During Xi Jinping’s tenure, especially since the commencement of his unprecedented third term, the PRC has grown increasingly assertive, posing a threat to the national security and foreign policy objectives not only of the United States but also of countries worldwide. The 2023 Threat Assessment by the US Intelligence Community indicates that China possesses the capability to challenge the current international paradigm in various regions and across multiple domains.

As per assessments from the U.S. intelligence community and other experts, the China threat in 2024 encompasses economic coercion, the spread of propaganda and misinformation, election interference, support for terrorism, territorial disputes, and the potential for war over Taiwan.

The Homeland Threat Assessment for 2024 by the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) indicates that “we expect the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will continue to use predatory economic practices to advantage its firms and industries over ours.” While the assessment is centered on the U.S., its repercussions are global. DHS foresees the PRC “continue to manipulate markets, employ economic espionage and coercive economic tools, and seek to illicitly acquire our technologies and intellectual property.” This economic coercion extends globally, affecting countries participating in initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, the Global Security Initiative, the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Additionally, China’s influence is felt through advisory roles and dialogue partnerships in other regional trade agreements and groupings, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Employing a comprehensive whole-of-government strategy, along with its civil-military fusion, Beijing is progressively integrating its expanding military capabilities with economic, technological, and diplomatic influence. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) leverages its crucial position in global supply chains, coupled with its role as a significant trade and investment partner, to influence other nations to align with its vision for reshaping the international order. This encompasses reinforcing its territorial claims over land, sea, and air space, coercing other nations to acknowledge the one-China policy, and recognizing Beijing’s sovereignty over Taiwan.

China’s adoption and heightened utilization of AI, coupled with extensive big data analytics capabilities, are not only strengthening Beijing’s economic coercion but also enhancing its espionage capabilities, cyber activities, and the impact of malign influence operations through increased dissemination of propaganda and misinformation. This aligns with the findings of the 2022 Department of Defense Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, which suggests that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has successfully achieved the initial phase of its modernization objectives and is currently transitioning to the next phase, termed as the “intelligentization of the armed forces,” slated for completion by 2027.

Modernization and intelligentization of the PLA involve harnessing the power of AI, along with the capability to produce “low-cost, synthetic text-, image-, and audio-based content of higher quality.” China-generated AI content is increasingly visible on social media and websites, and it has even made its way into news media, shaping public opinion in ways that favor Beijing. The improved capacity to disseminate propaganda and misinformation strengthens Beijing’s election interference activities. Security analysts in both Taiwan and the United States have cautioned that Beijing has made attempts to influence their elections.

The PLA Navy and Air Force currently represent the most formidable indigenous forces in the Indo-Pacific region. They are actively strengthening their capabilities in weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), ICBM, and nuclear-capable missile forces. Additionally, there are plans to increase nuclear warhead production, with a focus on developing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.

In 2024, the PLA will persist in its endeavors to establish overseas military installations and secure usage agreements. The PLA has dual-use facilities in Argentina, Cambodia, Cuba, Djibouti, and Myanmar, along with ports capable of accommodating PLA Navy vessels in Sri Lanka and various other nations. Extending its reach beyond Earth, Beijing is already advancing its space warfare capabilities. Through space exploration and satellite launches, China is actively developing space-based weapons and enhancing its space surveillance abilities.

In conclusion, the year 2024 will witnesses a dynamic and assertive China, challenging the existing global order across economic, military, and diplomatic fronts. As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) maneuvers through its ambitious plans under the leadership of Xi Jinping, concerns intensify regarding its influence on international affairs. China’s diversified approach, encompassing economic coercion, military advancements, and the strategic use of technology and intelligence, highlights the complexity of the evolving global landscape. Navigating the challenges posed by China’s growing influence in the years ahead requires a comprehensive understanding of the dynamic interplay between these factors.

The post China in 2024: More Challenges to International Order appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Leap forward to today, and the reverberations of the Cold War seem to echo once more. Yet the geopolitical environment has experienced substantial shifts since the Soviet Union’s dissolution. We currently reside in a multipolar world where authority is distributed among several key players, including but not limited to the United States, China, Russia, and a consortium of European powers.

A meticulous assessment of the present global landscape exposes delicate but firm indicators that the world is gradually gravitating towards a new version of the Cold War. Nonetheless, the emerging geopolitical arrangement is significantly more complex and multifarious. Each power is actively participating in global politics, tactically placing their assets on the international chessboard to gain the best possible advantages.

The United States, while remaining a dominant global actor, encounters challenges to its hegemony from rising powers. China, bolstered by its swift economic development and expanding military capabilities, has surfaced as a substantial challenger in the global arena. Russia, despite facing numerous internal and external difficulties, maintains its global relevance. In parallel, the European powers, each grappling with distinct challenges, collectively exercise considerable clout in international political and economic forums.

These principal actors are earnestly strengthening alliances and reinforcing their global sway. Recent diplomatic initiatives and strategic advances demonstrate a readiness for a potential new Cold War. For instance, the United States’ interaction with New Zealand regarding the AUKUS agreement, China’s engagement with Russia in the face of the Ukraine war, and the diverse approaches of European powers towards China all suggest a strategic rearrangement evocative of Cold War dynamics.

However, the possibility of a new Cold War does not simply mirror the 20th-century version. The game’s rules have evolved, the players have expanded, and the stakes have indisputably risen. A thorough comprehension of these changes is vital for forecasting future international political trends and formulating strategies to efficiently traverse this shifting terrain. The complexities of the impending new Cold War, guided by these recent developments, will be the central point of the following analysis.

The United States: Restructuring Global Strategy in Evolving Circumstances

As the geopolitical terrain undergoes significant transformations, the United States is in a critical stage of reassessment and reinvention of its international strategy. The formulation of this complex strategy is influenced by the rise of new global actors, shifting allegiances, and the revival of traditional foes.

The shadows of past confrontations are evident in today’s geopolitics. A clear instance is the recent tension with Russia, wherein the United States and its allies were accused by the Kremlin of imposing “unprecedented pressure” on African countries. This event underscores the longstanding geopolitical rivalry between the two nations, evoking the dynamics of the Cold War era.

Moreover, the security concerns brought about by North Korea add another layer of complexity. The trial of the Hwasong-18 ICBM, a missile capable of reaching the United States, represents a serious threat to international security. This instance highlights the high stakes involved, reminding us that geopolitical strategy is not just about power demonstration but also about securing national and global safety.

In light of these challenges, the United States is adjusting its strategy and taking proactive steps on the international scene. A case in point is the country’s involvement with New Zealand concerning the AUKUS pact, a trilateral security alliance with the UK and Australia. This initiative underscores the United States’ intention to fortify its alliances in the Asia-Pacific area and counteract China’s growing influence.

Furthermore, the United States is widening its strategic attention to include regions such as the Pacific Islands. The recent interactions between Secretary Blinken and President Biden with leaders of the Pacific Islands showcase a renewed commitment to these nations. These endeavors reveal that every region holds importance in the United States’ comprehensive strategy.

In the evolving geopolitical scenario resembling a new Cold War, the United States is diligently strengthening its alliances, opposing its adversaries, and cultivating new partnerships. This multifaceted approach exemplifies the United States’ efforts to retain its global leadership position amidst rapidly shifting international dynamics. It’s a precise balancing act, laden with challenges and opportunities, that will steer the course of global politics in the 21st century.

China: An Emerging Superpower

China’s swift ascent to international prominence marks a pivotal episode in the chronicles of world history. Its impressive economic expansion, advanced technological developments, and significant military growth have pushed it to a prominent position in international politics. In the context of the nascent new Cold War, China is no mere bystander but a powerful player, actively drawing new partners and allies into its domain of influence.

One cannot discuss China’s international strategy without addressing its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. This expansive project, evocative of the ancient Silk Road, seeks to establish a network of trade and infrastructure that extends across continents. Yet, despite the economic prospects it offers, the initiative has triggered apprehensions about debt-trap diplomacy and transparency deficits, thus portraying a multifaceted image of China’s international ambitions.

Recent events offer insights into China’s strategic actions. China’s alignment with Russia amidst the Ukraine war serves as an indicator of its geopolitical affiliations. Beijing’s unwavering support for Moscow, as shown by President Xi’s deepening ties with President Putin and echoing the Kremlin’s narrative over the conflict, signifies a strategic alliance that could substantially influence the dynamics of the new Cold War.

In the Pacific region, China’s increasing influence has raised alarms among established powers such as the United States and Australia. The conclusion of a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, Beijing’s regional investments, and the potential for a policing accord have escalated concerns about China’s aspirations. As US Secretary of State Antony Blinken flagged China’s “problematic behavior,” it’s evident that the Pacific is surfacing as a new battleground in the international power contest.

Further afield, China’s prospective plans for overseas naval bases in Asia and Africa denote its desire to safeguard shipping routes and enhance its capacity to withstand sanctions. Analysts propose that locations like the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka and the Ream naval base in Cambodia could be part of China’s plan to bolster its naval prowess. These developments highlight China’s strategic ambitions and the measures it is prepared to undertake to defend its interests.

In the global politics’ vast chessboard, China has transformed from a mere pawn to a potent player. As it continues to integrate new partners into its domain of influence and extends its global presence, the world watches with anxious anticipation. The ascent of the Dragon carries substantial consequences for the international order, infusing another layer of complexity to the budding new Cold War. However, akin to any other power, China’s rise is not free from obstacles, and only the passage of time will unveil how this elaborate game evolves.

Russia: Resurgent and Assertive

In the throes of a geopolitical realignment mirroring the Cold War period, Russia is rising as a bold actor maneuvering deftly amidst economic hardships and escalating geopolitical trials. Its capacity to preserve and augment its global sway reflects a strategic approach, as evidenced by recent occurrences that depict the portrait of a nation determined to affirm its stature and broaden its influence.

The Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum convened in St. Petersburg serves as a symbolic representation of Russia’s tactical engagement with nations outside its immediate periphery. This occasion illuminated Russia’s desire to reinforce alliances with African nations, emphasizing its soft power endeavors and economic aspirations. However, the event’s achievements were somewhat marred by Russia’s sudden retreat from the Black Sea grain deal, an action that incited global anxiety regarding the stability of international food supplies, specifically in grain-reliant regions of Africa. Despite these obstacles, the summit accentuated Russia’s steadfast attempts to elevate its global rank.

Indisputably, the most critical and far-reaching event highlighting Russia’s assertiveness is the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, initiated in February 2022. This confrontation, which has transmuted into a significant geopolitical crisis, has propelled Russia into the international spotlight. The consequences of Russia’s actions in Ukraine resonate beyond the immediate area, inciting a substantial rearrangement of worldwide alliances and connections. As the world contends with the fallout of this dispute, Russia’s role and conduct are subjected to rigorous analysis.

Concurrently, the intensifying bond between President Xi Jinping of China and President Vladimir Putin of Russia illustrates a striking shift in global alignments. Their united front on the Ukraine issue indicates a potential strategic partnership that could significantly alter the dynamics of the nascent new Cold War.

In addition, Russia’s ongoing military and diplomatic interactions in regions like Africa and the Korean Peninsula highlight its plan to extend its sphere of influence. Military engagement in several African nations, lucrative arms transactions, and unwavering support for North Korea are all strategic moves aimed at solidifying Russia’s global presence. The potential establishment of naval bases in Asia and Africa provides further proof of Russia’s ambition to project power well beyond its territorial boundaries.

In the swiftly transforming arena of international politics, Russia has reasserted itself as a steadfast actor, relentless in its efforts to carve out a notable role. Amid increasing global pressure, the durability of Russia’s strategy will undeniably be a key factor in determining its position in this forthcoming new Cold War period. As we continue to monitor these evolving events, one fact remains evident: Russia’s current actions will significantly influence the geopolitical layout of the future.

The European Powers: Navigating Shifting Alliances

In the evolving stratagem of the incipient new Cold War, nations of Europe occupy a distinctive position, balancing delicately between historical affiliations and current realities. Each of these countries, as well as the collective European Union, are navigating actively through the novel geopolitical terrain. They are consolidating alliances and partnerships while concurrently addressing internal issues such as Brexit and the upswing of nationalism. Europe’s stance is particularly intricate due to its longstanding ties with the United States, geographical closeness to Russia, and growing economic interdependence with China.

Current events illuminate the diverse approaches pursued by different European powers. France, under President Macron’s leadership, has been expanding its geopolitical influence actively. Macron’s trip to Beijing, in the company of over 50 business representatives, culminated in new contracts for Airbus, EDF, and L’ Oréal, among others. This move, much to the displeasure of China skeptics in Europe and the United States, underlines France’s intent to nurture economic relationships with China.

Simultaneously, France is also affirming its influence in the Pacific, a region experiencing growing rivalry between China and the United States. Macron’s visit to an independent Pacific nation—the first by an incumbent French leader—was intended to emphasize France’s significance in the area. France’s rejuvenated focus on the Pacific and its proposition of an “alternative” in the region could considerably shape the dynamics of the imminent new Cold War.

Germany, under Chancellor Olaf Scholz, has also indicated a pragmatic attitude towards China. Scholz’s remarks on de-risking echoed those of Chinese Premier Li Qiang, demonstrating a cautious yet cooperative posture towards economic engagement with China.

Conversely, countries such as Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic have taken a more contentious stance towards Beijing. Lithuania’s decision to permit Taiwan to establish a representative office in Vilnius, bans on Huawei by Poland and Romania, and the direct conversation between the newly elected Czech President Petr Pavel and the Taiwanese president underscore the diverging approaches within Europe.

These occurrences expose a complex and multifaceted European strategy in response to the imminent new Cold War. The varied approaches mirror the unique challenges and factors each country grapples with in this transforming geopolitical environment. It’s evident that European powers, both individually and as a collective, will persist in playing a significant role in defining the framework of this new global arrangement.

The Intricacies of the Emerging New Cold War

In the realm of global politics, a new narrative is emerging that bears striking parallels to a well-known historical period—the Cold War. However, despite similarities in the cast and overarching themes, the storyline of this renewed Cold War is distinct. The demarcation lines that once differentiated East from West are not as definitive, the links of economic interconnectedness are more potent and intricate, and the scene is no longer solely occupied by state actors.

This refreshed narrative signifies that the ideological discord is not simply a matter of capitalism against communism. It now encompasses a wider array of subjects including political governance, human rights, technology, and environmental change. It represents a multi-faceted ideological conflict that surpasses conventional political borders.

Moreover, the complex network of economic interconnectedness further distinguishes this looming Cold War from its forerunner. During the bipolar world of the 20th century, economic structures predominantly aligned with political alliances. Currently, global supply chains and financial systems traverse political and ideological divisions, forging a convoluted terrain of economic cooperation and rivalry.

Furthermore, the emergence of non-state actors—from multinational corporations and international organizations to cybercriminals and terror groups—adds an additional layer of intricacy. Empowered by technological advancements and globalization, these actors have the potential to shape global politics in ways that were inconceivable during the original Cold War.

However, as the world catapults into this new Cold War epoch, some elements of the historical playbook endure. The scramble of global powers to solidify their alliances and demarcate their spheres of influence harks back to former Cold War dynamics. Recent occurrences, such as the escalating assertiveness of Russia, China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, and the tactical maneuverings of the United States and European powers, affirm this tendency.

Additionally, the 70th commemoration of the conclusion of the Korean War (1950-1953), one of the initial international conflicts of the Cold War era, provides a poignant reminiscence of the historical background and potential consequences of this novel geopolitical rivalry.

In this incipient new Cold War, the demarcations are more nebulous, the stakes are escalated, and the dynamics are more complicated. As leading powers hasten to construct new boundaries and pull new allies into their spheres, the world is positioned at a pivotal crossroad. Decisions taken now will delineate the trajectory of global politics for the ensuing decades.

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Fentanyl’s ascent to the forefront of the US opioid crisis and antidrug priorities began in 2016. As the drug became increasingly mixed with other drugs like heroin and cocaine, demand grew immensely. Combined with a steady illicit supply, the fentanyl wave had begun. Along with the new wave of the opioid crisis came emerging dynamics on both the supply and demand sides.

The 2017 National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA) states that in 2016, law enforcement seized a record 287 kilograms of fentanyl, a 72 percent increase from 2015. The 2017 NDTA also noted the increasing availability of fentanyl-laced pills marketed as legitimate prescription opioids like Percocet and Xanax. The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized more than 20,000 of these counterfeit pills in 2016, 20.4 million in 2021, and more than 10.2 million between May and September 2022. DEA Laboratory testing discovered that six out of ten fake pills analyzed in 2022 have a potentially lethal dose of fentanyl, compared to only four out of ten pills analyzed in 2021. Fentanyl’s expanding footprint has caused a spike in synthetic opioid-related overdoses. In 2021, a record 65 percent of the record 108,000 US overdoses were related to synthetic opioids.

For the US, 2016 was not the first fentanyl overdose outbreak. Between April 2005 and March 2007, the DEA reported 1,013 non-pharmaceutical fentanyl-related deaths. The DEA attributed the outbreak to the ‘readily available’ precursor chemical N-phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP). As a response to the outbreak, the DEA designated NPP as a Schedule 1 chemical, which subjects its sale to regulations, deterring its illicit usage. The US continued to weaponize scheduling against several other key chemicals used to produce illicit fentanyl. The US Department of Treasury also sanctions significant figures in the illicit drug trade, but experts claim the sanctions overlook the complexities of the market.

By 2019, fentanyl had ousted the previous market hegemon, heroine, as the main driver of the US opioid crisis. The shift from heroine to fentanyl also represented a shift from non-synthetic drugs to synthetics in the US market. And the emergence of demand for synthetics boosted the need for the precursor chemicals needed to produce fentanyl, opening the door to China’s tricky chemical production industry and the Communist Party. China is the world’s leading chemical exporter by value and has between 160,000 to 400,000 chemical companies, most of which operate illegally.

Imposing class-wide regulations on fentanyl and its known precursors has been invaluable to US antidrug efforts. China also adopted a similar approach to countering the trade of fentanyl and its chemical precursors. Effective 1 May 2019, China officially controlled all forms of fentanyl as a class of drugs, honoring a commitment made by Xi Jinping in the May 2019 G-20 Summit. The new measure also featured stricter control of online fentanyl sales, the creation of special teams to investigate leads on fentanyl trafficking, and stricter enforcement of shipping regulations. The new measure, a result of severe diplomatic pressure from the US, curbed the flow of fentanyl and precursors coming directly from China. The US State Department’s 2020 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report states that China’s class scheduling “led to pronounced shifts in fentanyl and fentanyl analogue flows to the United States.” Citing data from Customs and Border Patrol, the report showed a drop of over 116 kilograms in FY2017 to less than 200 grams in FY2019 in seizures of fentanyl directly shipped from China. However, despite US-China counternarcotics cooperation yielding positive outcomes, the CCP’s will to cooperate has suffered under the overall decline of their geostrategic relationship.

The current severity of the US fentanyl crisis is a grim reminder that Washington must work with Beijing to stem the flow of illicit precursor chemicals. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the main agency responsible for coordinating international drug control programs, adopted a strategy in 2019 based on increasing the difficulty of manufacturing and trafficking illicit drugs. To do this, the strategy describes the need to “work with the People’s Republic of China to address the production, sale, and export of precursor chemicals.” China has maintained a posture of innocence toward illicit fentanyl production and trafficking, especially in the context of the US opioid crisis. Since 2018, China has not acted on US-provided indictments and intelligence on Chinese traffickers. Recently, after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan in August 2022, China’s Foreign Minister characteristically announced it would suspend cooperation with the US to combat narcotics trafficking.

Besides the absence of cooperation, China’s chemical production industry remains an immovable force in the fentanyl supply chain. The industry’s role in the fentanyl supply chain is fixed due to its ability to circumvent US and Chinese drug laws and the CCP’s inability and unwillingness to regulate it. Even though the CCP identifies as a global leader in counternarcotics, they have long struggled to regulate the export of illicit drugs and chemicals, and fentanyl is the latest example.

The class regulations stemmed the flow of illicit fentanyl directly to the US, but experts doubted the regulations’ ability to stem the supply chain itself due to rising US demand and the CCP’s inability to regulate chemical production. According to the RAND Corporation, “China has some 5,000 pharmaceutical manufacturers, but regulators scrutinize a small share of companies.” This not only shows the need for regular US-China cooperation, but also China’s chemical producers’ ability to sustain an illicit output despite new regulations.

Soon after the class-wide regulations on fentanyl and its analogues took effect in May 2019, the Chinese chemical producers employed an array of tactics to sustain the illicit supply-chain. One influential tactic was using Mexican Cartels as the middleman to the US market, which not only  upheld the supply-chain, but also solidified its transnational reach. An investigation by C4ADS found that chemical producers use an ‘ever-evolving’ mix of non-scheduled chemicals to avert international drug controls in addition to online advertising techniques that are sensitive to legal restrictions and enforcement pressure. These attributes, among others, show the predatory nature and agility of China’s chemical producers and some of the challenges the CCP face when trying to enforce regulations.

The industry’s rampant illicit chemical production and distribution has been costly to the CCP’s self-made image as a global leader in counternarcotics and strengthened the rift in their relations with the US. While there is a political disparity between the US and China’s motivation to tackle the fentanyl problem, there are opportunities for both countries. Regulating the chemical industry would bolster the CCP’s ability to combat transnational crime. For the US, fentanyl seizures and synthetic opioid-related overdoses would decrease at a pace parallel to that of the two countries’ bilateral efforts. But there is little global political appetite for scheduling a vast number of dual-use chemicals, which forebodes its continued absence.

Illicit fentanyl seizures and overdoses related to synthetic opioids continue to soar in the US due to severed counternarcotics cooperation and a resilient illicit supply-chain. Despite the actors and mechanisms of the fentanyl problem being responsive to comprehensive drug laws, the decline in US-China geostrategic relations moves the chance of cooperation further away from reality. And without cooperation, China’s chemical production industry maintains the upper hand against law enforcement in addition to their transnational grip on the US market and ongoing opioid crisis.

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Businesses are rightly more concerned now over the outbreak of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait and its impact on physical security, assets/investments, and business continuity. Given the Chinese response to US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s 2-3 Aug 2022 visit to Taiwan, the risk of significant business disruption is perceived to have shifted up a notch from a low probability scenario to medium probability.

What has changed?

Prompted by the visit, China launched military exercises unprecedentedly close to Taiwan, as compared to the 1995-6 third Taiwan Strait crisis. China effectively closed six zones surrounding Taiwan from 4-7 Aug. Unlike in 1995-6, this is a step up as three of the exercise zones fall within Taiwan’s territorial waters, and all the zones fall on Taiwan’s side of the median line. China also launched ballistic missiles into multiple exercise zones, and some of these missiles overflew Taiwan, another unprecedented move. These Chinese military exercises signalled China’s ability to impose a blockade on Taiwan and also featured anti-access area denial capabilities to ward off intervening foreign forces.

China also demonstrated the full range of its options short of war – from economic leverage to cyber-attacks. China temporarily halted over 100 Taiwanese brands of food imports and also stopped selling sand to Taiwan. China did not go as far as to stop other types of Taiwanese imports like electronics, but started strictly enforcing its customs regulations stipulating that products with Taiwanese-made content had to be labelled as made in “Taiwan, China” or “Chinese Taipei.” Chinese state-sponsored groups also engaged in low level cyberattacks on government and commercial targets in Taiwan.

Impact on businesses and supply chains

China’s actions have had a limited impact on maritime shipping and air traffic in and around Taiwan. China restricted commercial flights that passed through danger areas, but as far as media reporting indicated, this was only for the four day (4-7 Aug) duration of the first round of military exercises. Some commercial shipping had also been affected. Transit traffic (such as large LNG vessels) through shipping routes close to Taiwan had been rerouted to avoid the exercise areas, and cargo ships also had to seek longer alternative access routes.

No major impact on supply chains had been observed. An AmCham survey of 126 US companies in Taiwan reported in mid-August indicated that only a handful of these companies experienced supply chain delays. This was probably due to limited duration of the closure of maritime and air zones, and the fact that Pelosi’s potential visit was widely speculated by the media, which provided early warning and probably allowed businesses to make adjustments to prepare for disruptions.

Nonetheless, China’s actions have had a demonstrative impact of how disruptive an actual blockade would be. This would have alarmed businesses concerned about operational risks and supply chain disruptions. Zone 2 of the exercise area, which was located north of Taiwan, was proximate to the port of Taipei and the city’s main airports. Zone 6 was just off the coast from Taiwan’s southern port of Kaoshiung, a major gateway for vessels picking up Taiwanese semiconductor chips and where state refiner CPC Corp makes petrochemicals to supply manufacturers globally. During the exercise period, maritime shipping steered clear of this large area (zone 6) out of caution and called on other Taiwanese ports instead.

What does this mean?

Most analysts have pointed out that the developments surrounding Pelosi’s visit and its aftermath represent a new normal of more mini Taiwan crises. China probably intended to use its response to normalise its military activity around Taiwan. Chinese state media quoted a commentator who said that the PLA will henceforth conduct regular drills on Taiwan’s side of the median line. Going forward, China will need to respond forcefully to US and Taiwanese provocations, which have grown increasingly bold. Pelosi’s Beijing-defying visit has now paved the way and encouraged more of such unofficial visits, including by US congressional delegations eager to profile themselves ahead of the US mid-term elections. For example, a second congressional delegation arrived in Taiwan on 15 Aug, barely two weeks after Pelosi’s delegation left. This prompted the PLA Eastern Theatre Command to announce a continuation of its joint exercises around Taiwan.

We should expect a higher state of US-China tensions over Taiwan, given the strategic importance of the Taiwan question to US-China relations and the escalatory dynamics surrounding this perennial flashpoint. As recent developments have shown, the US and Taiwan have become much bolder in pushing the boundaries of the grey area around the One China Policy, and in response, China’s warning moves (though calibrated and short of provoking a conflict) have become much more forceful. Monitoring should focus on identifying developments which have the potential to trigger misperception and action-reactionary spirals amongst the three players – China, Taiwan, and the US.

For those worried about the US and China sleepwalking into World War III, the risk of conflict has indeed increased but is by no means a high probability outcome. Neither is the US spoiling for a fight nor is China set on a costly warpath toward national rejuvenation. Conflict is not in the long-term interest of both major powers, and there have been signs of restraint on both sides. China’s longer-term gameplan still remains peaceful reunification with Taiwan under a one country two systems model, although trends in Taiwanese public opinion remains a major obstacle. China’s position was clearly spelled out in its third white paper in three decades, released promptly on 10 Aug after days of military posturing. Similar to the previous two white papers, China emphasised that use of force would be a last resort, although it did not rule this out if their redlines were crossed. Furthermore, any military invasion would come at a significant cost to China. China cannot invade Taiwan without seriously setting back not only its economy but also its own technological development, since Taiwan produces the vast majority of advanced chips and is also integral to global semiconductor supply chains which China is still heavily reliant on for imported chips.

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Here are the major takeaways from the document:

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Two weeks ago, US President Joe Biden announced a new Pentagon task force to examine how the United States should respond to the growing challenge posed by China. The 15-member task force will be composed of civilian and military officials, and it will examine the full spectrum of US-China relations, everything from Beijing’s maturing military and technological capacities to the potential impacts of China’s rising power on US allies in Asia.

More recently, US Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer announced that he is directing his caucus to draft a set of bills countering China’s unfair trade practices, namely in the tech sector. Just yesterday a group of lawmakers met with the US president to discuss new ways to secure US supply chains of strategic commodities.

It appears as though a new strategic paradigm is coalescing with regard to US China policy. But don’t call it an overhaul – there was never much of a comprehensive strategy in the first place.

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A recent call between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and top diplomat Yang Jiechi has helped to answer a burning question in US foreign policy circles: Will President Biden’s China policy come to resemble Trump’s scorched earth approach, or will it opt for the path of least resistance and revert to the previous dogma of ‘peaceful evolution.’

The phone call, along with recent hawkish rhetoric from Washington, suggest that this is one area where we’ll see some policy continuity between the two administrations.

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As 2020 neared its end, the results of a survey conducted by Pew Research Center revealed that negative perceptions of China have risen markedly in several major Western countries over the past year. After the emergence of COVID-19 in Wuhan and the later ravaging of Europe and the US by the virus, the findings are not all that surprising. Yet unfavorable public opinion toward China in the West also reflects broader concerns over trade disputes, a crackdown on Hong Kong activists and human rights abuses in Xinjiang.

Negative views increased most in Australia, where 81% viewed China unfavorably – a 24% increase on last year. The US was not far behind: 73% had an unfavorable perception of China, up 13% on 2019 and 20% since Donald Trump was elected. In major European states including the UK and Germany, and in regional rivals Japan and South Korea, negative perceptions also rose. And across all 14 nations surveyed, 61% said China had done a “bad job” in handling COVID-19 and 78% expressed little or no confidence in Xi Jinping.

China has pushed back on criticism of its response to the initial outbreak, and having brought the virus under control domestically, is attempting to shift the narrative on COVID-19 to cast itself in a positive light. The supply of face masks and medical equipment abroad, and defence of its containment measures by an increasingly vocal band of “wolf warrior” diplomats, are a key part of this battle to influence opinion. Will these efforts be successful? And what else must Beijing do to rebuild its damaged global reputation?

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US-China relations stand at a turning point.

The pre-Trump model of accommodation in the hope of changing China is done and dusted. The question now is whether or not China will manage to change the West.

But what replaces the old way of doing things? Will it be the Trump administration’s approach, assertive in style if not always substance? Or will there be an attempt to gloss over differences, suspend the decoupling, and arrive at some kind of new bilateral accommodation?

Whatever the ‘new normal’ in US-China relations ends up being, 2021 is likely to be the year that got the ball rolling.

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One of the landmark policies of the Trump administration was taking China to task over unfair trade practices. Though the complaints far predated Trump, with threats to classify China as a currency manipulator or remove its most-favored nation status long treated as rites of passage on the US campaign trail, Trump went much further than his predecessors by initiating a full-fledged trade war with the People’s Republic of China.

The goal was to end unfair state support for Chinese competitors (which would require systemic change in the PRC), renew the United States’ manufacturing sector, and eliminate its yawning trade imbalance with China.

Did the US-China trade war achieve its aims?

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