A growing number of articles and policy discussions have described Germany and Japan as ‘rearming’ eighty years after the Second World War. Recent examples have appeared in outlets ranging from The New York Times to defense and international affairs publications across Europe, North America, and Asia. The term retains a considerable degree of validity. Both countries are increasing defense spending, modernizing their armed forces, and adopting security policies that would have been politically difficult to implement a decade ago. However, the term is often employed in ways that encourage historical comparisons which may not fully capture the strategic realities of the 2020s.

The historical associations attached to the concept of rearmament are difficult to separate from contemporary discussions. The term carries historical associations with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan’s rearmament and military expansion in the years preceding the Second World War. As a result, contemporary defense developments are sometimes interpreted as a departure from decades of restraint and a return to more assertive forms of nationalism. While such comparisons may offer a familiar historical frame of reference, they can also obscure important differences between past and present circumstances.

A salient distinction emerges from Germany and Japan’s general characterization as status quo powers, whose policies have largely been oriented toward working within the existing international order. Both are stable democracies that are deeply integrated into alliance networks, international institutions, and global markets. Their defense policies remain constrained by domestic legal and political frameworks: Germany’s Bundeswehr operates under the ‘parliamentary army’ (Parlamentsarmee) principle, which places military deployments under Bundestag oversight, while Japan’s defense posture is shaped by Article 9 of the Constitution and the principle of civilian control over the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). In both cases, defense policy is also subject to public scrutiny and embedded within extensive cooperation with allies. Although debate continues over the appropriate scale and scope of military expenditure, contemporary German and Japanese security policies differ fundamentally from the expansionist strategic objectives that characterized the 1930s.

A related strand of contemporary policy discussion places emphasis on Germany’s role as a central security actor within Europe and a key partner of the United Kingdom (UK) and other European states. Arguments for increased German defense capabilities are not solely grounded in national threat perceptions, but also in the broader requirements of European collective defense and burden-sharing within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). From this standpoint, Germany’s economic weight and central geographical position generate expectations that it should play a more substantial role in European security, especially as transatlantic dynamics evolve and European states face growing pressure to assume greater responsibility for deterrence.

The Contemporary Threat Environment

Understanding contemporary defense policy in Germany and Japan requires attention to the markedly different, yet increasingly challenging, security environments confronting each country. While discussions of rearmament often focus on historical analogies, the strategic circumstances shaping defense policy today are primarily driven by contemporary threat perceptions.

Germany’s Changing Security Posture

Germany’s evolving defense posture represents a broader shift in perceptions of European security, shaped by what the Radban Security & Defence Institute (RSDI) describes as ‘a harsher strategic reality.’ For much of the post-Cold War period, European governments largely operated under the belief that the risk of large-scale interstate conflict on the continent had significantly diminished, shaping a ‘peace dividend’ era characterized by reduced defense priorities. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine challenged many of the assumptions that had underpinned European security policy and renewed attention to conventional military deterrence.

Germany’s decision to expand defense spending—with expenditure projected to increase from €82.7 billion in 2026 to €105.8 billion in 2027—may therefore be interpreted not simply as a process of militarization, but as a response to a changing European security environment. This context is particularly important given Germany’s relatively low starting point. For many years, successive German governments faced criticism from NATO partners for failing to meet alliance spending targets and for shortcomings in military readiness. Consequently, recent defense initiatives may be viewed in part as efforts to restore capabilities that many allies had long argued were necessary for Germany’s alliance commitments.

Japan and the Indo-Pacific Security Environment

Japan’s trajectory follows a similar logic, although it is shaped by a distinct regional security environment. The country faces a strategic landscape increasingly shaped by China’s military modernization and growing assertiveness in the East China Sea, North Korea’s advancing missile and nuclear capabilities, and rising uncertainty surrounding a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait. These regional developments have contributed to a reassessment of Japan’s security requirements and encouraged a more proactive approach to defense policy.

Viewing Japan’s response solely through the lens of rearmament risks underestimating the extent to which its defense policy remains influenced by longstanding legal, constitutional, and political constraints. Public opinion continues to reflect caution regarding the use of military power, while successive governments have generally framed new capabilities in terms of deterrence and self-defense. Even measures that would once have been politically contentious, such as the acquisition of longer-range strike capabilities, are typically justified as responses to specific regional security challenges rather than as manifestations of broader military ambitions.

Rearmament, Remilitarization, or Strategic Normalization?

The terminology used to describe these developments warrants closer examination. While rearmament generally refers to the expansion or modernization of military capabilities, remilitarization carries broader implications. It suggests an increasing role for military institutions within political life, society, and national identity. Although Germany and Japan are expanding defense capabilities, evidence of a wider societal or political remilitarization remains limited. Civilian control of the military, constitutional constraints, and public caution regarding the use of force continue to shape policy in both countries.

Moreover, contemporary developments reflect a broader reassessment of defense priorities rather than a straightforward transition from demilitarization to militarization. Germany has maintained substantial armed forces within NATO since the Cold War and has participated in a range of international military operations. Similarly, Japan’s SDF have long ranked among the world’s most technologically advanced and capable military organizations, despite constitutional restrictions on their use. Current defense reforms therefore represent an expansion and adaptation of existing capabilities rather than the creation of military institutions where none previously existed.

These developments have generated debate over how best to characterize the evolution of German and Japanese defense policy, with interpretations ranging from strategic normalization to concerns over remilitarization. Germany and Japan are gradually assuming defense responsibilities more comparable to those of other advanced industrial democracies. The debate therefore concerns not only the scale of military expansion, but also changing expectations regarding burden-sharing, alliance commitments, and national security responsibilities.

Defense Spending in Comparative Perspective

A comparison of defense expenditure further complicates the narrative that Germany and Japan are uniquely undergoing remilitarization. To ensure cross-country comparability, all figures below are drawn from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database and expressed in constant or current US dollars, with GDP percentages presented on a consistent SIPRI basis.

The comparison suggests that Germany and Japan are not clear outliers within the broader international landscape. Germany’s defense budget is broadly comparable to those of other major European powers and remains significantly below that of the United States. Japan, despite being one of the world’s largest economies, continues to devote a relatively modest proportion of national output to defense when compared with several allies and regional partners. By contrast, countries such as Poland and South Korea allocate a larger share of GDP to defense in response to their own security concerns.

The Broader International Security Context

The defense spending figures also point to a broader trend that is sometimes overlooked in discussions focused narrowly on Germany and Japan. Across much of the democratic world, policymakers have increasingly concluded that the relatively benign security environment that followed the Cold War has become less certain. Governments are therefore directing greater resources towards defense in response to what they perceive as a more challenging strategic environment.

Several developments have contributed to this reassessment, including the return of major interstate conflict in Europe, intensifying strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, persistent concerns regarding nuclear proliferation, cyber threats, vulnerabilities affecting critical infrastructure, and growing uncertainty surrounding global supply chains. Collectively, these developments have reinforced perceptions that the international security environment has become less predictable and potentially more dangerous than many policymakers assumed during the immediate post-Cold War era.

Consequently, increased military expenditure is no longer confined to a small number of states. NATO members across Europe have raised defense budgets, while countries such as Poland, Finland, Sweden, Australia, and South Korea have accelerated procurement programs and expanded military capabilities. Even governments that continue to prioritize diplomacy and multilateral cooperation increasingly argue that credible deterrence requires stronger defense capabilities.

The relevant analytical question is not simply whether these countries are rearming, but whether their responses are proportionate to the strategic conditions they face.

From a realist perspective in International Relations (IR) theory, these developments may be understood as a predictable response to changes in the external security environment. States operating in an anarchic international system are generally expected to prioritize survival by maintaining sufficient military capabilities to deter potential threats. When the perceived balance of power shifts or when credible threats emerge, states tend to adjust their defense postures accordingly.

One interpretation is that increased military spending in Germany and Japan reflects not an exceptional departure from established behavior, but a response to heightened uncertainty within the international system. While realist explanations provide a useful account of the relationship between external threats and military adaptation, domestic political institutions, historical memory, and alliance commitments also help shape the form that these responses take.

The Alliance Dimension

The role of alliance structures is particularly significant in understanding contemporary defense developments. Germany and Japan are not pursuing military expansion in isolation; rather, their policies are being implemented within security frameworks that are closely integrated with allies, most notably the United States.

In Germany’s case, increased defense spending has been encouraged for many years by NATO partners seeking greater European burden-sharing within the alliance. Similarly, many of Japan’s defense reforms have been welcomed by Washington as part of a broader effort to strengthen deterrence and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. This context distinguishes contemporary developments from the military expansions associated with the interwar period, which were often pursued in opposition to existing security arrangements and international institutions.

The alliance dimension also highlights the extent to which contemporary defense reforms are linked to collective security obligations. Rather than seeking strategic autonomy through unilateral military expansion, both Germany and Japan are strengthening capabilities that are intended to operate within established alliance structures and multinational security frameworks.

Domestic Political Debate and Strategic Trade-Offs

Domestic opinion remains divided in both countries. Supporters of increased defense spending argue that changing strategic conditions require stronger deterrence capabilities and more resilient defense institutions. Critics, however, question the fiscal costs of military expansion, the potential impact on social spending priorities, and the risk that increased military capabilities could contribute to regional tensions or arms competition.

These debates illustrate that contemporary defense reforms remain politically contested rather than universally accepted. In both Germany and Japan, defense policy continues to be shaped by electoral politics, public opinion, historical memory, and constitutional considerations. The existence of such debates further underscores the distinction between contemporary democratic decision-making processes and the political environments that characterized earlier periods of militarization.

Germany and Japan in Comparative Context

The wider international context merits particular attention. Germany and Japan are not alone in expanding defense budgets or modernizing military capabilities. Defense spending has increased across much of Europe and Asia in response to perceived changes in the security environment. Focusing exclusively on Germany and Japan can create the impression that a unique or historically exceptional process is underway when, in reality, both countries are participating in a broader trend affecting numerous advanced democracies.

This observation does not imply that concerns regarding increased military expenditure are unfounded. Higher defense budgets inevitably involve trade-offs, as resources allocated to military capabilities cannot be directed towards other policy priorities. Furthermore, military build-ups can contribute to security dilemmas in which states respond to one another’s actions in ways that increase regional tensions. These considerations remain important subjects of policy debate.

However, meaningful analysis requires careful consideration of both causes and context. The central issue is not whether Germany and Japan are increasing military capabilities; they are. Rather, the more significant question concerns the strategic rationale behind these decisions and the extent to which contemporary security conditions justify them.

Conclusion

Contemporary defense developments in Germany and Japan may be understood less as a revival of historical militarism than as part of a broader process of strategic adaptation among democratic states. While the term rearmament accurately describes an increase in military capabilities, it does not in itself explain the political, institutional, and security contexts in which these changes are occurring.

Alternative concepts such as strategic normalization may, in some respects, provide a more precise analytical framework. Germany and Japan are not emerging from a state of military absence, nor are they abandoning the institutional constraints that have shaped their post-war security policies. Rather, they are adjusting existing defense structures in response to changing strategic circumstances.

A fuller assessment therefore requires analysis of contemporary security conditions rather than reliance on historical analogy alone. Understanding developments in Germany and Japan depends not only on recognizing the significance of the past, but also on examining the specific security challenges, alliance commitments, domestic political debates, and deterrence considerations that shape policy decisions in the present. Historical analogies may illuminate aspects of the debate, but they should not substitute for analysis of the strategic realities confronting Germany and Japan today.

Scott N. Romaniuk—Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS); Department of International Relations, Institute of Global Studies, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary.