It took 20 years to the day for the two blocs to reach a trade deal, but the improbable finally occurred on June 28, 2019.

Hailed as a ‘truly historic moment’ by EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, the agreement will create a new market of over 770 million people. In Europe it’s being viewed as a victory for manufacturers, especially vis-à-vis their US competitors; in South America, it represents lucrative access to a market worth 3.4 trillion euros.

Here’s what’s on the deal:

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The surprise victory of Jair Bolsonaro in the presidential elections of October 2018 was viewed as a godsend by Brazilian investors. Here was a figure who was committed to deregulation, privatization, corruption fighting, and economic growth at all costs. And even better, his triumph came at the cost of the Workers’ Party which had played the part of Bogeyman for the business community since Lula da Silva was first elected in 2003.

There was only hitch: despite a long tenure in Congress, Bolsonaro had no background in crafting effective legislation or building a consensus behind it.

Turns out that’s actually a problem when governing a diverse country of over 200 million people, or at least this is what growing disillusionment with the president’s early rule would seem to suggest.

The post Honeymoon Over for Brazil’s Bolsonaro? appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Jair Bolsonaro will soon be sworn in as the president of Brazil, marking a decisive swing to the right for the country after years of leftist administrations. But his election is not just relevant for Brazil’s domestic politics; it will also have repercussions in the international sphere. In particular, we can expect Brazil to forge closer ties with (Trump’s) America, which could be bad news for the regional strategy of other powers like China and Russia.

Background

With a population of over 200 million citizens, a GDP of 3.24 trillion USD in 2017 (9th in the world), and a surface of 8.5 million square kilometers, Brazil is undoubtedly the dominant power in South America. It controls abundant natural resources (like oil, minerals, and timber), is a prominent agricultural producer, and has a quite a powerful military as well. Even though the country has been struggling to eradicate poverty and has long struggled to deal with the environmental fallout of mass deforestation, its international relevance has only grown over the past 20 years. Brazil is a member of the BRICS group that unites of the world’s emerging powers (the others being Russia, China, India and South Africa); and it is expanding its influence beyond its region. This expansion is made easier by geography: Brazil has comfortable access to the Atlantic Ocean, and therefore to rich regions like Europe and the United States, but also to Africa and the Middle East. Its geography is also favorable on land. The country includes large swathes of the continent, including most of the Amazon basin; it also has access to the Rio de la Plata in the south.

Leveraging these geographic features, Brazil has precise geopolitical objectives: affirming its influence over the URAPABOL area (formed by Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia), and connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans for trade with the U.S., Europe, and East Asia. For these reasons, it is also expanding its influence at sea by building up its navy.

Of course there are several challenges that Brazil must resolve in order to achieve these objectives, but in spite of the recent economic and political turbulences it remains the most important power in South America, and can therefore be considered the continent’s geopolitical pivot. This is why Brazil’s foreign policy alignment is a significant matter, notably for the US and for its competitors like China and Russia.

Impact

In theory, Brasilia’s geopolitical interests could collide with those of the US administration. A powerful and assertive Brazil could turn into a competitor and challenge the pre-eminence of the US in the continent, even becoming a security threat in the most extreme case, especially if it decided to side with US rivals. As a matter of fact, China and Russia view Brazil’s rise favorably because it would represent another step towards the emergence of the multi-polar order that they hope will eclipse US hegemony.

In this optic, Bolsonaro’s election could be a positive development for (Trump’s) America. The reason is to be found at the individual level of foreign policy, and especially in the personalities and political beliefs of the two presidents. Both present themselves as strong leaders who pledge to restore the greatness of their countries, to eradicate their problems in a direct manner and to preserve the stability of their respective societies. They adopt a straightforward style in policy-making and in political debate. In other words, the two leaders employ a very similar discourse that appeals to public discontent, one based upon outright and even chauvinist patriotism and on the need to protect their countries and their societies from destabilizing factors like crime and immigration. They have even attracted very similar criticism in their respective countries, with opponents calling them populists, nationalists, xenophobes, misogynists and the like.

Bolsonaro and Trump also share very similar views on many themes. On social issues, they are both close to Christian movements and hold a conservative stance on matters like abortion, same-sex marriage, and the legalization of recreational drugs. Both oppose immigration, presenting it as a vehicle for crime, cheap labor that harms national workers, and in general as a threat to the societal security of their countries. They have pledged to curb criminality and are in favor of the death penalty. They also oppose firearms regulation, arguing that it represents a violation of a citizens’ right to self-defense and even that weapons are useful to guarantee public safety. Both support free-market economic policies such as deregulation and privatization. And both are supported by powerful lobbies (the oil & gas industry for Trump, agribusiness for Bolsonaro, and gun rights advocates for both). The two presidents also favor business over environmental protection or the rights of native peoples.

But the similarities extend to foreign policy as well. Both have a rather “self-centric” view of their country’s role in international affairs and are committed to preserving their national interests. Both are sceptic over international organizations and their approach is mainly economy-driven. They share a very friendly attitude towards Israel: Bolsonaro has declared his intention to follow Trump’s lead and move Brazil’s embassy to Jerusalem. He has also suggested that his first official trip abroad will be to the Jewish state. Both criticize authoritarian states like Iran and Venezuela, take a zero-tolerance stance on terrorism, and have expressed concern over China and its economic penetration in their countries. But most importantly of all, Bolsonaro is openly pro-American. He wants to foster ties with the US and its allies, especially Asian ones like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

As such, it is clear that his election is very good news for America, and especially for President Trump. Considering their similarities, Trump has just found a useful ally to pursue his foreign policy agenda and (re)extend Washington’s influence into South America. Despite the 2013 declarations of then Secretary of State John Kerry that the Monroe Doctrine was over, in reality its fundamental logic persists: considering Brazil’s prominent role in the region, having positive ties with Brasilia is a virtual guarantee of achieving Washington’s main geopolitical objective in South America of maintaining its hegemony and precluding the possibility of an external power spreading its influence over the continent. At the same time, this is potentially a major setback for Beijing and Moscow. The PRC has been building up its presence in South America in the past decade, including in Brazil, but soon the country will be ruled by a President that mistrusts China and on the contrary is friendly to the U.S. and Taiwan.

Forecast

Given the two leaders simpatico political views and the lack of any real foreign policy friction, it appears likely that Brazil and the United States will deepen their political and economic ties over the next two years. Brazil can pursue its own foreign policy as long as it does not challenge America; and it is very unlikely that it will, especially with Bolsonaro in charge. As such, this two-year period that both leaders are assured to remain in power may be enough to foster longstanding bilateral ties and, most importantly, to undo much of the progress that China has made in South America until now (and to a lesser degree, Russia).

Bolsonaro’s Brazil will enable the United States to easily extend its influence across the continent and push back the influence of competing powers, all the while freeing energies to focus on other areas of the world. This represents a major success for Washington, as acknowledged by US National Security Advisor John Bolton.

For their part, Beijing and Moscow will see recent inroads in the region imperiled; as Brasilia, at least for the next few years, will not become an alternative pole of power in the American continent to counter Washington. The cohesion of the BRICS group, which is already strained by Sino-Indian tensions, will also suffer during this period. As such, Russia and/or China may look to other regional powers to fill the gap. Unfortunately for them, the choices are limited. The best alternative is Argentina, but gaining it (if they manage to) would still not compensate for Brazil’s loss. Its position is not as good, its power is inferior and most importantly it is facing another period of severe financial instability. Mexico could be an interesting choice due to its location, but it too has longstanding domestic problems to solve.

Finally, some regional powers may benefit from Bolsonaro’s election. The main example is Argentina. The future president expressed his support for kindred spirit in Macri, and it is possible that the two countries will develop closer ties (if Macri himself can survive the ongoing financial turmoil there). This is a positive development for Argentina, as it may help to revive the country’s economy – first by developing the partnership with Brazil, and second, in a more indirect way, by garnering benefits from both the spillovers of the US-Brazil friendship and from the fact that China and Russia may invest their resources in Argentina to compensate for recent setbacks in Brazil.

In conclusion, Bolsonaro’s election is not only a matter of importance for Brazil, but also for the rest of South America. It may one day be looked back on as a seminal geopolitical event for the region. And though the long-term consequences of Bolsonaro’s unlikely victory remain to be seen, one thing is abundantly clear at this early stage: it’s good news for the United States, and bad news for China and Russia.

The post Bolsonaro in Brazil: Good News for the US, Setback for China appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Despite his openly racist, homophobic, and misogynist views, Bolsonaro’s strategy of standing on an anti-establishment ticket has helped him attract voters who are frustrated by the political corruption and violent crime which has plagued Brazil for decades.

And, while Bolsonaro’s rise to prominence can be largely attributed to the series of economic, social and political crises that have dogged Brazil in recent years, it also fits into a global trend that has legitimized the rule of so-called ‘strongman’ figures such as the Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte and Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán. So, why are despots and dictators of every political persuasion enjoying a renaissance?

Bolsonaro’s success reflects the global rise of populism

For Bolsonaro supporters, the appeal lies in his populist roots. Emerging from the military rank-and-file to serve in congress after Brazil’s twenty years of dictatorship, Bolsonaro has never attempted to hide his radical right-wing views – from his claim that he would rather his son die in a car accident than be gay to his belief that Afro-Brazilians are “no use, even to procreate.” His willingness to voice his opinions, no matter how outrageous and offensive, and his ability to leverage the nascent nationalism of his citizens echoes that of other bombastic leaders like Donald Trump.

Bolsonaro’s success can’t be seen in isolation: the mixture of overt bigotry and vows to crack down on crime and corruption that he has carefully honed is resonating with the Brazilian electorate, as it is increasingly resonating in a diverse swath of nations around the world. Over the last two decades, populist parties – often dangling the prospect of a return to prosperity– have enjoyed a staggering surge in support.

A reaction to progressivism and economic shocks

One of the most worrying aspects of the new strongman phenomenon is its near-universal spread, across continents and the political spectrum. In China, Xi Jinping has used his anti-corruption campaign to consolidate his own power by loosening presidential term limits, while Hungary’s Viktor Orbán has just won another term as prime minister by promising to protect the country’s ‘national’ values in the face of liberalism and the perceived threat from unchecked migration.

Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić has cast himself as a reformer while his praise of accused war criminal Milosevic betrays the nationalist roots he has never fully cast off. But populism isn’t only the flavor-of-the-month in Europe’s post-communist states; it’s also gaining a foothold in affluent societies such as Sweden and Denmark, where social tolerance and liberal attitudes are deeply ingrained.

As Western societies have become more liberal on numerous social issues, those who are entrenched in what they call “traditional values” have felt threatened, making them more likely to turn to strongman leaders who promise to restore national pride and old-fashioned ideals.

Operating above the law

This increased public support in turn emboldens authoritarian leaders, persuading them of their own invincibility— a dangerous cocktail which often leads to egregious human rights infractions and worse. The grisly killing of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi has underscored crown prince Mohammed bin Salman’s determination to wield power at all costs. Attempts by the Saudi authorities to distance themselves from Khashoggi’s murder, initially by denying the journalist’s death and later by suggesting it was the consequence of a brawl gone wrong, have only served to further illustrate the administration’s contempt for international law.

In a similarly macabre vein, President Rodrigo Duterte recently admitted his role in authorizing extrajudicial killings as part of his controversial war on drugs in the Philippines. Duterte has employed the most draconian crime-fighting measures, even claiming that he personally killed three men, while dismissing the advancement of human rights and democracy as a tool of modern imperialism. It’s a toxic return to illiberal principles which is stifling progress in what was once a prosperous region.

Digging in for the long term

Even autocrats from the past are haunting their countries anew. 93-year-old Mahathir Mohamad, who ruled Malaysia with an iron fist from 1981 to 2003, pulled off a surprising victory this spring to become prime minister again. Mahathir has worked to shake off the shadows of his first premiership, which was characterized by media censorship, nationalist policies, and interference in the judiciary—most notably when Mahathir oversaw a purge of the Supreme Court which left lasting scars on Malaysia’s judicial system, and when he sacked his deputy and had him imprisoned on trumped-up sodomy charges. Despite campaigning as an unlikely reformer, thus far Mahathir’s new stint as PM – from his casual anti-Semitism to his obsessive persecution of his predecessor Najib Razak – seems uncomfortably similar to his previous regime.

In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega is also presiding over his second administration, marked by a brutal subjugation of protestors and the free press. Once the poster-boy of the Sandinista rebels, he has since morphed into the very kind of fascist dictator he helped to overthrow. Ortega has vowed to remain in office until scheduled elections in 2021, unleashing “Operation Clean Up”—a brutal campaign by squadrons of masked gunmen to beat and sexually assault the hundreds of thousands of protestors calling for him to step down.

Mahathir and Ortega’s political resurrections show that not only are countries choosing to elect new authoritarian candidates like Bolsonaro, they’re also returning to those who symbolized repression and tyranny in the 1980s. With the strongman ascendant, it’s ordinary people who are likely to be crushed underfoot – a development which should profoundly concern the entirety of the free world.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect the official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any other institution.

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Brazilians will be heading to the polls on October 7, and then again on October 28 in what’s widely expected to be a two-round presidential election.

There has been no shortage of drama in the lead-up to the contest. The champion of the Left, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (or “Lula”), is serving a 12-year sentence for corruption and money laundering. The champion of the Right, the fringe spoiler candidate Jair Bolsonaro, is recovering in hospital after being stabbed in the stomach at a campaign event last week. And incumbent president Michel Temer is about as popular as the bubonic plague, sporting a radioactive 3% approval rating. Temer has become emblematic of everything that Brazilian voters are tired of, namely austerity policies and corruption. Just last week, Brazilian federal police recommended new corruption and money laundering charges against the current president, who had hitherto evaded the Operation Carwash reckoning that has swept away so many of his peers.

Amid the drama, uncertainty, and voter apathy surrounding upcoming polls, Brazil’s moribund economy hangs in the balance.

Background

Brazil employs a runoff system in its presidential elections. A candidate can claim victory on the first ballot so long as they garner over 50% of the vote. However, that is unlikely to occur given the current slate of candidates, and we’ll likely see the top two vote-getters square off in a second round of voting on October 28.

Brazilians will also be selecting congress, gubernatorial, and legislative assembly (state congress) representatives on October 7.

The post Backgrounder: Brazil Elections 2018 appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Summary

OPEC countries joined with major non-OPEC oil producers to hammer out a new supply agreement in Vienna last Friday. The group, which now includes Russia and is collectively being referred to as “OPEC+,” agreed to increase supply to global markets – but by how much exactly, no one knows for certain at this point. Saudi Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih told reporters in Vienna that the deal would bring a further 700,000 barrels to market beginning in July. The number of one million barrels in additional supply was also being floated in the aftermath of the meeting. But the actual text of the joint communique makes no mention of any specific number, instead pledging to bring supply in line with originally agreed upon levels from 2016. Supply from OPEC+ exporters has been slipping over the past six months on disruptions in Venezuela, Libya, and Nigeria. The cartel has been falling short of its 2016 target by roughly 850,000 barrels per day, leading to gradual price increases that have recently caught the attention of US President Donald Trump.

Here are some key takeaways from last week’s meeting:

The post OPEC Stabilizes Oil Markets, for Now appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Summary

Just three years after being elected on a platform of new and invigorating economic reforms, President Mauricio Macri is going through the motions of an old act by seeking assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Of primary concern is Argentina’s currency, which has lost around 32% of its value over the past month and 20% since the beginning of the year. In May, it hit an all-time low, prompting President Macri to approach the IMF for help.

The peso’s plunge can be linked to a variety of internal and external factors, including high public debt and continued deficit spending, inflation, tepid growth, and a recovery in oil prices and USD value which has increased costs for debt servicing and new external borrowing. Macri’s turn toward the IMF is something that Argentinians have seen before, most infamously in the lead-up to 2001 when the Fund shut off the tap of assistance citing government non-compliance, leading to a disastrous default that took years to recover from, if Argentina ever really recovered.

Will this time be different?

The post Will the IMF Rescue Macri’s ‘Gradual Austerity’ in Argentina? appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

President Ghani announces a temporary ceasefire with the Taliban, continues to push for talks

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has announced a temporary ceasefire with the Taliban that will last through to June 20, the day after Eid-ul-Fitr – a holiday that marks the end of Ramadan. His announcement is the latest of a series of moves intended to deescalate the conflict ahead of key parliamentary and district council elections in October. Presidential elections are scheduled to follow in 2019.

It’s unclear whether or not the Taliban intends to honor the temporary ceasefire, which comes at a time of spiraling violence in the capital. Kabul has seen a rash of escalating attacks in 2018: 60 were killed in a suicide attack on a voter registration center on April 22 (claimed by Islamic State); 26 people, mostly Western journalists and children, were killed and 45 injured in a series of bombings on April 30 (claimed by Islamic State); and more recently the interior ministry was attacked last week (again claimed by Islamic State). Then on Monday, at least 12 people were killed in a suicide attack on a group of Muslim scholars who had just concluded their meeting by declaring a fatwa against suicide bombings.

The post Global Forecast (05-28-2018) appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

There’s plenty of room to critique Maduro’s politics, but U.S. invectives against his government have escalated to a stunning degree under Donald Trump. The White House surprised policy wonks in August 2017 when President implied he was considering an armed invasion of Venezuela. In remarks shortly before he was sacked, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson insisted that the United States wasn’t pushing for regime change in Venezuela. His protests, however, were undermined by his repeatedly raising the spectre of a military coup, euphemistically declaring that “when things are so bad the military leadership realizes that it just can’t serve the citizens anymore, they will manage a peaceful transition.”

Other American policymakers have gone still further. U.S. Senator Marco Rubio echoed Venezuelan national hero Simon Bolivar’s words that it is “always noble to conspire against tyranny” and insisted that the “world would support” a military coup removing Maduro from office. The top Trump administration official for Latin American issues, Juan Cruz, gave a fiery speech exhorting the Venezuelan military to privilege loyalty to the country’s constitution rather than to its administration. Many in the audience, including former U.S. Ambassador to Panama John Feeley, interpreted Cruz’s words as a thinly veiled promise of American support for a coup.

Cruz’s call to arms drew mixed reactions. Military hawks in the audience, such as Bush administration official Roger Pardo-Maurer, agreed with Cruz that it was “high time that the Venezuelan military execute a coup and use force to effect government change.” Other attendees were less convinced that it was a wise policy to openly encourage violently overthrowing one’s government, with former Department of Defence official Frank Mora commenting that “the military is not an agent of democratic change.”

Aside from the troubling optics of high-level U.S. officials blatantly advocating regime change by any means necessary, this escalation of rhetoric is unlikely to do anything except add fuel to Maduro’s allegations of American “imperialist aggression” and reinforce nationalist sentiment in Venezuela. Throughout his presidency, Maduro has derived his legitimacy from his opposition to the United States. Maduro’s attempts to portray his country’s myriad problems as part of a concerted attack by the U.S. and its “imperialist hand” would ordinarily seem like a far-fetched conspiracy theory. But the combative stance many American policymakers are taking, however, lends them credibility.

While media frequently portrayed Maduro’s victory as a foregone conclusion, the narrow margin Maduro was elected on in 2013 suggests that his re-election was not necessarily assured. It’s impossible to know how much benefit he drew from a rally around the flag effect in response to the barrage of criticism coming from the United States and its allies. The fact that Maduro’s approval ratings went up by 6 percentage points in the month after Trump threatened military intervention indicates that American criticism may have actually helped Maduro win a second term.

While it’s extraordinarily unlikely that the United States wants to “recolonize” Venezuela, as Maduro has claimed, and a U.S.-sponsored coup or military invasion also seems improbable, the States have already dealt a crushing blow to the South American country by imposing a series of stringent sanctions which have bled its already depleted coffers dry.

The sanctions, which have included cutting Caracas off from the US financial system, have made it virtually impossible for Venezuela to restructure its debt and have weighed heavily on an economy already reeling from low oil prices. Venezuelan government officials such as Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza have underscored how the sweeping sanctions have hurt the Venezuelan people by exacerbating shortages of food and medicines; it’s a concern that some foreign commentators share.

Despite the fact that the existing sanctions have disappointed some of their proponents and are opposed by the majority of Venezuelans, Trump has threatened to “punish” the country for re-electing Maduro by imposing fresh restrictions, potentially including a complete embargo on Venezuelan oil.

Analysts estimate that such a prohibition would be the “death knell” for Venezuela’s oil industry, which makes up 95% of the country’s exports. While this would certainly hurt Maduro, it would devastate the Venezuelan even more and unleash a global wave of problems which could undermine U.S. policy in any number of ways. Crude oil prices, already at multi-year highs as tensions mounted in the lead-up to the election, would skyrocket.

A desperate Venezuela would be driven further into Russia and China’s embrace, who have already been propping up the Venezuelan economy in exchange for oil on the cheap. The ensuing global scramble for oil would undercut Washington’s Iran policy; difficulty accessing Venezuelan oil would make China and India significantly less likely to support sanctions against Tehran. Saudi oil could help plug some of the shortfall, but Russian oil would also become more in demand, giving Russia leverage over the U.S. even as Russia-U.S. relations languish at an all-time low.

This constellation of ramifications is too serious a price to pay. As a recent Foreign Policy article pointed out, whatever Maduro’s flaws, “Venezuela is no North Korea.” Trump has proven willing, even enthusiastic, to meet with North Korea’s unelected dictator Kim Jong Un and make a deal despite their serious differences. Comparable flexibility with Venezuela would be in the Venezuelan people’s best interest—and in those of the United States.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The post Bellicose Rhetoric & Brutal Sanctions Not the Way to Help Venezuela appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

However, even as the number of Venezuelans leaving home continues to grow, the international community is still speaking in euphemisms, referring to the exodus as “the Venezuelan situation.” But language matters. Leaders in the region and the international community need to formally call the exodus what it really is—a refugee crisis—and invoke the Cartagena Declaration in order to provide Venezuelans stranded abroad with the legal protections and funding they require.

The distinction between migrants and refugees may not be obvious, but it is consequential. Receiving countries often implement programs to help accommodate migrants, but they are not legally bound to do so. In contrast, the designation of refugee status confers the right to refuge, work, and travel abroad for individuals, and compels nearby states to provide such protections under international law.

Technically, the situation inside Venezuela does not fit the standard criteria for the declaration a refugee situation. Under general United Nations conventions, refugees are forced to flee their country due to fear of persecution—typically political, racial, or religious. Some Venezuelans fit this description, like members of the political opposition. Most Venezuelans, however, are leaving to escape a man-made disaster, as economic mismanagement, combined with political repression, has plunged the country into a humanitarian crisis. One fifth of Venezuelan children are malnourished. The vast majority of the country’s hospitals have run out of medicines. Caracas, its capital city, is one of the world’s most dangerous cities.

Although Venezuelans may not fit the standard UN definition of refugees, their choice to leave cannot be considered an active decision when they are faced with starvation and violence. This is a distinction that makes them refugees in Latin America. The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, a regional agreement signed by 14 Latin American countries, expands the UN definition of refugees to protect those fleeing situations of extreme poverty and generalized violence, like that besieging Venezuela. The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), in fact, called on Latin American leaders to invoke the Cartagena Declaration in a report released in March. Nonetheless, the refugee crisis remains, formally in international statements, “the Venezuelan Situation.”

Fortunately, Latin America’s history of intra-region migration has created a strong precedent of legal protections for migrants. So far, Latin American governments have done an admirable job accommodating Venezuelans. But host countries are reaching a breaking point. The arrival of more than half a million Venezuelans in Colombia, for example, threatens to destabilize a country struggling to overcome its decades-long armed conflict. Stricter border measures, introduced in Colombia in March 2018, have made it harder for Venezuelans to attain legal recognition in Colombia. Meanwhile, a backlog of asylum applications across the region, combined with a substantial number of migrants who have avoided official crossings, has left a worrying proportion of Venezuelans abroad in irregular status.

A region-wide invocation of the Cartagena Declaration would provide a framework to address the crisis. While the Cartagena Declaration is not legally binding, the recognition of Venezuelans as refugees applies political pressure on regional governments to implement protections and accelerated asylum processes for Venezuelans. Furthermore, working with a common understanding of Venezuelans as refugees, regional groups that are concerned with the situation inside Venezuela, like the Lima Group, could work together to coordinate a burden-sharing agreement. With Spanish as a common language across Latin America, it is feasible that countries could coordinate to resettle Venezuelans across the continent and avoid forcing any single country to bear the brunt of the refugee crisis.

Officially invoking the Cartagena Declaration is crucial for one other reason: money. Compare, for example, the amount of funding devoted to Venezuelans and Syrians. The UNHCR put out a request for $46 million to provide humanitarian assistance and coordinate a response to the Venezuelan crisis. This amount is less than a tenth of what the UNHCR asked for to aid Syrian refugees and host countries, and is barely a drop in the bucket compared to the $4.8 to $8.9 billion that Brookings has calculated will be needed to resettle and provide aid for 1.7 million Venezuelans.

While declaring a Venezuelan refugee crisis would help bring international assistance to the region, domestic politics make it unlikely that Venezuela’s neighbors will take the lead. Both Colombia and Brazil will hold presidential elections this year, and their electorates remain concerned primarily with domestic issues, like corruption and social services. Neither country, therefore, is eager to increase responsibilities toward Venezuelans by invoking the Cartagena Declaration.

Some experts have argued that the United States should defer to Latin American leadership on the Venezuelan crisis, but the refugee crisis offers an opportunity for the United States to lead from behind. President Trump’s administration has already demonstrated its commitment to helping Venezuelan refugees as a complement to its policy of promoting regime change within Venezuela. In March, US officials announced that the government would provide $2.5 million in food and humanitarian aid to Venezuelans in Colombia. At the 2018 Summit of the Americas, Vice President Michael Pence committed another $16 million to Colombia and Brazil. The United States could use this aid as leverage to encourage Latin American leaders to formally recognize the Venezuelan situation for what it is—a refugee crisis.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The post Call Them by Their Name—Fleeing Venezuelans are Refugees, not Migrants appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.