The conflict in Yemen continues to undermine the impoverished country’s economy and infrastructure, and now a humanitarian crisis is brewing. What was originally a civil war between the Houthi movement, drawn from the Zaidi Shia Muslim minority from Yemen’s northwest, and the central government of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi has now become a proxy war between Iran, which backs the Houthis by supplying arms, and Saudi Arabia, which has intervened in support of President Hadi.

Yemen’s humanitarian disaster is now further compounded by an ongoing naval blockade by Saudi-led forces. The blockade is being blamed for pushing Yemen to the brink of famine, with 70 percent of the population in need of international aid. Meanwhile, jihadist groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and so-called Islamic State (IS) have taken advantage of the chaos, seizing territory in the south and increasing their attacks throughout Yemen, particularly in the old southern capital of Aden.

Background

Collapsing state authority. Although Yemen had been in various levels of turmoil for years, the forced departure of its long-time authoritarian leader Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011 set off a catastrophic chain of events which led to central government authority collapsing during 2014-15. Saleh had handed the reins of power to his deputy, Hadi, whose ability to control the Yemeni armed forces was subsequently fatally compromised by Yemeni officers who remained loyal to Saleh. Corruption, unemployment, terrorism, separatism, and food insecurity also undermined the Hadi regime, which essentially collapsed in September 2014, when the Iran-backed Houthi movement entered the capital of Sanaa. The Houthis were able to expand outside their heartland due to support from disaffected Yemenis across the political spectrum, plus an unlikely alliance with their former nemesis in the deposed Saleh.

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In a 55-minute video released in September 2014, the leader of Al-Qaeda announced that the movement was expanding into India. Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri assured Moslems in Burma, Bangladesh, in the Indian states of Assam and Gujarat, and in Kashmir, “that your brothers” in the militant organization “did not forget you and that they are doing what they can to rescue you.”

Zawahiri explained that creating the Qaeda al-Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent had taken more than two years to complete. It is Al-Qaeda’s first Asian branch.

The declaration came two months after Baghdadi, in his black cloak of Caliph Ibrahim, proclaimed his hegemony over Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the one hundred and seventy-five million Moslems of India. During the fifty-five minute video, Ayman al-Zawahiri said nothing about the rival Islamic State. Instead, Ayman al-Zawahiri repeated his allegiance to Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban. At the time, he appears not to have known that Mullah Omar had died nearly a year and a half earlier.

After Ayman al-Zawahiri released the September 2014 video and disappeared for the next eleven months, the rumor mill produced stories that he had died, or had been removed in a coup, or was planning some spectacular event. The failure of the emir to praise the Yemeni branch of Al-Qaeda for the successful attack in January upon the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo was unusual. Failing to eulogize the death by an American drone in June of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the leader of the Yemeni branch and his chosen successor left many members worried because the movement was under attack by the Islamic State in Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, and Syria.

The return in August of the emir in a ten minute video did not explain the reason for his absence. In it, he pledges his allegiance to the new leader of the Taliban, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor and eulogizes the late Mullah Omar. The surprise that might explain the reason for the disappearance was the disclosure that Al-Qaeda was following the Taliban back to Helmand Province in Afghanistan from where it had fled fourteen years ago.

One other surprise was the introduction of Hamza bin Osama bin Laden in a ten minute video that was recorded in May and released on August 19. The twenty-four year old son of Osama Bin Laden praised the martyrs to the cause, urged more attacks upon the United States, and pledged his allegiance to Mullah Omar.

His introduction comes at the time when Al-Qaeda is undergoing a transformation.

A recording by Ayman al-Zawahiri released this September and believed to have been made around February reflects the shift in Al-Qaeda’s strategy. “Despite the big mistakes [of IS], if I were in Iraq or Syria I would co-operate with them in killing the crusaders and secularists and Shi’ites even though I don’t recognize the legitimacy of their state, because the matter is bigger than that.” Abdullah bin Mohammed, who is an Al-Qaeda theorist, is proposing that the strategy of recent years has been a failure and that change is necessary.

Jabhat al-Nusra’s second-in-command Abu Mariah al-Qahtani of the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda voiced his support for the strategy that Abdullah bin Mohammed calls “political guerrilla war.” He opposes confronting the far more powerful states that can overwhelm the movement or the creation of caliphates that are easy targets for superior military forces.

Political guerrilla war advocates the merging of the Al-Qaeda movement within a coalition of Jihad organizations. Abdullah bin Mohammed’s methods appear to have been put into operation in Syria.

Jabhat al-Nusra, which is strongest in Idlib province, had joined with a number of other Jihadist groups to form the Army of Conquest. The united force captured Abu al-Duhur airbase after a two-year long battle for the last remaining government military base in Idlib province.

The formation of the Army of Conquest has received approval from the Turkish, Saudi Arabian, and Qatari sponsors who are providing financing and fresh supplies of weapons. There, however, are reservations by other Jihadist groups about including Al-Nusra in an alliance.

Responding to the doubts, Ayman al-Zawahiri earlier this year outlined in a secret communication the strategy for the Syrian branch. A strategic shift that is causing a schism within the organization is focusing upon Syria and abandoning the traditional objective of targeting the far off enemy, meaning the U.S.

Ayman al-Zawahiri instructed the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra’s to adapt to the local cultural and political environment by coordinating more closely with other Islamic groups. The movement is to promote a Sharia legal system and to strengthen its base within Syria.

Directing Jabhat al-Nusra to abandon plans to attack the far off enemy will have little effect upon the Syrian-based branch, because it has been the Yemen franchise of Al-Qaeda that was responsible for the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris and attempts to send bombs to the United States. There is no evidence that the shift in policy to localize operations has been extended to AQAP in Yemen. Going by the first public statement of Qassim al-Raymi released in early July, the new military leader of AQAP is calling for more attacks upon the United States.

The real change for AQAP has come as a result of the Saudi Arabian invasion of Yemen in March. So far, the Saudis are ignoring AQAP and the Al-Qaeda branch is avoiding contact with the Saudis.

This is a time of consolidation for AQAP.

The movement has taken control of the southeastern province of Hadramawt, which is the ancestral territory of Al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden. Al-Qaeda militants are enforcing Islamic sharia law throughout the province.

About the time that Saudi Arabia launched its invasion of Yemen, Iran released in a prisoner exchange with AQAP five of the organization’s key leaders. The loss of so many of the Yemen branch of Al-Qaeda’s key personnel to drone attacks makes the return of these five a needed infusion of vital management; and their return makes AQAP more dangerous.

Saif Al-Adl is viewed to be the most dangerous of the five. The former colonel in the Egyptian army has a five million dollar bounty on his head. He is believed to have been involved in the 1998 bombings of US embassies in East Africa.

Abu Mohamed al-Misri was involved in much of the Al-Qaeda operational planning before the attack upon the World Trade Center in 2001. Abul Qassam was a colleague of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was involved in the founding of the organization that became Islamic State. There are also Sari Shibab and Abdul Khayr al-Misri.

So long as the Saudi Arabian military coalition is occupied with fighting the Houthis, Al-Qaeda in Yemen has a license to continue consolidating its position. Eventually, it is more likely that it will be the Saudis and their allies who will be forced to abandon the battlefield. That will leave the Houthis, Al-Qaeda, and the growing Islamic State to battle each other.

What remains an open question is why Hamza bin Osama bin Laden was placed center stage at this time. The simple answer may be that he can provide the organization the psychological link to the man who many consider to be the founder of the Jihadist movements, the man called the Lion of Jihad; but is the son the Lion’s cub?

Osama Bin Laden made his reputation by performing a number of spectacular terrorist feats. If Hamza bin Osama bin Laden is to be accepted as a leader capable of rivaling the caliph of the Islamic State, he too must make is mark by some grand blow against the enemy. Al-Qaeda has spoken about attacks against vital Western symbols, such as Big Ben in London or the Eiffel Tower in Paris, or the Vatican in Rome. There are many other potential targets; and we should not be surprised if Al-Qaeda presents the son as the second coming of the father.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Throughout the course of these events, it was an open question how Saudi Arabia would respond. Yemen, after all, with its near 50-50 split between Sunnis and Shiites and proximity to the Kingdom, represents fertile ground in the battle between Saudi Arabia and Iran – a rivalry that is increasingly unfettered as Washington experiments with a more balanced engagement in the region.

Well it seems we have our answer.

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The Houthi religious-political-military movement was born in the eighties in the northern region of Saada under the leadership of Husayn al-Huthi (deceased), expressing a Zaydi (a Shiite sect which ruled the Imamate in northern Yemen until 1962) pushback against Sunni dominance in the country, which is supported by the central government and by Saudi funds. After the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011, the Houthis have managed to take over control of a vast area thanks, in no small part, to the retreat of army units still loyal to Saleh. In doing so they defeated the Sunni militias linked to the Islah Party (which includes the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists). Meanwhile, Ansarullah, the Houthi political movement, was taking part in the ‘national dialogue’ process to re-draft the Constitution; therefore, the Houthis have managed to gain both military and political ground, not unlike Hezbollah did in Lebanon during the 1990s.

Last August, the Houthi militias exploited the government’s reduction of fuel subsidies to occupy the capital Sana’a. At first, they did this ‘peacefully,’ but inevitably they clashed with security forces and pro-government militias. Finally, the Houthis, along with all other parties in the Yemeni quagmire, signed the National Peace Agreement (NPA) in September, which managed to reduce the urban violence for a while under the rule of a temporary government. The NPA established the formation of a caretaker government, which included the backing of Ansarullah and another separatist group from the South.

Yet the Houthis have rejected the attempt at federal reform, because under this plan their strongholds would be grouped into a new macro-region of Azal, which is densely populated, poor in energy resources, and landlocked.

The Houthis then retaliated by kidnapping Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, Secretary of Reforms, and holding the presidential palace and the private residence of the president under siege, which culminated in an attack on the prime minister’s convoy.

A Web of Rivalries

Were Yemen’s problems simply confined to Houthi/Sunni rivalries, a solution could be found. The problem is that Yemen has at least four separate conflicts within its borders. There is a clash between the northern insurgents and the central authority (mirrored in the south by the Southern Movement, which is clearly demanding independence). Then the Islah movement and the old regime’s elite, headed by Ahmed Saleh (son of the exiled former president Saleh), has been challenging the transitional authority. The Army has served as the ‘battleground’ for this conflict, where loyalties are not to the central government but to tribal leaders and their various allegiances. This phenomenon has effectively left the central government with no military forces through which to challenge the much more dedicated and disciplined factional militias, allowing the Houthis to gain territory very quickly. The fact that the Sunnis are divided among supporters of the former president and his clan and the transitional authority has created a vacuum making the Houthi advance even more dramatic. Ansarullah has, in fact, taken over territories in the western coastal region (including the Hodeida, oil terminal), as well as in the central Sunni strongholds of Marib or Ibb. The vacuum has also allowed al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to regain some strength against a stripped central military force. AQAP has attacked police and military installations as well as Houthis (their main enemy). Amid the accentuated climate of tribal division, the Sunni tribes, whether against or in favor of former president Saleh, have tended to side more alongside AQAP than show even the least bit support for the Shiite Houthis.

There have been accusations that the Houthis have been receiving funding and weapons from Iran while Saudi Arabia, which had backed Saleh at first and then the transitional government, has suspended financial aid to Yemen. The problem for Washington is that the Houthis represent the best way to contain AQAP in Yemen, given the collapse of the temporary government and the official armed forces. However, the Houthis are not especially sympathetic to the United States, given the latter’s support for Saudi Arabia – which has engaged in frequent skirmishes against the Houthis over the past few years and even before President Saleh’s resignation. President Obama will surely discuss the Yemen situation with the new Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz in order to relaunch regional cooperation; nonetheless, continued talks between the United States and Iran over containment of the latter’s nuclear program should also leave some room for the Houthis to take up their struggle against AQAP.

Any issue of US military involvement to try and restore order is very delicate because Yemenis, according to polls, have shown some of the highest rates of ‘anti-Americanism’ in the Arab world. Such interventions, or even the perception of US support for the temporary government, would only add to the divisions. Foreign intervention could prompt some people to support the militants against the ’invader,’ which would then truly risk creating another Afghanistan, albeit one much closer to the world’s largest oil producer.

Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world; it has some oil, but reserves are dwindling and there is no investment in new exploration because of high security risks. Recent governments – especially the one led by Saleh – have not had any economic plan to deal with the ‘post-oil’ future. Saudi Arabia is understandably concerned, as it is clear that Yemen has descended into a situation of chronic instability and militancy.

Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer, fears this instability and the void that has enabled insurgent groups such as AQAP to establish territorial footholds. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Emirates are concerned by the prospect of Yemen becoming another Afghanistan, which has had a destabilizing effect on neighboring Pakistan. Much like Afghanistan, and adding to security concerns, Yemen is poor; the population faces a number of health and economic difficulties such that the Yemeni government is always on the brink of having to confront a disaster. Yemen could yet become another failed state overrun by extremists in an area already marked by the presence of that better-known failed state of Somalia. Through the Bab-al-Mandab, Yemen occupies a strategic position at the entry of the Red Sea, which is one of the world’s leading cargo shipping routes; it is also the main route for the shipment of oil from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Any unrest in Yemen is a cause of concern in Riyadh, the other capitals of the Gulf, and inevitably in the West as well.

Saudi Arabia is not only concerned by the growing risk of terrorism from Yemen, it is also worried by the spillover effects of the Shiite, specifically the Zaidi Shiite, rebellion in northern Yemen. After suffering intense bombardment last December, the Zaidi rebels have tried to come to an agreement with the Saudi-backed Yemeni government. Meanwhile, having incurred heavy bombardments for the past few years, the government of Yemen has denied the Zaidi rebels request for an unconditional ceasefire. The government is concerned that the Zaidis have not made an explicit reference to refusing to attack Saudi Arabia, which is also home to a Zaidi Shiite community in the areas bordering Yemen. Saudi Arabia became very involved in suppressing the Houthi revolt in 2010, though the Zaidi rebellion began in 2004 and has so far left thousands dead and driven 200,000 people from their homes. Ironically, one of the Yemeni social phenomena that is raising concerns in Saudi Arabia is the spread of Wahhabi or Salafist interpretations of Islam among Yemeni youth – from Saudi Arabia.

While the United States has already given Yemen at least USD 100 million in military aid, it would be wiser to target Yemen’s socioeconomic problems. Oil production is expected to end by 2017, while Yemen’s population – already experiencing a 40% unemployment rate – may double by 2035 at current birth rates. While all Arab countries are characterized by large percentages of youth, Yemen is the country where this phenomenon is highest, seeing as 45% of the population is below 15 years of age. Considering the stunted opportunities for economic growth, an imminent oil shortage, and the severe water problems, Yemen is a social and security time bomb.

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One such vacuum is Yemen, though few are aware of it because the local government’s struggle has faded into obscurity against the more high-profile disasters of Syria and Iraq.

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Since its establishment in January 2009, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has launched numerous attacks against American interests in the region. In response, Washington has slowly expanded its drone attacks in Yemen and strengthened the government’s ability to fight this ‘organization’ on its own via increased training and military assistance. With the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011, a political crisis emerged in Yemen between former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who ruled for more than 30 years, and his opponents who criticized the government’s systemic corruption and failure to provide basic services. Al-Qaeda took advantage of the growing security vacuum and launched a series of raids across the South in that year. As the Arab Spring intensified in Yemen, causing the overthrow of the Saleh regime, al-Qaeda significantly expanded it operations, particularly against the Yemeni armed forces. In March of 2012, an Islamic Emirate was declared in Shabwa province, and the city of Zanzibar has been held by the organization since 2012.

The surge of al-Qaeda’s activities in Yemen after the Arab Spring is a cause of great concern for both the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the United States. Yemen’s control over one of the most important naval straits in the world, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, which is located between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, underscores this geostrategic importance. Commercial liners and oil tankers pass through the strait on their way to and from the Suez Canal. International stakeholders are concerned that al-Qaeda will take advantage of the current transitional conditions in Yemen to threaten shipping and international trade, contributing to the maritime piracy that is already blighting the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

There are several factors that will complicate new Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s attempts to stabilize the South and reestablish central government authority. They include:

Terrain

Al-Qaeda has concentrated its activities in areas that are mountainous and lacking in infrastructure, where literacy rates are low and poverty is rife. In this, Yemen poses challenges similar to those of Afghanistan.

Political Instability

The Islamists are taking advantage of post-revolution political turmoil. Currently, the armed forces are preoccupied with internal stability and domestic political power struggles; the Yemen Army is seeking to maximize its influence and presence in several cities, especially in the southern provinces. In fact, there are political parties and power blocs that are invested in al-Qaeda’s activities because they lost out in the process of political transition in Yemen. Many opposition groups and tribes have thus facilitated al-Qaeda’s activities as a way to weaken the incipient central government. For example, some tribes have allowed terrorists to establish safe havens for training and recruitment.

Arms

In addition to the fact that Yemen has the second highest rate of gun ownership in the world, al-Qaeda-allied groups have been able to seize large quantities of weapons, equipment, and ammunition from Yemeni army sites captured in the south and southeast of Yemen.

These factors have enhanced al-Qaeda’s ability to become President Hadi’s biggest challenge in moving the country from dictatorship to democracy. After the Arab Spring, the new leadership inherited a fragmented security and military apparatus that must contend with an organized terrorist structure with a strong grip on many of the important cities and regions in the southern part of the country. Given the circumstances, the new government is faced with a very difficult task. On the one hand, it must fulfill the political responsibilities entrusted to it in the transitional phase, particularly the responsibility to push for a national dialogue and political settlement. On the other hand, Hadi’s government has to eliminate all sources (economic, political, and security) that al-Qaeda is drawing on to strengthen its grip on the southern areas. It also needs to understand that the continued escalation of al-Qaeda activity will doubtlessly overshadow the overall situation in Yemen, making any political settlement vulnerable to further shocks. The war against Islamist militants is draining the state’s resources, all at the expense of other political and economic development goals. In addition, security agencies have often botched operations in dealing with militants, thus prolonging the duration of the fight and encouraging al-Qaeda to carry out more daring attacks against top Yemeni leaders.

The inability of the new government to resolve the battle with al-Qaeda will affect the democratic transition negatively. It’s only a matter of time until Yemeni citizens lose confidence in the transitional government which has promised to fight terrorism and ease their economic hardship. This may push some people to engage in other local or regional political projects, or even fall into the arms of terrorist groups. Moreover, the continuation of these groups’ activities in Yemen will encourage dissatisfied young people on the regional and international level to come to Yemen and support the terrorist cause.

In the end, the geostrategic blessing of Yemen’s location – its proximity to oil wells of the Gulf and supervision of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb – is turning into a geostrategic curse. At present, these characteristics merely expose the country to more external pressure and interference, turning it into an open battleground against terrorism.

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The geopolitical significance of Yemen is often understated in mainstream media. Situated between Saudi Arabia and Somalia, it occupies the north shore of the crucial Gulf of Aden. It also has the second-highest rate of gun ownership in the world- coming in behind the unbeatable gun-loving behemoth that is the United States. Thus, a breakdown of Yemeni stability could in turn lead to a destabilization of Saudi Arabia in the north just as easily as it could feed into the expanding sphere of al-Shabab influence across the Gulf of Aden. In other words, it would turn into yet another hot zone in the global terror game of ‘whack-a-mole’ that Western military planners are engaged in- and one that would be extremely hard to ‘fix’ using a military option.

Unfortunately, a breakdown in the internal stability of Yemen seems to be exactly what is occurring. A cursory check of Al-Jazeera’s Yemen Blog can tell you all that you need know regarding the extent of ongoing violence. There have been frequent clashes within Sana’a between the Republican Guard that is still loyal to President Saleh and the First Armoured Division that is led by Ali-Mohshen al-Ahmar, a general who has defected and taken up the cause of defending protestors in Change Square. There have also been incidents of government bombing in Taiz, Yemen’s second largest city and home to high concentrations of anti-Saleh protesters.

What’s important to take from the violence is this: It’s an incendiary confluence of extremist elements, fracturing government forces, and powerful elites. This is not a conflict that can be ‘fixed’ by short-term political reforms ala other ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings. There isn’t enough water, oil, or stable government institutions in Yemen to serve as a basis for economic renewal. These problems are deep-set and serious, and what we are now seeing is likely just the prelude for the onset of civil war between the north and south.

From a geopolitical standpoint, the Saudi regime will be hit hardest by anarchy in Yemen. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen-based branch of Al Qaeda behind the abortive 2009 Christmas Day Bombing, has been quite that its primary goal lies in toppling the Saudi regime in Riyadh. If Yemeni instability were to spread into the Saudi Kingdom and induce a violent response from the government, the Saudi’s could fast find themselves prevailing over their own rash of mass anti-government demonstrations. This would at the very least cause global oil prices to shoot through the roof, if not re-draw the map of the Middle East in a way that savages Western interests in the region.

There is still time to avoid the worst-case scenario in Yemen, but it will take a swift and creative response from international stakeholders. Like so many other countries grappling with home-grown terrorist movements, Yemen needs a political solution that is focused on economic renewal and foreign support. Yemeni corruption needs to be stemmed via political reform before foreign assistance can help mend the arguably more serious problems of dwindling oil reserves and a lack of potable water.

The international community is at a crossroads. There’s still time before Yemen falls into the abyss and Western pundits can comfortably invoke the all-too-common spectre of military intervention once more. But, as is the case with so many problems that require long-term planning to solve, will the window of opportunity slam shut before anyone even realized it was open?

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At least 33 people have been killed in an attack on a hotel close to the presidential palace in Mogadishu. Fighting started when al-Shabab fighters, disguised as government soldiers, broke into the heavily fortified hotel and began to hunt down government MPs in fierce room-to-room fighting. The militants eventually detonated themselves, but not before six government MPs, five government officials, and 21 civilians had been killed.

These attacks were both brazen, taking place during the holy month of Ramadan, and disturbingly well-planned. They seem to be modeled after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, as they apparently required specific training and long term planning and reconnaissance. According to the New York Times, several local residents claimed that the fighters had been seen renting rooms in the area and scouting out the target for weeks in advance. Al-Shabab has also gone on the record to claim that those who executed the attacks were a part of their “special forces.”

The attack comes just one day after al-Shabab declared a “massive and final” war against the transitional government and AMISOM forces in Mogadishu.  It’s possible that the attacks are aimed at curtailing some of the momentum that the AU deployment has gained in the wake of the World Cup bombings in Uganda. Uganda’s commitment of an additional 1,300 troops is set to start landing in Somalia over the next few weeks.

All in all, though this recent attack suggests that al-Shabab’s tactics and logistics are evolving, the military balance between the two sides remains a stalemate.

Around the internet, Dr. Afyare Abdi Elmi agrees that the military situation will remain a stalemate:

“As long as these [AU] forces are in Mogadishu, I think it will be unlikely for al-Shabab to take over [the city]. But they can inflict huge damage.”

AllAfrica is reporting that the government of South Africa has come out against sending troops to bolster the AMISOM deployment:

“South Africa is unlikely to deploy soldiers in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as it did “not believe” in the political direction being followed to resolve the conflict, and there was no exit strategy, an analyst said.”

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Al-Shabab’s motivation for the Kampala attacks was likely two-fold: they allowed the group to prove its operational capacity by conducting attacks outside Somalia’s borders and they also allowed an opportunity for al-Shabab to make a grab at populist legitimacy. In other words, by justifying the attacks as revenge for indiscriminate shelling by Ugandan forces in AMISOM, al-Shabab positioned itself as defender of the Somali people against an ‘outsider’ African Union detachment in Mogadishu. This is definitely the type of imagery that al-Shabab will be using to win the hearts and minds of Somalis. Basically, the group will use nationalism to woo the masses of traditionally-moderate Somalis who wince at the more fundamentalist aspects of al-Shabab’s ideology.

However, whether or not al-Shabab can re-brand AMISOM as an ‘infidel army’ remains to be seen. The AMISOM detachment has taken over three years to get up to its intended strength of 8,000 troops, a feat which was accomplished just this week after a Ugandan pledge of 2,000 more troops. Furthermore, African Union troops have been stymied by rules of engagement that at best limit their effectiveness and at worst put them in grave danger. Essentially, the AMISOM detachment has never had the necessary resources to be effective, so the question of whether or not a reinforced AMISOM can make in-roads against al-Shabab remains a mystery.

Although the AMISOM mandate has remained largely untouched by African Union heads of state at this week’s summit in Kampala, AMISOM troops will now be able to conduct pre-emptive strikes on militants. Also, the two Muslim-majority states of Guinea and Djibouti have pledged to send troops to Somalia to bolster AMISOM numbers.

It seems that the Kampala attacks may have backfired on al-Shabab. Far from deterring African Union members from sending troops to Somalia, they seem to have revitalized the AMISOM mission. Instead of seeing the Somali conflict as strictly a domestic affair, African Union leaders are starting to view it as a regional security threat- and they are responding in kind.

Over the next few months, we will see whether an unfettered and better-supplied AMISOM can make a push against al-Shabab militancy.

Around the internet, BBC News’ Will Ross has raised the possibility that an enlarged AMISOM mission may play into al-Shabab’s plans:

However the presence of more foreign troops in Somalia and the deaths of more civilians could well play right into the hands of al-Shabab… It wants to paint the AU mission, like the earlier Ethiopian intervention, as a foreign invasion and in so doing gain more support from Somalis and possibly jihadists way beyond the country’s borders.

AllAfrica has carried an interview with Johnnie Carson, Assistant US Secretary of State, on the potential for conflict in Somalia to spread throughout the region. Here’s an excerpt on what he sees as the crux of potential regional instability:

However the presence of more foreign troops in Somalia and the deaths of more civilians could well play right into the hands of al-Shabab… It wants to paint the AU mission, like the earlier Ethiopian intervention, as a foreign invasion and in so doing gain more support from Somalis and possibly jihadists way beyond the country’s borders.

AllAfrica has carried an interview with Johnnie Carson, Assistant US Secretary of State, on the potential for conflict in Somalia to spread throughout the region. Here’s an excerpt on what he sees as the crux of potential regional instability:

Beyond piracy, we see a multiplicity of problems flowing throughout the region. Violent extremism is an issue of international concern. The bombings in Kampala are a result of violent extremism. We know some of the leaders of the al-Qaeda east African cell were responsible for the tragic bombings of the American embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi on August 7th, 1998, and were responsible for the Paradise Hotel bomb blast in November 2002 and the attempt to shoot down an Israeli commercial plane on the same day. It is no longer possible for the international community to ignore the danger from a continued absence of security and governance in south-central Somalia.

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This weekend’s double bombing in Kampala bears all the hallmarks of an al-Shabab attack. It seems that Somalia’s homegrown strain of the Taliban has struck outside its own borders for the very first time.

Evidence pointing to an al-Shabab hand in the Kampala attacks is growing stronger and stronger. Unconfirmed reports from the scene of the blasts have noted the presence of a severed head and the remains of two victims thought to be suicide bombers of Somali origin. While it may take a while to uncover a ‘smoking gun’ through forensics, al-Shabab definitely has a motive for these kinds of attacks and the militant group has threatened to strike within Uganda before. Uganda is a key member of the African Union AMISOM deployment in Mogadishu, and just last week it pledged to boost its troop commitment.  Also, the targeting of an Ethiopian restaurant harkens to old al-Shabab vendettas concerning Ethiopian involvement in the 2006 ouster of the Islamic Courts Union government in Mogadishu.

Although this is the first instance of an al-Shabab attack outside Somali borders, the writing has been on the wall for a long time that al-Shabab would eventually attempt to export violence and fundamentalist ideology to surrounding countries.  In the wake of the abortive Christmas Day bombing, al-Shabab made clear its willingness to join up with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and transpose the conflict in lawless Somalia onto the wider region.

The situation presents somewhat of a ‘catch-22’ for Ugandan authorities. If they respond to the attacks by pushing harder in Somalia and possibly even ‘taking the fight to al-Shabab,’ then the conflict could take on a new intensity. Such an expansion of the size and scope of the AMISOM mission would play into al-Shabab plans insofar that the conflict for Mogadishu could be recast in a nationalist mould with al-Shabab donning the cloak of Somali nationalism in the fight against encroaching Western-backed interests.

As al-Shabab strengthens its hold on southern Somalia and the transitional government in Mogadishu appears less and less likely to ever mount a serious campaign to recover lost ground, all eyes are starting to land on Somaliland; a pseudo-independent and relatively stable territory in northern Somalia. It is looking increasingly likely that it’s merely a matter of time before the transitional government in Mogadishu falls to al-Shabab militants. If this happens, al-Shabab will then bring the struggle towards Somaliland in an effort to establish control over a united Somalia.

At this point, American and African Union support could hypothetically shift to Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland. If Mogadishu falls, AMISOM stakeholders will be searching for a way to carry on the fight against al-Shabab militancy and stabilize Somalia. On the other side, the government of Somaliland has long sought international recognition as a functioning independent state. There may not even be much choice in the matter, as the militant group has made it clear that it considers Somaliland a part of a united Somalia and that it would fight for it if the need arose.

Al-Shabab efforts to export violent ideology and stage attacks outside Somalia’s borders are particularly troubling due to the fact that the international community’s hands are tied when it comes to staging a response. An ANISOM escalation risks igniting nationalist passions and consequently further imperils security. Similarly, even if the United States was willing to put troops on the ground, the same dynamic would exist. In sum, most military approaches to the problem simply risk intensifying the conflict and dragging it out over a longer period of time.

The situation is somewhat similar to Afghanistan insofar that negotiation between the government and militants seems to be the only real way to defuse the conflict. What remains to be seen is whether or not Somalia will take as long as Afghanistan has to arrive at the same conclusion.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS: July 5th – July 12th, 2010

NORTH AMERICA

United States

The National Security Agency has begun work on an “expansive” spy system that will monitor critical infrastructure inside the United States for cyber-attacks, in a move that detractors say could end up violating privacy rights and expanding the NSA’s domestic spying abilities.

Despite its role in the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, energy giant BP remains a key supplier of fuel to the Pentagon, The Washington Post reported.

Mexico

With Mexico’s left divided and Calderon sinking in opinion polls, the PRI is eyeing a return to national power in 2012, two terms after PAN ended its 71-year rule in 2000.

WESTERN EUROPE

Europe

Euro MPs have approved a new deal to allow US anti-terror investigators to access Europeans’ bank data.

Norway

Three people have been arrested in connection with a plot to bomb targets in Norway, police in Oslo have said.

France

Prosecutors have launched an investigation into claims of illegal campaign funding for French President Nicolas Sarkozy, officials say.

A French bill to ban full-face veils worn by some Muslim women in public will go to parliament on Tuesday, bringing closer a measure which critics argue is hard to enforce and may be unconstitutional.

EASTERN EUROPE

Russia

The US and Russia have taken part in the biggest spy swap since the Cold War, in an exchange at Vienna airport.

Reports from Russia say a prisoner swap is being planned to bring 10 suspected Russian spies back from the US.

MIDDLE EAST

Iraq

A suicide bomber has blown up a car at an army check point in Baghdad killing at least five people, officials say.

More than 60 people have been killed in Baghdad in a wave of bombings targeting Shia Muslim pilgrims over the past three days, security sources say.

Israel

Israel said on Wednesday that its moves to ease its blockade on Gaza do not include relaxing regulations on Palestinians looking to travel out of the enclave, court documents showed.

Turkey

The Turkish foreign minister has warned Israel that ties with its decades-long ally could be in jeopardy unless the country apologizes for the May flotilla raid that cost the lives of eight Turkish citizens.

Iran

Iran said on Monday that Germany, Britain and the United Arab Emirates were refusing to provide fuel to Iranian passenger planes following unilateral U.S. sanctions on the Islamic state, the ISNA news agency reported

Iran has handed over new documents proving one of its nuclear scientists was abducted by the US, Tehran says.

SOUTH ASIA

Pakistan

At least 50 people have been killed in a suicide bombing in a Pakistani tribal village on the border with Afghanistan, officials said.

Afghanistan

Corruption in Afghanistan has doubled in the two years since 2007, according to a survey by anti-corruption charity Integrity Watch.

Sri Lanka

The European Union has decided to withdraw Sri Lanka’s preferential trade access to EU markets after it failed to improve its human rights record.

EAST ASIA

North Korea

North Korea on Friday proposed military talks with the United States next week to discuss the sinking of a South Korean warship which Washington blames on the North.

China

The Chinese government has renewed Google’s licence to operate in China, the internet giant has said, ending a long-running stand-off between the two.

Security is tight in Urumqi in China’s Xinjiang region ahead of the first anniversary of deadly ethnic riots.

AFRICA

Somalia

Witnesses say Somalis in four towns held by Islamist militants are protesting a recent decision by East African nations to send 2,000 more peacekeepers to Somalia.

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