The Indo-Pacific is entering a new missile age, marked by rapid proliferation of advanced missile systems amid intensifying US-China strategic competition. The US deployment of the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) in the Philippines, Japan’s test of its Type 88 anti-ship missile in June 2025, Australia’s procurement of hypersonic and long-range air-to-air missiles from the United States, South Korea’s debut of the Hyunmoo-5 ballistic missile, and India’s export of BrahMos to the Philippines signal a coordinated effort to counter China’s growing military reach. Alongside this, China’s own deployment of hypersonic missiles, such as the DF-17 and YJ-21, underscores its aim and ambition to dominate not only the first island chain but also the South China Sea. These developments, driven by strategic rivalry, risk escalating tensions, particularly around flashpoints like the Taiwan Strait, threatening regional stability and global trade.

Drivers of Missile Proliferation

The Indo-Pacific has witnessed a worsening security environment over the last decade owing to a myriad of factors –including increasing assertiveness from China, the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) to counter China, and the potential for conflict over territorial disputes – driving nations to invest heavily in a range of missile capabilities. One of the key drivers of this proliferation was the US withdrawal from the Cold War-era Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019, citing violations by Russia and the exemption of China from such binding clauses. Following the withdrawal, Washington explicitly stated its aim to counter China’s missile advancement by deploying previously prohibited ground-launched surface-to-surface systems. Japan, Philippines, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan also perceive China’s growing military assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, as a primary threat. North Korea’s ICBM tests in 2022–2024 and its missile advancements stoke further tension in the region.

Missiles offer strategic advantages: they are survivable due to mobility (e.g., road-mobile systems) and capable of rapid, precise strikes. For North Korea, missiles ensure nuclear deterrence; for China, they allow for conventional and nuclear escalation management; for South Korea, they can effectively take out North Korean assets; and for Taiwan, they bolster deterrence by denial in an asymmetric conflict against China. Likewise, Japan’s gradual shift toward counterstrike capabilities, Australia’s missile programs backed by AUKUS, and India’s missile exports enhance strategic autonomy amid growing maritime disputes in the region.

US Missile Deployments in the Philippines

In April 2025, the United States deployed the NMESIS system to the Philippines’ Batanes Islands, alongside the Typhon ground-based launcher system, marking its first overseas deployment. The Typhon Medium Range Capability (MRC) is capable of launching SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles with ranges exceeding 2,000 km. The SM-6 can potentially counter hypersonic threats, addressing China’s advanced capabilities and putting the Taiwan Strait, most of the South China Sea and parts of Southern China within striking distance. These deployments of high-lethality military assets in the Philippines under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) are part of the US strategy of forward-positioning across the first island chain. With Typhon and NMESIS ship-killer systems in place, the Philippines, a US ally in the region, strengthens deterrence in the Bashi Channel, the closest point the U.S. can get to Taiwan, but avoids hosting offensive US operations, reflecting caution to balance security and neutrality in US-China tensions.

Japan’s Missile Test and Island Chain Defense

Developed entirely in Japan, the ground-launched Type 88 anti-ship missile’s test in June 2025 near the strategically important Tsugaru Strait signals a marked shift from Japan’s pacifist tradition. Moreover, its plan to deploy upgraded Type 12 missiles and US-made Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM), alongside a $1.7 billion purchase of 400 Tomahawk missiles in 2023, aims to fortify the Ryukyu Islands along the first island chain. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy identifies China as the “greatest strategic challenge,” prioritizing long-range strikes to deter East China Sea aggression and support Taiwan. US support, in this regard, including the 2024 transformation of US Forces Japan into a joint headquarters, enhances interoperability through systems like the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), countering China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) strategy.

Australia’s Missile Defense and Production Surge

Australia’s response to China’s September 2024 ICBM test, which violated the Treaty of Rarotonga by landing in the South Pacific, includes a $49 billion investment over the next decade to bolster missile defense and long-range strike capabilities. A $4.7 billion deal in October 2024 secures US-made SM-2 IIIC and SM-6 missiles for the Royal Australian Navy, enhancing ballistic missile defense against hypersonic threats. Australia’s new domestic manufacturing firm, the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise (GWEO), will produce 4,000 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) annually with Lockheed Martin. Joint production with Norway’s Kongsberg for Naval and Joint Strike Missiles, and deployment of 200 Block V – Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) missiles to be procured from the United States under a $895 million deal, will extend Australia’s strike range to 2,500 km. Moreover, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) conducted an operational test of the AGM-158C LRASM with its F/A-18F fighter jets, deterring Chinese coercion and supporting allies in Taiwan or South China Sea conflicts.

China’s Hypersonic Missile Advancements

China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) operates the region’s largest and most diverse missile arsenal, including the DF-17 Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) with a range of 1,800–2,500 km and YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship missile, showcased in 2022 near Taiwan. The DF-17’s Mach 5–8 speed and maneuverability has the ability to evade missile defenses, targeting U.S. and allied bases along the first island chain. The YJ-21, a hypersonic Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) deployable from ships, can threaten naval assets up to 1,500 km, enhancing China’s A2/AD strategy in the East and South China Sea. The DF-26, dubbed the “Carrier/Guam Killer,” complements this capability. With a 4,000 km range, it can endanger US aircraft carriers and bases in Guam, potentially disrupting air and naval operations in the event of a conflict. Furthermore, its dual-capable (conventional and nuclear) warheads create target ambiguity, raising escalation risks. China’s September 2024 ICBM test into the Pacific, landing 2,000 km from Hawaii, violated the Treaty of Rarotonga, alarming Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. With satellite imagery showing China constructing over 300 new ICBM silos in its western deserts, and development of more sophisticated hypersonic missiles like the DF-27 (CH-SS-X-24), China is bolstering its deterrence as well as coercion capability, complicating regional defense planning.

Taiwan and the Shift Toward Asymmetric Strategy

The Taiwan Strait is the epicenter of this missile race. Taiwan, facing China’s growing aggression, is steadily transitioning toward an asymmetric strategy and has accelerated its domestic missile production by the National Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), Taiwan’s primary arms manufacturer. In fact, it achieved its 2026 goal of producing 1,000 missiles annually, two years early, by developing the likes of the Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missile and Tien Chien II an air-to-air missile. These efforts, supported by a $7.4 billion special defense budget allotted under the  “Sea-Air Combat Power Improvement Plan Purchase Special Regulations,” aim to create a “Fortress Taiwan” to deter invasion or at least delay an offensive by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) long enough to secure US assistance. Taiwan is also fielding Hsiung Feng III supersonic and Harpoon anti-ship missiles to counter a potential amphibious landing by China. However, China’s numerical and qualitative superiority, missiles like the DF-17 and ASBMs like the DF-21D, pose a significant threat to Taiwan’s own and allied defense planning.

North Korea and Regional Stability

Missiles are the cornerstone of North Korea’s nuclear deterrence. It’s significant missile advancements, including tests of the Hwasong-8 (claimed by Pyongyang to be a hypersonic glide vehicle), Hwasong-16B intermediate-range solid-fuel missile, and KN-23 quasi-ballistic missile, reinforce its nuclear deterrence. The Hwasong-18 and Hwasong-19 ICBMs, which can reach 6,000 and 7000 km altitude respectively, threaten US territory, escalating fears of provocative actions akin to the 2010 ROKS Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong-do shelling. Its “use-or-lose” dilemma, driven by concerns over US-South Korea preemptive strikes targeting mobile launchers, further heightens instability on the Korean Peninsula, where ballistic missile flight times of 1–2 minutes risk miscalculation. Besides, China’s tacit support for Pyongyang’s missile program, via economic aid and lax sanctions enforcement, amplifies regional tensions, potentially emboldening North Korea to coerce South Korea or test US resolve, threatening broader Indo-Pacific stability.

South Korea’s Missile Programs

South Korea’s Hyunmoo missile series, including the Hyunmoo-3 and Hyunmoo-4, is central to its defense against North Korea. The Hyunmoo-3, a cruise missile with a 1,500 km range and 500 kg payload, enables precision strikes on North Korean command centers to preempt missile launches. Such preemptive and precision strike plans belong to the “Kill Chain” strategy, part of the Three-Axis system outlined in the 2022 defense white paper. The Hyunmoo-3C or the sea-skimming variant enhances anti-ship capabilities, targeting North Korean naval assets. Next in line, the Hyunmoo-4, a ballistic missile with a two ton warhead and 800 km range, can penetrate underground bunkers, and its ship-to-surface version Hyunmoo-IV-4, can be launched from submarines, showcasing impressive strike capabilities. South Korea’s 2023 test of the Hyunmoo-4, simulating a strike on Pyongyang, and October 2024 test of the latest Hyunmoo-5 underscored its readiness, though it heightened tensions, prompting North Korean retaliatory launches. Political drivers, including Seoul’s push for wartime operational control (OPCON) independent from the United States, reflect a quest for greater strategic autonomy amid regional volatility.

India’s Missile Exports and Regional Dynamics

India’s export of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile to the Philippines in 2022 marks its rise as a regional arms supplier. The BrahMos, jointly developed with Russia, reaches speeds of Mach 3 and a 290 km range in its export variant, bolstering the Philippines’ maritime defense in the South China Sea. Variants tested up to 900 km demonstrate India’s technological prowess, though also raising Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) compliance concerns. The 2024 delivery of BrahMos to the Philippines, coupled with plans to export to Vietnam, amplifies India’s strategic footprint, potentially shifting Southeast Asian power dynamics. This export success could encourage competitors like China or Russia to expand their missile sales, risking an arms race. 

Conclusion

The escalating missile proliferation across the Indo-Pacific underscores a dangerous shift in regional security dynamics. Particularly, the Taiwan Strait remains a volatile flashpoint, where the interplay of offensive missiles and defensive systems could rapidly escalate tensions, drawing in regional and global powers. Hypersonic missiles, with their above Mach 5 speed, high maneuverability, and unpredictability, are challenging the effectiveness of missile defense systems and incentivizing preemptive doctrines that heighten the risk of miscalculation. The Iran-Israel conflict of 2025, particularly Iran’s deployment of the Fattah-1 ballistic missile, highlights this global challenge. Israel’s advanced Arrow-3, designed for ballistic threats along with the American Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD), struggled against the Iranian missile salvo, revealing the vulnerabilities of even the most sophisticated defenses, reshaping the deterrence calculus of future conflicts. As a matter of fact, this confrontation serves as a harbinger of the tensions brewing in the Indo-Pacific, where strategic mistrust and the absence of substantive dialogue amplify the risk of escalation. As pragmatic de-escalation becomes increasingly elusive, the proliferation is only going to get intense in the coming days.