On March 26, the Trump administration eased restrictions on Belarus-linked banks and potash companies after Alyaksandr Lukashenka released 250 political prisoners following talks with US envoy John Coale in Minsk. The Treasury Department also removed Belaruskali and the Belarusian Potash Company from sanctions restrictions. On the same day, President Donald Trump announced that his administration would roll out measures to support American farmers hurt by the Iran war.
That overlap mattered. The Iran war is disrupting fertilizer flows through the Strait of Hormuz and tightening supplies during the critical planting season, increasing the strategic value of Belarus’s potash sector at exactly the moment Washington was looking for ways to cushion pressure on US agriculture. Potash is especially important because potassium has no substitute as an essential plant nutrient, and the United States is still 90 percent net import reliant for potash in 2026.
The evidence that follows shows how these developments have expanded Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s room to maneuver in ways that now bear directly on US national interests, especially food security and sanctions policy.
Belarus Rebuilt Leverage Even Before Washington Changed Course
The March 26 decision to ease US sanctions had practical significance because it targeted a potash sector that was already operating near pre-2022 levels. US Geological Survey data shows that Belarus’s potash production in 2024 had almost returned to where it stood before sanctions were imposed following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Belarus, in other words, did not need to rebuild its potash industry. It needed easier terms for a sector that had already regained much of its capacity.
US Geological Survey data also demonstrates how far that recovery has gone. Belarusian mine production rose from 4.5 million metric tons in 2023 to 7.0 million in 2024, while global production rose from 43.3 million to 48.0 million. In other words, Belarus accounted for more than half of the worldwide increase in potash output that year. Its share of global production rose from about one-tenth to roughly one-seventh, restoring Belarus as one of the world’s largest producers.
The logistics picture reinforces this point. After losing access to Lithuania’s port of Klaipėda, Belarus kept exporting through several Russian ports and by rail, primarily to China. That gave Minsk a functioning system for moving product, even under sanctions. A country that controls a large share of global supply, can still get that supply to market, and sells a nutrient agriculture cannot replace is positioned to regain political relevance when fertilizer becomes a strategic concern.
The Iran War Raised the Value of Belarus’s Potash
The Iran war raised the value of Belarus’s potash by turning fertilizer into an immediate policy problem. The Food and Agriculture Organization says the Strait of Hormuz accounts for up to 30 percent of internationally traded fertilizers and that tanker traffic through the Strait fell by more than 90 percent within days of the escalation. The conflict came during planting season, fueling fears among farmers that they might not be able to obtain fertilizer at any price.
That shift increased Belarus’s importance. In a tighter fertilizer market, governments have more reason to pay attention to any major supplier of essential crop nutrients, including one they had previously tried to isolate. For Belarus, the result was a rise in the strategic value of its potash exports.
Moreover, the Iran war increased the value of the Washington’s transactional opening to Belarus that was already underway. The United States had already traded limited sanctions relief for prisoner releases in 2025, including the December potash deal tied to the release of 123 prisoners. By March 2026, however, fertilizer disruption had made Belarus’s potash sector more economically useful and politically easier to engage.
Lukashenka Benefits from a Widening Western Split
Washington and Brussels are now pursuing different objectives in Belarus. The United States has shown that it is willing to use limited sanctions relief to secure specific concessions from the Belarusian regime. That approach is selective and transactional. The European Union is working from a broader framework. Its sanctions on Belarus respond to human rights abuses, Belarus’ support for Russia’s war against Ukraine, and Belarus’s hybrid attacks against the European Union. These EU measures have been extended until February 28, 2027, and currently cover 310 individuals and 46 entities.
The split benefits Lukashenka by lowering the price of partial concessions. The United States is willing to reward narrow steps such as prisoner releases, while the EU still measures Belarus against much broader benchmarks tied to repression, the Ukraine war, and hybrid attacks. That allows the Belarusian authorities to extract targeted gains from the United States without meeting the larger political conditions Europe continues to insist on.
Human-rights groups are warning against reading recent prisoner releases as evidence of real change. Amnesty International said the release of 250 political prisoners “must not be mistaken for justice,” while UN experts have warned that Belarus has paired some releases with forced expulsion abroad. Those warnings matter because they clarify what is at stake in the policy split. Washington is testing whether limited engagement can produce useful outcomes. Europe and human-rights groups are emphasizing that the regime’s underlying structure remains intact. That divergence gives Lukashenka more room to maneuver between tactical bargaining on one side and long-term pressure on the other.
