At the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue, Washington and Beijing presented starkly competing visions for the Indo-Pacific’s future. One was centered on forward deterrence and alliance networks, the other on resisting what Beijing portrays as a containment strategy. Yet the most consequential question was not asked on the conference stage.

Across Southeast Asia, a deeper unease has taken hold: after two decades of wars, sanctions, regime-change interventions, and strategic distractions stretching from Libya and Afghanistan to the escalating confrontation with Iran, can any regional order remain stable when its principal guarantor repeatedly generates instability elsewhere?

The most significant strategic shift in the Indo-Pacific is therefore not China’s rise, but Southeast Asia’s shifting judgment of the United States. For decades, US power was regarded as the indispensable ballast of the international order. The US Navy secured the sea lanes that carried Asia’s prosperity, the dollar underpinned global commerce, and Washington’s alliance system provided the strategic confidence that enabled the region’s economic transformation.

Yet from Jakarta to Hanoi, Kuala Lumpur to Singapore, a more searching question now shadows official diplomacy: if US power can still deter adversaries, can it still be trusted to deliver the stability upon which trading nations depend?

From Stability to Strategic Risk

The answer matters profoundly for Southeast Asia because geography has made the region one of the world’s greatest beneficiaries of stability. ASEAN’s collective economy exceeds US$3.8 trillion and serves as a critical hub of global manufacturing and maritime commerce. Around one-third of global trade passes through Southeast Asian waters. Prosperity depends not on ideological contests but on uninterrupted flows of goods, energy, capital and technology.

From that perspective, every US intervention in the Middle East carries consequences far beyond the region itself.

The lessons have been harsh. Libya’s collapse after the 2011 NATO intervention created a prolonged vacuum that continues to destabilize North Africa. Afghanistan ended not with democratic consolidation but with a dramatic US withdrawal in 2021, raising difficult questions about long-term commitment and strategic patience. More recently, the Iran war has exposed the fragility of global energy and shipping networks.

For Southeast Asia, these events are not distant headlines. They are economic shocks. The Strait of Hormuz handles roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption. Any disruption reverberates immediately through Asian supply chains. Energy-importing economies such as Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines remain acutely vulnerable to price spikes. The Red Sea crisis has already demonstrated how quickly shipping costs can surge when strategic waterways become contested.

Viewed from ASEAN capitals, the concern is not merely whether Washington can win conflicts. It is whether repeated cycles of escalation generate systemic risks that ultimately undermine the stability upon which trading nations depend.

This helps explain a reality often misunderstood in Western strategic debates. Southeast Asia is not moving towards China. It is moving away from dependence.

Strategic Autonomy as Southeast Asia’s New Compass

The latest ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute surveys reveal a region increasingly unwilling to choose sides between Washington and Beijing. While concerns about Chinese coercion remain significant, confidence in the United States as a consistently reliable strategic actor has also weakened. The result is neither alignment nor non-alignment. It is strategic autonomy.

That phrase has become the defining doctrine of contemporary Southeast Asian statecraft. Strategic autonomy does not mean neutrality. Nor does it imply indifference to Chinese behavior in the South China Sea. Rather, it reflects a conviction that no external power should be allowed to determine the region’s future.

The logic is straightforward. China is ASEAN’s largest trading partner, with two-way trade surpassing US$900 billion annually. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest trade agreement, further deepens this integration. Chinese investment continues to reshape infrastructure, digital connectivity, and industrial development throughout the region.

At the same time, few Southeast Asian states want Chinese regional dominance. Maritime disputes remain unresolved. Concerns about economic coercion persist. Beijing’s expanding military capabilities generate unease across the region.

Yet China’s rise is not a future possibility. It is a present reality. The PLA Navy is now the world’s largest by number of vessels. Chinese shipyards produce commercial and military vessels at a pace unmatched by Western competitors. Beijing’s economic gravity touches virtually every ASEAN economy.

Against this backdrop, many Southeast Asian leaders increasingly see a mismatch between China’s immediate presence and America’s future promises. AUKUS illustrates the dilemma. From Canberra, Washington and London, AUKUS represents a transformational long-term investment in deterrence. From parts of Southeast Asia, however, it can appear as a strategic project whose most significant capabilities may not materialize until the 2030s and 2040s.

China’s naval expansion is happening today. AUKUS remains largely a promise about tomorrow. That does not make AUKUS irrelevant. Beijing’s intense diplomatic opposition demonstrates that Chinese leaders regard it as a serious long-term challenge. But it does reinforce a broader regional concern: can Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy keep pace with the speed of strategic change?

The question becomes even sharper whenever Middle Eastern crises pull Washington’s attention elsewhere.

Successive US administrations have declared Asia their priority theatre. Yet regional observers have repeatedly watched resources, political capital, and military bandwidth diverted by events in the Middle East. The pattern has fostered skepticism about whether the United States can simultaneously manage multiple theatres without strategic overstretch.

Think tanks from the Lowy Institute and Brookings Institution to CSIS and the International Institute for Strategic Studies have all highlighted a central challenge confronting Washington: credibility in Asia increasingly depends not on declarations of commitment but on the ability to demonstrate sustained focus despite competing global crises.

A Region Reshaping Its Own Security Future

For ASEAN, this credibility gap is producing a profound strategic adjustment. Defense spending across Southeast Asia is rising. Security partnerships are diversifying. Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, the European Union and Gulf states are becoming increasingly important strategic partners. Local currency settlement mechanisms are expanding. Regional states are strengthening indigenous capabilities while avoiding exclusive dependence on any single external actor.

The emerging order is not bipolar. It is multipolar, transactional and fluid. Washington remains indispensable. No other power can replicate the United States’ alliance network, technological advantages, military reach or capacity to balance China. Yet indispensability no longer translates automatically into trust.

That is the central message emanating from Southeast Asia. American power remains welcome. American military presence remains valuable. American engagement remains essential. What has changed is the assumption that US leadership is inherently stabilizing.

The message for the United States is clear. In the new Indo-Pacific, dominance can no longer be assumed simply because it existed before. Influence must be earned through consistency, discipline and the ability to provide stability without exporting instability.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com