Latin American and Caribbean countries that are members of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (ITRA) – the so-called Rio Treaty – have the possibility of invoking that agreement to address the threats by the United States to seize Greenland, which is an integral part of Denmark.

There are several reasons why this might be conceivable.

First, we should begin by mentioning the text of the Rio Treaty. According to Article 1, the parties “formally condemn war and undertake in their international relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force.” Article 3, paragraph 3, states that “the provisions of this Article shall be applied in case of any armed attack which takes place within the region described in Article 4.” The latter article details the limits (latitude and longitude) of the region (including the polar boundaries) covered by the treaty: Greenland is, thus, geographically covered by the ITRA. In turn, Article 6 refers to “aggression that is not an armed attack,” to different types of conflicts, and to “any other fact or situation might endanger the peace of America.” In that scenario, “the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately…for the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent.” Article 11 specifies that “the consultations referred to in the present Treaty shall be conducted through the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics.”

Geopolitics of the Rio Treaty

Now, let us analyze the overall geopolitical situation, both past and present. It is evident that Greenland has been since 1814 a Danish territory, just as Denmark is a member of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Consequently, in political terms, Greenland is covered by NATO. However, its geographic inclusion within the framework of the Rio Treaty is curious. Historically and militarily, for the United States, its principal defense perimeter—an essential area for deterring intruders—had been the broad Caribbean Basin, particularly because of its projection of power toward South America within the context of a regional hegemonic design. Amid the First World War and due to the possibility of German military incursion in that area, the United States negotiated with Denmark the status of the Danish Virgin Islands to buy it: by 1917, they became the US Virgin Islands after being purchased for $25 million—paid in gold.

The Second World War and its aftermath turned the northern part of the continent—especially given the growing importance of the Arctic—into another key area as part of the US defense perimeter, at a time when the country had already become a great international power. This appears to be the reason why Greenland is covered by Article 4 of the ITRA. In short, an attack on Greenland would have been, in the heat of the Cold War, a major military provocation against NATO, while also a highly sensitive matter for the security of the Americas as a whole. That hypothetical attack never occurred but had it taken place it would have mobilized NATO militarily, first and foremost, and, highly probable, the members of the ITRA as a complementary rear guard. This, of course, would have been the result of a possible action by the Soviet Union, as a revisionist power challenging both the United States and the West, in general.

What’s Old Is New Again

Let us briefly introduce Panama, a signatory of the Rio Treaty. The recently announced, in the 2025 National Security Strategy, “Trump Corollary” is reminiscent of a previous one: the Roosvelt Corollary of 1904 by which the United States claimed the right to intervene in the internal matters of Latin American nations. Speaking at the University of Berkeley in 1911, Theodore Roosevelt later asserted: “I took Panama.” He was referring to US actions promoting Panama’s secession from Colombia in 1903 and the subsequent purpose of building the Panama Canal. By the Carter-Torrijos Treaty of 1977, Panama recovered its canal. In late 2024 then President elected, Donald Trump, reclaimed full control of it. He subsequently threatened to “take back” the waterway.

Thus, to the extent that there is today a key geopolitical reassessment of oceans, poles, straits, and strategic resources, nations such as Canada (a NATO member but not a ITRA member), passages such as the Panama Canal, and territories rich in rare earths and close to the North pole such as Greenland (with its peculiar status—political as part of NATO and geographic as part of the Rio Treaty) have been placed at the center of the expansionist project of a current revisionist and aggressive power: the United States. To the south, Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy seeks to recreate, by coercion, its former sphere of influence. To the north, it seeks to advance, through provocative announcements and bullying measures, its presence and influence in the larger context of a deepening polar competition. To the south it intervenes (Venezuela) to reorder; to the north it disrupts (Canada, Europe) to intervene.

From a Latin American perspective, it is very significant that the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) refers in three different sentences, and together, “key terrains like the Panama Canal and Greenland.” Within this frame of reference, in which the government of President Donald Trump behaves as an overbearing actor that disguises its mounting weakness in the face of profound global transformations, it is essential to obstruct and curb its destructive impulses. Latin America and the Caribbean did not resort to inter-American instruments to prevent or challenge the illegal use of force against Venezuela, nor earlier in response to the extrajudicial executions of many boatmen in the Pacific and the Caribbean. Nothing indicates that Washington—particularly the hardline trio of Marco Rubio, Pete Hegseth, and Stephen Miller—is satisfied with the Venezuelan military operation. They want more. They are willing to cross more international legal red lines, and even domestic laws. Panama and Greenland are placed as integral parts in the defense “US Homeland.”

Greenland is today at a crossroads, while, for the moment, Panama is not at the center of Trump´s intimidations. For this reason, it would be appropriate for a group of Latin American governments to request a special meeting to address the Greenland issue. It is worth recalling that the first preambular consideration of the ITRA underscores that it is “a treaty to prevent and repel threats and acts of aggression.” In global terms and with respect to the Western Hemisphere, there is an urgent need to “prevent.” This idea of effective anticipation should be welcomed by Canada and the European members of NATO. If Washington continues to insist that Greenland should belong to it and keeps reiterating its threats, the region must seriously question the Trump administration and demand explanations regarding the possibility of a major conflict within the limits of a Western Hemisphere treaty that could affect the peace and security of the Americas. This would undoubtedly be a bold and risky decision that would likely irritate the White House. But it is time for someone to do so, using diplomacy rather than weapons. Otherwise, the risk is that the Rio Treaty becomes a dead letter, and the United States may begin to convene a “coalition of the willing” from the region to “do something” in Panama. This is not farfetched if one analyzes the right-wing wave extending in Latin America.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.