On 20 May 2024, Republic of China (Taiwan) President Lai Ching-te began his four-year term. Lai’s election marked a watershed moment in Taiwanese history as his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) began an unprecedented third consecutive term in control of the presidency. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and Kuomintang (KMT) were left to ponder the unrealized potential of a joint ticket after their negotiations for the 2024 presidential election fell apart, resulting in the defeat of their separate tickets by 13.5 and 6.5 percentage points, respectively.

The TPP’s failure to run a successful independent or joint presidential candidate highlights the structural barriers that third parties face when attempting to compete for presidential power in Taiwan. Third parties must differentiate themselves from the KMT or DPP to build a base of support. However, achieving this involves differentiating themselves ideologically, which hinders the ability to negotiate with a majority party to form a joint presidential ticket. This ideological differentiation hurt the KMT and TPP during their 2024 presidential ticket negotiations, as their political leadership lacked aligned policy objectives besides a strong dislike of the DPP. The pan-green base for Ko’s initial mayoral elections in 2014 and 2018, which aligned closely with the DPP-led wing of Taiwanese politics, demonstrated that he did not have a long-standing professional working relationship with KMT party members. The negotiations for a joint presidential ticket in 2024 also suffered because of this factor. These negotiations are the most realistic way for third parties to gain executive power since no third-party candidate has ever come within even five percentage points of beating the KMT or DPP candidate in a three-way presidential election.

The third party must also keep its base of support while facing an electoral system designed to hinder third-party candidates. The 2005 electoral reform halved the number of legislators from 225 to 113, instituted single-member districts to replace the multi-member-district system, and created a five percentage point minimum to receive any national seats allocated by proportional voting. The reduction of seats and introduction of first past-the-post single-member districts meant that competition for each seat became more intense and thus favored the larger parties. The five percentage point minimum for nationally allocated seats is also difficult for smaller parties to meet while facing severe resource disadvantages compared to the KMT and DPP. The data below supports this assessment, even while accounting for the legislative demise of the People’s First Party after 2004 and the rise of third parties in the aftermath of the 2014 Sunflower Movement.

The Legislative Yuan is an opportunity for smaller parties to create a sustained institutional presence, but the structural barriers designed to prevent them from winning seats severely hinder their staying power.

Third parties’ lack of institutional staying power prevents them from becoming an enduring force in Taiwanese politics that could compete for the presidency or win the majority in the Legislative Yuan. After his unsuccessful 2004 joint ticket with the KMT, People’s First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong ran in the 2012, 2016, and 2020 elections on his own platform, but only garnered above 10 percentage points in 2016. He chose to center the PFP around his charisma and did not create party infrastructure upon which he could draw for support. This led him to split a minority of votes with the KMT, rather than build a durable organization that could replace the KMT as the primary pan-blue party in the long term.

As for the TPP, it will have difficulty building a robust party infrastructure while its founder, Ko Wen-je, awaits trial for a corruption scandal and the party remains committed to defending him in the public sphere. The failure of both the PFP and TPP to build a robust party infrastructure meant they failed to become a long-term institutional player in Taiwanese politics. No other third party in Taiwan has even achieved the national popularity of the TPP or PFP, which would be a first step for establishing long-term institutional influence.

These barriers to third parties mean that the KMT and DPP will likely remain the two major players in Taiwanese domestic politics that are capable of winning the presidency in 2028. The best outcome a third party could hope for is a situation like the TPP’s current role as a kingmaker, forming an alliance with a major party—in this case, the KMT—in a closely divided Legislative Yuan. The lack of a long-term, viable third party to win the presidency means that Taiwan’s political future will continue to be shaped primarily by the DPP-KMT rivalry, with third parties relegated to the role of tactical partners or spoilers rather than genuine contenders for executive leadership—limiting the diversity of political representation and policy innovation that a more competitive multiparty system could bring to Taiwan’s vibrant democracy.