The most recent wave of political instability and violence in Iraq has its roots in the 1991 US-led invasion of Iraq; a project intended to bring peace and stability to the region. Operation Desert Storm was a military action coordinated between the United States and other NATO allies in response to Saddam Hussein’s refusal to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait; however, the mission was ultimately unsuccessful, and rather than stabilizing a state plagued by brutal authoritarian rule, it further destabilized the entire region and caused a tightening of Hussein’s grip over the Iraqi state apparatus and its people.

In the decade that followed, Iraq continued to live under Hussein’s strict authoritarian regime. The period is characterized as one of relative peace and stability, especially compared to the violence and unrest experienced during the United States’ intervention. Despite Hussein’s often brutal tactics, basic resources such as food, shelter, and water were generally available. The system began to change however, following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre. In the wake of these attacks, the United States proceeded to invade Iraq for the second time, eventually installing the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was to act as an interim governmental regime while the Iraqi state was rebuilt following the conflict.

Two of the key issues surrounding the establishment of the CPA in Iraq was the lack of consent granted by the Iraqi population to the new regime and its foreign backers, as well as the simplistic success criteria used by the liberal peacebuilding model. They also did not properly consider the reality that proxy governments and semi-democracies tend to produce more instability and are more prone to war than authoritarian regimes due to their propensity for corruption and illegitimate leadership.

When graphed, the relationship between democracy and state stability forms a ‘U’ Shape, with complete authoritarianism, much like Saddam Hussein’s regime, and complete democracy producing the highest levels of state stability. For those regimes that fall in between however, such as semi/quasi-democracies and proxy governments, the further they stray from either end of the spectrum, the more unstable the regimes become, eventually reaching the base of the ‘U’, and resulting in total instability and political unrest within a state – as was the case with the CPA in Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority, despite its status as a ‘democratic’ regime, resulted in a high-number of casualties, reduced state legitimacy, and forced the displacement of over two million refugees, thereby resulting in the Iraqi people discrediting the project and rejecting enforced democratization as a plausible method to restore stability. The imposition of a new government is not always a benevolent or democratic maneuver, as it can easily result in the installation of a puppet regime, or an illegitimate one.