Nepal is a relatively small, land-locked agricultural state squeezed between China and India, Asia’s main rising powers. While its importance is limited on its own, in the context of ongoing Sino-India competition Nepal holds a greater geopolitical significance. As a matter of fact, it is a typical example of buffer state between two great powers. But for a buffer zone to preserve its nature, a fundamental requirement must be respected: none of the two neighbors should have a prominent role in its affairs. In other words, there must be a mutually acceptable status quo. If the buffer state starts leaning toward one power, the equilibrium is put at risk as the other will consider it an extension of its competitor, and therefore as a potential threat.
Recent geopolitical developments indicate that this may well be the case in Nepal; the equilibrium is straining, with potential ramifications for the region and beyond.
Background
Originally a Kingdom within the sphere of influence of the British Empire, Nepal began facing serious political troubles in 1996, when a Maoist insurgency triggered a civil war that lasted 10 years. In 2008, two years after the end of the conflict, the monarchy was abolished and Nepal became a federal democratic republic. In the short term, this did not have much of an effect on the country’s foreign policy, and especially towards India. Nepal maintained friendly (and some even say subordinate) relations with its large southern neighbor for decades.
Naturally, not all of Nepal’s political players were satisfied with this state of affairs, the most important example being the Maoists, who were ideologically sympathetic to China and wanted Nepal to establish closer ties with Beijing. The last political offspring of this pro-Chinese group was the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Center), or CPN-MC. Its longstanding rival was the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), also called CPN-UML. Apart from doctrine issues and preferences over the domestic affairs, the two parties also diverged on foreign policy, as the CPN-UML was favorable to India.
But in recent years, the situation has changed. Ahead of the 2017 political elections, the two parties reached an agreement to form an electoral coalition called the Left Alliance (LA). This proved to be a winning move: the LA triumphed, gaining about two-thirds of the seats in Parliament, thus allowing it to form a government. In the aftermath of the victory, the two parties decided to move forward and unite to form a single political force called the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN, the name it had in the 50s before its subsequent splits). Other than being a turning point in Nepalese political history, this event brings considerable consequences for the country’s foreign policy, especially on the relations with India and China.
Impact
As seen, before joining into a single electoral coalition, the CPN-UML and the CPN-MC had opposing views with regards to Nepal’s relations with other countries. The former favored India, while the latter promoted closer cooperation with China. But in the lead-up to reunification, this changed; and now both wings of the reunified CPN are adopting a marked pro-China stance.
This shift is the result of several factors. One is the ordinary political bargaining that always takes place in these cases. While the Maoists are (as they have always been) the minoritarian communist current, they hold enough seats to be essential in forming a government all the while exerting a notable “blackmail power” (as they can always threaten to withdraw their support and cause the executive’s demise). As such, the Marxist-Leninists had to make concessions, and a warmer attitude towards Beijing was likely part of the deal that brought the two factions together.
