Shops and markets in various cities have been closed since today and the boycott of classes continues in various universities just two days after December 7, when ‘student day’ is celebrated in Iran and President Ebrahim Raisi is scheduled to give a speech at one of the universities. Notably, the strikes also involved truck drivers and some workers at the petrochemical plants in Mahshahr and the steel mills in Isfahan. The Revolutionary Guards said the security forces would show “zero tolerance” towards what they called rebels and terrorists. Protests in the country have followed since the death, on September 16 in Tehran, of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old of Kurdish origin who died while in the custody of the morality police because she did not wear the veil correctly. Since then, according to human rights organizations, reports claim that over 400 protesters have been killed and 18,000 people have been arrested. The wave of protests triggered by the killing of the young student has quickly turned into an anti-system wave and constitutes – according to various observers – the most serious threat to the stability of the Islamic Republic for years.

Popular uprisings have been frequent in the history of Iran and even earlier, when Iran was called Persia. Still before the interpreting the protests as a full-scale Revolution, any analysis of the situation should avoid the Twitter and social media-friendly simplifications, which have been amplified by a foolish Western media. There is no doubt that there have been widespread, resilient and most of all spontaneous demonstrations (that is, the government’s suggestion that the revolts are triggered by external elements does not pass scrutiny). As the various protests have shown, millions of Iranians have been demanding a more liberal, modern and developing Iran for years. But, the reality is more complex.

The Islamic Republic is characterized, even in the precarious phase of the past few years, by deep divisions that go far beyond matters of religion. And the struggle engages different generations as well as different religious and military institutions. One of the overriding complexities is that despite the Islamic Revolution and its de-jure theocratic Constitution, an ever-larger number of Iranians are not religious at all. Iranian society is well educated and not as radicalized as in other Muslim countries. And if the 1979 Revolution succeeded in overthrowing the Shah, it was also because the ayatollahs received significant support from secular elements such as the Tudeh Party (the ‘Left’) and socialists like Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr or Sadeq Qobtzadeh (both of whom occupied important institutional posts in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution), influenced by the intellectual Ali Shar’iati, who theorized a combination of Islamic and Socialist political philosophy. In contrast, many Iranians, who in the past supported Khomeini’s revolutionary “reforms,” still believe in a more conservative state closely linked to the principles and precepts of the Quran and consider the West and Saudi Arabia (Sunni) as a strategic existential threat. Still, the outcome of the protests, should they succeed in fracturing the leadership and overturning the theocratic order is completely unclear.

Even if it’s premature to propose, as have Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi and Farideh Moradkhani (Ayatollah Khamenei’s own niece), that the world is witnessing “the beginning of the end of the Iranian regime,” there can be little doubt that a return to the status-quo is not possible, and that the protests will lead to changes, probable attempts at reform, and possible state collapse. But, whether or not they will lead to the freedom advocated by the protesters is not a given outcome; it’s another question altogether. The protests are certainly challenging the legitimacy of the Iranian government and they carry the momentum of the widespread economic and social dissatisfaction, which had already exploded in a much more structured way in 2019. Those protests were, even more than the 2009 ones, a very broad and cross-class movement that challenged the system also in part triggered by the failed efforts of then (reformist) president Hassan Rohani to secure the promised relaxation of Western economic sanctions following US President Trump’s repeal of the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal. Rohani’s attempts were dashed by the US administrations as well as elements within the Iranian government, reluctant to offer concessions to the West – namely reducing (if not outright cutting) aid for Hezbollah in Lebanon, support for the Syrian government of Bashar al-Asad, and diluting the government’s nationalist temperament. Indeed, while there are no political parties as in many West-inspired democratic systems, there are factions in the Islamic Republic that might be broadly described as conservatives, reformists, and pragmatists.

So far, however, the Iranian government – and the Supreme leadership in particular – has succeeded in legislatively and steadily limiting the influence of the reformists and pragmatists – even if the two respective camps have had presidents (Khatami and Rohani) to represent them. Khatami and Rohani would have had far greater success at changing the Islamic Republic from within, had they enjoyed more support from the United States – that is a lifting of sanctions. That would have strengthened the more democratically and secularly oriented segments of the population. It is not clear how long the current regime will last, but current events demonstrate some aspects of the ability of the two sides: the first modernist side tends towards the future and even personal innovation, while the second aspires to keep Iranian society in the domain of narrow areas linked to strict observance of both religion and its political representation.

The continued sanctions and the lifting of the JCPOA have strengthened the conservative factions in the Iranian parliament, the Majles, and in society at large. Therefore, Khamanei was able to narrow down the range of candidates eligible for election. And, even if in recent years the Ayatollahs have focused on Iran’s internal socio-economic development and political stability, their supporters are typically defenders of the hard line inspired by the religious body of the 1979 Revolution. Moreover, while many Iranians may wish for a more liberal and more “Western” society, all Iranians harbor feelings of distrust of the United States, Russia, Europe and their Arab neighbors. The list of nefarious Western interference examples is long. Apart from the well-known 1953 overthrow of the democratically elected and secular (but nationalist) Mossadegh government, It is still studied in history textbooks that Iran was a victim of Western “imperialism” which in turn dates back to the British tobacco monopoly of 1890-1892 and the D’Arcy oil concession of 1901.Along the same lines followed the entry into the area of ​​the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, later the British Petroleum Company (BP) in 1933. Which gave Britain de facto control over Iran’s main source of currency and industry until at least in the mid-1950s.

Therefore, it’s important to note that whereas the recent street demonstrations have made it clear that a significant number of Iranians want the regime to be more tolerant – especially towards women – and to focus more on the social development of internal relations as well as on the progress of the economy aimed at the benefit of all strata of the population, at the same time, many Iranians believe that Iran’s actions are either not aggressive as much as they are defensive. Without having to resort to past history, Iranians have even more current reasons to distrust the West. While Iranians are nationalist – much more than their Arab neighbors – it should be noted that this does not mean that most Iranians support the efforts of the Supreme Leader and the IRGC to expand Iran’s influence and control in the region. Politicians and analysts should take these and other similar conflict situations into account because if Iran’s history and intentions are ignored, any serious geopolitical analysis useful for making decisions becomes superfluous.

So is it a Revolution? Not quite yet. There is one major obstacle to surmount. A bigger obstacle than the Russian proletariat faced in October 1917 when it confronted the Czar’s guards – many of whom were sympathetic and less inclined to shoot. The IRGC has too much to lose to let go peacefully.

The IRGC

The IRGC is the powerful “Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” better known as the “Guardians of the Revolution” or pasdaran. It is a militarized body that Ayatollah Khomeini established in Iran after the 1979 Islamic revolution because he did not believe he could count on loyalty from the regular armed forces. Today, the IRGC remain by oath absolutely faithful to the Islamic nature of the Republic and to the Supreme Leader and it is by far the most powerful Iranian military corps, which in addition to reporting directly to the Supreme Leader also has huge economic interests in the country. The Revolutionary Guards are made up of around 300,000 people, most of whom would lose power, wealth or, to put it even more succinctly, their salary if the regime were to fall. Foreign Policy noted some time ago that the Revolutionary Guards could be ready to drag Iran into civil war, just to protect the regime (and their obvious interests). The scholar Ali Alfoneh has suggested – and many agree – that the IRGC would stage a coup against the ayatollahs and take over directly in the event of a full-scale revolution. The IRGC’s loyalty is not towards the Iranian people or against the state, but exclusively weighed against the Islamic Republic, i.e. the current regime, because if the regime fell, the Revolutionary Guards too would probably be dispersed.

Over the years, the Revolutionary Guards have grown into not only a military body, but also an instrument of internal repression and a center of economic power: given their broad ability to move internationally, the Revolutionary Guards are among the very few groups in Iran to manage to avoid international economic sanctions, to import smuggled goods and raw materials, and to accumulate enormous wealth thanks to the proceeds obtained. Indeed, the IRGC benefits from sanctions; because, the sanctions render them indispensable to the normal flow of daily life in Tehran. While alcohol and narcotics are officially banned, a friend has informed me that it’s very easy for to secure the home delivery of a variety of spirits, alcoholic beverages and other white-powdered stimulants at any private residence: just call an IRGC representative you trust. They’re in charge of protecting the tenets of the Islamic Republic, and they’re also in charge of its citizens’ debauchery. The ‘Iran’ scene in the film Syriana by George Clooney is one of the most accurate depictions of life in the Islamic Republic ever captured by American cinema.

The IRGC is different from the army: it answers directly to the Supreme leader and remains above all other institutions borne out of the 1979 Revolution. Over time, the Revolutionary Guards became known throughout the world mainly for the operations carried out by their feared elite unit, the al Quds Forces, which until three years ago were led by General Qassem Suleimani, one of the most powerful, famous and feared Iranians. Under Suleimani, the al-Quds Forces carried out a great many covert operations abroad, and became experts in the so-called “asymmetric warfare”, i.e. a war where one side (the other, in this case) is clearly superior in terms of resources and power. The Quds Forces have trained groups such as Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon, but also numerous Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq. For the past three decades, the al-Quds forces have been to Iran what the CIA and Special Forces combined have been to the United States: a powerful yet elusive intelligence, military and foreign policy tool.

Another very important aspect of the Revolutionary Guards is their exceptional economic power. The Guards directly and indirectly control billions of dollars in contracts in the fields of construction, electricity supply, engineering, telecommunications and media, and continue to do so despite the international sanctions imposed on them in recent years.

The Revolutionary Guards were directly involved in the violent suppression of the protests. It happened in 2009, with the so-called “Green Wave,” which mainly concerned the bourgeoisie of the capital Tehran demonstrating against the rigged election of the conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It happened again with the protests of 2019, which instead concerned more the working classes and were caused by the sharp increase in the price of fuel. Security forces killed around 1,500 people in 2019, and the Revolutionary Guards were responsible for some of the most heinous massacres. It is also happening in the protests of recent months, in which the Guards have become among the main perpetrators of the brutal repression. More than 400 people have been killed so far, and over 15,000 arrested. The fact that the Revolutionary Guards are a very strong center of military, economic and ultimately political power is a serious problem not only for those who, like the Iranian protesters, would like to overthrow the regime, but also for those who would simply like to reform it. The Revolutionary Guards depend on the regime, and the power, wealth and income of hundreds of thousands of people depend on the Revolutionary Guards. To these are added hundreds of thousands of people who depend on other bodies, such as the police and the regular army.

Just a Diversion?

Meanwhile, the words of the attorney general Mohammad Jafar Montazeri who said during an interview that the morality police “has been abolished,” have become a case in point. Revealed around the world as an initial sign of openness, the news has never been confirmed by the Tehran government, however. “The morality police has nothing to do with the judiciary, and it was abolished by whoever created it,” Montazeri said in response to a question about why the police force created by then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2006 was not seen more in the streets. After a few hours of euphoria among the supporters of the protests, appeals from activists and observers were posted on social networks calling for calm and not to be deceived by propaganda. According to some, the move was merely a diversion to calm tensions. How could the announcement – ​​also by Montazeri – be a diversion, according to which the legislation providing the obligatory veil for women is under discussion? The Parliament and the Supreme Council of the cultural revolution – said the prosecutor – are studying the question and will announce the results within two weeks.

What is the morality police? Iran has had various forms of ‘morality police’ since the Islamic revolution in 1979. Its latest version – formally known as the Gasht-e Ershad (Orientation Patrols) – is the main force charged with enforcing the code of conduct Islamic law in the country. It was established in 2006 by then President Ahmadinejad enforce the dress code, which also requires women to wear long dresses and bans shorts, ripped jeans, and other clothing deemed ‘immodest’ or not in line with religious dictates. The units, usually composed of multiple men and women, use white police vans with dark green stripes to patrol the streets or park in spots frequented by pedestrians or young people. Its officers claim to enforce the dress code which requires women to cover their hair and wear loose clothing. For violations, they issue verbal warnings and can decide to detain the women arrested by taking them, as happened in Mahsa Amini, to “re-education” centers.

Too Little Too Late?

If confirmed, the end of the obligation to wear the veil would be a very important victory for the protesters. But it is said that it would be enough to stop the protests. “Just because the government has decided to dismantle the morality police does not mean that the protests are ending – an Iranian woman commented yesterday on the BBC’s Newshour program – even if the government said that the hijab is a personal choice it would not be enough. People know that Iran has no future with this government in power.” Witnessing the change of ‘nature’ of the demonstrations, transformed from a protest movement to a counter-revolution, is the fact that from the squares and streets, the protests have progressively  infiltrated universities, high schools and factories, the scene of several strikes. A change that also affects the protagonists: if the revolt had been launched by the young women, who were later joined by male and female students, now it seems to be above all the men who take center stage, in the clashes against the forces of the order. “Even assuming that the morality police is eventually abolished, it is unlikely that the protesters’ demand for regime change will be satisfied by such minor changes as those relating to the application of religious practices by the Islamic Republic,” according to Sara Bazoobandi in comments to ISPI… “the prosecutor’s comment distracted the global media from the ongoing tensions and gross human rights violations by the Iranian government, without providing any tangible solution to the discontent.”

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Grounding the Boeing Max may have been Trump’s best decision as president so far into his mandate. He took responsibility while Boeing, the FAA and many North American based air carriers did not. Boeing may incur a few billion dollars in costs by grounding the plane, but considering it earned 100 billion in revenues last year, its a small price to pay. The company, however, has tarnished its reputation. It’s interesting to note that Trump was once an airline owner himself: Trump Shuttle. Trump’s older brother Freddie Trump Jr., who suffered from alcoholism and died in 1981, was an airline pilot. He flew for Eastern Airlines, the company that Trump used as a platform for his own Trump Shuttle.

Old Frame + Latest Software, A.I. Algorithms and Avionics = Disaster

The 737 is a strange combination of old and new – and this may be causing the problem. The ‘old’ does mean that pilots have experience flying the plane. But, the new systems and some new design features have changed the plane’s performance characteristics. Thus, it should have been delivered and sold as a new plane, requiring new training.

In fact, the basic ‘structure’ or frame of the 737 MAX dates back to 1967. Successive generations have added new engines, winglets and avionics, including electronic “fly-by-wire” flight control systems. But, the MAX has entirely new ‘geared turbofan’ engines with different power delivery and size. These have changed the way the plane flies. The plane seems to generate too high an angle of attack, causing it to climb too high – too soon. This means it is susceptible to stall, particularly at lower speeds. To avoid this, Boeing has programmed flight control computers to stabilize the aircraft’s nose. However, it seems pilots are unware of this system – especially when they assume manual control of the aircraft.

In other words, the pilots end up struggling for control of the plane with the computers. It’s not unlike Hal taking over the spaceship in Kubrick’s ‘2001 A Space Odyssey.’ Oh, and as reminder to Elon Musk, who wants to shove self-driving cars down our throat…or roads, the Apollo 11 moon landing mission relied on good old fashioned manual driving as the computers failed.

The MCAS and Its Discontents

The guilty system is called Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). Its purpose is noble. It prevents, when working properly, the pilots from stalling (causing the plane to drop lift) the plane by pushing the nose down to reach sufficient air speed to regain lift.

The MCAS, however, relies on the ‘angle of attack detector’ (AOA). This device is crucial. When working properly, it measures the angle of attack (the angle between the wings and the air flow). If the angle of attack is too high, the plane risks stalling. In the case of Lion Air, crash analysts were inclined to blame a defective AOA system for the plane’s uncontrollable and rapid descent. The device transmitted incorrect data, triggering the MCAS system to drop the nose against the pilots’ wishes.

The pilots, not knowing why (or of the existence of the MCAS), failed to regain control of the aircraft. They switched off the auto-pilot, thinking they had total control. But, they did not know that the MCAS apparently functions independently even of the auto-pilot.  CNN reported that, even after the Lion Air crash last October the 737 Max operating manual does not mention the MCAS system. And, it the pilots do not know of its existence, they cannot possibly be expected to know if it’s malfunctioning or not.

It seems that the Ethiopian Airlines crash occurred under the same technical circumstances. Some have tried to blame it – using veiled hints – on it being a poorly managed African airline. Yet, Ethiopian is one of the best airlines in the world, not just one of the best in Africa.

Thus, when President Trump says modern planes are too complex, he’s partly right. Partly, because modern planes are safer than ever. Electronic systems have contributed to this safety. The problem is that the pilots must know what is and isn’t controlled electronically in order to manage those systems. Modern pilots are, in effect, system managers more than the kind of instinctual pilots of the past. To do their job, they rely on accurate information and properly functioning sensors, which deliver the right data.

The Economic Fallout for Boeing and the United States

The 737 MAX is Boeing’s most important plane, representing about two-thirds of Boeing’s future deliveries and accounting for 40 percent of profit. The catastrophe saw Boeing’s stock sag, wiping nearly $16 billion off its market value on Monday. How much worse can it get for Boeing? In the worst-case scenario, is it possible for the air carriers to cancel orders for the MAX 8? Which Airbus model can replace the troubled plane, Airbus 320 or Airbus 320-neo?

Boeing risks losing huge contracts in China. Beijing can exercise tremendous leverage in its trade negotiations with Washington, given that Boeing is the United States’ top exporter by dollar value. The way it’s handling the Max 8 gives the Chinese sufficient incentive to shift orders to Airbus and not just for the mid-range type market that the 737 family occupies. Boeing’s failure to act quickly – even if it believes it’s in the right – could prompt a huge loss of reputation and sales to ‘stall,’ quite literally.

There won’t be any MCAS system in place anywhere to improve its image. Boeing does have a huge market share and market power. But, others are ready to fill in cancelled orders. Airbus, will be only too pleased to sell its new 200 series (formerly Bombardier C-series) or 320-neo series planes, which many pilots (I have spoken to some) prefer over the 737. Replacing the 737 won’t be easy, of course. The airplane operates all over the world; and, it remains a great airplane. But, airlines need to think of safety above all else. They can’t afford to risk accidents and incidents that are preventable – or apparently so.

Big markets, like the Chinese, could force Boeing to comply with modifying the MCAS, fix the sensors just as Japan – whose airline ANA was the launch customer for the 787 Dreamliner – forced Boeing to fix the exploding lithium batteries on the first 787 jets to be delivered in 2011-2012. It would be best if Boeing took the initiative on its own. It’s still in time to protect its reputation. The FAA, meanwhile, in the interest of safety and the economic interests of the United States may want to act like the ‘adult in the room’ and take action now.

As for the airlines that have not yet complied, meanwhile, it gives the impression that they may have calculated that compensating families with a few million dollars in the event of another crash is cheaper than grounding the planes and retraining pilots to use the MCAS.

A Huge Mistake

Airlines are not thinking strategically and won’t survive their customers’ ire if they allow another preventable crash from occurring (at least where similar circumstances to the Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes are concerned).

Boeing will pay dearly for its failure to follow, what is after all, common sense. In its rush to compete with Airbus, it apparently failed to mention the presence of the MCAS to the airlines and pilots who would fly the Max 737. The FAA did issue an Emergency Airworthiness Directive in the week after the Lion Air crash in Indonesia, revealing – partially – the problem. And the Max should have been grounded then. But, nothing happened. And whether or not the Ethiopian pilots were made aware of the MCAS, the systems in a 737 are harder to turn off than in a comparable Airbus (according to an A320, Boeing 777 pilot with whom I spoke and wishes to remain anonymous). They may not have had enough time or wits – under the pressure they were facing – to turn it off in time.

Much has been said about corporate responsibility and sustainability. I’ve made the case that aerospace manufacturers and airlines are leaders in this area. But, Boeing has failed, showing the nasty side of capitalism itself. Rushing to protect its market share and shareholder value in financial markets, Boeing delivered an apparently faulty airplane, using tactics, which will surely be many a lawyer’s target in the next few months and years.

Any damage control by Boeing now will appear hypocritical. Trump’s decision was made under international pressure; it should have been made by Boeing…immediately after the Lion Air crash. Manufacturing and export of civil aircraft is a significant driver of revenue for the US economy. The FAA may have succumbed to economic interests by not-grounding the troubled jet after the second fatal crash in Ethiopia. But, in doing so, it merely amplified the economic fallout that will result now. Some airlines, such as Norwegian and Spice Jet (India) have already announced plans to demand compensation from Boeing after they had to stop using the jet.

How big will Boeing’s potential losses be? Into the several billions. But, even that won’t buy its reputation back. And airlines do have alternatives to the MAX. They range from the Bombardier C-Series (Now Airbus 200), Airbus A320, the new Chinese COMAC planes or maybe the Russian МС-21.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any institutions with which the authors are associated.

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Both the bank and the corporation used artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms to determine the outcome of the loan or the job application. In practice, this means that if your loan application is rejected, or your CV rejected, no explanation can be provided. This produces an embarrassing scenario, which tends to relegate AI technologies to suggesting solutions, which must be validated by human beings.

Explaining how these technologies work remains one of the great challenges that researchers and adopters must resolve in order to allow humans to become less suspicious, and more accepting, of AI.  To that effect, it’s important to note what AI is not. The very term AI conjures up images of sentient robots able to understand human language and act accordingly. While it may one day reach that point, for the time being, in the vast majority of cases AI refers to a complex software, programmed to make decisions based on the inputs it receives.

The big leap occurred when such software moved beyond being able to play and win at chess against humans (Google’s DeepMind) to being able to approve or deny credit such as Lenddo. In other words AI now largely consists of software, based on decisional algorithms. The self-driving apps that Apple, Google, and Tesla are developing are based on the same principles. Similarly, many humans come literally face to face with AI every day when they ask Siri, Alexa or Google Assistant to help them with a search or in finding a good restaurant.

AI, therefore, for most people, is a decisional system that produces results based on the data that feed a given algorithm. And while we’re discussing the subject of AI explainability, algorithms (derived from the IX century Baghdad mathematician al-Kharawazm who first recognized these) are procedures that resolve a specific problem through an established number of basic steps.

In a sense, explainable AI offers a solution to enable the relevant humans to understand how an AI algorithm made a particular decision. Why does anyone need to know this? Because the algorithms take decisions with serious ethical and legal ramifications. Therefore, in order for AI to advance and spread, it can only do so in a context of ‘explainability.’ Let’s consider self-driving cars. In case of an accident, the obvious question is ‘who is responsible?’ The issue of repairing the damage, to a vehicle, person, or property begs to be asked. Legal systems have been slow to adapt, even as automated systems are making decisions in situations, which not even the human algorithm programmers can predict.

The issue of self-driving vehicles may be the most obvious.

Who is responsible? Insurers and lawyers are already debating the issue. And despite the fact that related experimental vehicles have driven millions of miles in tests on actual roads, before drivers will be allowed to exploit the full potential of self-driving technology, legal knots will have to be worked out. And in order for that to happen, the AI algorithms will have to be able to explain how they make their decisions.

Until then, humans will have to take responsibility for decisional processes. And this limits the potential of AI.

Therefore, the future of ‘AI explainability’ is the future of AI itself.

AI will also need to explain itself, given its enormous philosophical implications.

In the Bible, the Creator asked Adam and Eve not to eat the fruit from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. The Creator offered no explanation for the demand; and his two most valuable creations, Adam and Eve, defied the command. In the Bible, God expelled the two from eternal life. Mankind will not have this luxury. AI technology, like all other technology before it, cannot be expelled from the world-no matter how hard luddites may try. Yet, the ‘forbidden fruit’ story does pose two crucial A.I. problems:

Will AI systems also become independent enough to think for themselves and defy human orders (as many fear and as science fiction has suggested)? And why should humans abide by decisions taken by AI systems?

Of the two, the one that must be addressed first is the latter question.

In the opinion of many, including unlikely sources involved in selling AI dependent technologies – such as Elon Musk of Tesla Motors and SpaceX – artificial intelligence suffers from excessive opacity. Artificial intelligence technologies have generated programs that peruse curricula, cover letters, medical diagnostics or loan applications. Nevertheless, these programs make decisions in ways that seem arbitrary. Or, rather, they make decisions that neither the humans in control nor the programs can explain. Programmers and users simply cannot track the multitude of calculations that the AI program has used to reach its conclusion.

AI technology—if we can even use that plebeian term to describe something that’s as revolutionary as the discovery of fire—will be a turning point for humanity, not just the economy, making our lives better. It’s on the brink of devising systems, whether machines or processes, that can think, feel and even worship their creators…humans. Indeed, humanity has truly reached an Olympian moment. It has evolved to the point of having reshaped the world physically, it has now reached a stage where it can literally play ‘God’. If humans are now in a position to create ever more sentient ‘machines’, there are no guarantees that the machines will be happy to serve and obey their creators all of the time.

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Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, appears to have revitalized the Democratic party, capturing the imagination of the younger and ‘politically-correct’ and CO2 indoctrinated generations, so-called millennials. However, the green new deal would eliminate an activity that millennials have enjoyed and exploited more than any other generation: air travel.

Electric-power airplanes do exist. Yes, at the experimental stage. Airbus and Boeing are working on prototypes and perhaps, by 2030, Airbus will unveil a version of its E-Fan electric and hybrid-electric powered regional plane, good for a range of some 400-500 km (about 240-280 miles). But, anyone wanting to travel greater distances, across the Atlantic or the Pacific, will still have to rely on good old kerosene (or perhaps another fuel) powered jets.

Indeed, the Green New Deal proposes to eliminate commercial air travel – or at least it proposes to limit it to a select few by making it extremely expensive through regulatory costs and ‘carbon taxes’ (or similar instruments).

The irony is that few industries have done more to reduce carbon dioxide emissions quite like those involved in commercial and military aviation. That would include aircraft manufacturers like Boeing and Airbus, engine makers like Pratt & Whitney or General Electric and the airlines themselves. It’s not that these industries are more environmentally conscious, or ‘greener’ than the others. It’s because, they have long been driven by the need to reduce fuel consumption and improve efficiency. Less fuel burned per mile means longer distance non-stop flights (airplanes burn much less at operating altitude than they do landing and taking off.) Airlines want significant cost savings on every flight. Military air forces want the advantages of being able to deploy aircraft more strategically – and at lower cost.

Yet, the media has painted commercial aviation in nasty colors. Who can forget the lamentations of one George Monbiot, comparing air travelers to killers? And what of this gem from Liberation in France?

Perhaps, it’s time to reconsider the wonder of aviation, its contribution to society and, yes, its role in developing new ‘green’ technology.

Commercial aviation will continue to develop, but there are many challenges ahead. And one of the most important is to rekindle people’s fascination with flight.

The 19^th century English poet laureate, Alfred Lord Tennyson, appears to have prophesized commercial and military aviation in Locksley Hall, which he wrote in 1835:

“For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see, Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be; Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails, Pilots of the purple twilight dropping down with costly bales.”

The ‘argosies’ (a type of large Venetian merchant ship) with ‘magic sails’ conjure up images of the large airplanes with their colorful logos on airfoils and fuselages that have literally shrunk the world in little over a century. It’s only been that long that mankind has been flying. From the 892 feet the Wright Brothers flew at Kittyhawk in 1903 to the over 15,000 miles that a Boeing 787 can fly non-stop today, commercial aviation has developed at a staggering pace.

Still, the future of the commercial airline industry faces the kinds of challenges Tennyson could not have prophesized. Air travel has become so safe and reliable, for millions of people every day, that it’s taken for granted. Indeed, airlines’ biggest problems derive from their own success.

The commercial airline industry may double in aircraft capacity and passenger demand over the next 20 years according to Boeing. The world’s largest aerospace company estimates that commercial aviation services will grow at an annual rate of four percent from now until 2037. As great as such growth is for the aircraft industry, it places considerable and costly burdens on the airlines themselves, and the infrastructure that supports them, forced to abide by ever more stringent government regulations and ever more indifferent, if not angry, passengers.

The airline industry has been under pressure from environmental activists; the protests over the expansion of Heathrow airport, one of the most congested in the world, and the proliferation of low cost carriers and cheap travel (or ‘binge travel’ as Greenpeace has called it) in recent years have helped advance the idea that airlines are somehow bad, that airlines are a primary contributor to climate change and that they are noisy. No doubt, this has contributed to turning commercial aviation into a demon that governments can squeeze with arbitrary regulatory burdens with tacit support from voters and media.

In other words, a good part of the ‘ethical’ public believes that commercial aviation is a major contributor to climate change – among other bad things. And that it’s fair to constrain it with arbitrary fiscal and other burdens.

The industry has been pushing for advanced technology, involving engine and airframe design, as well as flying techniques to reduce fuel consumption, emissions (and not just CO2) and noise pollution. In fact, working closely with aircraft manufacturers, the industry is well on its way to significantly reduce its current (estimated) 2% share of overall CO2 emissions over the next decade, even as it aims to produce carbon free technology in the next 50 years.

There’s no need for a ‘carbon tax’ regime to encourage airlines to take action. They already are.

Airlines were among the first to address environmental concerns. They moved from turbojet to quieter turbofan engines in the late 1960s. The 1973 oil crisis stimulated the design of more efficient planes, featuring higher capacity and lower fuel consumption. The less fuel burned, the less pollution and CO2 gases emitted. These incentives have become even more important today, from a business and competitive perspective as much as an environmental or sustainable one.

Rather than disappearing the airline industry must respond strongly to counter its ‘unethical’ image. The industry is taking a lead in challenging the negative charges. IATA has called for the industry to eliminate CO2 emissions altogether by 2057.

This puts the industry on the ‘ethical’ side of the debate; it is taking action against climate change, rather than being a mere cause of the problem. Aircraft manufacturers Airbus and Boeing – not to mention Bombardier, Mitsubishi or Embraer are already responding to the challenge.  Whether or not the targets are achievable within the established time frames, the airline industry must reveal and brag about its environmental (or ethical) record.

On ‘passenger bills of rights’ and other regulations

Excessive regulatory pressure, even when framed in ways that benefit the passenger with assorted ‘bills of rights’ often fail to see the big picture.

Airlines have few options to tackle the multiple cost cutting pressures by discontinuing or reducing service on some routes while reducing their workforces, training investment and, passenger in-flight amenities. Relations with employees and labor unions have been strained by staff reductions and lay-offs and the reduced level of service has negatively impacted customer satisfaction. Collaborative relationships with stakeholders including labor unions, suppliers, employees and customers, will be important to help ensure harmonious relations.

Higher speeds and passenger comfort will also be important factors. But the days of the Concorde and the wonder of sipping champagne while traveling in luxury at twice the speed of sound are gone.

Indeed, those who are old enough, can still remember a time when a flight was an occasion. You looked forward to the flight. You dressed up to board a plane. The journey was as exciting as the destination. Indeed, in the 1970s the Boeing 747 with its bars and lounges and the supersonic Concorde made air travel nothing short of glamorous. Air travel was the true face of progress and optimism in the future.

Spacious and superfast travel were going to be the ‘normal’ method of travel…

The media have played a large role in fueling myths and fallacies about the industry. Even those who still take delight at watching an airliner take off risk falling prey to the misconstructions.

The fact is that commercial aviation is complex. And for all of the complaints it endures from the likes of journalists and frequent flyers alike-whether it’s about environmental footprints or poor meals and narrow seats-aviation has made huge progress where it counts: reducing costs for passengers and reducing noise. Most importantly, commercial aviation has improved safety and reliability.

Aviation’s technological achievements have made the extraordinary, ordinary. Even though flight itself, which relies on a principle so elegant and simple, has made the ordinary, extraordinary.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect the official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any other institution that the author is attached to.

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Canadian expats in Saudi Arabia are now at risk – I would advise them to hold back any cravings for alcohol. More significantly, companies like SNC Lavalin stand to lose considerable business in ongoing projects in the Kingdom. While human rights are important, it’s also important to recognize the totality of a country’s interests when picking a spat – one you can’t win. And Canada is proving that because of the obvious problem that it’s causing in Ottawa, despite appearances.

Recently, through diplomatic channels, Canada has demanded the release of a jailed woman in Saudi Arabia. Her husband has refugee status in Canada. So far so good and diplomatic. But, Canada’s ideological (just look at her record on relations with Russia) former journalist minister of foreign affairs, Chrystia Freeland, has picked up Trump’s penchant for Twitter. She decided to tweet about the Saudi woman and ruined any chance of her release, while also triggering a diplomatic crisis with the Kingdom.

For all of the human rights paraphernalia of the Trudeau government, diplomacy should be conducted through diplomatic channels – not social media. Moreover, the Saudis have a distaste for Twitter, having arrested many locals who have used the platform to criticize – however legitimately – the House of Saud. Freeland has committed a rookie but cardinal diplomatic error. Instead of admitting this, Ottawa has upped the ante – and played right into the Conservatives’ arms. They, not to be outdone, presumably sent former foreign minister, John Baird, to criticize the Canadian government on Saudi TV no less. There’s an argument that could be made featuring the term ‘treason’ somewhere in what Baird (and his former boss, PM Harper) did.

Oh my God, indeed!

That said, when it comes to human rights, Freeland and Trudeau seem oblivious to the Saudi led war against the Houthis in Yemen. Canada has gladly sold armored cars to the Saudis. Thus, it has shown that moral lessons can take a backseat to trade and business.

Still, the big issue concerns the excessiveness of the Saudi reaction. Why has it been so tough?

Simply put, the Saudis have little to lose by cutting off Canada. But, they can make a big example out of it, should any other Western nation be tempted to criticize its human right records while Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman implements what seem like slow reforms in the West. Yet, the Crown Prince is moving the equivalent of mountains vis-à-vis the Wahhabi religious establishment, the Ulama.

Saudi Arabia knows that the West is the one that has most to lose in any diplomatic showdown of this kind; especially Canada, which has little leverage in the Middle East. Canada, for example, has bad ties with Saudi enemy Iran and even worse perhaps with Russia, the very same which has defeated Saudi backed ‘rebels’ in Syria (while Canada tacitly supported them).

The Saudis have also been moving closer to Israel – thanks also to Trump’s interventions and the common enemy of Iran. Thus, Saudi Arabia, and not without some reason, believes it should enjoy the kind of immunity from criticism that is afforded to Israel. Moreover, Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS – the real architect of the Saudi ‘reforms’), given the apparent senility of King Salman, expects to become King soon. He faces much internal competition and has to appear tough about upholding traditional Saudi virtues in the eyes of the religious establishment.

The Saudis are clear about one thing. And the other Western nations have already absorbed the message. If you want Saudi riyals in your pockets, you must ignore crimes against humanity and the violence against the civilians in Yemen. The Saudis demand and expect to be granted a special status within the “international community.”

Saudi Arabia has learned much from Israel. It shares with it an intense identity policy, religious exclusiveness, and a willingness to adopt disproportionate military force against civilians.

The Saudis have oil and money. The West wants these and the al-Saud family, the primacy of which is any Saudi monarch’s prime concern, knows this. Either Canada cuts off relations with Saudi Arabia altogether and Freeland starts treating the Kingdom as she has Russia or Iran, or she must keep quiet on violations of human rights. It’s really that simple.

Canada is ready to use tough language and diplomacy against certain easy targets, like Iran and Gaddafi’s Libya. But in the end, Canada will find the right way to apologize to the Saudis and bury the hypocrisy of its selective ‘human rights’ stances under the desert sands.

As evidence, consider Sweden foreign affairs minister Margot Wallstrom and her spat with the Saudis in 2015. The case is remarkably similar to Canada’s, as it involves the same man Raif Badawi, the brother of the refugee Samer Badawi who is in Canada. (Raif was flogged).

After cancelling various arms deals and other cooperation agreements, Saudi-Swedish relations gradually improved. But, in 2017, Wallstrom defended Saudi Arabia’s appointment to the U.N. women’s rights commission. She explained: “[the Saudis] ought to be there to learn something about women.”

Expect Freeland to express support for a similarly incongruent post involving Saudi Arabia in the near future. That will be the price to pay.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect the official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any other institution.

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On October 31, 2017, one Sayfullo Saipov, an Uzbek citizen who won the Green Card lottery to legally live and work in the United States, killed eight people in New York City, deliberately running them over with a rented pickup track. It was a terrorist attack, inspired by (if not attributed to) ISIS and whose method has become sadly familiar. Such tactics were used to even more tragic results in Nice, France on July 14, 2016. In Europe, however, many of the suspects have been of North African descent. Living in the margins, they tend to have lived lives of crime, perhaps radicalizing in jail and finding validation by identifying with ISIS, which offered a cause, an ideology that conveyed to them, in however disturbed a way, some kind of meaning as they radicalized in the banlieues of Paris and Bruxelles.

But Saipov represents an overlooked phenomenon. Many of the ISIS terrorists who have targeted soft targets in 2017 were Uzbeks. It was an Uzbek national who killed 39 people in the first hours of 2017 in Istanbul. It was also an Uzbek national who killed four people in Stockholm last July. The authorities are suggesting that Saipov radicalized in the United States, frequenting mosques known for their radical preachers. However, such suggestions overlook the fact that Uzbekistan and its neighboring states have become some of the main centers of Islamist radicalization in the world. Rather than looking to New York for explanations, Saipov’s attack should draw analysts and authorities’ attention to the growing dangers of the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia.

Background

Was Sayfullo Saipov radicalized in the USA? Perhaps, and this argument might help cover up some sloppy security work around the time he got his green card. Indeed, the recent history of Central Asia suggests that he could have been radicalized a long time ago. One of the strategic reasons that has pushed Russia to intervene directly in Syria is to stem the Islamic radicalization phenomenon south of the Caucasus and in the Steppes of Central Asia. Russia’s own Muslim majority province of Chechnya represents a risk, but so do the Islamists, who have intensified their militancy fighting alongside ISIS and al-Qaida in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The Turks and Russians call this the “Asian School” of jihad. It could represent the most fearsome branch of ISIS. It includes experienced fighters, who have fought their ‘jihads’ in Chechnya and Afghanistan, even before there was an ISIS. They are thus highly experienced in military assault techniques and guerrilla tactics.

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The resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri may well have Saudi, Israeli, and American roots and interests at their base. Syria has all but taken full control of Deir Ezzor and will be moving to Raqqa, where it may have fewer problems with ISIS and more with the US-backed Kurds, who took the city a few weeks ago. Bashar al-Asad has emerged from the Syrian conflict as the victorious party. That was not supposed to happen. The Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah intervention has been the key to this support. In turn, Hezbollah and Iran will feel stronger in Syria and beyond. The Shiite government of Iraq has already taken steps to move closer to Moscow than Washington, securing a Russian arms deals and possibly more. Russia has also entertained better relations with Turkey while establishing a dialogue with Syrian Kurdish forces in an effort to make the eventuality of peace talks and post-war political (and physical reconstruction) more plausible and longer lasting. As the situation stands now, the U.S. will have a much smaller role to play and the Saudis will not have any role.

To what extent will Iran and Hezbollah have a hold over the political affairs of Lebanon?

There is little doubt that Hezbollah and Iran have significant control over Lebanon’s political affairs. This has been the situation since the end of the Lebanese civil war of the 1980s. It was a battleground for the whole region, but the Taif peace accords that ended it recognized the fact that Shiites have the largest population in Lebanon, thus ushering in an increase of their political power. But this influence has further increased in the meantime because Hezbollah has gained acceptance and support from beyond the Shiite population. It has also been the most effective Arab army ever against Israel. Iran’s financial backing of Hezbollah has given it weapons but also the means to rebuild infrastructure and housing after wars (as in 2006). It has also allowed Hezbollah to run many social welfare programs, which help it retain popular support. Indeed, the Israeli war of 2006 only served to strengthen Hezbollah’s role in Lebanese politics. They have become much less militant about religious matters, allowing them to gain support from wider sections of the population. But, it’s important to note that Hezbollah was not an Iranian creation. Hezbollah emerged as a more radicalized faction of the original Shiite religious-political movement known as Amal in 1982 in response to the Israeli invasion of that year.

But, the same Saudis, not to mention the Americans, have put too much of their credibility into ‘regime changing’ Syria. Israel will not tolerate a strengthened Hezbollah, which has been one of the most important elements in challenging the onslaught from ISIS and Western-backed rebel forces (not just the Kurds). The resignation of Rafiq Hariri must be viewed in this context.

Hariri said he feared he would end up killed as Father Rafiq (he was killed in a massive bombing blamed on Syria – but never proven as such by special investigators – in Beirut in 2005.) This can be understandable because Lebanon is certainly not a stable country. The resignation of Hariri is a major event given that the country’s delicate sectarian and religious balance between Shiite, Sunni, and Christian components is always a problem and always a potential trigger of conflict. Saad Hariri is above all a very contradictory character. He may have inherited the role from his father but not the political skill. Thus he is an ideal puppet.

A US and Saudi role in PM Hariri’s resignation?

There is a connection between the arrests in Saudi Arabia, including that of Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal, and the resignation of the Sunni Saad Hariri. The Saudis and the Sunnis, in effect, have lost the war in Syria. Iran and its proxies have won it. The Asad win means that ISIS and the anti-regime jihadist factions sustained for years by the monarchies of the Gulf (Riyadh and Doha in particular) have lost. In Lebanon, Hariri knows that he can only maintain power as long as he works within the agreement signed with Hezbollah and their Christian allies, led by President Aoun. The Hariri resignation represents the next Saudi-American-Israeli move to prevent the Shiite Front from enjoying their victory. The US has military bases in Iraq; they have also established bases in Syria and they will be reluctant to leave. Hariri’s resignation will cause an institutional crisis in Lebanon. But, it could also cause the kind of political chaos that translates to factional violence on the streets. Indeed, the tactic might well be to trigger another Lebanese civil war – or to transfer the Syrian war to Lebanon. The goal is to break Hezbollah, who have gotten too strong for their own good.

In addition to the defeat in Syria, Saudi Arabia has to handle the heavy consequences of the war in Yemen where it is struggling, despite having made billions of arms purchases from the USA and UK, to defeat much less equipped Houthi rebels – which are perceived as allies of Iran, because they are a Shiite sect.  The fact that the Houthis once ruled Yemen – until 1962 – is often overlooked.

The Saudis are preparing for a massive shift.

The Saudis are struggling to save face. Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the de-facto ruler, may be very ambitious and seems to be in a competition with the Emir of Qatar, who is about the same young age.  Their failure to win in Yemen may inspire the Shiites who live in Saudi Arabia in the rich oil region of the northeast. The arrests of the princes, including Talal, helps Prince Salman divert blame and attention from the military failures just as Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah will be scoring their final and decisive points against ISIS. Salman is out to build his power and has targeted the biggest figures in Saudi Arabia for arrest (don’t feel too sorry for them, they are confined in luxurious quarters).

The ultimate goal, given his stated ambition to reform Islam, will probably be to encourage a wider Sunni participation in Saudi causes. In other words, Salman wants to move to a ‘normal’ Sunni religious approach (allowing women to drive, opening movie theatres) like Qatar or the UAE – but less like the progressive Kuwait. This, in Salman’s strategy, could help stem the popularity of Hezbollah and drive a deeper wedge between the entire Sunni world and the Shiites. It’s a case of softening the Wahhabi ideology – rather than strengthening it – to beat the Shiite tide. It’s not that Alwaleed Bin Talal was a radical Wahhabi. On the contrary, he’s more progressive than Salman will ever be. But he and other more open-minded figures may have criticized the royal family one too many times. Thus, they undermine the Saudi royal family’s authority at a time when its new leading figures want more power to make radical changes.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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President Trump has little, if anything, to do with ISIS’s defeat. The US-backed campaign against ISIS in Syria started two days before Trump won the elections last November 8. But Trump is a salesman and therefore, by definition, an opportunist. He’s doing what is logical in his world, and that’s about it.  He needs consensus on the eve of midterm elections next year. Trump has also made a point of increasing military spending. If there’s one thing, however, that he can claim it’s that he has not interfered with Russia’s operations in Syria. Unlike the previous administration – and unlike what Hillary Clinton likely would have done – Trump allowed Russia to pursue its policy of backing the Syrian government’s effort to reclaim territory both at the expense of ISIS and other Islamist militias.

Claims that US efforts are just a smokescreen may have some credibility…

I have always doubted U.S. claims in the fight against ISIS. Indeed, it’s important to note that ISIS itself has direct roots in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. (See my article on the subject here). As for the more recent campaign, there are many questions that linger. It’s true that policy wise – other than the April 2017 missile raid against a Syrian air base and accusations that the Assad government authorized a chemical weapon attack near Idlib – Trump has run a more ‘hands off’ policy in Syria. But, on a few occasions, when the US-led coalition had the chance to eliminate various terrorists who are guilty of killing thousands of Syrian civilians, they instead let them go, leaving their posts without challenging them such that they could move to the provinces in which the Syrian government forces are operating. The head of Russian forces in Syria, Sergey Surovikin last summer suggested that the Americans have used ISIS to oppose the Syrian-Russian-Iranian-Hezbollah effort, using the excuse of fighting international terrorism in Syria. Gen. Surovikin’s accusations are credible because whatever the U.S. does in Syria takes Israel into consideration. Israel is concerned that Hezbollah and Iran, apart from Assad, will gain considerable strength and prestige from defeating ISIS. Thus, from an overall US strategic outlook, it would have made sense for the Americans to back ISIS against Assad. At best, one can say, the Americans have been ‘neutral’ in the past year.

What about the contribution of other parties to the fight against Islamic State: Iran, Russia, Turkey, Kurds?

If ISIS has been defeated in Syria, praise must go almost entirely to the Russians, the Iranians, Hezbollah, and the Kurds. However, the Kurds have ulterior motives. The fall of Raqqa, a city reduced to ashes, has marked the end of the territorial entity of the Caliphate. It’s a historical event. The ‘caliph’ al-Baghdadi was either killed as the Russians said last August or has disappeared. Raqqa was designated as the capital in memory of one of the greatest caliphs of all time: Harun al-Rashid, the one whose tales inspired the Thousand One Nights and made Baghdad into a glorious capital of art, culture, science, and literature in the 9^th century. The Raqqa of Isis however was a theater of terror rather than civilization.

The liberation of the city is not entirely good news. Raqqa remains the heart of a geopolitical mess. While the Iraqi army has chased the Iraqi Kurds led by Massoud Barzani from Kirkuk (an oil producing center), the Syrian Kurds have claimed their win in Raqqa with the support of Americans. Iraqi Kurds are trained by Americans and NATO. Meanwhile, those same NATO forces have been lukewarm about Kurdistan’s nationalist claims. Turkey and Iran are totally opposed to the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan, as voted by a referendum. The Syrian Kurds of Rojava, backed by Americans, want an autonomous area but inside Syria. Without an agreement with Damascus, Russia and Iran would be in the throes of the Turks, who during the siege of Kobane in 2015 helped ISIS fight the Kurdish resistance (Turkey has the most to lose from Kurdish victories in Syria/Iraq).

Thus, the fall of ISIS was mostly the effort of Damascus, Moscow, and Tehran. They had the most to gain and they put up the strongest effort. Even before the demise of ISIS in Raqqa, the terrorist group was losing pieces everywhere owing to heavy losses it suffered from Russian and Syrian efforts. Raqqa is more of a symbolic win, which the Kurds will use for their own opportunistic ends. Moscow and Tehran’s victory has certainly strengthened the Shiite axis (Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut). It remains to be seen how Israel and the U.S. react. They are the losers in a sense. Russia has been pursuing better tiers with Turkey and Saudi Arabia also because, it helps in securing its goals in Syria. The U.S. has no role in the negotiations at Astana between Russia, Iran and Turkey. What will Trump do? Will he leave Vladimir Putin and Iran full control over what happens in Syria? Perhaps, which is why Trump’s advisors want to weaken Tehran by scrapping or renegotiating the Iran nuclear deal.

Yet the ISIS threat, or the threat of terrorism, is not over. The Kurds negotiated with ISIS in Raqqa, allowing thousands of armed fighters to flee. These fighters will probably move from somewhere else – maybe Europe, maybe North Africa. Clearly, Libya is a free for all mess still, thus it’s an ideal new base for the Caliphate. Others could go to Sinai or Yemen where ISIS might join in with al-Qaeda against Houthi Shiites in a conflict where the Saudis have been bogged down for years. What seems clear is that the situation in Syria (and Iraq) is not pointing to peace yet. The future of the Kurds could yet involve a major redrawing of the Middle Eastern map as devised by the Sykes-Picot agreement 100 years ago.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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The meeting did not produce any formal agreements, but it appears to have improved the prospect of more constructive discussions to resolve “pending” issues in the Libyan crisis. The two representatives agreed to meet again. The fact that Italy’s ambassador to Libya, one of the few EU diplomats in the North African country, also attended the talks, underlines the extent to which Rome wants the parties to reach a solution, such that the GNA might finally achieve a sufficient degree of sovereignty. Italy’s prime minister recently visited Washington, where he discussed Libya to gauge the extent of President Trump’s interest in taking a more active stance – as Obama had done – in backing the GNA and Prime Minister al-Sarraj’s efforts to extend its reach. However, Trump’s enthusiasm in this regard was less than lukewarm.

While Trump may appreciate the glory of playing intermediary in a Tobruk-Tripoli reconciliation, he doesn’t want to put any effort into attaining it.

That leaves Moscow. The Russians are doubtless interested in reclaiming a role in Libya, perhaps gaining a naval base in Cyrenaica, and extending their influence in the eastern Mediterranean. To that end, Vladimir Putin’s government has kept Marshal Khalifa Haftar and the Tobruk (HoR) close. But, the Russians have also held talks with the HoR’s Tripolitanian rivals to find an acceptable solution to the crisis. For Russia, Libya might serve as a lever for diplomatic leverage. For, the EU and Italy, which endures the largest burden of illegal migration from the Libyan coast, Russia might contribute to a solution.

The Libyan Summit in Rome shows that reconciliation is not impossible

It would be premature – stability is at the ‘toddler’ stage at best – to suggest the Government of National Accord has reached a breakthrough. Libya is still far from even a precarious stability. But, the renewed diplomatic effort to resolve the GNA puzzle may have a chance of achieving a reasonable facsimile. The Tripoli government, led by Al Sarraj, which is the only one that the UN (and the EU) has formally recognized, remains vulnerable. But, Russia seems ready to return to North Africa, having courted but not formally recognized the Tobruk HoR, elected in 2014. Until last March, when Moscow and Washington appeared to have found a common language, General Haftar was counting on a double ‘whammy’ of support from Trump and Putin.

Gen. Haftar fought Islamic State in Cyrenaica, also using his small air force to attack the Islamic militants in Sirte and Misrata. Haftar himself enjoys direct backing from President al-Sisi of Egypt as well as the United Arab Emirates, and does not recognize the authority of the government of national unity established in Tripoli. Yet, as of April 6, when Trump launched Tomahawk missiles against a Syrian air base in response to the al-Assad government’s alleged use of chemical weapons, it seems something got lost in translation between the White House and the Kremlin. As for al-Sarraj’s government, it has never been able to impose its authority on the capital, where at least a dozen militias remain active and alliances and areas of influence shift continuously. Fayez Al Serraj remains a weak prime minister of a government that has not established its rule. From a practical point of view, Serraj’s government, even after the Rome meeting, has yet to secure political legitimacy from the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk.

In this scenario, Aghila Saleh and Haftar might be persuaded to come to terms with the GNA. Both fear that with the legitimation of Serraj, their roles, without American backing, are destined to carry less international weight. Now the UN-sponsored government administers some three quarters of Libya’s territory on paper. That is all of Libya except for Cyrenaica where the ‘unrecognized’ HoR is based. Moreover, Serraj has secured the support of three key institutions: The National Oil Company (NOC), the Central Bank and the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA). These are remnants of the Qadhafi regime and they control the clear majority of Libya’s assets. LIA managed some $70 billion euros, which during the time of Qadhafi, Libya invested virtually all over the world. That money is still being withheld, but would be released once stability is achieved. The funds, oil revenue, and the Central Bank’s coffers, will all be used to pay for reconstruction.

Haftar and Saleh wanted to create an alternative LIA and even another NOC in Cyrenaica, but oil production is too weak to support these projects. Thus, The Tobruk government had little choice but to try to reach a compromise with Tripoli. As much as Haftar can count on Russian and other international support for his efforts to combat Islamic State, Moscow cannot play all its cards on a Libyan bet. Still, Haftar and Saleh might yet secure some lofty roles within the GNA if they play along.

The Libyan summit in Rome is significant because it’s the first ever meeting between the Tripoli and Tobruk rival authorities. The Italian government, meanwhile, appears to have taken a responsibility to fulfill the Libyan political agreement. The two sides agreed on achieving a peaceful and fair solution to issues focused on the country’s interests, national reconciliation, and the repatriation of all Libyan refugees and displaced persons. Tripoli and Tobruk can now begin consultations to amend the GNA agreement to help resolve the Libyan stalemate, including the role that General Haftar will play. The Rome ‘Libyan’ summit could also serve as the platform for a more important meeting as early as this summer between Sarraj and Haftar in Washington, with President Trump. That meeting could settle a reconciliation between the two Libyan leaders. Europe fears the Libyan refugee ‘bomb.’ The country, as it stands now, faces a constant risk of implosion. Collapse would mean an exponential rise in the already dramatic migration phenomenon.

Washington’s absence in Libya is an opportunity for Moscow

While Trump may appreciate the glory of playing intermediary in a Tobruk-Tripoli reconciliation, he doesn’t want to put any effort into attaining it. He will let the EU handle it, and give American assent when everything is ready. Trump does not see a US role in resolving the Libyan crisis. Italy’s PM, Paolo Gentiloni, tried to draw some American attention to the problem of security in the Mediterranean during his visit to Washington. But he came back empty-handed. The White House no longer cares about the Libyan problem, which the U.S. itself helped to trigger with its 2011 NATO intervention. For Trump, Libya is Obama’s and, especially, Hillary’s problem. The possibility that jihadist militias might grow stronger was, incidentally, one of the arguments that Gentiloni discussed with Trump to persuade the president not to ignore the Libya file. Trump confirmed that if the threat were to come back, he would not hesitate to intervene. But, the task of shaping a political solution to the crisis would be left to the EU and Italy. Perhaps at the forthcoming May 2017 G7 Summit in Taormina Italy, Italy’s PM might try to persuade Trump to intervene, noting that Russia is backing Haftar. He might wish, in passing, to mention that it might not be in Washington’s interest to allow Putin to grab more influence in the Mediterranean.

As recently revealed by The Guardian, even a top candidate for the role of US Special Envoy to Libya, Sebastian Gorka, urged the partition of Libya into three, on the basis of the Ottoman-era administrative divisions of Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripolitania. The EU would find that hard to accept, given all the efforts in trying to keep Libya whole such as to better control the migration problem.  Migrant landings in Italy are incessant and continue to rise, marking a 40% increase compared to 2016. But, Haftar seems the only one capable of suppressing the Islamist wave. As for Moscow, Haftar’s ally (the Libyan General even speaks Russian), it might be the better capital for the Italian PM to visit to secure more support in mediating the Libyan crisis. Al-Serraj’s visit to Russia on March 2 certainly suggests the Kremlin is keeping all options open in Libya, especially the idea of a unity government. Putin would work with Italy in that regard and get some concessions on sanctions and Ukraine in return. Italy has this one chance. It should mediate an intra-Libyan agreement with Moscow. It should be noted that Russia has also held bilateral talks with Algeria, which has a strong influence in Libya, on security issues.

The post Moscow Steps In to Fill the Vacuum in Libya appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Yet Syrian jets were using the base not 24 hours after the Tomahawk strike. Apart from the minor physical damage to the base, the biggest effect of the missile attack has been to put the United States on a collision course with Russia President Vladimir Putin, who has not wavered in offering Russia’s protection to the regime of President Bashar al-Asad in Syria. The Kremlin reacted to the American raid calling it “an aggression against a sovereign state.” Russia also suspended the memorandum of cooperation on Syria with the United States. The Trump attack ultimately marks a major step backwards in the common fight against terrorism, undermining future relations with Moscow.

The Fallout

It now seems clear that in the case of a new attack on Syria, Russia will respond firmly and proportionally. This could imply the sinking of US or other NATO ships involved in launching further attacks against Syria. Naturally, it would also imply that any US aircraft attacking Syria would be a legitimate target. It’s a dangerous escalation that threatens to drag the world into a much bigger clash between nuclear superpowers, with unimaginable consequences. Trump is probably betting that Moscow, in case of another attack on Syria, would not dare to attack American ships. But in such an event, Putin would face enormous pressure from his own military – and people – to respond forcefully.

For the time being, Russia and Iran maintain that the United States has launched a direct attack against a sovereign Syria and the Assad government. Thus, Trump has sided with the ‘terrorists,’ jeopardizing relations with Moscow. Syria’s allies also insist that a full and impartial investigation into the Khan Shaykhun incident be held. Trump’s missile strike, meanwhile, came just days after the Trump administration announced that Washington would no longer seek to overturn the Syrian regime. Trump’s rapid reaction to the attack might have been a swift and effective ‘tactical’ move from the point of view of internal US politics. Yet it seems like a chaotic strategic move at best. Indeed, more than anything else, Trump’s 59 Tomahawks, costing $1.5 million each, raised an important question about the Trump White House: who’s really in charge? Does President Trump really lead the United States?

The fact that Trump has grown accustomed to swift ratings as a measure of success suggests that he may pull a similar move again if it drives negative poll numbers away. It’s still unclear whether the missile strikes are part of a strategy to initiate a regime change process or are just a one-off. Has Trump used the Tomahawks as a kind of ‘mine canary’ to gauge what kind of appetite Americans have for a wider military intervention in Syria? If so, Trump has forgotten the reasons so many Americans voted for him. They don’t want more wars. The mainstream media loved the move, however. CNN’s Fareed Zakaria proclaimed that Trump “became president” with the strikes. CNBC’s Brian Williams literally waxed poetic, observing the “beauty of our weapons.”

What the handsomely paid Zakaria and Williams, and many others, failed to observe was glaringly obvious. The Syrian army’s alleged use of chemical weapons remains alleged. No proof whatsoever has been presented to confirm that sarin was used. Some say it might be chlorine or phosgene. Moreover, as not so distant history shows, the U.S. has accused regimes it has selected for change of using or developing weapons of mass destruction. When the United States decides to export democracy, its plans are packaged to include a chemical attack of some sort. It’s not clear how the White House will proceed. Trump has not spoken about the Tomahawk launch since the attack – which occurred while he was having dinner with China’s President Xi Jinping. That may have been a deliberate affront as Syria has enjoyed Chinese support. Yet members of Trump’s staff, and his ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley, hinted that more strikes would come.

The big question is: Has Trump finally caved to pressure from the anti-Russian Republicans and Democrats?

If Trump intends the attack against the Shayrat base to be part of a wider strategy, then he’s directing a movie whose script audiences have seen before. Trump might want Syria to be the sequel of Serbia, Iraq, or Libya. The plot goes something like this: attribute guilt a priori, announce you have proof – but don’t bother to present it to the world – launch an attack and deploy the opposition. Russia’s military presence, however, disrupts the linearity of this plot. If Russia wants to protect its interests in the area – the naval base of Tartus and the air base near Latakia – the United States risks an escalation of tensions not seen since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The risk Trump takes by reviving the regime change option falls nothing short of World War 3. Alternatively, if Trump contains the strike to the tactical – for domestic political consumption – as Bill Clinton did when he attacked a Sudanese alleged WMD factory in Khartoum in 1998 to retaliate against blasts at U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, then the episode might not involve any follow-up actions.

Ultimately, the attack against Syria shows that Trump does not decide all that much in the United States. Trump had said last week that the real problem was not Assad, but ISIS and terrorism in general. It was not a priority for him to change the government in Damascus. The fact that Trump could find it so easy to pursue a diametrically opposite policy in a matter of 48 hours suggests he has little control. He has caved to pressure from various elements of the Pentagon, perhaps the CIA and certainly to Republican and Democratic members of Congress. The demotion and ousting of close Trump advisors like Steve Bannon and Michael Flynn – who was strongly opposed to a Syrian intervention – might be taken as the first hints of the Trump shift.

For President Trump, it might be the beginning of the end. His shift in favor of military threats in Syria – and North Korea – and away from ‘America First’ could cost him considerable domestic support. His military advisors, Generals Mattis and McMaster, may have urged him to launch an attack, persuading him it would help appease domestic tensions over Russia-gate, which would then allow him to concentrate on making ‘America great again.’ Trump’s detractors on April 5 became his supporters on April 6. Hillary Clinton, John McCain, and Chuck Schumer now applaud what they believe was his first presidential action: attacking a sovereign state and killing civilians. This is more symptomatic of the United States’ conviction of its global policeman role than any specific Trump fault. But, unlike other conflicts, Trump has attacked a sovereign country backed by Russia (and Iran) directly and overtly. Even if Putin – and maybe even Iran – wanted to start reducing their involvement, they can’t back away now. Russia wants to reassert its global superpower role and caving to US demands – even worse, US accusations of abetting a chemical weapons attack – cannot happen. That is also why it’s hard to believe the accusations leveled against the Syrian government and why it’s so important to allow an independent investigation of the Khan Shaykhun incident.

The risk now is that in launching Tomahawk missiles against Syria, Trump has hit a hornet’s nest. No matter the implications and machinations in Washington, the various al-Nusra, al-Qaida, and even ISIS terrorists on the ground in Syria now know that they can stage poison gas attacks, using them as a kind of ‘bat-signal’ to prompt a US attack against Syrian government forces. The ‘chemical’ formula is easy: stage chemical attack, bring White Helmets and blame Bashar al-Assad. The media and political circuit will lap it up and do what it does best. Fareed Zakaria will declare the inevitable military response as oozing presidential greatness. Trump may have been sucked in by the media – whose attention he craves – and the proverbial neocons who have tried for the past six years to get the United States militarily engaged in Syria. Trump has thus sold his soul, and his presidency, to them in the hope of saving both.

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