The concept of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) did not emerge in a vacuum. The four democracies in the Indo-Pacific—India, United States, Australia, and Japan—were brought together during the 2004 Sumatra-Andaman Earthquake that devastated some of the counties in the region. Though the Quad did not come into being until 2007, the humanitarian relief efforts during the 2004 disaster demonstrated the impeccable coordination capacity of the partner-states. Nonetheless, forming in 2007, the dialogue fell apart shortly after due to several reasons including domestic developments in Australia and Japan. It was not until 2017 when the four democracies revived Quad 2.0, this time encouraged primarily by the United States. Despite these promising developments, doubts over the long-term sustainability of the dialogue persist. In fact, the participating states harbor major differences when it comes to addressing China’s rise as well as preserving the rule-based order in the region. This is particularly a problem with India and Australia.
Background
The security dialogue involving the United States, Japan, India, and Australia traces its roots to the 2004 Sumatra-Andaman Earthquake that left 200,000 dead. In the direct aftermath of the disaster, the four nations mobilized in order to coordinate the humanitarian relief efforts. The group eventually became known as The Tsunami Core Group (TCG). Nonetheless, per participants’ decision, the TCG was disbanded once the humanitarian mission was accomplished.
The idea of Quad 1.0 was brought forward in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Appearing before the members of the Indian Parliament he conveyed his concept of “broader Asia.” While emphasizing the importance of growing strategic partnership between Tokyo and New Delhi he hoped that the bilateral partnership “will evolve into an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United States of America and Australia.” Abe then added: “Open and transparent, this network will allow people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely.” Not coincidentally, in 2007 the Japanese also articulated the diplomatic notion of an “arc of freedom and prosperity,” published in the Diplomatic Bluebook which called for strengthening Tokyo’s security alliance with the United States in the meantime extending the strategic partnership with Australia and India.
After the formation of Quad 1.0, member-states participated in the Malabar Naval Exercise that had traditionally been held between the U.S. and India. This was rather remarkable as it was the first time that the four militaries exercised together.
However, the dialogue was destined to collapse abruptly. Japan’s Abe found itself in domestic turmoil—including corruption scandals—that led to his resignation. Additionally, due to Chinese protests Australia’s then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd withdrew from the dialogue and suspended the sale of uranium to India. In light of these developments the Quad ceased to exist.
Impact
The revival of Quad in 2017 coincided with Trump Administration’s release of National Security Strategy which recognized China and Russia as great power competitors. Moreover, President Trump announced his concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” as further illustrated during the APEC CEO Summit in Vietnam.
The impact of the Quad’s dissolution and revival can be understood as follows. First, the resurrection of this informal partnership signals the shared concern over China’s growing influence in the region and the common desire to enhance regional interoperability. Nonetheless, the Quad’s demise has also demonstrated the looming strategic differences of the dialogue. Among the member-states, Australia and India remain the weakest links that have long struggled to establish an adequate bilateral relationship. This keeps manifesting itself in India’s continuous rejection of Australian participation in Malabar Exercise. For the record, New Delhi granted Japan a permanent membership. Furthermore, Australia and India have mismatching threat perceptions vis-à-vis China. Due to immense dependence on Chinese economic support, the Australians tend to take a softer stance toward Beijing. Moreover, the economic dependence has become so visible that Australia may begin balancing between Washington and Beijing as opposed to fully aligning with the former. For this reason, Australia’s possible Finlandization is an idea that has been gaining traction in recent years.
India on the other hand, has both land and maritime concerns when it comes to confronting China. Periodic military standoffs as well as China’s advancement into the Indian Ocean have alarmed both the policymakers and the military establishment alike. That being said, India remains rather cautious not to antagonize China. For India, the possibility of a two-front war (first being Pakistan) is a tactical nightmare. Hence, New Delhi remains hesitant of becoming a full-fledged member of a bloc that is seen as inherently anti-Chinese. Also, Australia’s abrupt withdrawal in 2008 contributed to India’s skepticism of other members’ commitment. It is true that India will continue pursuing closer relations with Japan and the United States. However, New Delhi also sees itself as a strategically autonomous power free of permanent commitments characteristic to formal partnerships/alliances. Therefore, India engages with all countries it sees fit for its national interests at any given time.
Forecast
The Quad will not turn into a military bloc anytime soon, if ever. Participating nations—most importantly India and Australia—still differ on their respective approaches on dealing with China as well as upholding the regional status quo. Instead, the Quad will continue remaining an unofficial dialogue with member-states consulting some overlapping issues of concern during international or regional forums (e.g. Raisina Annual Dialogue). In short, the Quad still has a long way to go and it is yet unclear whether the four democracies will come up with a coherent approach that’s suitable with their respective regional interests.
