Over the past decade or so, conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq have witnessed the engagement of Iran-backed militias, resulting in US soldiers encountering combat, security threats, and fatalities. The involvement of Russia and China often exacerbates the chaos, with China extending economic and diplomatic support, while Russia offers economic and military backing. Examples include China emerging as the primary benefactor of Iran and Afghanistan, as well as establishing normalized relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and accrediting the Taliban ambassador in Beijing. Additionally, Russia, besides supplying weapons, has deployed troops through entities like the Wagner Group and other private military companies (PMCs), backing various militias and parties entangled in these conflicts.

The interests of various external powers often converge, leading to alliances. For instance, both Israel and the United States share an interest in opposing Hamas and Hezbollah. Another example is the United States backing a coalition led by Saudi Arabia in Yemen, while the opposing side receives support from Russia and Iran. Additionally, Russia supports President Bashar al-Assad, while the United States and Saudi Arabia support Syrian opposition forces.

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The statement mirrors similar demands from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, countries which are currently under military rule. All three have since followed through on their intentions to expel foreign forces. Chad is effectively the last country in the Sahel region that plays host to foreign soldiers. Niger, which was also home to US personnel, requested that the US withdraw its troops in March.

Chad is divided by the arid Sahara Desert to its far north, the tropical savannah to its south, and the Sahel transition zone between them. There are few notable geographic features besides Lake Chad, where the country gets its name. The capital N’Djamena lies near the Cameroonian border on the banks of the Chari River in the west. In the east lies the border region with Darfur in Sudan, to the north Libya, to the south the Central African Republic, and Niger and Nigeria to its west.

Chad has the third youngest population of any country in the world, at an average age of 16.6 years. It is a majority Sunni Muslim country, with a substantial Christian minority inhabiting the south. Most Chadians are secular on political issues, however.

After the death of former Chadian president Idriss Déby in 2021, the military initiated a coup that installed Déby’s son Mahamat. Since then, Mahamat Déby has moved to consolidate power. In 2022, he unilaterally extended the transition period, took up the reins of transitional president, and announced his candidacy for the presidential elections scheduled for May 6. Opposition candidates have had their candidacies rejected. The only candidate left with any hope of challenging Déby in the polls is the current prime minister, Succes Masra. However, Masra’s supportive statements toward the Mahamat Déby administration have tarnished his credibility as an opposition figure. The ultimate result of the upcoming elections will almost surely be a continuation of the present security policy, likely under a Mahamat Deby presidency.

Though only fielding around 30,000 soldiers, the Chadian military has received extensive support from foreign instructors and direct combat assistance. The country has been in a state of war for the better part of 30 years, with a civil war erupting in 2005. The military is battle-tested, not just from delivering the government a victory on the battlefield, but also from years of directly supporting regional militaries in their fight against Islamic extremists, with the 2012 Mali insurgency being one notable example.

Of growing concern to Washington is the potential alignment of Central and West African states like Chad with Russia, specifically through the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company. In an interview with France24, Déby insisted that his country was not a “slave looking to change his master,” suggesting a desire to balance the stakeholders involved. This accords with Chad’s longtime strategy of entertaining foreign backers to maintain a hold over an ethnically and politically fragmented society.

The pivot may be a tactical move by Mahamat Déby meant to boost his chances in the election. Goodwill towards France and the United States regarding their presence in Chad has run thin lately. By appearing to take a stance against historic colonial powers, Déby is galvanizing support from that section of the Chadian electorate.

Electoral politicking, however, may not be necessary. No Chadian election in history has ever been free and fair. Instead, commentators have suggested that it is a bargaining tactic that N’Djamena is using to increase US support for the Chadian government.

Chad’s relationship with France is deeper than France’s relationships with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. As a result, Chad can’t shake the ties off so easily. For now, the French are not likely to immediately follow the Americans should the latter be fully expelled from the country.

The post Chad Looks to Expel US Forces ahead of Polls appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

The question remains: is a European war a genuine possibility, or simply a tactic to garner support for Ukraine? Perhaps it’s both. The warnings could serve as a dual message, deterring Russia while simultaneously pushing for increased aid to Ukraine. However, recent developments, such as the deployment of advanced Russian weaponry and the potential for a renewed offensive this summer, paint a concerning picture regarding the possibility of conflicts.

The tactics employed by both Russian and Ukrainian forces in this ongoing conflict could be readily and easily adapted for a potential hybrid war fought on European soil. The Iranian Shahed-136 drones, with their distinctive motorcycle-like engine roar, have become a constant presence in Ukrainian skies during Russian offensives. It’s not inconceivable to imagine these drones buzzing ominously over European airspace in the not-so-distant future. The geographical proximity of major European cities like Berlin and Warsaw to Ukrainian battlegrounds like Sevastopol and Kyiv (both less than 2,000 miles away) underscores the potential reach of these drones, even if they are not the most cutting-edge technology at Russia’s disposal.

Recent developments, including heavy Russian artillery going over the Polish border, paint a worrying picture. Despite these advancements, there seems to be a collective lack of urgency in acknowledging the seriousness of the situation. This perception, however, is not uniform across Europe.

Despite the increasing concerns, indeed, there is a clear divide between the proactive response of Eastern European countries and the apparent inaction of their Western counterparts.

Living in the shadow of the Russian bear, Eastern European nations have spent the past few months expressing a palpable sense of alarm and actively strengthening their defenses. Lithuania, a NATO member state that is eclipsed in size by countries such as France or Germany, stands out as a leader in dedicating a large portion of its GDP to bolstering its defenses and honing its military muscle – significantly outpacing its Western allies. Similarly, Poland, despite a recent shift in government, continues to grapple with historical and cultural tensions with Russia. Here, the specter of war is a constant vigil, a chilling reality that casts a long shadow over daily life. However, suggesting that their heightened awareness stems solely from geographical proximity would be a dangerous oversimplification. As the conflict in Ukraine tragically demonstrates, modern warfare can transcend mere kilometers.

A continent sleepwalking into conflict?

The European public seems largely oblivious to the potential consequences of war on their doorstep. While media coverage of the war in Ukraine has been extensive, it may not be adequately conveying the seriousness of the situation for Europe itself. Additionally, the daily news cycle often prioritizes domestic issues, potentially creating a sense of detachment from the larger geopolitical picture. This lack of urgency, particularly in contrast to the proactive stance taken by Eastern European nations, raises concerns about Europe’s overall preparedness.

The disparity in perception across Europe can be attributed to several factors. Eastern European nations may well have a historical memory of living under Soviet rule, which shapes their present outlook. They understand the potential brutality and unpredictability of Russia’s leadership, as did Ukrainians after the Crimea invasion. Western Europe, on the other hand, may be experiencing a form of war fatigue. Decades of relative peace have fostered a sense of complacency. Additionally, the economic anxieties associated with a potential conflict could create a strong disincentive to acknowledge the threat.

There may also be a lingering hope for diplomacy to prevail. European leaders and citizens alike may be clinging to the belief that negotiations can de-escalate tensions with Russia. Recent diplomatic efforts by Western European nations might further fuel this hope. However, a healthy dose of realism is necessary. While diplomacy should continue, a failure to adequately prepare for all possible scenarios would be a grave mistake.

A war on European soil could have a profound impact that extends far beyond the immediate conflict. Existing security architecture and alliances could be fundamentally reshaped. Political landscapes would undoubtedly shift, with potential for both increased cooperation and further fractures. The economic impact would be devastating, impacting trade, investment, and overall stability for years to come.

In the aftermath of COVID, a complacent Europe can ill-afford to ignore the gathering storm. The time for denial is over. Europe must confront the threat head-on. Open dialogue with European citizens about the potential for war and its consequences is crucial. This dialogue must move beyond the realm of political rhetoric and delve into the stark realities of the situation.

A multi-pronged approach is the only way to avert the looming shadow of war and ensure a peaceful future for Europe. Continued diplomatic efforts with Russia must remain a priority, but they should be coupled with responsible military preparation. Increased investment in defense capabilities and a renewed commitment to collective security through NATO are essential steps.

However, security goes beyond just military might. Europe needs to work towards a more unified foreign policy and a stronger economic foundation. This will require a renewed commitment to European integration and a willingness to overcome historical divisions.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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• The Marcos administration in the Philippines is internationalizing the South China Sea conflict, scrapping the bilateral approach of the Duterte years.
• US President Biden has reiterated that the US-Philippines mutual defense treaty applies to the South China Sea.
• ‘Gray zone tactics’ that may have worked previously are now more likely to elicit a response from Washington and other littoral claimants.

The United States and Philippines are planning their first-ever military training exercises outside of Philippines’ waters. The exercises are the latest in a series of moves suggesting a more active US stance on defending its allies’ sovereignty in the South China Sea. The overall objective is clear: remove the diplomatic and military ambiguity that China’s gray zone tactics thrive in.

Background

The South China Sea is a critical theater for Beijing, holding out the possibility of material wealth in its underseas mineral deposits and greater military security by pushing out the PLA’s defense perimeter from China proper. But Beijing’s sweeping claims to the waters overlap with other littoral states, namely Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan. The resulting clashes have played out for decades, sometimes producing a sudden redrawing of the map, as was the case after China’s occupation of the Paracel Islands in 1974, and other times leading to a more gradual ‘slicing of the salami’ where a previous status quo slowly gives way to a new one, often by way of gray zone tactics designed to fall short of producing a direct military response.

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Shortly after his father’s death, twenty-five-year-old Pavel Prigozhin took over the reins of his father’s company, but with limited legitimacy. Little is known of Pavel’s childhood or teenage years, except that he was pampered and traveled on private yachts and jets. He fought in Syria alongside Wagner troops, earning the organization’s “Black Cross” for outstanding military service. He also fought in Ukraine, where allegedly, his social media posts gave away his position, leading to his unit being bombed. Western sanctions have been extended to the children of Yevgeny Prigozhin, making it nearly impossible for Pavel to travel internationally.

Pavel’s age and lack of his father’s skills were ultimately his downfall, and most analysts believed the Kremlin would cut a deal to completely remove him from the picture, allowing Pavel to continue to earn money with the many other companies his father left him in a multibillion-dollar empire. Under Pavel’s leadership, Wagner began recruiting again, but then suddenly stopped. By October or November of 2023, Pavel was no longer leading Wagner. There’s no official confirmation on Pavel’s whereabouts or what happened to him. He may have been sidelined or removed from power struggles within Russia. It’s also possible he’s involved with the PMCs in a less public role. Information about the Wagner Group and its leadership is often opaque and shrouded in secrecy.

While Pavel’s role, and even if he is still alive, remain unknown, it is known that Wagner’s commercial and military interests have been divided between Russia’s numerous intelligence services and Putin’s allies. Parts of Wagner may have been absorbed into Rosgvardia, also known as the Federal Service of the National Guard of the Russian Federation. However, command over the largest part of Wagner’s overseas operations has been assumed by General Andrei Averyanov, a high-ranking officer in Russia’s military intelligence (GRU). General Andrey Averyanov, the former leader of a targeted assassination group, rose to international infamy for the failed poisoning of Russian dissident-in-exile, Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, UK in 2018.

The Defense Ministry established a number of other private military companies (PMCs) to recruit former Wagner men for operations in Africa or the Middle East. A PMC called Redut, established in 2008, has been fighting in Ukraine, while another PMC, Convoy, was established in Russian-occupied Crimea in 2022. Wagner’s Ukrainian operations now come under the name of the Volunteer Corps, while other arms-length, covert operations have been incorporated into the Expeditionary Corps. Effectively, the multibillion-dollar PMC business has been taken over by the Kremlin, with the Expeditionary Corps dubbed “Wagner 2.0.”

Russia’s strategy in using the PMCs is to undermine U.S. power and increase Moscow’s influence while maintaining plausible deniability. They provide security for foreign leaders while also offering training for their troops and sometimes engaging in ground combat, providing combat support, or conducting special operations. The PMCs aid Moscow’s foreign policy objectives by carrying out military operations, projecting Russia’s power, furthering Moscow’s political influence, gathering intelligence, and generating revenue. In Mali and Sudan, the Wagner Group was instrumental in securing gold and diamond mines, ensuring that certain local military leaders continue to benefit from them, while also transporting precious metals and stones back to the Kremlin.

Wagner was active in Libya from 2018. Russian PMCs are also fighting in Syria and Ukraine, and possibly in as many as 30 countries in total. Wagner had been propping up regimes across Africa, as well as controlling mineral extraction activity, namely in gold. Operations in Africa are continuing with mercenaries fulfilling existing contracts. The Kremlin is offering a “regime survival package” to governments in Africa in exchange for access to natural resources. The Russian government is also working to change mining laws in West Africa, attempting to unseat Western companies.

Now, those operations in Africa are continuing under the Africa Corps. Russia is negotiating with the Central African Republic to open a new military base there. The group is also active in Libya, Mali, Sudan, and Burkina Faso. The original plan was to recruit and place 40,000 Russian fighters across Africa. This target was reduced to 20,000, but by the end of 2023, even this reduced target had not been fulfilled. Consequently, the empty billets are being filled with recruits from Africa. Particularly in the Central African Republic (CAR), former fighters are finding that they are unemployable after a UN ceasefire. So, they are taking jobs with the Russian PMCs.

Another region where Russian PMCs are active is the Sahel, encompassing countries bordering the southern edge of the Sahara Desert. It has become known as the ‘coup belt’ due to a recent surge in military takeovers. Since 2020, at least five successful coups have plagued the region, including two in Mali, two in Burkina Faso, and one in Niger. The three nations withdrew from the regional bloc – The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – and created their own “Alliance of Sahel States.”

These coups all shared a similar theme: the new military leaders distanced themselves from Western powers. French troops, deployed for years to combat jihadist activity from groups like the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), were expelled or faced pressure to leave. Additionally, the juntas want the US military out of the region. It’s important to note that public dissatisfaction with government corruption and inability to address security concerns, including the rise of these terrorist groups, were also significant factors behind the coups, not just Western influence.

The United States is struggling to maintain its foothold in Africa’s Coup Belt, particularly after French troops were expelled from Mali and Burkina Faso. Washington seeks to prevent Russian PMCs from filling the security void. However, Moscow holds a certain appeal for the region’s newly established military juntas. Unlike Western powers, Russia doesn’t pressure them on human rights issues or democratic reforms. Additionally, the U.S. operates within the constraints of the international rules-based order, limiting its flexibility in negotiations. In contrast, Russia prioritizes its own interests and operates with less transparency, allowing it to deny involvement with PMCs. This opacity gives Russia an advantage, allowing them to cultivate influence in the region without directly committing troops.

The U.S. has several reasons for wanting to remain in the region. First, reports suggest the effectiveness of Russian PMCs in combating terrorism is debatable. Second, the U.S. is concerned about the potential for a detrimental economic impact on these already poverty-stricken countries. Cutting ties with Europe and facing potential sanctions could leave them economically dependent on Russia, with most of the wealth and benefits concentrated among the military rulers.

Furthermore, the coups have resulted in a curtailment of human rights and basic freedoms, with no expectation of full restoration. Unlike Western partners who would pressure for democratic reforms and respect for human rights, Russian PMCs are unlikely to exert any such influence. This lack of pressure is likely to further erode the quality of life for average citizens in these already struggling nations.

The presence of Russian PMCs is expected to expand in Africa, and with it, Russia’s influence. U.S. influence will decline unless Washington finds some way to dislodge the Russian PMCs. And unfortunately, citizens of these African countries will see a deterioration in their quality of life, standard of living, and general safety.

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This is the fourth MCA exercise conducted in 2024. The first MCA exercise was held in 2023 with the US and Philippine navies, followed by another with the Australian and Philippine navies. During the latest MCA, participating ships included the BRP Gregorio del Pilar and Ramon Alcaraz, the USS Mobile, the JS Akebono, and the HMAS Warramunga.

The Japanese Embassy in the Philippines released a separate statement outlining the scenarios involved in the MCA in greater detail, including anti-submarine warfare training, tactical exercises, link exercises, and photo exercises. During the MCA, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command (STC) announced that it was conducting joint naval and air patrols in the South China Sea on the same day, declaring that “military activities that mess up the situation in the South China Sea and create hotspots are under control.”

These latest naval exercises come after a spate of maritime confrontations between Beijing and Manila. The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) reported on April 6 that ships from the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) harassed Filipino vessels in Philippine Exclusive Exclusion Zone (EEZ) waters in the South China Sea. According to a statement posted by PCG spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela on X, the CCG ships harassed Filipino fishermen supporting ships from the PCG and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) on a mission in Rozul Reef, which is located 128 nautical miles from Palawan, on April 4. Photos of the encounters were also posted on X alongside Commodore Tarriela’s statement. This comes after a series of conflicts over the second half of 2023 centered around the Second Thomas Shoal, a contested South China Sea feature where the Philippines continues to maintain a small detachment of marines on the Sierra Madre, a light transport ship intentionally run aground in 1999.

MCA exercises are unfolding against the backdrop of new talks intended to deepen defense cooperation between Manila and Tokyo. Philippine ambassador to the US Jose Manuel Romualdez said that discussions are planned in the wake of a summit between Manila, Tokyo, and Washington DC, scheduled to be held on April 11. These talks are expected to broach the subject of establishing a legal path for the deployment of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) forces on Philippines territory on a rotational basis under a Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). If the agreement is signed, it would be the third such agreement where the Philippines established security guidelines with partner nations allowing foreign troops to be stationed on Philippine territory, with the other two involving the United States and Australia. Other issues being explored include the possible presence of the JSDF in the annual Balikatan exercises alongside American and Filipino troops, and joint maritime patrols in the South China Sea. Ambassador Romualdez said that a joint statement will be formally issued after the summit in Washington DC. As of 2024, Japan has participated with the two countries alongside American and Filipino marines through the KAMANDAG exercises via the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB).

For Japan, the MCA and upcoming summit come amid a general reorientation of its posture in East Asia, amid an evolving security environment due to threats stemming from a more aggressive Russian foreign policy posture, Chinese aircraft intrusions, and North Korean missile tests near Japanese airspace and waters. Joining the MCA is viewed by Japan as a way to bolster its reputation as a reliable security partner in Indo-Pacific countries and beyond.

As for the Philippines, recent cooperation signals a desire to set up alliances to counter Chinese incursions into Philippine waters. Participating in the MCA with the United States and later, with Australia and Japan, allows Manila to buttress rule of law in Southeast Asian waters, and especially in the South China Sea. Chinese incursions are affecting Manila’s national security, and as such, partnering with like-minded countries is viewed as a way to counter China’s encroachments.

A successful round of MCA exercises reinforces the idea that all parties have the right to safely navigate international waters, without being impeded by one state. In addition to ensuring that China respects the rule of law, the use of maritime exercises can deepen military cooperation with all the allies involved. The trilateral summit also allows the United States to become more involved in the region as a partner with direct interests in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, the MCA can serve as another forum for any and all countries in the Indo-Pacific that wish to participate, as shown by the participation of Australia and Japan when the forum was first launched in 2023.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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The F-15EX, like the F-15, is an air superiority fighter with limited ground attack capabilities. The F-15EX is the latest upgrade of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas’ F-15 multi-role strike fighter which entered service with the United States Air Force (USAF) in 1976. As a result of the termination of the F-22 production line, the 116^th U.S. Congress decided to procure 144 F-15EXs to add more air superiority fighters to the USAF fleet. The F-15EX can carry 12 AIM-120 air-to-air missiles and has next-generation electronic warfare systems that serve to enhance the survivability of the aircraft by jamming adversary systems.

Source: Inventory data is derived from IISS Military Balance 2024 and aircraft age data is from Janes Defense

A survey of the capabilities of Israel’s main state adversaries, Iran and Syria, reveals that Israel does not face a modern fixed-wing threat that would justify the procurement of an advanced air superiority platform. The most advanced fixed-wing combat aircraft fielded by Iran and Syria is the Su-24MK – a tactical bomber introduced by the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The two Iranian aircraft produced in the new millennium are Yak-130 trainer aircraft whose combat credibility is speculative at best. Israel, a state that operates 39 F-35s as of February 2024, can-handedly defeat any Iranian or Syrian jet in an air-to-air engagement. As a result, the aerial threat environment does not provide a sufficient answer for Israel’s interest in the F-15EX. Rather, the combat range of the aircraft may provide some clues concerning Israeli interest in the F-15EX.

Source: The above figures are derived from Janes Defense. The combat range of an aircraft is generally determined by taking a third of the aircraft’s total range without factoring in aerial refueling as it is assumed that the operator will exhaust significant portions of fuel in combat operations before returning to base.

Factoring in Israel’s threat environment, any combat aircraft in the Israeli Air Force’s fleet can strike into Syria without aerial refueling. However, the Israeli Air Force cannot strike deep into Iran. Even from Israel’s closest airbase, the Ramat David Air Base, Israeli aircraft would have to fly approximately 948 miles to reach Tehran. The F-15EX comes closer than other aircraft by over a hundred miles but still falls short by about 150 miles.

However, efficient flight paths mixed with aerial refueling have enabled the Israeli Air Force to penetrate Iranian air space with the F-35 in the past. Though how far the Israeli F-35s went into Iran is unclear, a similar operation with F-15EXs could likely put several Iranian nuclear facilities in the crosshairs of Israeli pilots. Specifically, the Bushehr reactors and Rudan Nuclear Research Center in southern Iran could be easily reached by the F-15EX granted it received mid-air refueling as a component of a hypothetical strike operation.

Israel’s strike on April 4, 2024, on the Iranian Embassy in Syria with US-provided F-35s coincided with the Biden administration’s authorization to transfer F-35s to Israel. As a result, Iran perceives the United States as involved in the April 4 strike despite the operation being carried out by Israeli forces. As the world awaits the Iranian response, the United States, with several thousand personnel deployed in the Middle East, may find itself the victim of the consequences of an Israeli operation.

Arguments to arm Israel with the capability to strike Iran generally center around deterring Iranian aggression. Despite the deterrent value of possessing a capability designed to harm an adversary, the dynamics shift when a state is willing to exercise force with little regard for the consequences. International relations literature accepts the premise that the perceptions of an adversary are integral to establishing deterrence. In the adversary’s mind, there must be ambiguity regarding the state’s exercise of force to deter the adversary and not invite preemptive aggression.

In the Israeli-Iranian case, the current leadership in Israel has overtly called for aggressive actions against Iran for decades. Additionally, Israel has an established history of preventative strikes against regional adversaries. The rhetoric of the current Israeli leadership and the normalization of preventive strikes is enough evidence to raise concerns regarding Israeli intentions and lack of restraint.

Throughout Israel’s conflict in Gaza, the United States has been unable to effectively shape Israeli decision-making despite the measurable humanitarian and political implications of Washington’s failure to do so. Israel’s current leadership has thus far demonstrated itself to be inflexible and unwilling to cooperate with the United States’ regional interests. Israel’s stubbornness is especially surprising given the United States provides substantive defense material and security guarantees.

As long as these dynamics continue to define the US-Israeli relationship, the United States should not authorize the transfer of the F-15EX to Israel. Israel has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to strike adversary targets in a manner that escalates tensions and puts US personnel at risk. Should Israel acquire the F-15EX, or any improvements to its combat aircraft’s operational range, there is no other mission than to be able to strike targets in Iranian territory. Should Israel acquire these capabilities, there is little indication to demonstrate that it will refrain from escalating tensions with Iran.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Alongside the obvious danger of attacks on government satellite systems, attacks on commercial satellites could also risk data loss. Such loss or theft could prove perilous in the hands of hacktivists and nation-state actors alike, including obstructed visibility into Iran’s nuclear activities. Further, for both federal and commercial systems, respectively, stolen defense-related data as well as the protected health information (PHI) of patients cared for by hospitals with affected satellites could be fatal.

In addition to the well-known distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) and supply chain methods of attack used to overwhelm and infiltrate respectively, backdoor attacks present a more elusive attack that exploits vulnerabilities in aerospace systems. To explore this subject in greater depth, MIT-trained Assistant Professor at Cornell University’s Aerospace ADVERSARY Lab, Dr. Gregory Falco, LEED AP, was consulted. Dr. Falco detailed the following (text minimally revised for context):

The bus is what facilitates all communication across the space vehicle. Usually, subsystems are reporting telemetry data over the bus to the brains of the satellite for consistent coordination. When something is chatty, it could either mean that it is programmed incorrectly or it’s sending too much data back. It could be sending data back to the brain to flood the brain with errant messages or for other malicious activity.

In terms of how a chatty bus might indicate an attack attempt, such as a DDoS or even a supply chain or backdoor, against a satellite system, Dr. Falco elaborated:

These kinds of vulnerabilities are also often used in supply chain attacks due to the many legacy parts of the satellite vehicle in question. [These parts] are [sometimes] operated or managed by an old supplier who does not bother to update their codebase or has third party entities engaging with operations and over-the-air updates. A chatty bus is a common sign of a backdoor installation but given the lack of runtime monitors on the edge of the vehicle, it is difficult to decipher the cause of the chattiness [noise].

In the face of potential adversarial activity conducted to gain a competitive edge in the aerospace sphere, defenders can take a step further by investigating beyond a DDoS or supply chain attack to also considering the stealthier backdoor. Artificial intelligence (AI) can be used to help analyze noise captures in either audio or text format, ideally equipped with a translation feature. This function would be further supplemented by a Persian Farsi human interpreter and translator to clarify the audio noise and any corresponding text captured via an AI speech-to-text dictation capability.

Regarding prevention, the AI could be trained to detect potential backdoors installed by Iranian actors by searching for Farsi words or code strings during code reviews. Such reviews should be conducted as a routine practice of input sanitization, alongside remaining up to date with the latest security patches. Coupled with regular security audits and code scans, following the principle of least privilege should help prevent threat actors from penetrating a system in the first place.

A Persian-language translation specialist could then advise on any whether any of the satellite system server logs contain text that, when rendered in English, would resemble common backdoor code.

Provided the ever-present insider threat due to social engineering, phishing also remains a hotbed for attacker penetration of any network or system. As Iranian social engineering attempts against Israel and the U.S. have spiked against the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas war, aerospace organizations should remain vigilant toward emails and other forms of communication with geopolitical themes. These communications might be composed in English, Hebrew, or another language spoken in a country seen as supportive of Israel and might focus on the Israel-Hamas war or similar political themes. If a user opens and clicks on a malicious link or downloads a malicious executable within, a backdoor could be installed on the corresponding device or system. An example might be an email composed using terms such as “war” (Hebrew: מלחמה, milkhama) or even “negotiation” (Farsi: مذاکره, mezakereh), pertaining to negotiations surrounding nuclear and political themes to put forth a false sense of diplomatic intentions.

Messages can be analyzed for spoofed sender addresses by comparing the email header’s From field against its return-path. If these entries do not match, analysts should use open-source tools alongside device and network logs to investigate any other instances of the domain names and email addresses observed in the return-path, with emphasis on Farsi words or other potential ties to Iran. Phishing attempts can be further suspected when conducted parallel to other potential attacks against satellite systems, such as DDoS attacks which attackers sometimes use to distract security analysts from penetration by other means.

When watching for possible infiltration tactics, defenders should be on the lookout for a wide range of techniques, possibly occurring simultaneously and against multiple geopolitical targets. In the case of Iran during the Israel-Hamas war, threats against both government and private satellite systems pose the unique threat of obscuring not only monitoring of Iranian nuclear capabilities but also of the targets’ accessibility to and retention of their own data.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Tokyo also announced that Japanese-made fighter exports will be limited to countries that have officially signed defense partnership agreements, including Germany, India, and the United States. As such, the policy can fall under the guidelines of The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, whereby such transfers can be done only if they would benefit Japanese national security or contribute to “peace contribution and international cooperation.”

It is expected that more military hardware can be approved for export to friendly countries under the new rules on approving sales and exports. The announcement would allow Japan to improve the standing of the Japanese defense industry and put Japan in a position where it can be seen as a reliable regional partner in East Asia.

Japan’s participation in GCAP can be traced back to the Mitsubishi F-X fighter jet project, which was launched in response to a ban on allowing the export of the F-22 to allied countries, including Japan, to comply with rules under the Obey Amendment. Since Japan could not legally purchase the F-22, the option was made to initiate research for the production of a domestic fighter jet. The F-X was an attempt to replace the Mitsubishi F-2 fighter jets under service with the Japanese Air-Self Defense Forces (JASDF). Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) served as the primary contractor. The capabilities and technology tested by the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD) included advanced radar systems to counter stealth technology, receiving targeting information from other platforms such as hostile drones and fighter jets, the use of fly-by-optics to process information faster, stealth technology, gallium nitride semiconductors to improve radar performance, and a new, more powerful engine. The project ultimately produced the fighter jet known as the Mitsubishi X-2 Shinshin, which performed its maiden flight on April 22, 2016 from Nagoya Airfield to Gifu Air Field.

Fast-forward to 2017 and Japan and the UK signed an agreement to explore possibilities of jointly developing a new fighter jet; then, in December, 2022, it was announced that Italy, Japan and the UK would work together to develop the next fighter jet under GCAP. This allowed research experience from the F-X to be integrated into GCAP alongside the BAE Tempest fighter jet project. A trilateral collaboration agreement between the three countries to support long-term working arrangements and capability requirements was reached on September 12, 2023. Finally,  on December 14, 2023, a treaty was signed, which called for developing the fighter in Tokyo. The GCAP industrial hub and joint business construct would be in the UK. Japan would appoint a representative to serve as the CEO, while Italy would appoint a representative to serve as the first head of the organization.

The new rules for exporting Japanese-made fighters under GCAP are a first in allowing the export of lethal Japanese military hardware, hitherto impossible due to Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution – the ‘pacifist clause’ – and years of strict policies on exporting military hardware. It was only during Shinzo Abe’s second term as prime minister that he called for restrictions on exporting military hardware to be changed gradually in relation to a reinterpretation of Article 9. It is uncertain if Komeito will fully back restrictions on exporting military hardware from Japan or if they will gradually come to allow them under certain conditions. For now, there are no plans to export co-developed weapons aside from the future fighter, which will be in service by 2035.

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