Eritrea has long been likened to the “North Korea of Africa,” and its ranking in various democracy indexes indicates as much. The US NGO Freedom House currently gives the country a rating of 3/100, placing it fourth from bottom of UN member states. Meanwhile, the V-dem electoral democracy index for 2025 finds it second from the bottom. These ratings reflect the nature of the Eritrean regime, one that is highly personal, closed off, and deeply authoritarian. Other African states like the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Chad, though they sometimes rank worse than Eritrea, generally have weaker coercive institutions. Hence the perception of Eritrea as “Africa’s North Korea.”
This level of personalist rule poses serious risks for the country. Should Eritrea’s longtime leader, Isaias Afwerki, die or otherwise be incapacitated, the regime he built around his personal rule could crumble from within, creating knock-on effects that risk destabilizing the wider region. The highly personalist character of the regime makes this more a question of ‘when’ than ‘if.’
A Regime of One
Since coming to power in 1993, Afwerki has built a closed, autocratic political system. But the level of centralization in Afwerki’s hands alone stands out against other authoritarian states. Independent political institutions are completely nonexistent. The military, along with other parallel patronage networks like the internal security services and the ruling PFDJ party, together monopolize political control. Afwerki’s complete and total hollowing out of state institutions is one of the primary drivers why he has been able to consolidate his rule and remain in power for over three decades.
Afwerki’s personalist rule is evident in the levers of power available to him. The military and security services report directly to him. Meanwhile, the country has no constitution, no formal, regularly meeting parliament, and all political parties besides Afwerki’s PFDJ are banned. At the same time, Afwerki has sought to ensure that his rule cannot be challenged from within. A lack of formal institutions limits the potential for ambitious rivals. The security services are fragmented. Reshuffles and disappearances, absent outright purges, help keep the elites in line. Eritrea’s diplomatic isolation and political economy serve to further the elite’s economic and political dependence on Afwerki personally.
Eritrea’s economic model further solidifies control. Though Afwerki was never a military commander, his political leadership of EPLF resistance movement gave him significant leverage over the military. Even today, the Eritrean military continues to control a disproportionate share of the country’s formal economy. However, these legal military-run enterprises are extremely inefficient, and the country’s status as a formal command economy contributes to Eritrea being one of the poorest countries in Africa.
Eritrea lacks many of the conditions that forced command economies to transition to market systems in the past, such as illegitimacy and popular pushback, uncontrolled black markets, or unsustainably low agricultural output. Despite its poverty, there is no current famine, though food insecurity is an issue. Around 60%-70% of the workforce falls under the agricultural sector, though not in collective farming units like China. Also, unlike pre-reform China, Eritrea’s government is heavily entwined with illicit markets for revenue and foreign exchange.
The government’s legitimacy has always been more tied to resisting Ethiopia than promoting economic development. Consequently, the regime has few incentives to abandon its current command economy model, especially when such a transition imperils the economic fiefdoms that currently enrich state elites.
Succession Risks Abound
The lack of an anointed successor, extremely hollow institutions, and fragmented security forces pose significant risks regarding the succession of Isaias Afwerki, who just turned 80. While he has yet to show signs of slowing down, the fact remains that his days are numbered. Unlike similar personalist rulers in Turkmenistan or North Korea, Afwerki appears wholly uninterested in identifying a successor. This is likely a calculated move. Identifying a successor risks unleashing intra-elite competition, destabilizing the regime in ways that could harm Afwerki and possibly unseat him before he dies.
The end result is a highly personalist regime that could crumble without Afwerki at the helm. Should he die, elite cohesion would fragment. Territory could be contested directly and become the personal fiefdom of individual commanders. The complete absence of virtually any formal institutions, even ones otherwise captured by the elites, would increase the likelihood of civil strife in one form or another.
Worse yet, a succession crisis would surely draw in foreign interests, namely from Ethiopia and possibly Sudan, and the UAE. Ethiopia’s prime minister has recently stated that he is still interested in pursuing a port on the Red Sea, and it is plausible that in the event of state collapse in Eritrea, Ethiopia could intervene and push to regain parts of Eritrea.
Regional actors, finally, have a role to play. Though Eritrea recently withdrew from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in December 2025, citing in part strained relations with Ethiopia, its continuing membership in the African Union (AU) suggests that the AU could have a role to play in stabilizing the country post-Afwerki. This would likely be through diplomatic channels and possible peacekeeping if conflict erupts, though the latter would come with significant complexities.
Eritrea’s large diaspora could also play a mediating role in a future conflict. With an estimated 700,000 to one million Eritreans living abroad according to conservative estimates, many of them will have developed the networks and skills needed to exercise effective governance in a post-Afwerki Eritrea.
Looking ahead, the Eritrea succession represents a host of risks, inviting potential spillover of the Sudan civil war, a new campaign for maritime access by Ethiopia, or even the destabilization of nearby Djibouti, home to several global military bases. And all of this would play out alongside one of the world’s key shipping routes through the Red Sea.
