The UNCLOS treaty boasts a membership of 168 countries, along with the European Union. Additionally, 14 United Nations Member States have signed UNCLOS but have yet to ratify it. Notably, only 16 United Nations Member and Observer States have refrained from both signing and ratifying UNCLOS. Among them is the United States of America, which has signed but not ratified the treaty.

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Beside the hypocrisy of taking the long flight and the associated carbon emissions to record a video and receive a briefing from scientists, public communication at the UN, not just about climate change, but a host of issues, is ironically, not rooted in science. A vast body of research from social and political psychology, in effect, renders Guterres’ message on climate ineffective. First, a concept known as construal-level theory, where the further removed one is from an experience, the more it impacts their preferences and actions. In other words, people have to experience climate change themselves and have tangible means of creating change in order to take concrete actions. Second, the UN faces the twin challenges of public mistrust, not only in scientists and scientific information, which was prevalent during the COVID-19 pandemic, but also growing distrust in leaders.

Mitigating trust and building confidence in the United Nations on a range of issues also means communicating results, which rarely at the global level result in something tangible to the public. Because UN agencies often use different terminology, have different climate-related programming, and often have varying ideas of what results mean, the resulting communication fails to connect with the public at large. Part of the problem is a failure to understand a long-standing “theory of change” within development organizations, defined as how an intervention can lead to a specific development change, drawing on causal analysis. Getting results depends not only on understanding what contributes to change, but focusing on results rather than the inputs or activities. When this occurs, UN officials will often talk about high-level government officials or staff that attended a key meeting or the general purpose of that meeting, but not the end results or what will contribute to results over time.

Results-based communication consequently becomes less frequent, or the impact of those results at a country level fail to make their way into communications that can resonate with the general public at the international level. In the case of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), its 2022 Annual Report featured fragments of information with little to no context, such as where artificial intelligence and technology somehow will “increase smarter use of water and irrigation in Palestine” or “strengthen climate resilience of farmers in Egypt.” Aside from an array of statistics that suggested “record delivery” the reader is left wondering what to do with the information. Donors have started to take notice. The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), which consists of 21 countries that regularly contribute to UNDP, including Australia, Japan, Denmark, Germany, and Canada, noted in a 2020 Assessment of UNDP that “[its results-based management (RBM) systems insufficiently steer and aggregate results at the global level”.

These issues are all compounded by the pace of modern communication. While the spectacle of a talking dinosaur voiced by actor Jack Black might draw some attention, it is of little to no use to the general public or to global leaders who are already well briefed on the complexities of climate inaction. On social media, senior UN officials are often followed by other UN employees. What is perceived internally as amplification is merely communication in a bubble.

The United Nations must quickly learn three critical lessons. First, results matter as they provide both credibility to donors and are essential in restoring public trust in the UN as an instrument of good. Second, public communication about complex issues need not come from Guterres, particularly from remote Antarctica, or through a ridiculous talking dinosaur. These first two lessons provide the basis for the third and final lesson: the UN must treat the beneficiaries of program results as equally as it does senior leadership. On climate change, the UN should let local people not only demonstrate the impacts of climate inaction, but communicate the impacts of program outputs directly. That can be easily done at any level and without the reputational damage of a trip to Antarctica that could have easily been prevented by a simple meeting on Zoom.

Mark S. Cogan is an Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Kansai Gaidai University in Osaka, Japan. His research interests include Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region, as well as security studies, peacebuilding, counter-terrorism, and human rights. He is a former communications specialist with the United Nations, serving in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The post The UN’s Public Communication Is Broken appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

There is much in its storied history to support this view. But this framing has its limits, especially as the liberal international order has come under unprecedented strain over time.

Alas, having regard to its central aim of tamping down and resolving international conflicts/crises, the UN’s ability to serve as a cornerstone of international cooperation is currently undermined in at least two ways.

The first centers on the nature of the crises themselves. As UN Secretary-General António Guterres readily admits, this moment of international politics is “marked by increasingly complex crises for our world.”

In fairness, in some instances, this is through no fault of its own. A case in point is the COVID-19 pandemic’s “deeply negative impact on SDG progress.”

Regardless, in the early goings of this post-unipolar moment-related conjuncture, the UN’s risk exposure-cum-profile has risen exponentially. A centerpiece of that risk is the emergent global transition to a multipolar system, which hinges on and is driven by great-power competition.

Beyond that, and secondly, as Guterres also underscores, “geopolitical mistrust” is at an all-time high. This is because great-power competition is in full swing, widening East-West and Global North-Global South divisions.

The main architects, along with their proxies, of unfurling post-Western-oriented geopolitical dynamics have seen to it that great-power engagement is in the rear-view.

Inasmuch as they are geopolitically significant moments in their own right, the Gaza and Ukraine wars are emblematic of those broader divisions, which are also unsettling the extant international order.

Just how those conflicts further take shape and the implications arising thereof will have a bearing not just on the UN’s 193-strong membership, but also on its fortunes going forward. This is playing out in a context where the UN, straining under the weight of a mismatch of organizational functionality and aspects of the shifting geopolitical realities in question, is already at a tipping point.

The UN Security Council, which is caught up in and is seemingly adding to international system-level dysfunction, is a prime example.

In the circumstances, the P5 UNSC members can ill afford to continue to pay lip service to UN reform.

Given the stakes involved, small states, such as those of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) bloc, also have a lot riding on UN reform. That’s how they see it; not least because their leaders have expended political capital on the matter.

Indeed, recognizing the wider, security-related impact of these conflicts, they have adopted a highly participatory approach to international diplomacy of the hour as regards the Gaza and Ukraine wars, which are on center stage in international relations. (That said, as part of their attendant diplomacy, CARICOM member states have pitched their reactions differently vis-à-vis the aforesaid conflicts.)

Yet it is important to recognize that, also in their view, such diplomacy will only achieve so much.

In that respect at least, for crises-related diplomacy to be given effect in ways that matter, UN organs like the UNSC must be fit for purpose vis-à-vis today’s (security) realities.

For all the world body’s success since it first opened its doors on October 24, 1945, then, such UN-related staples as the Security Council continue on as a vestige of a bygone era, whose architects have long since passed on. And as is often the case in such large organizations, owing to their path-dependent design, institutional inertia sets in. Given that its roots run deep through history, the UN is especially prone to such a state of affairs.

The UN’s roots can be traced to a series of high-level conferences, held in the 1940s, which took place at the behest of Allied powers’ statesmen of the day, who were committed to and vested in crafting the institutional contours and systemic orientation of the post-war international order.

But first, they had to craft a way out of the war. The Yalta Conference and the Potsdam Conference were crucially important in that regard, constituting final steps in the Allied powers’ efforts to bookend the war.

By May 1945, Germany had unconditionally surrendered. This resulted in an Allied victory over that leading Axis power, ushering in the “zero hour” or “Year Zero.”

Yet, this marked only the first of two hard stops to the war.

The final one came later on in 1945, stemming from Japan’s unconditional surrender. This occurred in the wake of the United States’ atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but also—thereafter—the Soviet Union’s declaration of war on this second of the two foremost Axis powers.

Given the sheer scale of that war’s devastation, 19th century German dramatist Georg Büchner’s outlook on mankind was likely never far from the minds of statesmen and diplomats of the day; i.e. mankind is held beneath the “hideous fatalism of history…[and] human nature [has] a terrible sameness, in human circumstances an ineluctable violence vouchsafed to all and to none.”

In hopes of distancing humanity from war and its uglier side, thereby charting a way forward towards some semblance of peace in the anarchic international system, yet another monumental conference took place to set the stage, as it were, between April 25, 1945 and June 26, 1945. This United Nations Conference on International Organization—held in San Francisco, California—brought together delegates of 50 governments.

Informed by the work of other, previously-held high-level meetings and outcome documents from the same—including The Atlantic Conference & Charter (1941)—this Conference (dubbed the San Francisco Conference) unanimously approved, inter alia, the UN Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, thereby establishing the UN.

Today, for the reasons outlined above, one may well ask—is it time for a San Francisco moment 2.0?

After all, the UN is struggling to navigate towards a resolution to the Gaza and Ukraine wars, which raise the ante in terms of global insecurity. The UN is at a crossroads, then, and all the more so because of the Gaza and Ukraine wars.

All things considered, notwithstanding the state of the world, it is less likely now that such a moment will (meaningfully) see the light of day. In short, in this geopolitical moment, the grand sweep of great-power competition is too much of an encumbrance to that end.

It would take a leap of the imagination to believe otherwise.

But that should not hold back the good work of those who are contributing to efforts to advance on the UN’s future development and, in this regard, UN reform. To paraphrase ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus, change is inevitable.

It is also worth noting, Rome was not built in a day.

But it is also the case that, as some of the world’s most intractable conflicts and crises continue to spiral unabated—putting virtually all of the international community in peril, as the UNSC is hamstrung by “strategic competition between the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the Russian Federation”—the UN and its membership do not have all the time in the world.

Something has got to give.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The post Gaza, Ukraine Wars Push UN Towards Its Tipping Point appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

This foreign policy posture also reflects how many understand international relations as: 1) dominated—at least on paper—by ‘equal’ sovereign states, whose power differentials are determinative of their status or standing in world politics; and 2) animated by the absence of a supranational global authority, impacting significantly on the behavior of states in the international system. (For this reason, like other United Nations (UN) member states, CARICOM member states want to maximize their security.)

However, this perspective tells only part of the story. It reflects only one of two key dimensions in CARICOM member states’ respective foreign policies, the security logic.

A Framework for Analyzing CARICOM Bloc Foreign Policymaking

At first glance, security considerations appear to have a ubiquitous influence in CARICOM member states’ foreign policy thinking. However, at this stage of the conflict, such considerations should not be overstated. To a significant degree, their foreign policies are held up by economic development considerations—focusing on “strengthening regional and global market integration of Caribbean economies.”

To achieve that goal, CARICOM’s diplomacy is geared towards advancing efforts on: graduation, non-access to concessional financing, blacklisting, debt relief, correspondent banking, the unfair treatment of middle-income countries by the international financial institutions, shortfalls in the Green Climate Fund, and the ‘loss and damage’ climate change issue, among others. These are core foreign policy priorities, coming up in CARICOM engagements with third countries regarding the bloc’s advocacy for diplomatic backing and development aid in support of its membership’s development challenges. Featured on the official regional agenda, they are emblematic of an economic development-related foreign policy logic.

As the CARICOM foreign policymaking community sees it, there is no uniformity of views on whether one logic takes precedence over the other. In fact, these distinctive logics represent a particular foreign policy outlook on and normative assumptions about the conduct of international relations.

For the most part, these long-standing foreign policymaking logics have played out in the CARICOM bloc with the benefit of esprit de corps-filled moments of compromise. To many, this provides impetus to CARICOM member states’ collective diplomatic voice on the international stage.  Ultimately however, either collectively or individually, CARICOM member states seek to leverage each logic to their own advantage at a given time and on a given international issue.

Shifting Trajectory of Foreign Policy Thinking

A case in point is regional states’ diplomatic state of play relative to the Ukraine war. A good barometer is the recently adopted UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for Russia to pay war-related reparations to Ukraine. Thirteen CARICOM member states abstained from voting, with one state absent. (Of the 193 UN members, 73 abstained, with just 94 voting in favor of the resolution and 14 against.)

While CARICOM member states have a record of voting-related abstentions in relation to some of the five Ukraine-related UNGA resolutions—with a view to telegraphing wider concerns—the virtual unanimity of CARICOM member states’ position on this particular resolution signals a shift in the bloc’s foreign policy thinking on the issue.

Bringing Economic Considerations Back In

To understand this diplomatic maneuvering, a focused discussion of the Ukraine war’s economic repercussions regarding CARICOM member states is in order. Set against the backdrop of a war that is nearing its one-year anniversary and that is showing few signs of resolution, CARICOM member states’ foreign policy goals vis-à-vis the conflict must increasingly account for economic considerations. This reflects their long-standing foreign policy prioritization of economic development as well as their deep concern that the bloc is paying a high economic price in relation to the wider effects of the conflict.

The economic repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war are undermining the economic fortunes of these countries. They already face systemic vulnerabilities, as well as myriad crises, which the COVID-19-induced economic slowdown has compounded.

The pandemic became synonymous with lockdowns and border-related closures aimed at promoting public health imperatives. However, these same measures spelled economic ruin for the largely tourism-dependent economies of many CARICOM member states. Ensuing pandemic-related supply chain issues only added to recovery-related woes, given these small open economies’ high dependence on trade and their infrastructural constraints. Topping the list of these woes are the ongoing inflationary pressures facing the region. All told, the pandemic’s knock-on effects have brought about a historically consequential economic contraction in CARICOM.

Viewed through this prism, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated the Caribbean’s dire economic situation. The global inflation crisis, which has brought about price shocks, is a phenomenon that national authorities in the Caribbean link to the conflict. In the case of Jamaica, even though some organizations are upbeat about the country’s economic recovery and performance—citing exogenous factors—they warn of a likely recession. They even highlight “risks to a sustained growth path [as being] elevated.” This narrative of high vulnerability  is not unique to Jamaica. Even pre-pandemic, for example, many CARICOM member states—which rank as being among the most indebted countries in the world—were grappling with high levels of public debt.

In this setting, Caribbean leaders are making difficult choices to support key policy reforms. For the moment, economic reform imperatives are an urgent priority and CARICOM leaders must weigh the attendant political risks of not keeping pace with stakeholders’ expectations regarding a revival of their countries’ flagging economies.

Whither the Proverbial Foreign Policy-related Balance?

In the circumstances, balancing the norms of nonintervention with economic necessity may pressure Caribbean governments to take a different tact on how they approach the Kremlin-orchestrated invasion. Indeed, some in CARICOM’s foreign policymaking community see reason to review and change foreign policy orientations. They underscore that, through no fault of their own, CARICOM member states are being hemmed in economically by a global crisis that has arisen from the “international fallout” of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine.

Yet, others have much to say about and have a clear sense of the security dimension of CARICOM member states’ foreign policy thinking—expressing doubt that economic considerations trump sovereignty and territorial integrity issues and the use of force. It is not lost on them that what is at stake in this perilous moment is not just the European security order, but also their countries’ security. After all, the latter hinges on the sanctity of core principles of the ‘rules of the (multilateral) game’. From that perspective, the Statement of the Conference of CARICOM Heads of Government on the War and Humanitarian Crisis in Ukraine is just as relevant today as when it was issued in March 2022.

Concluding Thoughts

The CARICOM bloc’s diplomatic response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was built around security-related foreign policy thinking. Since then, however, the Russia-Ukraine war’s economic repercussions have become a foreign policy priority for CARICOM—marking a return to another tenant of the bloc’s foreign policy logic. Economic necessity is seemingly shaking up the initial foreign policy thinking of CARICOM’s political and foreign affairs elites. Relatedly, these effects’ macro-level consequences are a consideration for them. In short, at a time when the Russia-Ukraine war’s far-reaching impacts are overshadowing global policymaking discourse, it becomes that much harder for policymakers to move the needle on economic imperatives.  That said, just because the bloc’s Russia-Ukraine war-related foreign policy attention has taken on the characteristics of economic statecraft, security-related foreign policy thinking has not necessarily been lost.

As the Russia-Ukraine war and its (in)direct impacts become increasingly salient in international relations, CARICOM member states will likely ratchet up calls for an end to the conflict. They should close ranks behind requisite foreign policy démarches, not least to set the tone of such a narrative.  In the near-term, official pronouncements on this CARICOM foreign policy context may come from two upcoming high-level regional meetings. The CARICOM Council for Foreign and Community Relations, which is scheduled to meet again in May 2023, could provide important clues about the further evolution of member states’  foreign policy thinking. So, too, could a CARICOM summit that takes place early in 2023.

Dr. Nand C. Bardouille is Manager of The Diplomatic Academy of the Caribbean in the Institute of International Relations (IIR), The University of the West Indies (The UWI), St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the UWI. The author would like to thank Ambassador Colin Granderson and Ambassador Riyad Insanally for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. His other scholarship to-date on what the Russia-Ukraine war means for the CARICOM bloc is set out in a compendium of articles, which is published online here.

The post CARICOM’s Evolving Foreign Policy Thinking on the Ukraine War appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

The geopolitical fallout from drought is slow and cumulative; these are slow-burn disasters that stay out of the news until their worst effects are felt. What begins as a minor crop disruption one year can spiral into an agricultural disaster the next should disruptive weather patterns persist. Similarly, on the individual level, a small-but-manageable caloric reduction can end in disaster as household items and capital are gradually sold off to purchase food, effectively mortgaging the economic future of a families and whole communities. These shocks can erode faith in political institutions, generate sectarian conflict over dwindling resources, and even trigger civil wars.

2020 brought new extreme weather events, which disrupted agriculture and produced run-on political, economic, and humanitarian impacts around the world. But the year also ushered in the COVID-19 pandemic, which compounded the fiscal challenges of governments attempting to respond to agricultural disasters.

Though there’s reason to believe that COVID-19 will be on the wane by the time 2021 is over, erratic weather patterns and disrupted agricultural output will persist. Here are some countries to watch in the year ahead:

The post Outlook 2021: The Year in Drought appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Khmer nationalism is intensified by a longstanding border dispute with Vietnam, while fear of a civil society uprising is the primary concern for the Hun Sen regime. The arrests, detentions, and convictions began in late July when Rong Chhun, the President of the Cambodian Confederation of Unions, accused the government of ceding land to Vietnam by installing a border marker in Tbong Khmum, which he claimed led to a loss of land and livelihoods for farmers along the border. Cambodian authorities accused Chhun of spreading misinformation and “incitement to commit a felony or cause social unrest.” 

In August, Cambodia distributed a new map of the border with Vietnam and submitted it to the United Nations for recognition, in spite of activist warnings and protests suggesting Cambodia was ceding 3,000 hectares of territory to Hanoi. At the time of release, Cambodian Defense Minister Tea Banh said that activists who criticize the regime’s handling of the border issue were extremists and “will not be forgiven” for making public statements. 

Cambodia’s 1,200-kilometer border with Vietnam is a historic and hypersensitive issue, as the Cambodian population casts blame on Hanoi for decades of strife—including war in 1978 that did not see Vietnamese troops exit Cambodia until 1989—as well as today’s perceived encroachment. Twenty percent of the expansive border between the two countries is vaguely defined. In 2006, Vietnam and Cambodia began demarcation proceedings, but the reaction to it has led to intense animosity and even violence. Rainsy, then the leader of the Sam Rainsy Party, led a rally in 2009 to dig up border markers that he claimed were placed in a Cambodian rice field in Svay Rieng province. Rainsy was soon charged with racial incitement, and while in exile, convicted in absentia. Other incidents followed. In June 2015, approximately 250 activists, including those from the CNRP, entered the Vietnamese province of Long Am to inspect the border. In clashes with locals trying to stop the inspection, seven Vietnamese were wounded. While the demarcation issue affects the livelihoods of local farmers and border residents, Hun Sen has also made the most of opportunities to use harsher rhetoric against Vietnam. When nationalistic rhetoric and anti-Vietnamese sentiment increased support for the CNRP, the regime quickly cracked down on its opposition ahead of the 2018 general elections. Without a significant opposition party to threaten him, Hun Sen has noticeably softened his tone toward Hanoi. 

Land rights remain sensitive to Cambodians, dating back to the mid-1970s, when the Khmer Rouge banned the ownership of private property. As many as 70 percent of Cambodians lost their livelihoods and access to land, particularly farmers when the Khmer Rouge destroyed the deeds to their property. In contemporary Cambodia, people have become victims of land-grabbing, as the demand for land increases with livelihood insecurities. Loggers have recently plundered a Cambodian wildlife sanctuary, and a Vietnamese company has been accused of clearing indigenous land. 

Further complicating matters is a surge in bilateral trade, which increased to $3.8 billion in 2017 and $4.7 billion in 2018. Vietnam has become Cambodia’s third-largest trading partner, behind only China and Thailand. There have also been areas of mutual cooperation and investment, such as the Vietnamese construction of an administrative building inside the Cambodian National Assembly and the funding of scholarships to Cambodian nationals. Hanoi also invested in high-quality hospitals and schools in Phnom Penh. In 2018, Cambodia and Vietnam signed an agreement to boost bilateral trade to $5 billion. 

Khmer national identity was a motivating factor in the arrest of rapper Kea Sokun, charged with incitement under Articles 494 and 495 of the Cambodian Criminal Code. His release of a song entitled, “Dey Khmer” (Khmer Land) received more than 1.3 million views on YouTube before being removed under suspicious circumstances. The Hun Sen regime has also targeted other human rights activists such as Luon Sovath, who fled to Switzerland after videos appeared on Facebook claiming he had slept with three sisters and their mother, an accusation that was proven to be spread by Cambodian government employees. 

The Hun Sen regime has also used its controversial NGO law to target environmental groups. The Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organisations (LANGO), has been recently used to crackdown Mother Nature Cambodia, an environmental group. Mother Nature has accused the government of hijacking the group’s Facebook page and its founder, Alejandro Gonzalez-Davidson, was notified that his administrative access to the page was removed one day after three of their activists were arrested while creating a campaign video calling for the conservation of Boeung Tamok Lake, near the capital of Phnom Penh. A spokesperson for the government said that the bulk of the criticism, either from Mother Nature, Khmer Thavarak, a former member of the CNRP or other activists, was the product of an overseas network backed by foreign nationals designed “to create social unrest and move to topple the elected government.”

There are a number of takeaways from these recent events. First, the absence of a major opposition party in Cambodia has permitted the government to act in an aggressive fashion, with virtually no pressure from ASEAN states or the international community.  It used COVID-19 earlier this year as an excuse to lock up a 14-year old girl for voicing her concerns about the government’s response. It has learned in the past that political interference has paid huge dividends for the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). Prior to the interference, the CNRP had made significant gains, both in the commune elections and as a legitimate national opposition party. The CPP now controls all 125 seats in the national Parliament. Second, both sides of the discussion have in the past used nationalistic undertones to amplify messages. Rainsy and CNRP members have used demarcation issues to vilify Hun Sen as a puppet of Hanoi and have used pejoratives like “youn” to describe Vietnamese people. Nationalists turned on human rights activist Ou Virak after a 2013 speech where he urged the CNRP to stop its harassment of the Vietnamese. 

Reaction to Cambodia’s persecution of activists must be condemned, but it is also important to recognize its source—that Cambodians are historically anxious over Vietnam’s influence over in Cambodian affairs. Civil society groups have little trust in Hun Sen, who has limited their mobility and monitored their activities. In the meantime, Cambodia is stuck in a conundrum. Nationalism and fear of foreign interference will continue to drive sentiments in Khmer society, but lasting changes will likely not take place until open communication and free expression are permitted. 

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any institutions with which the authors are associated.

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Mark S. Cogan is an Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Kansai Gaidai University in Osaka, Japan. He is a former communications specialist with the United Nations in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East.

The post What’s Behind the Recent Arrests of Cambodian Activists? appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Though the United Nations champions multilateralism, it is often criticised for “doing everything and doing nothing” and has been denounced for the lack of a rapid and appropriate response to global challenges. “We have discussed COVID-19 every day since 13th March,” reassures one UN diplomat, but so far, the response has been ideological communiqués rather than pragmatic propositions or resolutions to collectively combat the effects of the pandemic.

On 23rd March, despite his “limited freedom,” the United Nations Secretary General António Guterres strategically called for a global cease-fire and an aid package for the most vulnerable, which was praised as the most serious proposal to emerge since the pandemic hit. Additionally, the 193-member General Assembly this month passed a non-binding resolution that called for “intensified international cooperation to contain, mitigate, and defeat” COVID-19.

The Security Council has been suffering from a lack of action. In March, under China’s presidency, the outbreak was not deemed to be a security issue and no action was taken. In recent weeks there has been mounting media pressure and calls from member states to force the Security Council to address the effects of the pandemic within its mandate. “We had to give in, but under any other circumstances it would be unimaginable for [a health issue] to be discussed under the Security Council’s mandate,” stated a current member of the Security Council. Tan Sri Hasmy Agam, formerly Malaysia’s representative on the Security Council and Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic disagree and describe clearly the ‘international security dimension of COVID-19,’ arguing that the potential impacts on international peace and security mean that the pandemic, “indisputably falls under [the Security Council]’s mandate.” It should also be noted that the Security Council did debate the impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa in 2000.

Despite the “archaic views of a few members on how the Security Council should work,” this month, the Council, under the Presidency of the Dominican Republic, implemented the working methods prepared by the previous presidency to start video teleconferences (VTCs). “The pandemic forced us to develop working methods that have allowed us to carry the agenda despite the difficulties of not being able to physically meet,” said a non-permanent member of the Security Council triumphantly. While it is helpful that the members can now talk to each other after several weeks, many businesses and institutions implemented similarly ground-breaking technological innovations overnight!

After much resistance, particularly from China and South Africa, the Security Council had its first closed-door virtual meeting on 9th April to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic. While this is good progress, there are significant barriers to any action. “It would be very detrimental for the UN SC to make its discussions on the pandemic public as that would demonstrate that its structure does not allow it to go beyond the vetoes of the permanent members (P5),” said a Latin American diplomat. In particular, the increasing tensions between the US and China have truncated any meaningful outcome: “They are in the middle of an ideological and strategic war,” continued the diplomat.

And yet, as the crisis deepens, negotiations on a possible resolution appear to be moving forward. Just as one draft resolution negotiated between the P5 stalled, another resolution between the non-permanent members was put forward, and currently all members are negotiating both resolutions as a single document. The finger-pointing and wording disputes between the US and China persist and, while France is working to smooth this relationship, new disagreements have emerged around the possibility to include in the resolution, the relaxation of unilateral sanctions against countries that have been heavily hit by the pandemic and need aid, such as Iran. Considering the scale and gravity of the pandemic, the fact that the P5 and the Security Council in general are getting bogged down on lexical semantics is unacceptable.

All eyes are on the Security Council this month and they cannot remain silent on what is happening. Coordinating a response to this situation will require great leadership and Latin America, through the Dominican Republic’s presidency of the Security Council, has an opportunity to be front and center. “The president has to ease tensions and blunt the edges of conflict among some of the members, especially the permanent members, and to generate close cooperation and unity in dealing with this global health trauma,” said a distinguished diplomat that has served twice on the Security Council. And yet, “the possibility of non-permanent members influencing these bureaucratic practices, stagnant, anchored in a history that we already know, are minimal,” emphasized a non-permanent member state of the Security Council.

The presidency’s role is primarily to guide and align the Council, and within its limitations, the Dominican Republic can play an effective leadership role in handling an international crisis of monumental proportions. “What would be required for such a leadership role are qualities of clear-sightedness, level-headedness and outstanding diplomatic skills, among others,” said a senior Asian diplomat.

As part of this month’s agenda, the Dominican Republic launched an open, high-level VTC entitled, ‘the protection of civilians from conflict-induced hunger.’ While the event had been planned for months and the agenda already set, the presidency successfully shaped the conversation to not only cover food insecurity and conflict-related starvation but also to include discussion on the related security impacts of COVID-19, for example, through disruption of food supply chains.

The response from the virtual attendees was remarkable, with all the briefers and interventions from different countries including consideration of the threats multiplied by the pandemic. For example, the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Qu Dongyu highlighted COVID-19 as one of the ‘shocks’ together with conflicts, extreme weather, desert locusts and economic shocks that are likely to “push more people into acute food insecurity,” The presidential statement of this event will hopefully produce a unanimous message on hunger and conflict, a much-needed sign of unity to identify common problems and seek common solutions.

This outcome could be an encouraging step for the Dominican Republic to assume greater leadership around the impacts of COVID-19 and its effects on international peace and security for the remainder of the month. The Latin American nation should seek to conclude its presidency by helping the Security Council to focus on the gravity and wide-reaching nature of the situation and work together on a resolution that directly addresses the threats of the pandemic and offers pragmatism in the management and the recovery, even if differences between the P5 persist. “The global pandemic presents both a challenge and an opportunity for a small Caribbean member state of the world body to demonstrate a much-needed leadership role to mobilize the international community to effectively combat COVID-19 and spare the world from further untold tragedy,” said an optimistic veteran of diplomacy.

The Caribbean nation will finish its presidency at the end of April and while there are only a few days left, its diplomatic skills will be put to the test in the coming days at other important events including one on 27-29 April on intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council Reform (IGN), where five points of convergence and disagreement will be debated: 1) categories of membership to the Council (i.e. permanent, non-permanent, or a third option), 2) the question of the veto, 3) regional representation, 4) size of an enlarged Council and working methods, and 5) the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly.

Each bloc of states (the S5 Group, the G4, the African Group, the L.69 Group, the Arab Group, Uniting for Consensus, the Caribbean Community, etc) have different positions, agendas and vision; “it’s a Tower of Babel,’ remarked one UN diplomat, “without forward-looking conditions, we will not advance the debate.” During this debate, the Dominican Republic could proactively try to reorganize the fronts between all the different positions of the UN regional groups and mark certain lines in the negotiation process.

The Dominican Republic could provide the same guidance to its own regional group within the United Nations, the Latin American and Caribbean States Group (GRULAC), which is considered “non-functional” due to its internal ideological struggles. “We must rebuild, remove the regional groups from their ideological struggle and make it a place where a conversation and eventually a consensus can be generated,” reflected a diplomat of a GRULAC member state. The Caribbean nation, through its prominent role in the presidency, “has the platform to propose an initiative that would put a specific work agenda in place as a mechanism for consultation and agreement rather than as a mechanism of ideological confrontation,” explained the same diplomat. Another Latin American diplomat agrees that there is an opportunity for the Dominican Republic to show leadership: “The Dominican Republic ambassador could be a valuable interlocutor if considered as a sensible person and not seen as a threat to other activities within the Security Council.”

The pandemic and its effects have laid bare the importance of decisive, visionary leadership and concerted action in such a critical point of human history and also provides an opportunity to the international community and its leaders to galvanize the process of change where multilateralism, compassion, and social consensus are no longer a policy of choice.

Elizabeth Deheza is a founder and CEO of the London-based, independent strategic intelligence entity DEHEZA, focused on Latin America and Caribbean.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any institutions with which the authors are associated.

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While scholars find themselves in heated debates about the impending changes of the post-pandemic era, with some heralding the complete shift of the global world order and others arguing against it and making their cases for a gradual return to normalcy, there is a limbo that is left by the low profile of the largest global multilateral organization: the United Nations. The World Health Origination (WHO) is on the forefront to do what it is authorized to do in such situations, including declaring COVID-19 a pandemic on 11 March and keeping an eye on the situation, despite all the criticism it attracted for toeing the line from China that portrayed the virus as non-transmissible from human-to-human.

However, the United Nations Security Council has encountered towering challenges to its effectiveness. After a solemn silence, the United Nations Security Council finally attempted to meet over the COVID-19 threat on April 9 and discuss Tunisian and French draft resolutions on the pandemic. As elaborated by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, the pandemic poses a threat to international peace and security by creating uncertainty and spreading economic, social, and political unrest in the world and “the engagement of the Security Council will be critical to mitigate the peace and security implications of the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, a signal of unity and resolve from the Council would count for a lot at this anxious time.”

There was a call for a resolution on the part of the Council, to speak up on this important issue as it did before in 2000/2001 on HIV/AIDS and on the Ebola crisis in 2014, when the Council was clear to name these diseases as threats to international peace and security. The Council however, could not agree on the proposed draft resolution over the disagreements between the P5 members, namely China and the United States, over mentioning the origin of the COVID-19. It had to suffice with a toothless press-release, which enunciated its support for the SC’s efforts related to “the potential impact of COVID-19 pandemic to conflict-affected countries.” The outcome was definitely not the most successful one and all eyes are therefore still on the Council as the debate is not over yet. But the longer the silence is, the wider the precipice becomes for effective multilateralism to fill the void.

If the Council remains unable to speak up on the disease, charting its characteristics and defining its standing on the spectrum of threats to international peace and security, one would expect the United Nations General Assembly to wade in, as usually happens within the United Nations, with a corresponding draft resolution that demands no more than the simple majority of votes of member states. This practice is not usually welcomed by the United Nations Security Council, as it feels this to be an exposition of its own inability to demonstrate a unified position on the issues within its competence. The delicacy of such a dynamic notwithstanding, hearing a voice of the United Nations that embodies states’ willingness to once again employ multilateralism in grappling with the threats and challenges to international peace and security would indeed be reassuring.

Granted, having a United Nations Security Council resolution on the COVID-19 pandemic will not stem the tide of the virus more quickly, nor will it offer any practical solutions for that matter. Even less so, if the United Nations General Assembly adopts a resolution instead of the Council. However, this would testify to states’ willingness to remain faithful to the principles of international cooperation, remain “within the club” and prioritize the values of multilateralism in dealing with threats of such magnitude. As we have all eye-witnessed, no state is capable of dealing with such threats in isolation, despite social isolation ironically being the best preventive method to contain the virus. Irrespective of the temporary closures of borders and extra measures to strengthen state sovereignty and exert control over freedom of movement, epidemics affect everyone involved to the same degree, therefore necessitating concerted solutions and coordinated actions, including in R&D to find vaccines and effective cures for the virus. Multilateral organizations are therefore august rostrums whose voices matter in uniting minds and resources to overcome such periods of uncertainty and fear. Let us remain hopeful that COVID-19 will not be another litmus test for failed multilateralism; on the contrary, effective multilateralism will do its bit to offer solace and unity of purpose.

Dr. Esmira Jafarova is the Board Members of the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center), Baku, Azerbaijan. Her writing also derives from her firsthand experience of working with the Council and understanding of how it operates.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any institutions with which the authors are associated.

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Case fatality rates in some regions of Europe are in double-digits and shortages of personal protective equipment and ventilators are hindering the response. Markets have crashed at a faster pace than during the Global Financial Crisis due to a collapse in global demand, and major US banks estimate that US GDP could fall by as much as 35% by the end of the second fiscal quarter. Demand for commodities from emerging markets has plummeted and investors have pulled over $96 billion from these markets since the start of this ‘black swan’ event. The economic and health impacts of the crisis will have a destabilizing effect on the most vulnerable in societies across the globe. If governments do not take decisive and collective action to respond to this health and economic crisis, it will quickly become a political one, especially in fragile states.

Despite the complexity and transboundary nature of this multifaceted crisis, governments in both poor and rich countries have retreated inwards, enacted unilateral travel and trade restrictions and worked to protect their citizens and territory in a way not seen in modern history. The Westphalian state of old seems to be making a comeback in an unprecedented way.

States must not fall into the trap of isolationism, nationalism and protectionism, which will only hinder response efforts and the trade in medical commodities and their components. Instead, they should pursue multilateral solutions while at the same time strengthening national systems. Governments must actively work to forge new multilateral health security mechanisms and norms that govern how they collectively manage, mitigate and respond to pandemics and Public Health Emergencies of International Concern, as the current architecture is no longer fit for purpose.

When you can be in Hong Kong in the morning and New York in the evening, diseases can spread at jet speed. Every country’s national interests are inextricably linked to the health of people across the globe. COVID-19 has reminded the world how connected the planet is and how a novel virus from a place many people had never heard of could change their lives and long-term economic prospects.

Governments around the world must acknowledge that globalization has allowed people and nations to prosper on a scale never before thought possible and that this interconnectedness has fostered peace and stability through commerce. States must remember that the impacts of ‘turning off’ globalization in the long term would have dire economic and humanitarian consequences that would outweigh the impacts of the pandemic, and ensure they work collectively to develop new paradigms, norms and rules to govern how states interact on matters of health security.

COVID-19 must not only be seen as a health threat but a threat to international peace and security. The disease has already killed more Americans than terrorism has to date (including 9/11) and no foreign or external threat to the US economy has ever inflicted this much damage. Great powers across the globe and their military establishments were woefully underprepared and ill-equipped to defend their citizens and their homelands from the greatest security incident since World War II. This is cause for concern and demonstrates that states need to rethink defence and security paradigms, and to invest and tool adequately to manage non-traditional hazards and threats. In 2019, NATO members’ cumulative military spending was approximately $1 trillion, yet WHO’s proposed budget is less than $5 billion for two years. Defence policy needs to be developed using a broader lens, and definitions of security need to be adapted to encompass health, human and food security instead of focusing purely on ‘hard security.’

Governments must also work through alliances like NATO to improve readiness, response, procurement and supply chain mechanisms that foster interoperability and preparedness. World leaders (especially P5 members) should also leverage the venue provided by the UN Security Council to engage in private dialogue on sensitive matters and use the Council to steer the UN and multilateral response. Security Council members could even consider holding special sessions of the Council with ministers of health and the director general of the WHO, along with the UN secretary general, in order to discuss how to eventually normalize travel and trade, or how The International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR) regime can be reformed and strengthened. This ‘Health Security Council’ would be perfectly placed to act as the preeminent diplomatic platform for states to discuss health security matters of international concern, serving to complement the technical WHO and IHR mechanisms, but also concretizing the critical role of the Security Council as a key political platform for inter-state deliberations on health security.

Under this rethought health security paradigm, donors (including departments of defense) should increase support for national centers for disease control and multilateral health and humanitarian agencies, not just for altruistic reasons, but because it would pay security dividends.

More than 70% of epidemics occur in fragile contexts. Nearly two billion people live in countries or settings affected by fragility, crises and conflict, and at least half of the world’s poorest people are projected to live in such areas by 2030. COVID-19 will further magnify poverty, food insecurity and gender inequality in weak states, acting to undermine hard-won development gains and intensify humanitarian needs, but also to destabilize weak states. This in turn will lead to greater competition for finite resources, fueling radicalism, political alienation, conflict, increased migration flows and other negative coping mechanisms, especially in places like the Sahel.

Out of the ashes of COVID-19, governments must seek to develop new international institutions and ramp up support for battle-tested ones. For example, states and major development players could consider creating a new global alliance to stockpile personal protective equipment (PPE) that could act in a similar way to The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI). The latter grouping brings together private foundations, the UN system, development banks, donors, research partners, impacted states and implementing organizations and governments who, together, are able to shape markets and influence prices and supply. In addition to developing new mechanisms, donor governments should continue to support tried-and-tested mechanisms that feed and provide health services for the most vulnerable, while helping to prevent or quell new conflicts and migration flows at a time when global coping mechanisms have been eroded.

Unlike others before it, this global crisis will not end with a peace deal or an outright victory. The disease is likely to exist in pockets around the globe in the long term and, until a vaccine is developed, will probably strike in waves for the foreseeable future. This epidemiological reality means that globalization and regular travel and trade cannot be turned back on in one go, and that a phased approach backed by science will be needed. States will need to develop new global norms, standards and rules that govern how international markets and traffic can be resurrected in a way that also safeguards national health security. In order to do this, a ‘new way of working’ should be developed and codified (potentially in a treaty instrument) and broadly endorsed. States could convene expert working groups on specific pillars (e.g., commercial aviation, maritime traffic, customs) co-chaired by the UN, WHO and/or experts and industry leaders. This could be done virtually via the G20 mechanism, or through the UN Security Council or General Assembly and its work could crystalize into a series of technical norms, a convention, or even a binding treaty instrument.

A global health crisis of this complexity and magnitude requires equally grand global political and technical remedies and this will require leadership. Leaders must suppress isolationist temptations and instead work together to collectively rethink security paradigms and develop new policies and international instruments and mechanisms capable of leveraging the full weight of the international system to combat this immense challenge. Leaders must come to the realization that a security crisis of this nature and magnitude (as with others before it) requires multilateral solutions and instruments, and they must in turn champion initiatives to enhance international cooperation. The sooner these are defined, the faster states will be able to reopen the global economy and come together to neutralize this novel threat.

Benjamin Syme Van Ameringen has previously worked as a risk management consultant and on health-related matters in the UN system. The opinions expressed do not represent the position of any state, organization or entity.

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It is possible to draw some parallels between COVID-19 and the Spanish flu pandemic from 1918–19. While a national healthcare system was established in many countries following the Spanish flu, the system of international relations has not profoundly changed. The world saw the birth and demise of the League of Nations—the precursor to the United Nations—and the eruption of another world war between 1939 and 1945. World War I, rather than the Spanish flu, transformed international relations.

Some scholars blame globalization for the pandemic, forgetting that throughout history, humankind has suffered from other pandemics, such as the fourteenth century Black Death or the Spanish Flu. Other scholars may blame the prevalence of inaccurate news. For example, self-isolation may expose people to fake news disseminated on social media that is laden with conspiracy theories and extremist views. However, the threat of fake news was also present before the COVID-19 pandemic.

In a post-coronavirus world, some countries will suffer from economic stress, which might trigger a new wave of regional conflicts. However, the world will not change drastically as long as humankind does not encounter a severe shortage of food as a result of this virus or another contagion.

In addition, the COVID-19 crisis has also deepened the polarization of countries and societies, which reflects a trend that has already been in place for the past twenty years. The income disparity between the rich and the poor has intensified. Within Western societies, conservatives and liberals have drifted further apart. On a global scale, the superiority of systems of governance—Western vs. Chinese governments, neoconservatism vs. social democratic ideologies, market vs. planned economies—will become even more fiercely debated.

There is a lot of discussion about how national governments should respond to a pandemic. Decision-makers acknowledge that countries can face another pandemic in the future and strive to understand what lessons can be drawn from COVID-19. Policymakers argue about the necessity of a large government and compare the Chinese response to the Italian or American approaches.

It appears that the crisis has worsened due to the lack of information, particularly in the initial period. For political reasons, many countries, including China and Iran, feared the dissemination of data that was necessary to deal with the outbreak of COVID-19. While centralized and closed governments are partly to blame for the delay in response, big governments are better equipped to mobilize resources and mitigate the consequences of a pandemic and economic crisis. In addition, universal health care is essential to provide better care to the public. Compared to other developed countries, the United States faces a tremendous challenge due to the lack of health care coverage for the entire population.

A few other experts have rushed to pronounce a dilemma in or even the death of, the liberal order. They argue that a mixture of economic distress and social anxiety may undermine transatlantic societies, making them vulnerable to authoritarian temptations. We are going to witness how international politics will be played out by major international actors; these actors must confront the politics of solidarity and the politics of fear.

Some countries, including liberal ones, have discussed the use of subdermal or mobile surveillance to track the movement of infected people. Historian and professor Yuval Harari highlights a threat posed by this possible response. He maintains that this level of surveillance might lead to a dystopian society. The threat to democracy from a super-surveillance state could come from both open and closed governments. Surveillance cameras, credit card transactions, and movement registration are all techniques present in almost every modern state, regardless of the mode of governance.

After the current pandemic, I believe the “return to normal” process will begin, as societies transition to a “new normal.” In most countries, political order and the current organization of international relations will remain the same. However, many countries will also strengthen their national healthcare system and emergency response, and more educators and businesses will take advantage of online platforms.

The end of the Cold War, which pronounced the victory of a liberal world order, established the advantage of open societies and market economies. However, the crises of 1997–98 and 2008–09 contributed to the rise of new skeptics of market economies. Both planned economies in collapsed countries like the Soviet Union and extreme laissez-faire economies are flawed and unsustainable. A centrist approach based on the market economy that includes a redistribution of wealth and limits corporations’ power is the only solution to prevent a future global crisis.

Similarly, international politics is better managed by a multipolar world based on international law and consensus. The United Nations and other multilateral platforms, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, are relevant in times of global stress. Global healthcare bodies like the World Health Organization, as well as national healthcare systems, should also be strengthened.

There are few other topics present in discussions about the world after COVID-19. International experts have renewed the debate about the threat of biological warfare, but this idea is not new. Biological weapons were prohibited after World War I, and the ban was reinforced in 1972 and 1993 through the criminalization of their development, stockpiling, and transfer. The global spread of COVID-19 demonstrated that a biological weapon would not spare any country; it would also eventually infect the country that issued the biological weapon. In addition, it is possible that terrorists obtain biological weapons, but this is also preventable, as similar efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear material have been effective.

COVID-19 has exposed vulnerabilities of the global supply chain, international travel, and close social interaction. However, few alternatives to these systems or industries exist. The biggest challenge is to reduce environmental pollution and population density, which requires the containment of demographic growth. Again, this challenge faces the dilemma between a laissez-faire approach or the widespread use of birth control. I would urge the use of a centrist policy, combining government-enforced measures and social education.

In the long-run, environment and demography will be the main challenges for humankind. In the near future, however, the world will feel the reverberating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in terms of the inevitable and impending economic crisis. However, humankind has already experienced crises like this one. It is manageable so long as all leaders prevent the spread of nationalism to the extent that it could cause another world war.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any institutions with which the authors are associated.

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