This article is the first of a two-part series. Part two can be found here.

As Iraq’s political crisis deepens and Islamic State’s (IS) influence grows, the future of Iraq and the wider region is once again in jeopardy. The West must come to the realization that the nation-state of Iraq is doomed and act to further empower allies like the Kurds. Failure to do so would be a grave strategic error and will further empower Islamic State.

The current crisis in Iraq has not occurred in a vacuum. Its roots lie deep in the region’s colonial and modern history. For starters, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 divided the Levant between the British and French following the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI. This agreement partitioned what is now modern day Iraq and Syria. The colonial masters redrew the borders of the map to divide the Middle East using straight lines which later became national borders. They did this with little consideration for the local populations. What resulted was the fragmentation of different religious and ethnic groups across various national borders. In the case of Iraq, Shia, Sunni, Kurds and other minorities were all grouped together in one artificial state, which became modern day Iraq. By imposing supranatural borders and forcing these rival groups to share an artificially-created state, the Great Powers are partially to blame for sowing the seeds of sectarian conflict we are seeing today. It should not go unnoticed that one of Islamic State’s first official statements was to declare “the end of Sykes-Picot.” One Islamic State militant was quoted in a propaganda video stating, “There is no border (referring to the Iraq-Syria border) alas. Now this is all one country, Inshallah.”

Another more modern root of this conflict was the US toppling of Saddam Husseinand the occupation that followed. This period and America’s ill-conceived notions that they could impose a functional democracy in a territory with such diverse ethnic/religious groups is also partially to blame for the current situation.

The Bush administration made some critical strategic errors during this period. One such error is its’ failing to see the enduring political value of Iraqi and Ba’athist institutions, including the Iraqi Army. Saddam’s military was the glue that held Iraq together and despite its brutality was able to suppress descent, unify Shia and Sunnis and quell fundamentalist elements. Today some of Islamic State’s most skilled operators include ex-Ba’athists. These individuals are driven not by ideology but by the goal of reasserting their position in Iraqi society.

The dissolution of Saddam’s military also greatly weakened Iraq’s security forces, creating the context for al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and later Islamic State, to grow their military capacity. The results really speak for themselves: despite all of the US training and military hardware provided since 2003, the current Iraqi Army was no match for Islamic State in Mosul, and many soldiers deserted when they were confronted by just 1,000 militants back in June 2014. A key reason for this is that the current Iraqi Army is just as ethnically polarized as Iraqi society on the whole. One security analyst commented that the predominantly Shia units felt less loyalty to, or less incentive to, stay and protect a Sunni population that they have increasingly come to view as inimical to them. These desertions not only allowed Islamic State to grab territory unchallenged, they also allowed it to seize stocks of US-made military hardware that reportedly include tanks and helicopters as well as ammunition and light weaponry.