Syria’s transformation has been nothing short of extraordinary. In the months since rebels toppled Assad’s government, it has seen many sanctions on its economy lifted while its new government and president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, make headlines on the world’s biggest stages. But one cloud continues to loom: continued calls to federalize Syria and weaken its new government to unite the country.

The case for a federalized Syria is admittedly strong, given the country’s recent history of dictatorship and sectarianism. Syria’s previous strongmen, Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, led the country to half a century of subjugation and a decade of civil war. That war brutalized communities, anti-regime and pro-regime alike. It brought ISIS and genocide. The price of the Assads was not paid by minority groups alone, but by any and all caught in the crossfire.

The civil war also saw the dissolution of the country and interference from foreign states. Regions of Syria fell under the control of local paramilitaries and militia groups, many of whom remain deeply skeptical of the new government and its previous Islamist affiliations. The recent spate of violence against the Druze and Alawites raises further questions about the government’s ability to ensure peoples’ safety and control its forces.

The demands for federalism are strong, particularly from Syrian ethnic groups which, since the civil war, have enjoyed newfound autonomy. They are not likely to give it up easily. Protracted negotiations between the government and the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have endured with little end in sight. But Syrian federalism is also gaining traction in the West, spurred on by Israeli media and prominent Washington think tanks. Federalism is the only solution to protect minorities and avoid “an endless spiral of conflict” for Syria’s ethnic minorities. Obviously, the parallels drawn to the United States’ federal system make a federal Syria seem like a conventional solution.

But convention can get lost in the Middle East and a federal Syria is a shortsighted and, simply put, naive solution to the country’s challenges.

Federalism may translate to a more restrained government in Damascus, but that restraint may render the government impotent in checking other nefarious actors across the country. An intricate web of independent militias still roam Syria, and they are just as likely as any bureaucrat in Damascus to extort and terrorize everyday Syrians. In short, it might nominally stabilize the country, but it would also do so by locking Syria’s people into isolated fiefs while exposing them to sustained corruption, stagnation, and sectarianism.

If the new Syrian government is to be successful, it must focus on delivering results. That means delivering security. But it also means delivering accountability, services, and meaningful access to the economy. At a time when the country needs to reconnect its fractured communities, Syria cannot afford a toothless government which rewards militias, corruption, and foreign powers at the expense of the national interest.

The evidence for this is clear. There are few, if any, decentralized states in the Middle East. The nearest examples, Iraq and Lebanon, show that postwar settlements which mandate power sharing between ethnic groups is far from a recipe for sustained peace and growth.

Ending the Cycle of Instability

Should the federalists be successful in their campaign, it will not end the persistent violence that begets Syria. Perpetrators of violence will simply shift to organized gangs and independent militias, which are not a bug in federalized states, but a feature. In Iraq, Baghdad’s federalized government has not empowered local councils and civil societies; instead, a complex network of organized paramilitaries use violence to conduct politics, dominate rivals, and suppress political activism.

So too would it be in Syria. Reports show that gangs and militias within Syria continue to carry out extrajudicial justice, even in government-controlled cities like Homs and Hama. Kidnappings, disappearances, and sectarian retaliations against communities accused of supporting the Assad regime have continued despite the government prioritizing transitional justice. As these attacks continue, so will the growth of rival groups who can protect the victims. If the government hopes to check these groups and provide robust security across the country, it must be strong enough to do so, not stymied from afar.

Violence from these militias will, of course, be paired with pervasive and pernicious corruption. Extortion, bribery, fraud, and racketeering will explode as local powerbrokers and warlords leverage their positions to control the economy and seek rent from the enterprises they control. It is no coincidence that Iraq’s weak state bureaucracy is complemented by staggering levels of corruption that continue to strangle the country’s growth. Some estimate that the country has lost as much as $300 billion in wealth since 2003, a sum higher than Syria’s annual GDP.

Though less well documented, Syria’s militias are also deeply rooted in the economy. During the civil war, militias supplanted the state in its functions, imposing taxes and fees across the economy. They also captured lucrative enterprises like oil, agriculture, narcotics and antiquities, to fund their continued operations throughout the war. To be a functional country, these enterprises must either be brought under the auspices of the state to be taxed, regulated, or be terminated entirely. The government cannot afford to cede the valuable ports on the coast and oilfields in the East to self-governed regions if it wishes to effectively allocate resources and rebuild the country.

But most importantly, a weakened Syrian government unable to project power in its borders will leave the country acutely exposed to its ruthless neighbors. This reality is readily apparent in Lebanon and Iraq, but it is also clear in Syria. The civil war shows that independent factions will sooner or later be co-opted by ambitious foreign powers, like Iran, Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf states, who used the civil war to advance their own interests. Some of these neighbors are already trying to leverage the country’s internal divisions for their own interests. Implanting federalism and codifying Syria’s patchwork governance beyond this transitional period enables the threat of foreign interference to continue. Syria cannot afford another civil war. And as uncertain and imperfect as the central government in Damascus will inevitably be, the alternative is worse.

The Only Way Forward

Federalism is not an answer to rebuilding Syria. It will not foster relations between minority communities. It will not develop national cooperation, nor will it spur growth and renewal. It will not rebuild the country’s economy or infrastructure. It will not deliver healthcare; it will not address corruption. It will intensify it. Federalism may protect a lucky few, but it will do so at the cost of Syria’s strength—and weak countries in the Middle East simply do not survive.

If the West wants to support the new Syria, and its transition to a united, peaceful and prosperous state, it must work with the new government, not sabotage it. Policymakers and observers alike are right to be skeptical of Ahmed al-Sharaa, and the West must continue to ensure that he is not only saying the right thing but doing the right thing. This starts by pushing the government to take meaningful steps for minority inclusion in a centralized government. Syria’s best hope now lies in a strong, centralized government under Ahmed al-Sharaa. It’s not much, but it’s the brightest outlook the country has had in decades.

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