foothold in Iranian Kurdistan, alerting Tehran to Kurdish movements across the border from Iraq. Beyond the Kurdish issue, any state collapse in Iran could trigger a refugee influx into Turkey, which has already constructed a border wall in apparent anticipation of instability in Iran.

Saudi Arabia has similar concerns about ethnically driven instability in Iran, though to a lesser extent. With its massive economic diversification projects, Saudi Arabia is keen to prevent instability in its neighborhood, particularly along critical oil export routes like the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, Saudi Arabia appears concerned about Iran either descending into chaos or coming under a pro-US regime, which, according to one Saudi analyst, would have ‘many negative consequences.’ As things currently stand, Saudi Arabia appears to prefer a weakened Iranian regime focused on addressing its domestic malaise rather than exporting militias across the region. In this, Saudi Arabia has the support of many regional stakeholders, with Qatar, Oman, Iraq, Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey among the most prominent.

In a sense, these countries—including what might be called the ‘elders of the Middle East’—are more preoccupied with preserving the geopolitical status quo than with driving change. Saudi Arabia signaled this during its standoff with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Yemen, and to a lesser extent in Sudan, by presenting itself as the leader of an alliance opposed to secession, fragmentation, and political upheaval.

Depending on how the situation in Iran evolves, the alliance of the ‘elders’ may soon be challenged by an emerging bloc of younger Middle Eastern states—comprising the UAE, Israel, and the Republic of Azerbaijan—smaller states that share a convergence of strategic interests in Iran and beyond.

So far, the US president’s decision to dial down threats of military action against Iran has contributed to preserving the status quo in the Middle East, especially after the Islamic Republic violently quelled protests. However, a significant military strike against Iran could open the door to profound geopolitical shifts across the region.

*This article was originally published on January 21, 2026.