The idea of Donald Trump’s “peace plan” first emerged in October 2025 before being bounced around various intermediaries ranging from Kirill Dmitriev to Marco Rubio and the Geneva group, encountering delays, vagueness, and reversals at almost every step. This background is crucial for analyzing Russia’s goals and methods in exploiting the peace process, because it appears that Russia is deliberately dragging out the negotiations and putting forward conditions unacceptable to Ukraine and its European allies. As the peace process grinds to a halt, Moscow will attempt to seize as much Ukrainian territory as possible. Drawing from this glacial process, and using falsifications described in a previous article, Putin will try to show Trump that he controls the initiative on the front, thereby pressuring him to preserve the points he considers essential: gaining the still-unoccupied part of Donbas with excessive losses, annexing all of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, and blocking Ukraine’s accession to NATO. On the so-called “limitation” of Ukraine’s Armed Forces to 800,000 troops (though on February 24, 2022, the number was about 250,000), Putin, maneuvering as if “ready for agreement,” for now pretends to accept.
In December 2025 this logic manifested in Berlin (December 14–16), where negotiations took place with Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff. Ukrainian negotiator, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) Rustem Umerov declared: “We achieved real progress,” while Volodymyr Zelensky called the project “very workable.” The US side stressed that “90% of issues are already resolved,” including a draft of security guarantees for Ukraine.
Ultimatums as Propaganda
Yet when all points of the “peace plan” are agreed by the parties, Putin may, in his characteristic manner, suddenly invent some categorically unacceptable clause for Ukraine in the ceasefire agreement. He already repeats at every opportunity the demand for Ukraine’s full renunciation of territories occupied by Russia, fixed in a separate treaty, or tightening requirements on the language issue. Thus, on December 4, 2025, Putin publicly declared: “Either we liberate these territories by force, or Ukrainian troops must leave them.” He emphasized that Russia will not abandon claims to all of Donbas and is ready “to take it by force” if Kyiv does not agree to concessions. These statements confirm that for Putin there are no concessions that are truly off the table.
An additional element of this propaganda line is Putin’s new false claim that Ukraine attacked his residence in Valdai. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, presidential aide Yuri Ushakov, and state media immediately amplified this narrative, presenting it as “evidence of Kyiv’s aggression” and as yet another justification for increasing pressure on Ukraine during the negotiation process. Moreover, Putin reportedly invoked the same episode in his conversation with Donald Trump, complaining about “Ukrainian provocations” and attempting to create the impression that “firm measures” were required. President Trump later repeated this false narrative to the press, reinforcing precisely the informational effect the Kremlin sought to achieve. The fabrication fits seamlessly into the Kremlin’s strategy of creating artificial pretexts for escalation and shaping the perception among the Russian public that “retaliatory steps” are unavoidable.
On December 17, speaking at a Security Council meeting in Moscow, Putin issued an ultimatum: Ukraine must withdraw troops from Donbas. Zelensky immediately rejected the demand, stressing that territorial concessions are impossible. That same day Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated in Brussels: “Either money today, or blood tomorrow,” urging the EU to use frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine.
Events may then unfold according to the following scenario. When Ukraine categorically refuses to sign an agreement unacceptable to it — whether on a temporary truce or a full end to the war — Putin will address Russians and declare that he did everything to end the war peacefully, through negotiations, consultations, and agreements, but that “the Kyiv regime and its overseas and European masters” do not want peace, seeking instead to exhaust Russia, seize its resources, destroy its statehood, divide its peoples. Russian propaganda, catching the narrative of coming events, already in December 2025 actively began using Trump’s involvement and his intermediaries as an argument to influence Russian minds: federal channels claim that “America finally understood that Ukraine must concede,” that “Trump brings back common sense,” and that “the West is tired of war and ready to pressure Kyiv.” These narratives fit neatly into the Kremlin’s strategy of presenting negotiations as Kremlin “peacefulness,” and Ukraine’s refusal as justification for continued occupation — or, as Putin and propaganda call it, “liberation” of “primordially Russian lands.”
Mobilization At All Costs
And then, at the end of his “fateful speech,” Putin will announce mobilization, which, in his words, “will become the foundation and prerequisite for the final defeat of the fascist Kyiv regime, bringing Russia long-awaited peace and prosperity for centuries.” The first fact validating my assumption was Putin’s signing on December 9, 2025 of the “decree on calling citizens in reserve to military training in 2026.” The document explicitly states: “Call citizens of the Russian Federation in reserve to military training in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the National Guard troops, rescue military formations of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, state security agencies, and the Federal Security Service.” The Kremlin presented this call-up as a “planned measure,” but in reality it became preparation for a new, still hidden wave of mobilization, which Putin fears to name openly, anticipating public outrage.
This trend is further confirmed by the report published on 30 December 2025 that Putin had ordered reservists to be deployed to guard critical infrastructure across Russia. Officially framed as a “security enhancement,” this move in reality reflects a redistribution of limited manpower and the preparation of state infrastructure for a large-scale mobilization campaign. Notably, the task is being assigned to unqualified reservists, which indicates not only a shortage of personnel but also that the high-tech security systems previously responsible for protecting these facilities have been effectively exhausted. The Kremlin is now drawing on its reserve not only for the front but also for internal protection, signaling growing fears of domestic instability and a shortage of personnel even in rear-area roles.
From Putin’s side, this looks like desperation. Those willing to die for unheard-of sums of money have already perished in the groves and steppes of Donbas. Initially, Russian authorities offered volunteers and contract soldiers relatively small one-time payments — about 195,000 rubles (approx. 2,260 USD) — but later, as the number of willing men dried up, by Putin’s decree in July 2024 the sums sharply rose to 400,000 rubles (4,600 USD), and in some regions (for example, Moscow) bonuses reached 1.9 million rubles (21,000 USD). Now one-time payments have collapsed due to Russia’s economic crisis. For example, in Bashkortostan in December 2025 the signing bonus was cut from 1 million rubles (12,987 USD) to 500,000 rubles (6,493 USD). The additional municipal supplement in Ufa shrank from 600,000 rubles (7,792 USD) to 100,000 rubles (1,298 USD). As a result, a new contract soldier receives about 900,000 rubles (11,700 USD) instead of the previous 1.6 million rubles (20,800 USD). Salaries for mercenaries are also paid incompletely and late. In December 2025, salaries of Russian contract soldiers and “volunteers” at war in Ukraine range from 200,000 to 300,000 rubles per month (2,600–3,900 USD), and in some regions and for assault units promises reach 500,000 rubles (6,500 USD). This is several times higher than the average Russian salary, which remains below 1,000 USD. Most of these wages are skimmed off by commanders for their own pockets, for unit needs, for buying uniforms that wear out quickly, for protective gear, medicines, and food, including water. Regarding payments to the families of the deceased soldiers, Khakassia and Yakutia stopped payments on November 20, 2025. The reason is a lack of funds in these regions’ budgets.
And against this backdrop of economic, demographic, and motivational collapse, Putin, realizing that war is the only way to keep absolute power in his hands, will inevitably move toward mobilization — not partial, as in 2022 when about 300,000 reservists were called up (though exact figures are classified), but full. Failure to achieve even one of the war aims Putin declared on February 24, 2022 threatens a loss of authority among the ruling elite, collapse of his image as “great strategist and geopolitician,” disillusionment of the population, and unrest over the sacrifices already made in this senseless, unprovoked war — the bloodiest since World War II.
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