Where predecessors relied on traditional media attention to spread their message, the Islamic State (IS) revolutionized terrorism by using social media and emerging technology to facilitate the recruitment and operations of their group. Just over ten years after the territorial peak of the Islamic state, security officials must reflect on how IS became so successful, particularly with foreign fighters, and how to discourage replication from other terrorist actors. At its core, terrorism is meant to communicate a political message––social media has made that effort easier.
In the wake of social media connecting and inspiring activist movements across the Middle East in the Arab Spring, IS exploited these same platforms to support their political goal, revolutionizing violent extremism forever. Islamic State is a Salafi-jihadist terrorist group with the ultimate goal of establishing the Islamic caliphate––a resurrection of the Islamic empire. While using social media to facilitate the goal of returning to fundamental Islam proves ironic, IS used social media platforms––in particular Twitter (now X)––to reach wide audiences and recruit significant numbers of fighters, including and in particular foreign fighters, to participate in the group.
Similar to tactics on a battlefield, Islamic State deployed organized strategies on social media that facilitated access to the group, allowed IS leaders to control information and propaganda narratives, and inspire potential recruits and boost morale of ardent supporters with displays of IS fighters’ prowess. While counterterrorism efforts online from both social media platforms themselves and the US government have attempted to disrupt IS messaging, these operations have failed due to a lack of understanding about the appeal of IS, as well as not being long-term solutions. IS continues to be a formidable presence online, and the proven success of utilizing social media for extremist groups has encouraged replication from others, becoming a daunting national and international security threat that lacks a simple solution.
Islamic State Background
At its peak, Islamic State governed physical territory, as well as dominated the digital sphere. In June of 2014, IS declared itself a caliphate, distinguishing itself from al-Qa’ida in several ways: 1) IS largely targeted apostate regimes in the Arab world; 2) its primary goal was to create a caliphate, therefore paramount in its strategy was territorial control; and 3) IS used extreme violence to subdue populations under its control. Once Islamic State declared the caliphate, it increased recruitment efforts online. In January 2015, IS held 90,800 km2 of territory, before joint military efforts from several countries and the United States disrupted the group’s expansion.
Although Islamic State no longer controls large swathes of territory, IS operations continue and have shifted from a regional focus to a global threat. In the summer of 2018, territorial loss produced a need to decentralize, and IS created the General Directorate of Provinces, in which several offices “are in control of different regions… and they coordinate amongst each other.” Furthermore, rather than attempting to bring IS supporters to IS controlled territory, IS encouraged supporters online to wage war in its name wherever that may be. While the ultimate goal in theory remains establishing the caliphate, the “digital caliphate” offers Islamic State staying power and allows its supporters to participate in the group from around the world.
Islamic State’s Twitter Campaigns
Islamic State flourished on Twitter due to the platform’s commitment to free speech, which allowed for limited regulations on content. From its founding, Twitter intended to have minimal rules on the platform and did not put immense effort into monitoring content. One senior Twitter employee in 2012 stated the platform remains neutral to content posted, because the, “‘general council and CEO like to say that we are the free speech wing of the free speech party.’” Twitter remained a privately held company until late 2013 and therefore was able to manage the platform with minimal regulations on content. Minimal regulations meant users could post shocking and divisive content, which IS took advantage of in their communications strategy.
Islamic State’s use of Twitter to create access to propaganda, increase information on IS, and inspire supporters or potential supporters to participate was overwhelmingly successful. In 2014, when IS achieved several key kinetic milestones in the group’s goals, IS gained traction with online audiences. Notably, Islamic State hijacked hashtags related to the World Cup and uploaded their own content. IS-supporters used hashtags such as #Brazil2014 or #WC2014 to post propaganda, including a new video with British foreign fighters called There is No Life Without Jihad and a picture of a severed head with the caption, “This is our ball . . . it is made of skin. #World-Cup #WorldCup2014.” From September to December 2014, conservative estimates for the number of Twitter accounts used by IS supporters ranged anywhere from 46,000 to 70,000 accounts. Using a sophisticated social media communications strategy deployed on the Twitter platform, IS brought attention to their political cause, and successfully spread information on the group, inspired potential recruits, and built the morale of followers.
Attempts (and Failure) of Counter Messaging
Islamic State’s weaponization of social media, which effectively reached Western audiences, required a new form of counterterrorism from the United States, as typical kinetic strategies were rendered useless. In order to combat IS messaging, the United States launched the “Think Again Turn Away” campaign as a first attempt. Executive Order 13584, signed by President Obama in September 2011, created the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), under the Department of State, focusing on reinforcing and complimenting the executive branch’s public communications efforts that counter the actions and ideology of international terrorist organizations. While the CSCC focused on audiences outside the United States, Islamic State’s rise on social media and their effectiveness with English-speaking audiences led to the creation of the “Think Again Turn Away” campaign in December 2013. The CSCC deployed this campaign on social media platforms commonly used by terrorist groups, including in particular Twitter. The strategy attempted to delegitimize terrorist groups on social media by sharing news articles about the groups and trolling prominent terrorist social media accounts.
However, the campaign proved not only ineffective, but it also harmed counterterrorism operations by legitimizing Islamic State while failing to deter potential recruits. The campaign tweeted, “photographs of IS atrocities and casualties and links to news stories describing them,” as well as “trolling” prominent pro-IS accounts. The campaign failed to take into account that the “Think Again Turn Away” account would only further Islamic State’s overall social media strategy. The CSCC facilitated access to IS for potential recruits by directing attention to ardent IS supporters on social media. Furthermore, the campaign spread information about IS, in particular their acts of violence, without understanding that IS’s ultraviolence attracts recruits to the group, and provides inspiration to IS supporters.
Counterterrorism Lessons from Islamic State’s Social Media Strategy
Lesson 1: Know the Threat
The first attempt at counterterrorism on social media against Islamic State proved the necessity to understand the appeal of terrorist groups when attempting counter messaging campaigns; the United States lacked a deep understanding of IS’s appeal to potential recruits and the existential nature of IS succeeding on social media. The “Think Again Turn Away” campaign attempted to highlight IS’s use of ultraviolence in an attempt to deter potential recruits, but in reality, accomplished IS’s recruitment goals. However, counter messaging that focused on opposing IS’s controlled narrative with depictions of the reality of Islamic State, for example, documenting atrocities against Sunni Muslims and revealing the group’s wider failures, could be far more effective.
Countering the ideological narrative portrayed by extremist groups benefits the United States counterterrorism strategy by better disrupting the recruiting and mobilization tactics typically deployed on social media. As terrorists continue to adapt, counterterrorism operations online must be structured as long-term strategies, which both collect intelligence to ensure other, including kinetic, counterterrorism operations are more effective, as well as continue to disrupt social media strategy despite changes in platform or tactics.
Additionally, terrorist campaigns are “like a shark in the water: it must keep moving forward.” Terrorists must resort to more dramatics and violence to bring attention to their political cause, or otherwise fade away as a group. Islamic State used adaptation as a central focus in its social media strategy, moving platforms when needed to continue to create and control the narrative about them and survive as a group. While crackdowns of extremist content by platforms themselves or by offensive cyber operations might stunt terrorist operations online, it does not eliminate the strategy of terrorist recruitment online nor decrease demand for violent or pro-terrorist content. “Platform migration” or, “the displacement of extremists to other less regulated platforms or those harder to monitor,” is a common phenomenon in extremist communities. Platform migration is a counterproductive effect of counterterrorism operations online, which is reaffirmed in the case of Islamic State. As extremists find new platforms to exploit, the need for long-term strategies to combat radicalization, as well as coordination with social media companies to remove extremist content, continues.
Lesson 2: Cooperation Is Key
Cooperation between governments and social media platforms plays a critical role in undermining extremist groups’ social media strategies. In 2017, the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) launched with the mission to, “prevent terrorists and violent extremists from exploiting digital platforms.” GIFCT brings together governments, digital platforms, and other relevant actors to cooperate in efforts to mitigate the exploitation of social media. Hash-sharing became an important development from the GIFCT. Hashes act like a digital fingerprint on original digital content from extremists; when hashes are added to the GIFCT database, it enables members––largely other social media platforms––to more quickly identify and remove that same content from their platforms. If governments have access to the content in the hash-sharing database, they may be able to collect intelligence about terrorist groups without the content proliferating on social media. The hash-sharing database provides a unique means to undermine the proliferation of extremist content particularly as it moves across platforms, which in turn will damage the social media strategy of groups like Islamic State.
Lesson 3: Respond Proportionally and for the Long-Term
Lastly, the United States must respond proportionately to the actual threat of terrorist groups, and not the perceived threat. Islamic State’s manipulation of social media can make decision makers susceptible to expedient policies that respond to an exaggerated threat from the group. Appropriate and pragmatic responses to terrorism ensure the mitigation of counterproductive effects. Importantly, terrorist groups derive more strength from the counterterrorism response, rather than from the distorted values they hold and promote.
The United States failed to understand Islamic State, particularly in their social media strategy, which in turn led to counterterrorism failures in the long term. US leaders must view success against terrorist groups in the long term, rather than a flashy topic to be used for popular votes and public favor. Politicians have repeatedly announced the defeat of IS, yet the group continues to take credit for and inspire attacks across the world. While the threat of terrorist groups should not be overstated, extremist ideologies are not likely to be eliminated anytime soon.
The success of Islamic State can be credited to their manipulation of online platforms––a strategy that continues to be utilized by terrorist actors and extremist groups ten years later. National security officials must learn from the mistakes made in counter messaging campaigns against IS, treating threats from terrorist and extremist groups in a more holistic manner.
