Russia has recently reaffirmed its interest in investing in Myanmar’s Dawei Special Economic Zone (SEZ), located in the southern Tanintharyi Region, despite the challenges posed by the ongoing Myanmar civil war. The project is of strategic interest to Russia as it entails the construction of a deep-sea port capable of accommodating vessels over 200,000 tons – a port that would be able to accommodate some combination of PLA Navy and/or Russian naval vessels should the need arise in the future.

The Dawei SEZ, launched in 2008 in partnership with Thailand, is located on the Andaman Sea. The project aims to connect Southeast Asia with South Asia, creating a transport network that bypasses the Malacca Strait, potentially alleviating Beijing’s ‘Malacca Dilemma.’ Apart from building up infrastructure, Russia has also expressed interest in Tanintharyi’s tourism potential, particularly in the Myeik Archipelago. However, progress on all major foreign-backed SEZ projects, including China’s Kyaukpyu SEZ, remains stalled amid the ongoing conflict.

Naypyidaw’s ‘Forever Friend’

Russia’s engagement with Naypyidaw aligns with a broader strategy of strengthening ties with Myanmar’s military regime, which views Moscow as a key ally and primary arms supplier. Yet the relationship remains somewhat stunted by skepticism on the part of the Kremlin over the junta’s ability to suppress pro-democracy forces, stabilize the country, and ultimately make good on the investment projects under discussion. Since the 2021 coup, Myanmar and Russia have been deepening their relationship, with Moscow at various times providing arms, military aircraft, ammunition, and fuel.

Looking beyond defense, Russia has also deliberated over deepening its involvement in Myanmar’s energy sector, including infrastructure projects such as gas pipelines and potential nuclear energy development. In October 2023, discussions took place over Russia possibly participating in building a gas pipeline to Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city. Additionally, plans for a nuclear research reactor have been on the agenda.

The Russian navy has conducted joint training exercises with junta forces, reinforcing the growing military and diplomatic ties between the two countries. As Russia’s arms sales in Southeast Asia decline, Myanmar has become an increasingly important client. High-level exchanges have strengthened this relationship, with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing prioritizing Moscow as his key foreign partner. Since the 2021 coup, the general has made three out of four of his overseas trips to Russia, meeting Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and other top officials; in September 2022, he met with President Vladimir Putin.

Russia, as the only major power apart from China openly engaging with the junta, has helped legitimize its rule, and has expressed support for its planned elections. In return, Myanmar remains the only ASEAN member to back Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Myanmar-Russia ties hold symbolic significance, particularly as Myanmar’s relations with Beijing have weakened since the 2021 coup. Tensions escalated further after various ethnic armed organizations launched a major offensive in northern Shan State in October 2023, disrupting trade routes to China. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s failure to implement the ASEAN-brokered Five-Point Consensus, which called for a ceasefire, dialogue, and humanitarian aid, has strained its ties with ASEAN.

Despite having met President Vladimir Putin only once, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly praised him and positioned Moscow as Myanmar’s “forever friend,” ranking it above China and India. Beyond diplomatic ties, the junta is seeking economic cooperation through its engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, particularly in energy investments and financial support from the BRICS New Development Bank.

Economic and Tourism Initiatives

Economic ties between Myanmar and Russia have been bolstered through various agreements and initiatives, though tangible progress remains limited amid the civil war. In August 2023, Myanmar Airways International launched direct flights to Novosibirsk, improving connectivity and tourism. Both countries have also discussed implementing a mutual visa-free regime. Russia’s Mir payment system has also been rolled out in Myanmar, a precursor for Russian tourists – now locked out of SWIFT – to holiday in the country in greater numbers.

In April 2024, Myanmar and the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) held their first joint working group meeting in Naypyitaw, focusing on a memorandum of understanding signed at the 26th International Economic Forum in Saint Petersburg in June 2023. While such high-level meetings signal Myanmar’s growing engagement with the EEC, they largely consist of discussions, MOUs, and future plans at this point, with little concrete progress in implementation.

The ongoing civil war has severely disrupted Myanmar’s energy sector, causing shortages that are reshaping its foreign alliances. Key gas fields, such as Yadana, are nearing depletion, leading to a decline in domestic production, while conflict has stalled critical energy projects and trade routes. The Sino-Myanmar pipelines, essential for transporting oil and gas to China, have been compromised due to security concerns, disrupting exports and reducing revenues.

In recent weeks, the Arakan Army (AA) has made significant territorial gains in Rakhine State, further complicating China’s investments. The AA now controls a number of key areas, including Gwa Township, Maungdaw, and Taungup, securing a 270-kilometer stretch along Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh. These advances place the Kyaukpyu deep-sea port, a crucial part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), under AA influence, threatening China’s strategic energy route that bypasses the Malacca Strait. With the AA now holding sway over critical infrastructure, China’s projects face growing uncertainties, further destabilizing its economic foothold in Myanmar.

The Russia-China-Myanmar Triangle

As rebel forces expand their territory, conventional trade routes are breaking down, diminishing China’s influence and investment appetite. This in turn creates an opening for Russia to expand its role. And unlike China, which remains cautious amid Myanmar’s deteriorating security situation, Russia has been a consistent supporter of the junta, providing arms, fuel, and political backing throughout the conflict.

Energy support could become the key factor cementing the junta’s relationship with Russia, especially as Chinese investment declines. Such a shift would position Russia as Myanmar’s most significant backer in both energy and defense, further reinforcing the junta’s reliance on Moscow over Beijing.

Analyzing the future outcome of the Myanmar war and support levels from Russia and China is further complicated by the presidency of Donald Trump, who may intensify sanctions and restrictions on both countries. If China’s support for Russia weakens due to Xi Jinping’s fear of secondary sanctions, Russia may struggle economically to continue backing Myanmar’s junta. Meanwhile, pro-democracy forces are making significant territorial gains, with strategic buildups around Mandalay and Yangon, and powerful ethnic armed organizations pushing toward Naypyidaw. If these forces advance further, the junta’s capital could soon rely solely on air-based resupply. The rebels will also gain the option of cutting off the capital’s water access, as rivers increasingly fall in rebel-controlled areas. Such a scenario would leave China as the junta’s primary, uncontested ally.

On the other hand, with or without Russia’s help, the junta could well collapse in 2025, in which case China would be the most likely country to engage economically with whatever new form of federal democracy emerges after the war. Beijing has always played the long game, and from China’s perspective, there is little need to outbid Russia for the junta’s friendship when the regime appears destined to fall. Rather, China could position itself as an indispensable post-war partner, investing in the infrastructure and reconstruction projects necessary to rebuild — essentially allowing Beijing to maintain its influence regardless of who is in power.