India and China have once again seen clashes along their long Himalayan border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The two powers are involved in longstanding disputes concerning several areas, most notably the Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin to the west and the India-administered Arunachal Pradesh to the east; both of which hold a deep strategic significance. Aksai Chin connects China’s autonomous regions of Tibet and Xinjiang, both of which Beijing considers buffer zones and ‘extensions’ toward Central Asia, and both are home to separatist movements. Arunachal Pradesh on the other hand is a one of the seven states linked to the rest of India by a narrow strip of territory colloquially called the ‘chicken neck.’ These two Asian giants have been upgrading their armed forces in recent years, and even though a large-scale war remains a remote possibility, an escalation is not to be excluded.
Background
Challenging the Assumptions: Far from the Himalayas
Most analyses of a hypothetical Sino-Indian war envision a short conflict in the disputed zones along the LAC in the Himalayas. While this is indeed the most likely scenario, there is also the potential for the two powers to get involved in a broader and longer-term conflict. In such a scenario, even though India is better positioned for a short-term clash, China can bring in more forces and reverse the dynamic as the conflict drags on. Considering the extremely difficult terrain which precludes the possibility of dispatching too many troops on the LAC, a breakthrough is highly unlikely and a stalemate a real possibility.
Such a limited exchange in the Himalayas could ultimately result in a negotiated ceasefire. However, it is also possible that the contenders could keep fighting under pressure of domestic nationalism and a desire to preserve their international image. In such an event, the maritime dimension would become decisive.
In global terms, Beijing holds a quantitative and qualitative advantage over New Delhi. Yet war is not only a matter of number and technical features. In this specific case, logistics and geography play a major role. Both the Indian Navy and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) have modern ships and can organize a carrier battle group, but with considerable limitations. Their aircraft carriers (the Liaoning and Shandong for China, the Vikramāditya for India) are conventionally-powered units of Soviet origin/design with relatively small fighter wings, which translates into limited operational range and strike capabilities. Moreover, these ships require protection, and this greatly complicates the logistical efforts to dispatch them far from their home bases. For geographic reasons, the Indian Ocean traditionally falls in New Delhi’s sphere of influence, as it possesses a capable fighting force and multiple bases in the region. This represents an advantage in terms of both logistics and ISR, as India operates a chain of radar outposts and owns P-8I Poseidon long-range aircraft for patrol, anti-surface, and anti-submarine operations. Besides, India can use its land-based jets to provide air support to its fleet. However, the Indian Navy does not possess the logistical infrastructure to project its power into the South China Sea, and while the PRC expanded its naval forces, India’s modernization program has advanced slowly and its fleet has withered as new ships are not commissioned fast enough to replace old ones.
