Who’s Apin’ Who?

Canada’s Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly, under the country’s ruling Liberal Party, stated that Canadians’ choices to go to Ukraine to fight against Russian forces as foreign fighters were “individual decisions.” She further remarked, “[w]e understand that people of Ukrainian descent want to support their fellow Ukrainians and also that there is a desire to defend the motherland and in that sense it is their own individual decision …. Let me be clear: we are all very supportive of any form of support to Ukrainians right now.” Canada’s Defence Minister, Anita Anand, championed the call by stating that, “all foreigners willing to defend Ukraine and world order” to make contact with Ukraine’s foreign diplomatic missions. The United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary, Liz Truss, is similarly supportive of UK nationals going off to fight in Ukraine, commenting that people need to make their own decisions regarding the fight “for democracy.” President Volodymyr Zelensky has increasingly framed Putin’s invasion of Ukraine as a fight for the defense and security of Europe, not for Ukraine exclusively, noting: “If we fall, you will fall.”

Informal Combatants: Wither Law?

While few should be surprised by Putin’s illegal and reprehensible aggression and military offensive in Ukraine, Western states’ acquiescence in the, colloquially foreign fighter phenomenon, and the creation of foreign legions contravenes established positions and laws on the matter. The West’s departure from its laws on its citizens participation in foreign wars (for the United Kingdom, the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870), constitutes a crisis-in-the-making. Although we have yet to observe the true scope of this emerging though not-so-embryonic crisis manufactured by states that are either fully compliant with citizens going abroad to fight and those that are awkwardly silent or attempting to evade the formulation of an official position – notably here, the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada – through their forceful ignorance and hypocrisy, their present positions support these events. In so doing, they place their own citizens who fight abroad in dangerous positions that may result in legal repercussions, at the very least.

Canada’s encouragement of foreign fighters from Canada, which resides somewhere in the hundreds, supports the establishment of a dangerous precedent suffused with risk that will further damage Canada’s tarnished reputation as a self-professed liberal democracy. It champions the idea for citizens of other states that the circumvention of national laws and potential violation of state sovereignty through foreign interference in lieu of formal declarations or intervention and war, is not only acceptable, but also the right thing to do. The escalating conflict in Ukraine can now be conveniently used, as we are presently witnessing, to redefine foreign policies and in ways that Western states have typically criticized others for doing. Rather than seeing the war in Ukraine as a unifying imperative, the rapid unfolding of events tows a number of key elements to light: unilateralism under the guise of multilateralism and unity, grey-zone or unofficial, noncommittal style decision-making, obscure objectives and intentions, and the use of paramilitary forces as a principal adjunct to their own state interests and (military) capabilities.

Finding (and Exploiting) the Loopholes

Previous foreign conflicts, throughout history and those in the not-too-distant past have led to many choosing to go and fight on foreign soil. Canada, a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and signatory of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, is responsible for upholding the international legal conventions to which it has committed, particularly when attempting to formulate policy responses to conflicts potentially involving the use of foreign fighters and foreign fighters returning to Canada. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, referring to its agreement to supply the Saudi regime with armored cars and military instrument, including weapons of various types, emphasized the notion that Canada takes international agreements and contract law very seriously. Unfortunately, it cannot claim so when directly supporting the unlawful premises of conducting war.

Canada is morally responsible and has the legal obligation to protect basic human rights and vulnerable populations at home and abroad. With the war in Ukraine representing a humanitarian crisis and a human rights challenge in myriad ways, Canada would have no means by which to monitor the activities and actions of its citizens participating in the war. Thus, the current Canadian government and its citizens, those who chose to fight, could serve as the means by which further violence and potential atrocities are committed. For Zelensky, more people mean more fighters. For Canada, this means the erosion of any notion of long-term viability of a positive image or position on future crises involving violent conflict and aggression. Canada’s position demonstrates the reversal of its “peaceful” foreign policy formulas.

Ukrainian law permits foreigners to join its armed forces. The Regulations on passing of military service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine foreigners and stateless persons, as per the Presidential Decree of June 10, 2016 (No. 248/2016) allows foreign nationals and stateless persons to join Ukraine’s armed forces. However, Canada’s Foreign Enlistment Act 1937 (“FEA 1937”) prohibits Canadians enlisting in a foreign state’s military or navy at war with a “friendly state.” Canada is not presently at war with Russia – one of the few country’s privileged to be part of the very council tasked with the preservation of international security and peace – nor is the definition of “friendly state” clear in this regard. Canada, like many states, uses old our outdated laws or finds loopholes to evade its responsibilities, culpability, or serve its own interests or those of other states. Passed under the government of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King  in 1937, the government used the act in response to the crisis in Spain. The Act never disappeared and can now be dusted off and used in the context of current aggression against Ukraine. While the Act would prohibit Canadians from joining Russian military forces, it would not preclude them from taking part in the fight on the side of Ukraine. The Act served the King government during and after the Spanish Civil War but turned into a scandal involving Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Canada’s Department of Justice. Canada’s official-unofficial position on the matter is convenient, even strategic as provides foreign consular services the freedom to recruiting anyone interested in supporting their cause. Thus, Canada’s highest political officials have directed Canadians to Ukrainian consular services.

The United States’ Neutrality Act 1794 (as amended) predates those of Canada and the United Kingdom’s, levies a three-year prison sentence against a person embarking on a military mission abroad against another state. However, the law does not legally proscribe that person from leaving the United States in order to undertake such a mission. The discrepancy within this and similar laws are therefore problematic. From a political point of view, the Canadian government is clearly not partial (that is, not neutral). From a legal perspective, it attempts to claim neutrality, but again this account is far from accurate. Even if Canada were neutral, its reliance on its outdated Act is inherently weak but also dangerous for the precedent it enables. That is, it violates the principle object for which it stands and that currently exist to fortify performances of a state in the international system with respect to other states. An account of the Neutrality Act made on April 20, 1961, just after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, which has become representative of the Kennedy Administration’s position, informs us that:

…the neutrality laws are among the oldest laws in our statute books. Most of the provisions date from the first years of our independence and, with only minor revisions, have continued in force since the 18th Century. Clearly they were not designed for the kind of situation which exists in the world today.

Second, the neutrality laws were never designed to prevent individuals from leaving the United States to fight for a cause in which they believed. There is nothing in the neutrality laws which prevents refugees from Cuba from returning to that country to engage in the fight for freedom. Nor is an individual prohibited from departing from the United States, with others of like belief, to join still others in a second country for an expedition against a third country.

There is nothing criminal in an individual leaving the United States with the intent of joining an insurgent group. There is nothing criminal in his urging others to do so. There is nothing criminal in several persons departing at the same time. What the law does prohibit is a group organized as a military expedition from departing from the United States to take action as a military force against a nation with whom the United States is at peace.

Irrespective of one’s ontological position on Putin’s invasion of Ukraine – and indeed the position should be clear, even in spite of 35 abstentions and 5 “against” votes at the United Nations General Assembly’s 11th Emergency Special Session – discussion over this specific facet of the war in Ukraine emphasizes the need for deep and more robust analysis – state leaders, including Canada’s, must have the requisite competence to deal with such complex issues, not merely feign competence.

An (Un)Intended Norm

Before Canada fuels the rapidly growing foreign fighter phenomenon, and contributing to the establishment of an (illiberal) norm, Canada’s current government needs to consider the complexity of its own law(s), International Human Rights Law, and International Criminal Law. This now stands as a matter of compliance alongside Canada’s international obligations and where it situates itself with respect to states’ roles in countering the occurrence of foreign (terrorist) fighters through the prism of the current situation in Eastern Europe and its deep impacts on the rest of the world.

Whether through the formation of an “international brigade”, contributions to such a task force, brigade, or whatever label it will assume, or subtly encouraging Canadians, regardless of their status, entrenches Canada’s peculiar adherence to non-commitment. Though serving as one perspective, Joly’s statement and the Liberal Party’s position demonstrates Canada’s willingness to remain idle as its own citizens enter into the dangerous milieu of an escalating conflict that has seen Russian forces intentionally target civilians, including the deliberate targeting of homes with cluster and vacuum bombs, schools and kindergartens, and orphanages.

If Canada truly stands for rule of law, justice, human rights, and international order, as it routinely claims, the current government will have to (re)consider its position and understanding of the legality of Canadians’ decisions to join the multifaceted conflict in Eastern Europe. Numerous dangerous precedents are presently being established, including the possibility of Canadians fighting alongside Russian forces anywhere in Ukraine. In essence, while Canada is encouraging its citizens to participate in unlawful fighting and permitting the act of killing by whatever means, and returning home without oversight concerning their activities abroad. It is doubtful whether Canada would have any reliable information about their activities – including potential atrocities, revenge assaults, rape, and so on – and various engagements in Ukraine. It is also unclear whether they be allowed to leave Ukraine after committing to the fight. Zelensky noted that men of military age can be charged with treason if they attempt to leave Ukraine.

These and other, even larger, issues need to be carefully measured and addressed by the Canadian government, its opposition parties, and NGOs prior to haphazardly supporting informal combatants flocking off to war. Foremost, the double-standard of supporting Canadians in becoming battle-hardened foreign fighters in Europe while simultaneously condemning those who choose to fight in other, notably Islamic wars abroad, particularly those in the Middle East, can foster animosity and tension within Canada, as well as between Canada and other states, including its close partners and allies. Adhering to this current posture invites criticism over its own but any government’s response to foreign fighter recruitment or radicalization via social media or other means.

While much of Canada’s talk about supporting Ukraine has so far proved, at least in relative terms, to be vacant rhetoric, despite the government’s messaging of firm support, its recent statements on this issue are deeply do much to counter the existing rules-based international system to which Canada and other states have turned in response to increasing aggression by the Putin regime.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com

The post Creating a Crisis: Canada and the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a history of presenting data gaps in its official statistical data, predominantly in the areas of GDP, military spending, housing, but in other areas as well that reflect on the overall performance of the state and its leaders. As China’s economy has grown, so too has interest in official Chinese statistics. In terms of research, one is somewhat restricted to using what the CCP provides while proving that official CCP data is modified with the intention of making the numbers shine is nearly impossible. One would then turn to other indicators that would either support of confute the data served by the CCP regime. An important item to highlight is, when dealing with such a state, statistical data as indicators of key performances areas (e.g., the economy) are important for legitimizing the regime in power. While there is an inherent challenge in disproving the data, one can almost certainly expect statistical manipulation.

One of the greatest challenges for the CCP in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak and its burgeoned into a full-blown pandemic was originally grassroots level data-sharing with the central government, which has turned into a major problem for the CCP. To begin with, competition within and across the large Chinese state exists. Positive figures reflect strongly on provincial governors, and in turn reflects efficacious leadership, efficiency, and other governance skills that simply make them look better to the ruling party and collectively reflect well on the party. Individually, it sets local government administrations and leaders apart from others that may not perform as well. To be sure, this internal competition can be seen at all levels but has blossomed into an international challenge for the CCP as a result of a gamble. The CCP reported on March 19 that it had no new cases of the disease while Italy recorded 3,405 deaths – China revealed 3,248 on the same day. That changed when it reported a rise yet again due to foreigners – Chinese returnees. Then, as if the sudden flattening and near-disappearance of the disease was not improbable enough, the CCP unexpectedly released information of 1,290 deaths to be added to the existing death toll on April 17. The reason? Authorities failed to count the bodies of those who had died from the disease but were never discovered. The fatality increase figure appears to be a strategic one – not too few, not too many.

Almost certainly, the data that the CCP shares with the world is the product of statistical distortion while its own internals possibly reveal different conditions that would delegitimize the ruling party and the regime overall. This is yet another tight spot that the CCP finds itself in. China’s reporting on COVID-19 has worsened since the beginning of the pandemic, which began as a concealed disease outbreak and true numbers being downplayed by over 500% in some locations in China. Dr Li Wenliang and the other COVID-19 “whistleblowers” were silenced by Beijing after drawing attention to the disease. Ren Zhiqiang, Chen Qiushi, Fang Bin, Li Zehua, and Xu Zhangrun, each of whom criticized the CCP and Xi in some form are still missing, presumably held by Chinese authorities. Dr Wenliang died, in a convenient turn of events for the CCP, of the disease he was attempting to draw attention to – a major point for Beijing but only if the audience is foolish enough to buy that story. In fact, in the weeks that followed, other journalists and activists shining the spotlight on the CCP’s mismanagement and cover-up of the virus vanished. These events lend credibility to existing (already soaring) degrees of suspicion over CCP data, especially given the tremendous rate of spread and fatalities in other countries with population concentration. As a peculiar case that illustrates the creativity of some governments, Chile’s Health Minister Jaime Mañalich stated at a press conference that victims of COVID-19 can be counted as recovered because they are “no longer contagious.” In fact, the bodies of COVID-19 victims can remain contagious. Dr Ilan Schwartz, infectious disease specialist and assistant professor at the University of Alberta, recently stated that, “it would be possible that the virus could persist and remain infectious in or on the body of someone who has died.”

One might ask whether the CCP is managing the data by focusing on aspects that can finesse COVID-19 numbers. Underlying health conditions can serve as yet another convenient cover for the true extant and impact of the virus. It is unlikely that many of China’s victims of COVID-19 were perfectly healthy individuals without other underlying health concerns, from an existing cold to pre-hypertension, or something far more serious. Thus, the existence of any other ailments can annul concrete claims that COVID-19 victims fell victim to the virus and nothing else. It was not until April that the Chinese authorities had elected to include asymptomatic cases into their official COVID-19 tally. In a study from April 6, 2020, Carl Heneghan, Jon Brassey, and Tom Jefferson of the Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine (CEBM) discovered that, “between 5% and 80% of people testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 may be asymptomatic.”

Given that the COVID-19 caseload has surpassed the 2.5M mark and that 210 countries and territories across the globe have reported on their respective figures (though the range of accuracy is broad and uncertain due to a surfeit of factors), there are enough cases to act against the virus as a unitary state actor and in cooperation with others. The weight of evidence exists for a variety of epidemiological research studies that can translate into policy action. However, any prospect of the global community moving forward or beyond current conditions without the support of a state that accounts for approximately 20% of the global population remains virtually non-existent at best. China and its people are an intricate component of the global economy, globalization, and many societies.

The question of how Chinese tech firms and other companies can withhold data from the CCP is an easy question to answer: they cannot. Section 2 of Article 71 in The Constitution Law of People’s Republic of China obliges essentially everything within and belonging to the state to supply requests of information. This is definitely not a two-way street and certainly not one that works beyond national borders, that is, between China and any other country. Furnishing others (i.e., states, international organizations, research institutes, and other entities) with (accurate) data is performed on a voluntary basis. As such, no authority can force China to provide accurate numbers to The World Health Organization (WHO) or any state in the international system. Indeed, it would be apt to question the effectiveness of conditionality with China as such a process would be contingent on many factors, some of which would be, risk/cost, benefit (for China, principally), material capacity, solidarity of actors involved, and so on.

The CCP  has gone against its own two-faced calls for transparency and freedom of speech since the beginning of the outbreak, calling into question even more so the accuracy of its data. This also applies to its own research. What people and governments know China knows about the virus at this point is based on the information that the CCP disseminates for public consumption. In classic CCP fashion, efforts to clamp down on independent data collection and analysis emerged as April carried on. No longer will research papers and publications be freely shared by Chinese medical experts without Xi’s stamp of approval. The CCP immediately pulled the plug on what it referred to as wasteful and counterproductive research into the disease. This means any scientific research data and analytics first needs to be fed through the filters in Beijing to ensure that research experiments and findings that could possibly assist in any international efforts to counter the disease does not veer from the regime’s path. Beijing’s two-pronged strategy in the face of suspicious numbers reported from within China and escalating death tolls beyond China’s borders (excluding Taiwan) includes: denial or false claims counter-accusations.

Pointing the finger at other countries, Beijing has reached in the direction of conspiracy theory, labeling the disease a product of the US military. Subsequently, Beijing’s blame game turned its sights to Italy, one of the hardest hit countries, claiming that the virus started in Italy and was brought to China by Italian tourists. Complementing its barrage of blame and redirecting the world’s attention, Beijing commenced its charm campaign, which coincided with calls by medical professionals regarding critical shortages of personal protection equipment (PPE). By the beginning of April, China’s coronavirus supplies were being rejected by other countries in short succession. Thousands of kits have failed quality criteria. The Netherlands reported that 600,000 face masks were recalled. Spain faced similar issues, stating that testing kits were essentially useless as they could not accurately determine if someone actually had the virus. Turkey made similar announcements about faulty equipment, as did Czechia (a country that sent supplies to Italy after China’s botched equipment was declared useless).

The reliability of what the CCPs “knows” about this virus is consistent with the reliability of other forms of data shared by the CCP. The numbers observed in China have been too perfect, consistently so. The CCP’s data on fatalities reveals prediction-models that are simply unrealistic, suggesting that the CCP new exactly how the virus was going to play out and the extent of human cost. This adds a further layer of impossibility, not improbability, given the that there is no way for the CCP to have known how the disease would be contracted. Authoritarian-style governments consistently demonstrate that they are filters of information. Others can only gain information about China’s internal medical competencies related to COVID-19 from the state, external scholarly research reports, or internal data leaking from whistleblowers – The CCP has covered all of those fronts. There is just as much reason to be in disbelief that the CCP is purposefully downplaying what it knows about COVID-19 as far as vaccines or a “cure” goes. At the same time, reports have recently come out suggesting that China has been successful in a peculiar treatment of two Chinese doctors. Overvaluing its knowledge about the disease, however, is an option but remains a risky move in that it would raise more questions about the regime than benefit it would yield. For now, it is far safer for the CCP to say “we know little about this deadly disease but our competencies are such that we have prevented the spread through conventional measures.”

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any institutions with which the authors are associated.

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Repressive measures against civil society have undergone drastic maturation processes since 2001. Measures of repression and co-option are part-and-parcel to the cultivation of increasingly tense and hostile environments within state borders, and have been observed in both developing and developed countries alike. While countries such as Russia and Turkey, for example, have recently had the uncivil society spotlight cast upon them, Western countries, the United States and United Kingdom for instance, have also contributed to the acculturation of a global environment hostile toward civil society through strict national security measures. The primacy of their roles were strengthened through the pursuit of international terrorist and criminal organizations after 9/11, the advent of which coincided with a sharp turn in government attitude and treatment of domestic and international NGOs.

With more than a dozen NGOs having been “blacklisted” by the government over the past several years, the list of organizations regarded by Fidesz as countering the national (security) interests of Hungary continues to grow.

This environment, while negatively impacting civil society in developed states, has been caustic for NGOs struggling not just to operate but also to stay alive in lesser-developed countries (LDCs), including non-consolidated or new and emerging democracies, and countries heavily reliant on foreign aid and other forms of external support. Since 2010, Hungary’s ruling Fidesz (Magyar Polgári Szövetség or Hungarian Civic Union) party has implemented measures that have culminated in a constrained and even hostile environment for civil society and NGOs, thus extending this backdrop to Central Europe and a region occupying a position within the European Union (EU). Measures and actions undertaken since 2010 have played a pointed role in the direct and systematic targeting of organizations regarded and labeled by the ruling party as “foreign agents” that promote fundamentalist or extremist views.

Government attacks against NGOs reached a feverish pitch in 2014, when Fidesz systematically attacked NGOs and the Norway European Economic Area (EEA) Grants program funded by Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland. The campaign began with rhetorical attacks against NGOs with the intention of damaging or destroying their reputations, but eventually led to several police raids on NGOs, and the seizure of personal property including computers as well as files and documents. 2015 presented renewed government efforts to discredit NGOs in the wake of the “refugee crisis” when Fidesz attempted to stigmatize NGOs either working in the fields of migration and asylum, or working with NGOs offering assistance to large numbers of refugees after entering Hungary predominantly through its southern border with neighboring Serbia. It was at this point that Hungary declared a state of emergency in an effort to address its proclaimed “migrant crisis.”

In December 2016, Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, openly stated his intentions to eliminate Soros influence in Hungary. However, pressure on civil society and NGOs in Hungary have preceded Orbán’s 2016 declaration. Extensive auditing procedures, for example, have required NGOs to shift their human resources to fulfilling reporting criteria to the government. This author’s fieldwork, in which several hundred NGOs were surveyed, elucidates the increased operational costs associated with the government’s auditing measures. The shift detracts from their day-to-day operations and has limited their human resources. Several program officers explained that in some cases months worth of time and work were detracted from their primary operations. Most NGOs in Hungary are composed of only a handful, sometimes one or two, paid full-time staff members, who then rely on volunteers for further assistance. Government pressure has also come in the form of financial restrictions and the passing of an “anti-foreign NGO” law in April 2017 – essentially a carbon copy of Russia’s 2012 “foreign agent law” seeking to shut down so-called “undesirable” NGOs – obliging NGOs to register as “foreign supported” or “foreign funded” if they receive more than $26,000 USD per annum. Failure to disclose their foreign funding sources can have severe consequences, including the termination of the NGO.

Government labeling of NGOs can have long-term negative effects, noted an executive director of an NGO working in the field of democracy, transparency, and anti-corruption, by resonating in the minds of individuals within Hungarian society and being compounded by subsequent government attempts to discredit and tarnish the image of the “third sector.” Fidesz’s anti-NGO rhetoric, and efforts to deface the Hungarian-born American philanthropist George Soros and the Open Society Foundations’ (OSF) work to promote democratic societies, have helped foster a small but palpable anti-NGO culture in Hungary. Defamation of NGOs by the government can have dangerous effects given the lack of legal channels through which to respond. The discrediting of civil society and NGOs, whether through government rhetoric, websites, or national referendums, can help to produce a negative image of organizations by linking them to other threats within the country or threat from abroad. People retaining an inadequate awareness about NGOs can become easily and permanently suspicious about the sort of work that takes place in the “third sector.”

Fidesz’s Vice Chairman Szilárd Németh made a public statement in January 2016 calling for the OSF and its partners to be “swept out” of Hungary, signaling the beginning of new efforts to crackdown on civil society in a country ruled by what has been referred to as a hybrid or semi-authoritarian regime. Budapest’s Soros-funded Central European University (CEU) came under fire by Fidesz in April 2017 with legislation that sought to close down the institution indefinitely. Ambitious initiatives of this nature are valuable instruments for testing the limits of Fidesz’s power within the country as well as public reactions. Németh underscored the need for Hungary to resort to all available tools to increasingly resist civil society and social movements linked to Soros and Western or “foreign” funding and interests.

Hungary has recently introduced a range of new counter-terrorism initiatives including the Hungarian Counter Terrorism Centre (Terrorelhárítási Központ [TEK]) and the Counterterrorism Information and Criminal Analysis Centre (Terrorelhárítási Információs és Bűnügyi Elemző Központ [TIBEK]), and has proscribed the Hungarian police forces with extensive reach that overlaps with that of national intelligence authorities. Fidesz has officially and effectively linked NGOs to issues of national security such as money laundering, illegal migration, and international terrorism, and extremism. With more than a dozen NGOs having been “blacklisted” by the government over the past several years, the list of organizations regarded by Fidesz as countering the national (security) interests of Hungary continues to grow. Attracting particularly negative attention by the ruling party are NGOs working in areas sensitive to the government. NGOs focusing on anti-patriarchal dimensions of society, transparency, anti-corruption, minority rights, migration, and LGBTQI+ have received particularly negative attention. The continuity of government calls for increased transparency also continues to provide a strong justificatory basis for assuming a more aggressive posture toward civil society in Hungary, and is being fueled by the type of international terrorism and national security narrative seen elsewhere within and outside of Europe since 9/11 and the advent of the “War on Terror.”

The material context is a major backdrop to this situation in Hungary. NGO financing can be seen as the historic “Achilles heel” of the civil society sector in a country where civil society, civic associations, and volunteerism have shallow and particularly fragile root systems. The so-called “Golden Age” of civil society passed at the turn of the millennium with the resource scarce environment strained further still by government crackdown on NGOs that have the ability still to contest aspects of the ruling party’s power in Hungary. Ideological interpretations of the role of civil society and NGOs are also a key component in Hungary’s anti-organized civil society and NGO character. Government spokespersons have linked NGOs with migrants and migration, the threat of terrorism and flow of terrorists, and the concept of extremism in various forms, such as ideas about the role of liberal institutions, and as the Fidesz party stated, over-interpretations about rights and freedoms, including human rights. This mixture has in other countries led to the systematic and strategic co-option of civil society.

Government actions have fallen in line with the ruling party’s visions for the creation of an illiberal state within the EU, and are congruent with national rhetoric as well as the planning and implementation of illiberal legislation and policy in Hungary. This relationship has led to a situation whereby NGOs and the organized aspects of civil society have become deeply politicized and securitized, so much as that they have been positioned alongside threats to national security, and inexorably linked to views of extremism and terrorism. Although it would be too convenient and simple to connect these events and suggest that the same strategic co-option and crackdown of civil society in the name of counter-terrorism has begun to take place in Hungary, the events have the potential for piecing together with the broader narrative highlighting the harmful character of the “War on Terror” in the context of civil society.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Putin’s successes have been sketched in the form of interventions in Moldova, Georgia, and most recently, Ukraine – where Putin’s perverse use of “Little Green Men” and Spetsnaz (Russia’s Special Forces) draped in civilian garment led to the annexation of Crimea, and dislodged large parts of eastern Ukraine from Kiev’s rightful possession. While Iran has also proven itself a leader in hybrid warfare capabilities in and around the Middle East, the use of hybrid warfare has been put to great effect on non-state and sub-state levels, with actors like the Islamic State (IS), Hezbollah (most notably during the Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006), and Boko Haram, among numerous others, having expanded and continuing to spread the practice of warfare in this fashion.

Devoid of legal or national marking, the US’ deniable hybrid instruments can remain concealed, almost in plain sight.

Few regions encapsulate the idea of modern hybrid warfare expansion as crisply as the South China Sea (SCS). China has made bold and strident moves over the past many months to reassert its claims of sovereignty and presence over a region of geopolitical importance, in what could aptly be referred to as state-sponsored piracy activities. China has simultaneously intertwined its actions with government supported propaganda campaigns, and a variation of violent and lethal action, scare tactics, and a blurring of soldier-civilian lines.

Whereas previous instances of modern hybrid warfare have predominantly occurred on land, the South China Sea will play host to the concept in a unique context. What is being observed in this area is in a way part of a normal progression in the application of technology as well as tactics and strategies that have led to major shifts in power in previous cases. A littoral guerilla style of warfare unfolds in much the same fashion as land-based operations, but they bring several distinct advantages for those actively pursuing littoral hybrid warfare activities, providing widespread coverage for a littoral hybrid warrior.

After a brief period of China leveraging restricted warfare for small but incremental politically and militarily strategic aims in its own backyard, most notably by way of its maritime military – China’s so-called “Third Sea Force” – the US took-up a protuberant position and began play a major role in the emergence of hybrid warfare in the South China Sea dispute. China’s capture of the US Navy’s (USN) Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) buoyancy glider has anything but signaled the start of the US’ littoral hybrid endeavors. US military officials instead have been planning for this type of engagement for years.

A process that has recently been expected to take a decade or more, the emergence of littoral hybrid warfare has already arrived. Operating relatively undetected in the South China Sea, the US can undertake interdiction operations with relative ease, and signal an ambiguous presence in the disputed area. Because the South China Sea is not part of the US’ “home territory,” it need not establish complete control over the region to frustrate the claims made by other states or their military/security assets.

The next stage of warfare expanding in this direction is already taking place. The US has the requisite mechanisms for countering what has been perceived by senior officials in the US as Chinese threats, but might not have developed its long-term vision for waging littoral hybrid warfare in Asia – a strategic effect that can be realized incrementally and relatively easily but also decisively, both tactically and operationally. Expect this to play-out in tandem, sort of like choreography, with China’s policy formation and implementation in the same region. China and the US have made it clear that they are aware of the possibility that other smaller states in the region will have a considerable impact on modern hybrid warfare expansion in the South China Sea dispute, just as small state and NSAs have in other parts of the world.

Because the US has the capacity to aggressively invest in the development of newer systems and produce large quantities of its “Little Grey (Un)Men,” they can deeply influence the pace of hybrid warfare in the South China Sea. Systems deployed in the SCS and elsewhere in Asia can “rest” for months at a time, and undertake missions at sea or over land. The same can be applied in other critical locations like the Arabian Gulf, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and even in the Arctic Ocean – anywhere where there is the presence of perceived enemy forces, including littoral forces, military bases, areas and objects of economic interest such as offshore oil platforms, or areas of political interest

Devoid of legal or national marking, the US’ deniable hybrid instruments can remain concealed, almost in plain sight. When required to act, they can then undertake missions in stealthy fashion, providing the US with valuable data on the presence of, in the case of the South China Sea for example, China’s “grey hulls” and “white hulls,” though with greater difficulty on China’s maritime militia that might be operating in disputed areas. The US has already had intimate encounters with hybrid threats, particularly within the framework of the “War on Terror” (WoT), and used its Predator fleets – armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – to significant effect in a wide array of conflict zones. Their use has depicted the potential for spending on much simpler though specialized equipment suited for highly specific tasks.

That same practice can be applied to the US’ sea forces as well with the US producing hundreds, if not thousands, of unmanned systems to patrol vital waterways and maintain their presence in hotly-coveted geographical locales. The US’ capacity for large-scale building coupled with small and relatively inexpensive hybrid warfare instruments breeds a departure from costly platforms when low-cost UUVs can function even more effectively in military/non-military missions. They fall neatly in-line with the view of a state, any state, interested in disrupting the security or security interests of another, practically anywhere.

The international realm today provides ideal conditions for all types of actors to bid for power, and for states to turn to atypical methods of warfare in an attempt to leverage their internal weaknesses and external disadvantages. Even powerful states like the US can benefit from a combination of regular and irregular elements in its military force structure. Paying closer attention to the potential benefits of modern hybrid warfare is particularly useful for the US government and its military, both of which have been criticized regularly for their lack of flexibility and their inability to adapt to a contemporary security environment in frequent flux.

It would be remiss to claim that US has learned all it can over the course of many years and decades as a war practitioner. Rather, many of its experiences have proved to be less than pristine examples of military execution and orchestration, or more harshly the height of political and military folly. Since the start of its 9/11 wars, the US has increasingly changed its military thinking and drastically altered its strategic doctrine, particularly as a result of its campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The South China Sea dispute presents the US with another opportunity for further developing its military competence and dexterity, especially as a modern hybrid war practitioner, and others in the region will surely follow.

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For the past 50 years, the Outer Space Treaty has remained the backbone of space governance, providing the framework on international space law and numerous principles. However, the strength of that backbone, often defended by its long history, cannot be expected to cloak the reality of an unstable peace forever, nor should it.

The principles of the Outer Space Treaty range from (freedom of) exploration, non-national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, the diplomatic nature of astronauts, to damage liability and state avoidance of harmfully contaminating space and its celestial bodies. Fissures have revealed themselves over the course of the treaty’s lifespan, but have typically been brushed off as the test of time and instances have served to only strengthen the Treaty and deepen national support for it.

Much of the world’s states have signed on to the Treaty, recognizing its protocols, but the obvious problem is the application of those UN-backed conventions to states that chose not to sign-on. With state backing, the UN has demonstrated the complexity of policing many of the world’s conflict and conflict zones, mediating between hostile actors, and managing delicate peace agreements. How would the UN be equipped to govern in such cases up in outer space? The rules can be ignored by anyone, from states to transnational corporations (TNCs), with few measures in place to punish those actors for their transgressions.

For the past half a century the world has observed a mutual respect for the Treaty, with its signatories seemingly recognizing the importance and reach of its legal foundations. The reasons for this could be many. One less affecting reason may be both a lack of advanced technology necessitating Treaty-damaging exploitations of outer space and its bodies. Another might be found in the relationship between activities in outer space and those here on Earth. With the information age and the importance of security and defense-based communication, and information sharing, there could be greater prospects for violating the conventions of the Outer Space Treaty.

The idea that outer space has been used for peaceful purposes is deeply disingenuous. Indeed, the area just beyond Earth has served as an important region for facilitating potential hostile activity. While no actor has the ability to claim anything in space as its very own, this does not preclude the potential for conflict between two or more states in or over that area – mere presence alone is enough to necessitate a defensive or aggressive posture even if a claim of ownership over a particular has not been made.

Hostile encounters on Earth serve as a case in point for this, with numerous areas demarcated for mutual and peaceful purposes, in principle hostilities can break out at any time. With a lack of “space police” – though there is the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) – as well as declarations that space remains a no-claims area, the peace and security architecture of this area has and continues to remain delicate, held together by trust.

Although a number of past incidents demonstrate the resolve of nations to maintain peace in space, there have been attempts to lay celestial ownership. For example, the Bogotá Declaration in 1976 was a bold attempt to circumvent the Outer Space Treaty’s declaration that national appropriation cannot take place in outer space. In an attempt by eight states sharing the Equator to defy the no-appropriations rule, the Bogotá Declaration labeled Geostationary Orbit (GEO) a “natural resource” as opposed to a region of space. In an effort to extend the concept of nature and naturalness the attempt reverted to the jus cogens principle of international law.

Some of the declarations were indeed valid and accurately pointed to the advent of cosmic conflict, over which the UN and other regulating bodies remained generally sanguine.

Technology has begun to catch-up to state and non-state interests and aspirations in space. The possibility exists that human will soon return to the Moon and that footprints will be stamped on the surface of Mars. Exploratory ambitions in space will eventually converge with economic interests and possibilities of mining asteroids, and establishing more sophisticated defense and security measures thousands of miles above Earth’s surface. Thus, national appropriation in space is a dormant but certainly not a dead issue.

With just more than half of the international community affixed to the Outer Space Treaty, a large number of states have failed to latch on to its principles. The world’s rising powers like China have made clear demonstrations of their interest in “testing” the tautness of the Treaty, and the international community’s commitment to its preservation. China’s 2007 operation against its satellite – the Fengyun-1C (FY-1C) – by means of an anti-satellite (ASAT) device with a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) payload launched from Xicheng Space Launch Center, sparked worldwide controversy with states calling this action aggressive in nature and more of a demonstration of military capacity, resolve, and Treaty defiance.

China’s actions were not interpreted as a violation of the Treaty because its weapons systems did not fall under the category of Weapons of Mass-Destruction (WMDs) though they can certainly be seen as having mass-effect due to the debris cloud generated from the procedure. The incident, which resulted in approximately 35,000+ fragments larger than one centimeter, raises questions about the impact of space junk and abilities to “escape” the layer of debris surrounding Earth.

Like other International Law shortcomings, its focus remains predominantly on nations rather than equally important and effective non-state actors. This is where the Outer Space Treaty requires a significant overhaul. Private companies are a viable way for governments to skirt around the conditions charted by the Treaty for appropriate activity in space. Even people, far from representing an entire country, have the potential to make claims in outer space, provided they have the financial capabilities or even (state) backing to engage in such ventures.

The United States’ (US) Space Act of 2015 has been called a fruitful step forward for space governance. However, despite a special clause stating that the US makes no claim over anything in outer space, the Act extends the boundaries of activity, and enhances the ambiguity of celestial activities by individuals and states that could work together. After establishing a significant presence in a particular area and subsequently developing those areas, back peddling on development or extrapolation projects would become increasingly difficult. In other words, undoing the work that inadvertently signals ownership over something could become a meteoric feat, depending on the circumstances.

The basis of the Outer Space Treaty is deserving of scrutiny because it was penned when both state and non-state capabilities failed to come close to undertaking the sort of ventures that press beyond conceivability today. The principle of establishing law in a region remains valid, and one that most states today will probably continue to support, however as witnessed in other geopolitical realms, international law cannot always keep pace with modern day challenges, including state and non-state political and economic interests that have the potential for resulting in violence conflict and war.

Without revamping the rules that were originally established to peacefully govern beyond Earth, one cannot ignore the possibility of an arms race potentially to the militarization of space or even real-life Star Wars taking place in the universe.

The post Is the Outer Space Treaty Ready for New Cosmic Challenges? appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

The nearly unanimous global condemnation that followed was enough to lead to an historic round of sanctions issued by the UN that even managed to gain China’s support. Though the U.S. has managed to tighten the noose around North Korea’s leadership, this achievement also appears to be in contradiction with the need for both immediate and long-term regional stability.

As a primer to the difficult-to-manage security architecture of the Korean Peninsula and surrounding area, John Mearsheimer noted in the past several years that we cannot continue to fool ourselves about the nuclear capabilities of North Korea. There is little doubt that the country is now a de facto nuclear weapons power – a verity that the U.S. and its close allies hasten to deny for fear that states could similarly pursue these weapons.

The statement, and one that has been supported by numerous experts and scholars on North Korea, nuclear weapons, and regional security in Asia, leads to an often evaded or dismissed notion that the U.S., South Korea, China, and Russia may have to accept living with a nuclear North Korea as part of their security calculations.

“They [North Korea] have the ability, they have the weapons, they have the ability to miniaturize those weapons, and they have the ability to put them on a rocket that can reach the homelands [U.S.],” said Admiral William Gortney, commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). NORAD is a bi-state (US and Canada) organization tasked with air and maritime warning, control, and defense. US NORTHCOM is a regional combatant command responsible for defending the continental US (including Alaska), Canada, and Mexico.

Attempts to halt North Korea matter only to the extent that North Korea actually cares.

“The most likely next vehicle that North Korea will use is their large liquid-fueled space-launch vehicle called Unha [“Galaxy” – an expendable carrier rocket], which today launches a satellite, but can be modified to carry a nuclear warhead,” explains Richard Fisher of the International Assessment and Strategy Center. The development plan therefore looks like this in simple terms: (1) develop a nuclear device, (2) develop a nuclear delivery vehicle, (3) reach global targets. As Fisher notes, that vehicle “can reach targets all over the United States.”

However, the success-rate of nuclear delivery for North Korea is greatly reduced due to lack of flight-testing. David Albright, Center for Science and International Security asks whether North Korea would be “willing to commit suicide for a 10% chance of success […] most nations would say absolutely not.” But we have to keep in mind that North Korea is neither most states, nor are there states like North Korea in the world.

US sanctions unveiled over five years ago were expected to dissuade North Korea from pursuing its nuclear dreams, but that never happened. It seemed like a good idea at the time although it led to several tests and an advanced stage of development. What we are now witnessing is ineffectual repetition.

With a dual-aim of removing Kim Jong-un and hitting the stop button on his nuclear weapons program, the U.S. is unlikely to reach its desired aims through adoption of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2270 on North Korea or further sanctions. Now that North Korea has crossed the nuclear threshold, there is little incentive to move back to the negotiation table with the U.S. and other representatives of the international community. As was the case half a decade ago, the North Korean dictator is little deterred.

Today, North Korea’s powerful military remains exactly that, only now it possesses a handful of nuclear warheads and is still led by an irrational dictator who stands to gain from the latest sanctions imposed on the state. It is rather inaccurate to see the US as occupying a victorious position after the adoption of the resolution since North Korea has gone on to indicate its readiness to use its military power whenever necessary. If by some stroke of fortune North Korea were to ever revert back to the path of diplomacy, little should be expected after years of rewarding North Korea for its failure to comply with a bundle of UNSC resolutions ordering the Kim Jong-un regime to halt its course.

Attempts to halt North Korea matter only to the extent that North Korea actually cares. The point of the sanctions, including those imposed years ago, were supposed to prevent North Korea from reaching the point that it already has. Now the legal instruments that the UN arms itself with are only able to inform the world that further transgression would be just that, merely a violation of what North Korea cares little about violating.

If North Korea were to go so far as to actually use its nuclear weapons, the UN would be prepared only to point to the fact that their use would be illegal under international law. Kim Jong-un, however, may find a bit of wiggle-room in this context.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) faltered when it came to the question of a state actually using nuclear weapons in an extraordinary case of self-defense. As Dan Joyner, writing in the field of arms control law expressed, “[o]f course, extreme circumstances of self-defense would only go, if anywhere, to the jus ad bellum question of whether a use of force against another state would be lawful. It does not go to the jus in bello question of whether the use of nuclear weapons during an armed conflict would be lawful under international humanitarian law, and its restrictive principles of distinction and proportionality particularly.”

Despite the major obstacles that exist in many different scenarios involving nuclear use by North Korea, if it were to be attacked its justificatory barriers remains tremendously daunting but not insurmountable.

The most striking event of the past several years is the adoption of new UN resolutions. This signifies the recommencement of a pattern that led to the one point nobody wanted to reach.  It is also illustrative of the weakness of the U.S. to stand for the principles in which it believes. There are now fewer options on the table to compel Kim Jong-un to back down – even taking into account his maniac and irrational character. What the U.S. and its allies have not learned from the recent past is that the repetition of a model for disaster seen decades ago in Iraq with many years of sanctions having destroyed Iraqi society to the point of eventually creating a dangerous backdrop for the emergence of extremists and leaving the regime of Saddam Hussein in an even more powerful position.

On the effects of sanctions, numerous economic studies, including Abel Escribà-Folch and Joseph Wright’s “Dealing with Tyranny” published in 2010 in International Security Quarterly, have shown that if there is a capacity of an opposition to increase then there is an opportunity for the repressive power of the ruling dictator to diminish, leading to regime destabilization. But when there is no opposition to benefit, sanctions are more likely to strengthen the ruling regime. Now the U.S. and its partners have to confront the balancing act of restricting the Kim Jong-un regime’s nuclear capacity but keeping North Korea from drifting toward outright regime collapse.

Georgetown University Professor Daniel Byman and Assistant Professor Jennifer Lind of Dartmouth College identify important aspects of the “authoritarian toolbox in North Korea.” They propose the Kim family depends on three tools: restrictive social policies; the manipulations of information and ideas; heavy use of force for purposes of suppression. The UN’s new round of sanctions are likely to strengthen those repressive tools, reinforce the aggressive propensity of Kim Jong-un, and narrow his options, perhaps even compelling him to resort to what the world fears most.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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The decision to close France’s borders is one that is incredibly challenging to implement. France shares a 1,274-mile long border with six countries to the east and a 436-mile long border with Spain and Andorra to the south. Its long coastline also poses a problem for border security. France is also part of the European Union’s (EU) Schengen zone – the product of an agreement that abolished the EU’s internal borders rendering border crossings and checkpoints across much of the bloc obsolete.

The events of the Paris attacks heighten tension about the role of borders in the modern EU. Germany’s Interior Minister, Thomas de Maiziere, asked Europeans not to link it to the ongoing migrant crisis. The next day, the Greek government announced that two men linked to the attacks registered as migrants in Greece and one of them “entered Europe [via Leros] while masquerading as a refugee just six weeks ago.”

While one of the gunmen was identified as a Frenchman, Belgian authorities have made several arrests related to the Paris attacks. These are precisely the factors that reinforce the idea that borders, particularly border closure, while playing an important role in national security, divert authorities’ attention from the real factors that facilitated such a highly-coordinated series of attacks in the heart of the French capital. A major obstacle is that one case cannot easily link terrorism with migration and consequently impact policy. This does not imply, however, that more cases need to arise before changes are made to the EU’s counterterrorism policy solely on the basis of migration.

Frontex’s 2015 risk assessment has only recently shown that human smuggling can serve as a channel for terrorist operatives into Europe where they can move freely throughout the Schengen area.

Following an extraordinary European Council meeting held on September 21, 2001, approval was reached on a comprehensive policy to combat terrorism. In addition to the five areas in which new instruments and measures were to be implemented, all EU member states became bound to a single long-term counterterrorism strategy. Shortly after ISIS militants carried out the Paris attacks, ISIS announced that it was just the “first of the storm” and that France would continue to be one of its top targets.

For the second time in a single year, the French nation had been deeply shocked by terrorist attacks with the security of France appearing less certain than in previous years. These events, and potential future attacks, illustrate the need to revisit the plan that came into effect in 2001, which implied that, “the rotating presidencies were no longer able to set the EU counterterrorism agenda solely on the basis of their own national priorities” as Dr. Ordrich Bures explains in EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?

The 2001 policy from inception was so ambitious and so widely encompassing that it seemed to be blatantly detached from the ability of policymakers to put its measures into practice – a perspective that, though observed by many in EU institutions, has yet to be acted on.

EU counterterrorism policymakers have been caught-up in debates with critics that terrorism is something exceptional, something more than organized crime and that the perceived difference implies that completely novel measures and instruments need to be put in place in order to combat it. Law enforcement authorities across the EU receive considerable training and sufficient means to combat organized crime, which also uses terrorism as a utilitarian tool. Counterterrorism, however, remains a question of organized crime even though what the EU faces today is serious internal and external threats from groups like the Islamic State.

For years now many EU member states have voiced their concerns about the inadequacies of Frontex, which remains drastically underfunded and understaffed. The agency has also been misused, supplementing national services in military-like missions rather than concentrating on coordinating border control. Executive Director of Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, reported on the agency’s efforts this past year in registering “more than 800,000 irregular border crossings,” and voluntary aid organizations, which have been shouldering a lot of the responsibility in Europe’s migrant crisis, are unable to sustain the responsibility for a long period of time.

Frontex should not have to enlist the help of volunteer organizations since this is the EU’s principle border control agency tasked with securing the EU’s external borders. But at the moment, the EU suffers from a combination of its resources being stretched too thin, poor allocation of resources, and a major blip in its prioritizing. Even though the EU has to maintain a fine balance between helping those who are fleeing conflict zones and ensuring the safety and security of its own citizens, the EU has to take stock of its recent failure to protect its own first and foremost.

The EU still accepts social cohesion superficially, pretending that freedom of movement poses little risk for the simple reason that it fails to accept the challenge of social disruption accompanying discriminate management of passports and identity checks on movement controls. The EU has chosen to settle the matter by accepting the free movements of all peoples in Europe. Alternatively, the need may soon arise to accept checking some Europeans or all Europeans.

EU authorities need to acknowledge that violence, organized crime, and terrorism share a relationship with the current migrant crisis. International human smuggling is strongly linked to other forms of transnational crime such as the trafficking of narcotics. Criminals, fugitives, terrorists, and weapons can be moved as easily as economic migrants and those claiming to seek refuge from conflict zones like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, among other places.

Frontex’s 2015 risk assessment has only recently shown that human smuggling can serve as a channel for terrorist operatives into Europe where they can move freely throughout the Schengen area. This should not have come as a surprise to EU authorities even before the Islamic State threatened to place terrorists among the thousands of migrants streaming into Europe where they are safely hidden in plain sight.

At a time when EU member states are calling for less intrusion and increased state sovereignty, the area of counterterrorism and border security is a principle area in which more EU is necessary, meaning greater cooperation, cross-“border” collaboration, and communication among authorities throughout the bloc. The Schengen system has measures built in that allow for enhanced security procedures if national interests are threatened. There is no sense worrying about defending Schengen given its flexibility. Instead, the EU must acknowledge the flaws in its outdated counterterrorism policy above and beyond those in its disturbingly neglected migration policy, and consider national priories in the face of the growing threat of terrorism (as part of transnational crime).

Carnegie Europe’s Visiting Scholar, Marc Pierini, talks about this threat, noting the some thousand or so terrorists already in the EU. It is clear that the growth of this number is a real possibility with Europe’s migrant influx. Even though increased rates of migration is something that the EU should have proactively addressed, beginning with updating its decade-old policies, it will have to come to terms with its interest in maintaining open borders, but in light of increased migration. One cannot dodge the fact that EU’s own “openness” is a self-created vulnerability making it susceptible to terrorist infiltration and networking.

To a large extent, current EU counterterrorism policies are relics that predate the events of the past several years, when increased terrorist instances have been recorded and migrant flows have swelled. These are the sort of events that the EU should have seen coming and should have been preparing for by taking into account the need for consensus, flexibility in its principles, prioritization, the role of internal and external borders, and the importance of agencies put in place for the sole purpose of surveying and managing those borders.

The EU also needs to reorient its current counterterrorism policy so as to focus on EU security against the threats of organized crime. Its core principles, furthermore, need to be re-read through the lens of current events and the expertise of security professionals and experts, without allowing its critics to delay the implementation of policy through boisterous claims that systematic border control infringes on Schengen and both the concept and practice of free moment.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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The Arctic attracted headlines more than half a decade ago when Russia planted a flag at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean. Russia has also been intensifying its military flights that violate European and North American airspace in addition to sending ships to the Caribbean, South Asia, and testing United States (US) coastal security. Much of the world’s attention has been focusing on the EU’s ongoing migrant crisis, the “Arab Awakening,” the rise of ISIS in the Middle East, and the current multifaceted conflict in Syria and Iraq. But Moscow’s interest in the Arctic has remained in place. Many analysts argue that war is brewing. Others maintain that while he is willing to test his adversaries, Putin clearly recognizes which issues would be suicide for Russia.

Will Russia and Canada come to blows over the Arctic? If so, what are the stakes, and is Canada ready?

Interest in claiming Arctic territory is primarily driven by the quest for Arctic resources. Until recently, the resources of the Arctic were deemed too difficult and expensive to develop. But with increasing access and soaring energy prices, the Arctic’s wealth, which is conservatively estimated to contain up to 25 percent of the world’s remaining oil and gas reserves, including over 100 billion barrels of oil, is being explored with ever greater fervor; even despite Royal Dutch Shell PLC’s recent decision to hit the stop button on its multi-billion dollar search for oil in Alaska’s Chukchi Sea. Nonetheless, these resources, which have not yet been exploited, are estimated at some $20 trillion – 15 times that of Canada’s entire economy. The oil is far more attractive on the Russian side because of the current state of the country’s infrastructure in the region, including numerous harbor facilities. Compared to Russia’s 17 points of safe harbor, Canada’s Nanisivik is still in the planning phase.

Senator Lisa Murkowski stated that the Northwest Passage was completely ice-free in 2008 for the first time in history. The absence of ice on this normally dangerous route captured the attention of many countries. Even China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea have been admitted to the Arctic Council as observers 2013 due to their growing interests. As interest in the Arctic and its issues grows, the inadequacy of existing instruments and institutions fosters legal, resource, as well as military and defense contestation. The Arctic Council focuses principally on issues of climate change/impact and biodiversity yet is ill-equipped to address issues pertaining to Arctic militarization. There is the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) union, which consists of Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland, but the group of nations does not preside over Arctic interests in relation to Canada exclusively.

Delays and budgetary constraints have left Canada exposed to Russia as its immediate rival in the region.

In response to the ice-free summer, Canada announced its intentions to establish an Arctic military training facility and deep-water port on the Northwest Passage. Additionally, Ottawa reported that it would undertake the construction of a handful of ice-strengthened patrol boats and icebreakers that would be in operation by 2014. The aim was to assert sovereignty in the Arctic. That plan has fallen drastically short of expectations in Ottawa and came to be known as Canada’s ‘Arctic inaction.’ The single icebreaker that was to be built came with the enormous price tag of $720 million (which eventually rose to $1.3 billion) and an expected delivery date of 2017. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is simply not ready for future military conflict in the Arctic despite the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (A/OPS) project initiated under the leadership of Stephen Harper. The A/OPS initiative was also a dismal failure. Moreover, The RCN has not been present in the Arctic for well over five decades. Since the 1950s, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) has been tasked with “protecting” the Arctic.

Delays and budgetary constraints have left Canada exposed to Russia as its immediate rival in the region. Noting Putin’s imperial ambitions, Canada’s new Liberal government can hardly turn its attention from the high north and what should be one of Canada’s most important foreign policy areas. The changes evident in the building program of the Russian navy demonstrate that at least one critical element of Russia’s armed forces has been and continues to be dimensioned approximately to the country’s most critical needs, and along lines that enables it to preserve its strategic dividends in this particular part of the world. That is not to say that the Russian military would likely hold a monopoly in military terms over the entire Arctic region, but certainly there is a gradation of power and strategic control, the bleeding point of which is Russia’s current legal and political territory.

Moscow is currently directing some of its resources toward the renewal of its old military bases and even building new ones to support its current and future Arctic endeavors. In its new doctrine, the Arctic is a naval priority. The Kremlin has also recently stated that it will strengthen its naval forces in the Arctic and Atlantic regions in response to NATO military exercises that have been held close to Russia’s borders. Against a backdrop of Canadian attempts to sort out its budgetary problems and no vision for the immediate future of Canada’s Arctic security, Moscow announced that its navy will be receiving a new fleet of icebreakers. In early 2015, the largest Arctic war games ever took place with roughly 35,000 Russia troops, 50 surface and sub-surface ships, and over 100 aircraft. Russia’s plans also include upgrading the airfield on Novaya Zemlya to accommodate modern fighter aircraft as well as sophisticated S400 air defense systems. Moreover, a newly formed 6,000 troop military group comprised of a couple of motorized infantry brigades will be stationed in the Murmansk area in the Kola Peninsula and the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Region. When the military is ready to move into the north, this is a good indication that critical infrastructure will either follow or is already in place.

Right now Russia owns 22 icebreakers with another 19 specialized ships held by Russian industry, and about 25 ice-capable attack submarines. By contrast, only three out of four of Canada’s decrepit Victoria-class submarines are available for operations. These boats are essentially worthless and have been holding the RCN back through ballooning upkeep costs and commitment to a $1.5 billion life-extension plan to enhance the functionality of the aging fleet. Completing scrapping the program, in favor of just one or two newer submarines, and committing its new boats exclusively to Arctic role would be a positive step for the Canadian government. Commander Jeff Bierley, of the US Navy submarine Seawolf explained that the “submarine is the best platform to operate in the Arctic because it can spend the majority of its time under the ice.” Nearly three decades ago, the Canadian government concluded that it needs 10 nuclear-powered submarines if it were to consider enforcing its claim to Arctic sovereignty at all feasible. Today it has none. But even small, non-nuclear (i.e., diesel-electric) attack submarines would be incredibly effective at protecting Canada’s Artic waters and would pose a significant threat to larger nuclear submarines operating under the icecaps. Although outnumbered by the US fleet of 41 nuclear powered attack submarines, Russia’s warships will likely outclass the old and decaying Royal Canadian Navy for years to come. The sovereignty issue needs to be critically important to all NATO members and to all EU (even European) countries. Former Defense Minister Perrin Beatty once reasoned that, “NATO has to appreciate the fact that, if it is abhorrent for Europe to have a single square inch of European soil invaded by a foreign power, it is no less abhorrent for Canadians to contemplate a single square inch of their territory being penetrated in a similar way.”

Even though no open conflict has yet been witnessed between countries over the Arctic’s resources, a road map to violence is emerging. This is not based on the energy element or climate change but Russia’s military program alone makes a considerable contribution. Bearing this possibility in mind, Russia has begun a process that will equip its national foreign policy with the teeth necessary to actively seek to acquire economic interests in Arctic zones, as well as to defend claims made with regards to economic, political, and strategic elements. Even in spite of a strained economy, challenges inside Russia, commitments lying far from Russia’ borders, and a declining list of reliable allies, Putin is pressing forward with his Arctic ambitions and compelling Arctic states to face the reality of a militarized high north. What can be obtained in the Arctic is expressed in terms of what kind of resources one puts into it, be it military, human, financial, or political resources. These represent powerful new strings in the bows of those wishing to obtain ownership over the wealth of the Arctic. For Canada, the needs are everywhere, and while daunting, cannot be ignored or receive paltry responses for another three or four decades.

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Kinetic strikes via UAVs draw the most attention because of the role they play on the tactical and strategic levels of CT and COIN operations. Numerous studies focus on their use against leaders of terrorists groups and insurgencies. This reflects the increasing ability of UAVs to target the regular rank-and-file of terrorist and insurgent groups. Militants are more likely to reveal themselves through the use of technology, which is not the case for higher-ranking leadership.

A still-perplexing aspect of this collection of CT and COIN instruments is the collateral damage rates (if even speculated) associated with each of them: for UAVs, challenging questions about prevision quickly emerge; for Special Forces operations, TK success rates measure very high and with extremely low collateral damage, yet they receive the least attention; for helicopter attacks, the rates are often reversed, yet they receive the majority of attention.

UAVs have received a significant level of treatment in the overall story of TK and have come to define the practice/policy option. This leads us to consider this as a matter of selection. It is precisely this issue that bleeds into another body of challenges about TK, especially within CT and COIN contexts. Special Forces operations (i.e., raids) offer CT and COIN actors the distinctive opportunity to incorporate the security and military forces of states such as Afghanistan and Iraq, so that they can receive valuable tactical training and strategic learning in vital campaigns.

A black box in research concerns the effects/impact of TK and drones operations on civilian populations (which often become involved one way or another in CT and COIN operations, and that should come as no surprise), in terms of radicalization – an idea expressed through David Kilkullen’s Accidental Guerilla. These are side effects of strikes tantamount to collateral damage but effects of which can come about over time – two, five, even ten years later. There is also no guarantee that terrorists or insurgents will play by the rules of the game established through UAV strikes.

There is an uncomfortable tension between the indiscriminate consequences and discriminate intentions on the part of kinetic strike designers.

What we expect is that jihadists will either be killed in UAV strikes or simply renounce their violence. But UAV strikes, rather than dissuading would-be terrorists or killing more than they manufacture, perform contra to their desired outcome. Through a different measurement of unintended effects, UAV campaigns can alter the nature of terrorists in two distinct ways. First, they could simply be displaced. In this sense, they deem the territory in which they operate too dangerous to exist and therefore move to a different location and become involved in a different violent conflict. Second, instead of being jihadists, UAV strikes can pressure terrorists to look to other forms of criminality such as running prostitution rings, human trafficking, or drug smuggling. Thus, some militants are benefiting from intensive and extensive UAV campaigns.

Indirect victims of a drone strike (i.e., an individual who incurs injuries) can become the next jihadi leader. There appears to be no way to avert this kind of unintended consequence of kinetic strikes, despite the very obvious objective and aim of such operations in mitigating terrorism and insurgency in the first place.

A dangerous recourse to the use of UAVs centers on the use of non-weaponized or surveillance UAVs, which by their very basic association, push the stigmatization of drone usage in spite of the (at least superficially) peaceful use but potentially longer-term role as supporters or facilitators of eventual violence. The omnipresence of drones hovering over communities can change them forever. They have a profound effect on the way that people live. This give us a picture of drones always hovering overhead is a similar account of the changes that can result from years of occupation. Thus, UAVs are a sort of occupation. They’re threat assessors and therefore in essence armed to perform a task that would eventually lead to the same result as that of an armed drone.

There is still intense debate over the accuracy of UAV strikes and the level of collateral damage associated with them. Whether kinetic strikes always achieve their intended outcomes or not is still a contentious matter and even more so when attempting to connect tactical operations and their effectiveness with the much broader strategic outcome.

There is an uncomfortable tension between the indiscriminate consequences and discriminate intentions on the part of kinetic strike designers. Soldiers, despite their military status may never become violent actors or they may never see combat. But his or her presence within a military structure or institution implies his or her intentionality. This is the case because the main purpose of such an institution is to harm states. Mark Maxwell stated that, “the status of someone can be targeted” precisely because his or her “function is to perform hostilities.”

His subsequent assertion raises further tension: “the test for status must be the threat posed by the group and the member’s course of conduct which allows that threat to persist.” There are further difficulties to address when considering the impacts on indiscriminate intentions when the threat posed by that group or individual exceeds so-called tolerable levels. Who decides and if the threat perception is not shared among states of the same or different alliances or groups could produce too many negative knock-on effects.

If the idea of “selective violence” implies that several, even numerous, forms of violence lend themselves to states as policy options, it is puzzling why murder is typically the form of violence selected, especially when CT and COIN actors can really profit from capturing leaders and militants. As the challenges for justifying the use of UAVs in kinetic strikes mounts, it is time to look seriously to better applications of this technology. UAVs have an extensive role to play in terms of force protection. They are critical to the protection and welfare of friendly soldiers on the battlefield and particularly in the event of critical injuries.

In Afghanistan UAVs have shown a remarkable ability to assist in tactical operations of military forces on the ground. In Pakistan, reports of kinetic strike success have been both bright and lackluster. In Yemen, they have been proven “effective” in as much as they have resulted in some sort of effect. Yet, that effect is, in and of itself, counterproductive on a strategic level. UAV usage has also been criticized for constraining military options, resulting in a more reductive approach to countering terrorism.

Having produced a record of achievement in support operations, UAVs show a great deal of promise in the surveillance field even despite the view that UAVs loitering directly above create a host of problems. One possible example is their maritime use in military hotbeds such as the South China Sea and elsewhere in the Pacific. Navy drone development (like the X-47B) can fit nicely into a long-term defense program for the US. In fact, the Pentagon has stated its interest in developing armed UAVs that can be launched from carriers by 2019. Notwithstanding the weaponry aspect of this endeavor, long-range UAVs operating at sea could greatly enhance existing US power on land, at sea, and in the air.

Longer striking range, greater visibility, different strike capabilities, and greater flexibility while adjusting to the reality that the United States cannot simply sail into the coastal waters of rising powers as if might have been able to a few decades ago are corollaries of UAV application in this regard. It might not offer the desired precision when it comes to UAVs, but it could provide a positive case for further UAV development (even for drifting away from UAVs as the only means of conducting TK operations), particularly given the pace of UAV development by other states around the world.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Reaching further back into history, even before the Gulf War, Japan opposed dipping more than its toes into the realm of international conflict management, anti-terrorism efforts, and peacekeeping missions. As early as 1954, a non-binding upper house resolution proscribed Japanese missions overseas, regardless of a mission’s purpose. Less than half of the Japanese population was in favor of Japanese involvement United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in 1986. By the end of the 1980s, less than a quarter of Japan’s population said they would support the dispatch of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Tokyo’s position over the use of the SDF has become a tad relaxed, but even minor changes have brought major concerns, most notably from former-SDF members about the security of personnel currently overseas. Can Japan afford to get caught-up in America’s wars abroad?

Indeed, Japan was one of the latecomers in the US-led War on Terror, but it can no longer afford to overlook the growth and concentrations of ISIS influence in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. “When we have a meeting with a president or prime minister from another country,” said Indonesian President Joko Widodo, “always they say that now the number one issue is ISIS … Indonesia [is] the same.” Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert Del Rosario, speaking to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), affirmed that the ISIS threat to the Philippines is real.  “At least 100 of our young Filipino Muslims have already infiltrated Iraq to undergo training to return and be jihadists or militants,” stated former president, defense secretary, and armed forces chief Fidel Ramos.

Even China must heed the threat of ISIS from Afghanistan, where major operations can be funded by drugs production and trafficking. China’s Foreign Ministry underscored its position in the face of ISIS, nothing that, “China opposes all forms of terrorism. China is willing to strengthen cooperation with the international community to fight together against terrorist forces, including the ‘East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM),’ in order to protect regional and global security and stability.”

Japan’s lethargic response to international terrorism has been somewhat puzzling because of its geographical proximity to the key actors in what the US described as the “Axis of Evil.” No other key ally, not even Israel, is close to as many of the main state-sponsors of international terrorism as Japan. But like Israel, Japan is no stranger to political violence and terrorist activities. Terrorist attacks were a large part of the Showa Restoration – the Blood Oath Corps (Ketsumeidan) involved assassinations. After World War II Japan fought the Japanese Red Army (JRA) (Nihon Sekigun) and other indigenous terrorist groups and organizations like the Chukaku-ha. Supreme Truth (Aum Shinrikyo) is a notable case. Japan has also had its close and intimate encounter with homegrown terrorism that acquired deadly materials abroad. The use of chemical agents in the Tokyo subway system came as a shock to Japan, in what some have described as chemical warfare on Japanese soil, but surprisingly few measures were implemented to circumvent future attacks.

Japan’s somewhat inconsistent experience with terrorism is still considerable, especially compared to those of some Western states like the U.S., which only began to focus a lot of energy on the issue of international terrorism during the latter half of the 1990s – although the US has definitely not been distant from political violence. The U.S. even managed to dodge a lot of the terrorist activity that Western European states had become used to throughout the 1970s and 1980s as well as Israel’s violent experiences during the 1990s. The European Union’s (EU) response to terrorism has been closely aligned with actual terrorist attacks from 9/11 to Charlie Hebdo, and ISIS’ wave of terrorism. There has been priority focus on the issue of “foreign fighters,” pressure placed on travel and movement, propaganda, and the revival of Passenger Name Records (PNR). Attention was placed national competence because the EU recognized that this is where supranational polity has less powers to act. In Japan, reaction to terrorism has been conspicuously absent. Anti-terror initiatives in Europe have been fed by real and violent events for years but in Japan only the events of ISIS have provoked a reaction, if one could even call it that.

Although Japan has been one of the closest allies of U.S. in the post-War period, and even during America’s recent charge against international terrorism, the Japanese model of domestic security and poor response after 9/11 was a product of the US’ occupation of the Japanese home islands. Japan’s poor security defense systems, what eventually factored in to Japan becoming one of the “weak links” in the coalition against international terrorism, were established by the security framework which came about by looking to either the Soviet Union or the United States. Yet Japan is not a lame duck. It has received billions of dollars from Washington over the past seven decades in economic and security assistance. Japan will be expected now to move beyond its past responses to terrorism, which have previously involved reliance on domestic policing, appeasing terrorists, and putting limited domestic laws into practice.

What makes the Japanese security paradigm so unique?

Positive and negative points characterize the Japanese security paradigm. Tokyo’s criminal justice system and domestic policing policies interact harmoniously, and its prison and rehabilitation systems deliver results. Japan, as in the case with JRA, cannot simply pass its terrorist threats onto other states and move on by providing indirect and passive support. Japan assumed that the decline of some terrorist organizations presupposed a decrease in the threat that terrorism more generally posed to Japanese society.

9/11 figures as a step forward in Japan’s counterterrorism progression but not as significant as in other states. New laws, and the Self Defense Forces (SDF), while meaning that Japan could be present in the War on Terror, did not enable it to play a major and active, even proactive, role. Japan remained and remains reactive in terms of terrorism. Japan has moved beyond providing medical supplies/services, transportation, information gathering, and recognizing the need to protect US military facilities, in addition to the extension of sporadic humanitarian, economic, and other emergency assistance operations. The enactment of new security legislation is a continuation of Japan’s previous policy moves to make it able to play a part in combating international terrorism but this merely provides a framework. Receiving praise from the US Department of State (DoS) for bringing security legislation in line with Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, Tokyo is acting divisively by contradicting its own constitution.

Fighting terror, now, requires Japan to avoid its past mistakes and to step lightly given the position of its domestic constituents and international partners. It needs to move beyond establishing a veneer of cooperation and activity in the face of growing terrorist threats and address the core of its anti-terrorism capabilities. Its war-renouncing constitution will always be a hindrance. Its poor and self-contained intelligence apparatus and institutions require further reform if they are to truly support any future anti-terrorism task forces. Since early in 2015, Japan has made little progress in fixing the main components of its counterterrorism efforts. Japan does not lack the essential elements to make a strong and proactive contrition to peace by combating terrorism. This is precisely what Tokyo’s response to the ISIS hostage crisis, concerning two Japanese civilians, cultivated. Japan’s financial and human resources, and political commitment are certainly in line with those of the United States and the most contributory actors in an ongoing WoT.

A number of remarkable intelligence gathering models, like the UK’s MI6, the US’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst [BND]), exist for Japan to pattern itself after and provide indirect security to tangible and intangible infrastructure. Japan’s baby steps in enhancing its law enforcement and domestic policing initiatives, however, do not speak to the level of commitment required for the country to make that necessary contribution. Rather, they contradict the very simple and clear message made by General Kiyofumi Iwata of Japan’s SDF, delivered nearly a year ago that: “[t]errorism is never tolerated.”

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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