Despite the spat among the new members, India managed to obtain an agreement on several institutional and economic issues, along with broadly shared language on multi polarity and Global South concerns. The “New Delhi Chair’s Statement” consolidated areas where consensus remained possible, notably de-escalation in West Asia, opposition to unilateral sanctions, reform of the UN system, climate finance, Global South development, and institutional management of BRICS expansion.
But what the statement did not say is equally significant. The text avoided anti-West bloc discourse, military alignment language, explicit condemnation of Israel or the US, endorsement of Iran’s military position or aggressive de-dollarization rhetoric. The omissions reflect India’s strategic priorities, which are to maintain BRICS unity, avoid ideological polarization, and maintain a focus on development and economic resilience.
BRICS Contradictions Come to Surface
Few if anyone expected a unified position on the Iran war, but the New Delhi meeting hints at growing internal contradictions within an expanded BRICS format. Even prior to the expansion, BRICS nations represented very divergent goals and positions. China viewed BRICS as a vehicle to promote multi-polarity, reduce dependence on Western-dominated institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, and complement broader initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia increasingly viewed BRICS as a hedge against Western isolation and pushed against sanctions, which gave the bloc a geopolitical tone. India on the other hand does not want BRICS to become openly anti-Western under Chinese or Russian influence, instead viewing the forum as a platform for multi-polar diplomacy.
With the expansion of BRICS to include Iran, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Egypt and Indonesia alongside the original members, the grouping has become far more heterogeneous, making unanimity increasingly difficult on thorny geopolitical questions. The Iran war exposed these internal contradictions starkly. Tehran sought stronger political backing and a more assertive BRICS role in regional security, while Russia and China remained broadly aligned with Iran’s criticism of Western pressure. India, however, had to balance its ties with Iran against its expanding strategic partnerships with the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Meanwhile, Gulf states within the expanded BRICS framework bring their own rivalries and security compulsions.
Has BRICS Failed?
The absence of a joint statement by BRICS is politically significant. Critics are openly questioning the bloc’s ability to act collectively and become a coherent geopolitical pole.
Yet a determination on whether BRICS has failed or not depends on what benchmark is used or how one expects BRICS to be. BRICS was never designed as a NATO-style geopolitical alliance with collective security obligations or a unified foreign policy. It is better understood as a flexible coalition of major non-Western powers and emerging economies that cooperate selectively where interests overlap, like finance, trade, reform of global institutions, technology, development financing, local currency trade, and multi polarity. That structure gives BRICS breadth, but also limits coherence. In that context, the absence of a strong unified statement was less a diplomatic failure of BRICS than a demonstration of the inherent limits of a highly diverse grouping.
Historically, BRICS has actually been more successful when focused on development finance, institutional reform, Global South representation, alternative payment mechanisms, trade coordination, etc. Examples like the New Development Bank, local currency trade initiatives, pressure for UN reform and IMF quota reform, represent easier consensus areas than live wars involving member states’ allies and rivals.
Is Expansion Working against BRICS ?
As things stand today, the expanded BRICS now includes states with overlapping regional conflicts and disparate security alignments. For example, Iran vs UAE, China vs India, Ethiopia vs Egypt over the Nile issue, etc. India has ties with Israel and Iran, Russia is engaged in open confrontation with the West, while Brazil and South Africa prefer moderation. Some want an overtly anti-Western bloc, others are uncomfortable with the idea. Under these circumstances, it remains unclear how the grouping will prevent bilateral disputes from hijacking its collective agenda going forward.
It’s clear that expansion can add to the BRICS geopolitical weight while simultaneously reducing its capacity for consensus and ideological coherence. If expansion leads to more frequent deadlock, vague statements, or a total inability to respond coherently to crises, BRICS risks appearing symbolically large but strategically ineffective. This is what Foreign Minister Jaishankar was alluding to when he said that future expansion of BRICS required careful institutional and political handling. Though India accepts BRICS expansion as a geopolitical reality, it will push for a calibrated integration of new entrants, such that the grouping can remain consensus-driven instead of ideological.
Taken together, the Iran war suggests that BRICS may be evolving into a much looser coordination forum, more a diplomatic signaling mechanism or economic balancing forum than a bloc that acts with one voice on wars and security crises.
