EU governments are racing to develop drone warfare capabilities with the help of Ukraine. These efforts will help boost European strategic autonomy in the short term, but from a deterrence standpoint, drones are only half the answer.

Amid new threats and wavering US support, European states are pouring unprecedented political will and financing into closing capability gaps. None is as pressing as a deep-strike capability, which, despite concerted efforts across European institutions, is still not expected to come online for years if not a decade.

The involvement of Canadian defense firms in EU’s SAFE instrument could serve as a genuine bridge between two defense industrial bases that have historically operated in separate ecosystems. But the path to Brussels is paved with grand plans that never came to fruition.

EU states have maneuvered to minimize the fallout from a war they were not consulted on. Yet two weeks on, they’re being pulled into it anyways.

Strategic autonomy in defense cannot exist without autonomy in semiconductors. Europe has begun to recognize this link. The question now is whether Brussels will act with the scale and urgency required to keep pace with global competitors.

First comes greater confidence and courage, then comes stability as Europe looks ahead to 2026.

France’s plans for a domestic medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) program might be a source of national pride, but they could also be a point of contention with European partners and there are better alternatives available.

In committing to a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, France as one state is doing what collective EU frameworks have struggled to achieve. But there will be long-lasting strategic consequences.

For twelve days in June 2025, Israel and Iran traded attacks as the world held its breath and watched, wondering how this geopolitical game of chicken was going to end. What can Europe’s military planners learn from the conflict?

The political forces that thwarted the European Defense Community - a previous attempt at a common EU army and defense policy - still exist today, looming large over Brussels' attempts to establish an autonomous strategic posture and escape from Washington’s shadow.

The EU’s path to true strategic autonomy runs through the very thing the bloc has always lacked: political will.

While the ambition behind the ReArm Europe strategy is commendable, its success hinges on overcoming entrenched political, institutional, and industrial inertia on the continent.

Challenges like interoperability and historic under-investment continue to plague the European defense industry. But in the current geopolitical moment, there may be enough political will to overcome them.

Amid the recent history of grand if empty pronouncements of impending European strategic autonomy, Poland actually delivers. Berlin, Paris, and London: take note.

President Trump’s geopolitical pivot from Europe will boost previous efforts by Brussels to enact a more autonomous European defense posture. Yet structural challenges loom large over the process.

Checking in on the progress of Chancellor Scholz’s sweeping modernization of Germany’s armed forces.

The United Kingdom often scuttled attempts at greater EU integration on security matters, but the prospect of an EU Army will remain daunting after Brexit.

There’s a much more cost-effective option than pursuing an EU army: boosting defense budgets under the auspices of NATO.

The US, Russia, and China may be the world’s largest arms exporters, but other states are now coming around on the economic perks of a military industrial complex.

The Munich Security Conference was supposed to underscore the ties that bind the transatlantic alliance. Instead, it emphasized what’s pulling it apart.