As one of the world’s most traded commodities, soybeans are a critical feature in the global agricultural landscape. Movement in soy futures can influence the stability of different countries: shaping trade policies, impacting diplomatic relations, and determining domestic stability through the movement of key input prices. Countries like the United States, Brazil, and Argentina, which are leading soybean producers, often leverage their production capacity as a significant economic asset, affecting global supply chains and price dynamics. On the other side, major importers like China, whose massive demand for soybeans stems from its vast hog sector, view soybean imports through the geopolitical lens, ascribing the commodity critical importance for food security and agricultural policy. This geopolitical significance was evident during the US-China trade war, as soy was one of the first commodities targeted for sanctions in 2018.

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Ukraine is not exactly a stranger when it comes to the notion of neutrality. In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the country expressed an intention in its declaration of state sovereignty of 1 July 1990 to become a permanently neutral state that would shun participation in military blocs and show a commitment to denuclearization. This largely nonaligned status resulted in a vacillating foreign policy, which nonetheless appeared to be conducive to the pursuit of amicable relations with both the European Union (EU) and Russia, before being ultimately abandoned in December 2014 in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the start of the Donbas war. In February 2019, with the overwhelming approval of the Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament of Ukraine), the Ukrainian constitution was amended, setting the country on a course toward full membership in the EU and NATO. Nonetheless, in late March 2022 Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy was still prepared to discuss the possibility of Ukraine taking a neutral position as part of a potential peace deal with Russia to halt the invasion.

Yet there are quite a few practical and moral reasons as to why the train of neutrality should now be considered to have long left the station.

Neutrality, which remains a somewhat imprecise concept and was famously characterized in 1956 by former American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles as an “obsolete conception,” may be regarded as a state of mind or a normative self-conceptualization of the political elite and the citizens, rather than a status that a country is bound to by balance of power considerations. Arguably, the more nuanced understanding of neutrality is even more relevant in the case of consolidated democracies. Public support for Finland joining NATO (the country officially became a member on 4 April 2023) rose from approximately 33% of Finns in 2018 to close to 80% of Finnish citizens in 2022, which was clearly a significant factor when it came to the decision taken by the country’s political establishment to submit a membership request in May 2022.

Ukraine is certainly on a path towards becoming a full-fledged democracy, as a result of which any decision to either adopt neutrality or stick to an explicitly pro-Western geopolitical course needs to reflect the wishes of the general population, which are not set in stone and will not in any way be compatible with the narrow definition of Ukrainian neutrality that is likely to be put forth by the negotiators on the Russian side.

What Russian policymakers do not seem to fully realize is that the Russian troops’ actions in Ukraine have unleashed what could be described as a generational hostility directed not only toward the Russian elites but also toward the Russian people themselves, which has also had implications beyond the realm of politics. In Croatian historian Domagoj Krpan’s words, this internecine war may become the founding narrative when it comes to building a new Ukrainian national identity in the 21st century. Assuming some form of neutrality is essentially forced upon Ukraine, a de jure neutral Ukraine will continue to instinctively gravitate towards the West, will be unwilling to perceive itself as a bridge between the Occident and the “Russian world”, and will inevitably evaluate its foreign policy options through an anti-Russian prism, for instance when it comes to the manner of its voting on United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolutions.

Given that many neutral countries such as Switzerland maintain capable armed forces with a full readiness for engaging in combat, it would be quite unrealistic, even if ironclad security guarantees are provided to Ukraine by Western actors, for Ukraine to be expected to scale down its military forces to the extent that the country would remain virtually without a standing army. Thus, it is difficult to see how, especially with trust between Russia and the West being in even shorter supply than before, a solemn proclamation of Ukrainian neutrality coming from the Ukrainian government and the main Western countries supportive of Ukraine (unless it occurs at a time when the Ukrainian military has been reduced to a shadow of its current strength) would satisfy one of the conditions still insisted upon by Russia for ending the invasion, namely “demilitarization.”

In contrast to previous instances in which a neutral status was essentially imposed on a country in a manifestly weaker position than its adversary, the present state of the conflict does not necessitate the adoption of such an approach. For example, unlike in the case of Finnish neutrality during the Cold War, which was not negotiated by the Finns from something approaching a position of strength, but was a way to guarantee Finland’s national existence and security by avoiding invasion or occupation by Soviet forces, Ukraine has already had its territorial integrity blatantly violated by Russia while at the same time it has demonstrated that it can hold its own on the battlefield against the Russian forces and is unlikely to find itself, unless Western support completely dries up, in the desperate position of having to sue for peace. Thus, a settlement that includes the adoption of a neutral status will not be palatable to the majority of Ukrainian citizens, especially if it does not entail the return to Ukraine of all Russian-occupied territories. The latter prospect does not mesh that well with the current military realities on the ground and continues to be a non-negotiable issue from the perspective of the Putin administration.

From a moral standpoint, requiring Ukraine to declare neutrality is also likely to be perceived by the country’s citizens as a betrayal of them by the collective West, with the latter appearing to bow down to one of the main demands stated by Russia, especially given the enormous personal sacrifices that Ukrainian people have made for advancing the cause of European security. According to a Gallup opinion poll from October 2023, there is already a creeping sense of disillusionment among ordinary Ukrainians with regard to the level of assistance provided by the USA.

Western policymakers should also be cognizant of the reality that neutrality has often been a contrivance of statecraft associated with small states. An adoption of neutrality may be regarded as a failure on the part of the Western countries to properly acknowledge that Ukraine, which prior to 2022 was already considered by a number of scholars to be part of the ranks of the middle powers, is currently yielding vast amounts of soft power and has actually contributed (courtesy of its ability to define regional and global agendas) to elevating the status of other middle powers in international relations. Political realists such as John Mearsheimer have criticized the USA for desiring, by relying on sanctions and other punitive measures, to knock Russia out of the ranks of the great powers. However, Russia’s own culpability (since the late 2000s) with respect to fomenting justifiable concerns among many of its neighboring countries due to the former’s actions weakening the norm of state sovereignty cannot be ignored. On the other hand, symbolically relegating Ukraine (through no fault of its own) from the status of a middle power to that of a small state by requiring it to adopt neutrality would constitute a misreading of the changing dynamics within the international system and would also represent an implicit admission on the part of the West that Ukraine does not deserve to have the same agency as that of the great powers, including those of them that are not averse to engaging in gross violations of the principles of international law.

The importance of (perceived) agency is not to be underestimated because while Ukrainian neutrality could theoretically go hand in hand with a potential membership in the EU, it may become an additional stumbling block by making the country’s future accession, already viewed in a somewhat lukewarm fashion by Germany and France, an even less attractive proposition. For instance, since the launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in defense at the end of 2017, the EU has become more active when it comes to military matters, but some of the neutral EU member states have not been able to make full use of the new opportunities afforded for military cooperation. Ukraine has already displayed increased interoperability with many EU countries that are also members of NATO, so being forced to opt out of common military initiatives due to a formal commitment to neutrality would be rather counterproductive with regard to both Ukrainian and EU security interests.

Even the most politically astute analysts are finding it difficult to forecast how the conflict in Ukraine will eventually end. What is virtually certain is that the (re)emergence of a neutral Ukraine should be regarded as one of the least viable scenarios, and one that will not be helpful in terms of firmly placing the country in the Western camp, where it belongs.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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In recent years, significant cooperation has been established between the South Caucasus and Central Asia, including agreements on connectivity, energy, and cultural links. A major milestone was the signing of the agreement on the Trans-Caspian East-West Middle Corridor in March 2022, bringing together Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkiye, and Kazakhstan which in itself was a huge step to enhance the transit potential of the signatory states. Fast forward to 2023, with the establishment of a joint rail company between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan plus various logistical agreements, including updates to the Middle Corridor deal, the Tbilisi Silk Road Forum became a turning point. In addition, in October 2023, another agreement between Georgia and Kazakhstan on the development of the Middle Corridor was signed.

Despite these major landmarks in the South Caucasus and Central Asia cooperation in the recent years, there is still much ground to cover. The shared history of these two regions means that much more can yet be done. Speaking of history, it was back in 1991 when the South Caucasian and Central Asian independence projects turned into reality. Despite their shared history, the security and foreign policy priorities of these newly independent states did not overlap in the slightest. This made disconnected, and sometimes even antagonistic regional affiliations emerge; Armenia and most Central Asian nations chose to go for Russia-led hegemonic structures, whereas Georgia aimed for NATO and EU membership. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan eventually opted for careful balancing and non-alignment, while Turkmenistan took a radical step, proclaiming its permanent neutrality back in 1995.

These decisions were made three decades ago. The world is far from what it looked like back in the 1990s and early 2000s. For some, the consequences of those choices resonate deeply; Armenia would be a good example of how over-reliance on one security guarantor brought nothing but havoc to the country’s security. But the problem is not limited to over-reliance only. By refusing to liberate to put an end to the occupation of almost 20% of Azerbaijani territories, Armenia has been trapped in such a snare that either way (continuing or quitting the CSTO) would come at a huge cost. Armenia’s fate tomorrow could be replicated by another one. Then, the question is: what is the optimal solution?

In the age when a multi-polar order is progressively replacing the unipolar world through various regional arrangements and alliances, perhaps it is a good time for the South Caucasus and Central Asia to come under a single organizational umbrella. History provides good examples: during the Cold War, nations across Africa and Asia decided to create the Non-Aligned Movement to avoid having to make a forced choice to join either bloc. Since today’s reality is widely characterized as another cold (or even a semi-hot) war, an alternative regional security mechanism should be really high on our agenda.

Such a regional framework could, for the first time ever, unite these eight countries under one institutional umbrella, making them more resilient vis-a-vis hegemonic powers and increasing their leverage on the global scale. Speaking of symbolism, perhaps it would be better to move away from colonial labels and start to call this region by a name that reflects its historical and cultural legacy, such as the Silk Road, instead of South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Such an alignment should be attractive, especially for small states like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as it would increase their space for maneuver not only on regional but also global scale, providing greater flexibility and autonomy in their foreign policy decisions. If the Trans-Caspian ties are institutionalized, each country from both sides of the Caspian Sea can gain a lot. For instance, as it has been mentioned above, it will boost their ability to review certain commitments which may not be in these countries’ best interests, for example quitting CSTO.

For the region, an alternative to a rapprochement is being trapped in a web of mutual rivalries which would only make all the local players more fragile in front of increasingly assertive global powers. This collaboration, on the other hand, could not only shield them from outside manipulation but also empower to tackle challenges head-on. Together, they can forge a powerful collective, ensuring that each member not only stands strong but actively contributes to the success and resilience of the entire alliance.

This cooperation can start with connectivity, with Azerbaijan taking a leading role along the Silk Road. The war in Ukraine and the most recent logistical crisis in Red Sea prove over and over that the successful development of the Middle Corridor is a must for ensuring sustainability in international trade between Europe and the rest of the world. By investing more in joint connectivity projects, energy corridors, and digital connectivity, this would-be bloc can turn into a seamless web of interactions, reducing trade barriers and enhancing the overall competitiveness of these two regions. With the Silk Road region becoming more interconnected, it could gain additional relevance as a reliable partner for Europe, making it an attractive and stable hub for European trade and investment. Moreover, a well-connected Silk Road can serve as a gateway for European businesses seeking to tap into the vast markets of Asia. Enhanced connectivity will facilitate smoother logistics and trade, positioning the region as a crucial link in the Euro-Asian economic chain.

Environmental security can be another important issue to work on together. Both regions face similar environmental problems, particularly the issue of water resources. In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have their upper hand when it comes to water sources, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan rely heavily on them. This imbalance often leads to tensions, highlighting the need for a cooperative approach to water management. In the South Caucasus, Armenia and Georgia’s relative abundance of water resources compared to Azerbaijan adds another dimension to the region’s environmental dynamics. (Re)emerged Silk Road could address these challenges, ranging from initiatives such as joint infrastructure projects to regional agreements to ensure equitable and just access to water resources.

A road started with connectivity and environment does also have the potential for establishing a regional security architecture over time. This would not be the first thing in mind for many nations, but the current geopolitical dynamics exposes a greater need for such regional configurations with each passing day. Perhaps the use of the collective security concept is the only way to make the South Caucasus and Central Asia more resilient and our independence projects- long-lasting. This would-be regional bloc – and an alliance of the future – could also play a crucial global role in addressing common security challenges like transnational crime and terrorism, which both regions are amenable to.

The list of possible cooperation ventures on both sides of the Caspian Sea—from now on, the Silk Road region—is endless, ranging from environment to multilateral diplomacy, from security to connectivity. But in light of this rich space for collaboration, there lacks a single, unified regional framework that would bring the South Caucasus and Central Asia under one umbrella. The last three years taught (or should have taught) us one lesson: the more divided we are internally, the less powerful we are externally. Perhaps this could resonate in Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan no less than in Astana, Bishkek, Asghabat, Tashkent and Dushanbe.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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What We Know

Minister Quispe explained that the Bolivian Mining Corporation (Corporacion Minera de Bolivia: COMIBOL) and the Geological Mining Service (Servicio Geologico Minero: SERGEOMIN) have located REE deposits in Independencia (Cochabamba), San Luis, Cotaje, (Potosí), San Javier and Cerro del Mutún (Santa Cruz). Additional surveying in Cerro Manomo identified 850 REE samples, while Rincón del Tigre had 799 confirmed samples of REEs, both locations are in the Santa Cruz department. The Bolivian La Razon newspaper added that Bolivia has deposits of 17 types of REEs.

“We have two elements, scandium and yttrium, and other elements. We have prospected and explored Cochabamba in the Independencia province: uranium, titanium, and others were identified. Then, in San Luis in Potosí, [prospecting will seek] cobalt and copper,” Minister Quispe said. “Other projects include San Javier, in Santa Cruz, for exploring and prospecting for tantalum and niobium. Also, at Manomó Hill, for uranium and thorium deposits,” added the newspaper Ahora el Pueblo, noting that future exploration will occur in Rincón del Tigre and Mutún for manganese.

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With $10 trillion in assets, BlackRock dominates Wall Street. The world’s biggest asset manager now aims to expand its presence significantly in infrastructure investments, including airports, bridges, oil pipelines, and other sectors. The asset manager is making a significant investment in infrastructure, a financial strategy involving the investment, acquisition, and management of assets such as tunnels, highways, and oil and gas networks. This approach has gained traction in recent decades, driven in part by consistent long-term returns. Governments facing financial constraints have increasingly turned to private funding for projects like fiber broadband, data centers, green energy initiatives (aligned with BlackRock’s focus on climate-related assets), as well as enhancements to airports and roads.

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As last year closed out, Moscow predicted annual economic growth of 2.8 per cent, following contraction in 2022 when the sanctions noose was tightened considerably following the invasion of Ukraine. A surge in defense spending and high oil prices have helped to buoy the economy, and Russian private companies have apparently adapted well to the new economic realities. At the same time, the country has not seen the wholesale Western business exodus that appeared in the cards at the start of the conflict.  Many companies chose to remain,  some curtailing operations and investments. Yet, they still contribute billions to Kremlin coffers.

Nonetheless, underlying conditions are not great. High interest rates and inflation, a weak rouble, and big labor shortages do not augur well, especially when much of the country’s still substantial foreign reserves have been frozen by the West and most Russian banking system assets are sanctioned. True, the Russian economy is weaker than it was prior to the invasion but, to the frustration of Western policymakers, sanctions evasion and Moscow’s pivot East have helped to keep the country afloat.  A US study showed that by the autumn of 2022, Russian imports had rebounded from a steep fall in the  aftermath of the invasion.

Soon after the tightening of Western sanctions, as Russian forces advanced deep into Ukraine, Moscow looked to circumvent the restrictions. It built up a shadow tanker fleet to get round an oil price cap and looked to grow parallel imports – goods exported to unsanctioned countries, then re-exported to Russia without manufactures’ knowledge or consent. Moscow formalized the practice in May 2022, listing goods, ranging from auto parts to consumer goods, that could be imported in this way. The West, in particular the US, has sought to put pressure on exporting countries – notably Turkey, Kazakhstan and the UAE. Yet, it is unclear how effective this has been.  Moscow doesn’t seem too troubled. It claimed in December that parallel imports amounted to over 70 billion dollars’ worth of goods over the last two year.

Moscow had already been pivoting eastwards before the Ukraine war to boost economic growth. The invasion has expedited the geostrategic shift, with President Vladmir Putin finding willing trade and investment partners, apparently undeterred by the threat of sanctions. Trade between Russia and China rose by nearly 30 per cent to exceed $200 billion in the first 11 months of last year, with the Chinese exports to Russia surging by 50 per cent.  Half of Russia’s oil and petroleum exports went to China in 2023, with 40 per cent going to India. Overall, Russian-Indian bilateral trade doubled to over $50 billion between January and October last year.

On the military front, Russia has turned to rogue states like North Korea and Iran for direct weapon supplies, and is suspected of purchasing technology with civilian and military uses (subject to export controls)  from other friends, including Turkey and China.  According to US intelligence, Beijing has not only been providing Russia with vital economic assistance, but likely also military and dual-use technology, including navigation equipment, jamming technology and fighter-jet parts. The US think tank the Atlantic Council recently pointed out that open-source trade data suggested “a surge in imports of Chinese-manufactured goods with important military uses played a key role” in keeping Russia equipped and supplied to resist Ukraine’s recent counteroffensive.

Russia’s dependence on China to mitigate the impact of sanctions is such that a fifth of its imports by the end of 2022 are reported to have been invoiced in Chinese yuan, while Beijing has markedly increased the use of the currency to pay for Russian commodities. And while the West has sought to squeeze investment in Russia, Moscow has turned to China to fill in some of the gaps. Beijing, which has called for greater cross-border connectivity, has invested in transport infrastructure projects. It has also agreed to cooperate on a major mining project, is  considering joint development of oil and gas fields, and plans to collaborate on a  trans-shipment oil complex.

Moscow’s economic ties with Beijing seem to be getting closer and closer, so much so that there’s now a debate over whether Russia is becoming a vassal state.  But for China, India, and other smaller countries  eager to step up trade with Russia, commercial opportunity, it seems, is the main driver. “Russians are short of goods, so we’ll supply them and try not break sanctions whilst we’re at it,” they might argue.

The US and the EU will continue to penalize those that do, but this may represent just a fraction of illicit transactions. Moreover, what to do with all the legitimate trade that is undeniably helping Russia to weather the West’s sanctions regime? These questions will no doubt loom large in the minds of Western policymakers as Putin prepares to secure a fifth presidential term in March.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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In an attempt to counter this influence, the US is injecting millions into the Lobito Corridor project. Indeed, sourcing the metals to fuel the energy transition remains a headache for Western countries. The commodity trade consortium Trafigura asserts that the Lobito Atlantic Railway will “provide a quicker western route to market for metal and minerals produced in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” The project entails the construction of approximately 550 km of rail line in Zambia, from the Jimbe border to Chingola in the Zambian copper belt, along with 260 km of feeder roads within the corridor. Moving those valuable resources from the Central African copper belt to Western markets is key for the US and Europe, particularly as the energy transition unfolds.

Earlier this year, President Joe Biden’s administration unveiled plans to invest in a new railway project that will link the copper-rich regions of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the Angolan port of Lobito. With the 120-year-old Benguela railway, the US plans for the resources to go west (through the Lobito Corridor) rather than the traditional eastern route via the Dar El Salaam port. The railway hopes to connect to the port in Lobito, ensuring smooth traffic flow and establishing a significant trade route from the Congolese copper belt to the Atlantic Ocean. Additionally, the improved railway line will facilitate the transportation of essential goods and resources into the region, fostering business development and commercial activities. In September, on the margins of the G20 in India, the US and the EU teamed up to launch feasibility studies for a new greenfield rail line expansion between Zambia and Angola.

The significance of this railway project cannot be overstated, nor can its timeliness. Chinese FDI in Africa remains much higher than Western nations, particularly as Beijing demonstrated both intent and financial capability to loan vast amounts of cash to African countries since 2013. Yet that competitive edge has shrunk in recent years. An economic slowdown post-pandemic and weakening lending capabilities have caused BRI-related investment to fall from a peak at $125 billion in 2015 to $70 billion in 2022 according to Fudan University. And due to increasing concerns about the risk of debt distress in various African nations and internal economic challenges in Beijing, the Chinese government has decided to halt funding for energy projects in Africa. This has led to a significant decline in lending to the continent, bringing it to below US$1 billion, the lowest in approximately two decades.

Aligned with Washington’s soft-power strategy in Africa, the project also reflects a broader geopolitical intent to strengthen ties with African nations. By investing in infrastructure projects, the US aims to foster economic development, create job opportunities, and build lasting partnerships that can serve both African nations and US interests, as highlighted by the visit of US VP Kamala Harris to no less than three African countries (Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia) in 2023.

While the US initiative is a step in the right direction, it faces numerous challenges. China’s head start in Africa, both in terms of established infrastructure and diplomatic relationships, poses a significant hurdle. The Belt and Road Initiative has already ingrained China as a reliable partner for African nations in need of infrastructure development, and the US must work diligently to build similar trust. Moreover, geopolitical complexities, historical ties, and regional dynamics must be carefully navigated by the United States. African nations, mindful of their sovereignty and national interests, are likely to pursue a balanced approach in engaging with both China and the US. For African leaders, the question is less regarding what the US or China can get out of those deals, but more about what Africa can get out of its resources.

As the US embarks on its ambitious railway project in Africa to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the stakes are high. While the challenges are formidable, the investment signals a renewed American commitment to actively engage with Africa, recognizing its growing importance in the global geopolitical landscape. Whether the US can catch up with China’s well-established presence remains uncertain, but the competition for influence in Africa will undoubtedly shape the future trajectory of international relations. The success of the US endeavor hinges on its ability to navigate the complexities of the African continent, build trust with local partners, and deliver tangible benefits that align with the aspirations of African nations

Global and regional organizations are also chipping in the project, as the push to secure the minerals key to the green transition grows. In October, the African Development Bank (AfDB) joined global partners to raise financing for the $16 billion Multinational Lobito Transportation Corridor Programme. The AfDB’s involvement underscores the importance of collaboration in securing funding for large-scale infrastructure projects that can drive economic development and regional integration in Africa. The World Bank also got involved through a $300 million “Accelerating Economic Diversification and Job Creation Project” which will directly link to the Lobito Corridor. Notably, the organization hadn’t financed an infrastructure project in Africa since 2002.

In conclusion, Beijing has more than a head start on Western powers and regional financial institutions regarding investment in African infrastructure. Residents of Lagos, Kinshasa or Addis Ababa now transit daily via infrastructure that was most likely built by Chinese construction firms, through Chinese loans. Now, economic headwinds and financial woes in Beijing are creating new opportunities for the US, Europe, and G7 countries to narrow the gap. Nevertheless – and despite US efforts to counter Chinese overseas development funding – it is unlikely that a slowdown in project funding will mean that the West will take the lead in infrastructure projects, particularly given African nations’ intent to create and retain value within the continent.

*This article was originally published on November 13, 2023.

The post The Lobito Corridor: Washington’s Answer to Belt and Road in Africa appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Recently, several of my Khmer friends have reminded me of a well-known saying: “Where there is water, there are fish. Where there is land, there are Chinese.” This historical connection between Cambodia and China has gained renewed significance, especially in light of the upcoming project to develop a waterway along the remnants of an ancient water passage.

This initiative is poised to improve water transportation and logistics in Cambodia, leading to a reduction in transportation costs and helping to bridge connections with the international community, bypassing the need to go through Vietnam. However, many voices across the border in Vietnam’s lower delta are already expressing concerns that this waterway may impact the flow of water downstream into the already environmentally challenged Mekong Delta.

The ambitious canal plan will take four years to construct, traversing 160 kilometers at a width of 80-100 meters. It starts from the Mekong River, connecting the Bassac River, and spilling out into the Gulf Of Thailand.

In 2021 China’s state-owned company, China Communication Construction conducted its own feasibility study; and as a result, Mekong experts are expressing concerns. “This artificial canal project could be the final nail in the (Mekong Delta) coffin,” claims Brian Eyler, Southeast Asia Program Director at the Stimson Center.

Across generations, indigenous farmers in the Mekong Delta have depended entirely on the river’s abundant fish resources and rice crops for their livelihoods. The lifeblood of their existence is intricately tied to the river’s constant flow. However, more water experts caution that the elaborate network of the Mekong river system—encompassing its captivating tributaries and canals—is facing a serious threat. The natural rhythm of the water is being disrupted due to the adverse impacts of water flow issues stemming from upstream hydropower dams in China.

Eyler, along with hydrologists, worry that the canal project could cause even more harm to the downstream communities, particularly the Vietnamese farmers on the lower delta who are already dealing with serious challenges related to climate change. The issues is that the canal will require over 80 million cubic meters of water for trade, which will deplete the levels of the Mekong and Bassac rivers.

On April 27, 2020, in an online symposium hosted by the Mekong Environment Forum, a domestic non-government organization (NGO), located in Can Tho, Vietnam, researcher Philip Minderhoud and Sepher Eslami Arab of Utrecht University, who are part of the Rise and and Fall Project, shared the results of their six-year investigation. Their research on the Mekong Delta verified that less than five percent of saltwater incursion is caused by climate change. Rather, the growth of hydropower is primarily to blame. The two researchers claim that the upstream dams are to blame for the over 90 percent reduction in the Delta’s supply of river sediment.

Their research, along with others’, illustrates the impact of alterations in upstream hydro-infrastructure on various aspects such as fish production, biodiversity, bed and bank stability, sediment and nutrient transport, and the biology of basin flow regimes. The depletion of sediment flow to riverbeds and banks is occurring more rapidly than climatic changes.

Current evidence indicates that upstream dams are inflicting irreparable damage on the delta, disrupting fragile ecosystems and jeopardizing the livelihoods of farmers who cultivate along the river. Since 2010, the Mekong Delta has experienced recurring and record-breaking droughts every four years.

Notably, Vietnam and Cambodia have a long history together along the Mekong River, and the growing problem of water shortage in the area now defines much of the their relationship. This challenge is exacerbated by factors such as population growth, urbanization, industrialization, energy demand, and the impacts of climate change. As the economic and strategic value of water rises, so does the competition for access to the increasingly scarce resource.

The Mekong River Commission (MRC), an intergovernmental organization, has been established by four out of five of the six countries that share the Mekong River, namely, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam.

Its mission is to oversee the sustainable and equitable management of this transboundary water resource. According to Cheang Vannarith, Executive Director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), “National sovereignty remains a challenge for this intergovernmental organization to agree on any binding policy or principle to guide the management of the river.”

The Xayaburi dam and other Chinese massive dams that have been built on the upper reaches of the Mekong, have had a direct impact on food security in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, where 18 million people live. Vietnam is the world’s second largest rice exporter and the Mekong Delta –already one of the areas most vulnerable to sea-level rise produces half of its rice crop.

So any new upstream project, whether it’s another dam or canal that drains water from the Mekong River, requires independent studies. It’s already acknowledged by many hydrologists that the Mekong River Commission has repeatedly failed in its mission to halt the downstream damage inflicted on the alluvium, agricultural, and fishery products. The sediment that has flowed from the Yunnan province in China to Vietnam for thousands of years has been severely depleted due to the number of hydropower dams built on the Chinese stretch of the river, as well as large-scale sand mining from the riverbed.

Despite Prime Minister Hun Manet’s recent efforts to alleviate Vietnam’s concerns during his visit to Hanoi, assuring that the canal will not harm the shared Mekong River crucial for food security in the Mekong region, Vietnam’s skepticism persists about Chinese funded Belt and Road Initiative flagship projects.

This planned transboundary water project offers an opportunity for Cambodia and Vietnam to involve their scientists and engineers in a thorough examination of the proposed canal plan. Temporarily setting aside China’s “run of the river” approach could pave the way for embracing the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of the International Watercourses. Both countries stand to gain significant advantages in safeguarding Cambodia’s Tonle Sap and Vietnam’s Mekong Delta through collaborative efforts.

The proposed construction of this waterway involves tracing the path of an ancient water passage, serving not only as a means of connectivity but also as a symbolic bridge between two neighboring countries that share the river of life.

James Borton is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at Johns Hopkins/SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and the author of Dispatches from the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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On 18 December, the electoral commission officially announced the triumph of the Serbian Progressive Party in the recent parliamentary elections, securing 46.71% of the vote (1,721,572), whereas the opposition pro-European coalition “Serbia Against Violence” garnered 23.58%. Out of 6,500,666 registered voters, 58.84% participated in the elections, with approximately 2.7% of the ballots deemed invalid.

The performance of the “Serbia Against Violence” (Srbija Protiv Nasilja) party has demonstrated that there is space for opposition to the current regime. However, the state apparatus has actively taken measures to diminish their capacity to influence the public. The key question lies in the future development of this party, which, if approached with wisdom, could evolve into a formidable force posing a genuine threat to Vučić in the coming years. Achieving this would require securing more media visibility and engaging in conflicts with Vučić, particularly on the issue of Kosovo, while presenting alternative solutions that the public would be willing to accept. This scenario is highly questionable.

President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia has requested extraordinary elections as part of a strategic move to demonstrate his authority and reinforce the absolute dominance of the Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska Napredna Stranka – SNS) over the country. Especially through personalizing the campaign for the SNS to secure votes.

In the week before the elections, as an analyst and commentator on politics and foreign affairs in Europe and the Western Balkans, I appeared as a guest on N1 Croatia’s Newsroom. During that discussion, I predicted that President Vučić ‘s party would secure victory through non-ethical elections. The Serbian Progressive Party’s governance can be somewhat compared to Lukashenko’s corrupted rule in Belarus. Concerns are around issues such as media freedom, political corruption, treatment of minorities, and diplomatic relations with Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Albania, and Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Since the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the Republic of Serbia, a trend has emerged where politicians and leaders associated with the previous regime of the war criminal President Slobodan Milosevic dominate the Serbian government, judiciary, military, and public services, including crucial institutions. This infiltration of politics and the ruling party into the state constitutes a “deep state,” capable of influencing and controlling the electoral process.

According to the opposition and its leader, Miroslav Aleksić, the recent elections in Serbia were manipulated, with numerous rule violations reported. Miroslav Aleksić, the opposition leader, claimed that individuals residing outside Belgrade were transported in buses, vans, and cars to vote as if they were local citizens. He further alleged that 40,000 identity documents were issued for individuals not residing in the Serbian capital. Expressing strong disapproval, Aleksić stated, “we will employ all available democratic means to address the vote rigging in Belgrade and Serbia. What happened today is not something we can acknowledge as the result of a democratic and fair election.”

In this context, it is intriguing to observe certain regional leaders standing alongside President Vučić and Prime Minister Brnabic. Noteworthy figures include Milorad Dodik, the President of Republika Srpska, Nenad Nesic, the Minister of Security of Bosnia & Herzegovina, whose ministry effectively functions as the state intelligence agency, and Andrija Mandic, the President of the Parliament of Montenegro. The presence of President Dodik and Minister Nesic may also be associated with allegations that they are assisting President Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) by mobilizing people from Republika Srpska to participate in voting in Serbia.

Minorities, including Croats in Serbia, experienced limited representation in Sunday’s elections, with no representatives successfully elected to the Serbian Parliament. It also highlights the need for Serbia to enhance efforts toward safeguarding minority rights and protection. For example, Croatia by law guarantee representation of minorities in the Parliament of which 3 seats are reserved for Serbs minority representatives in Croatia. Serbia should in same way protect minorities and guarantee their representation in the Parliament and government. Croatia should address this concern within the EU framework, particularly in the context of Serbia’s negotiations process for the EU integrations.

The complicated relations between Croats and Serbs in Bosnia & Herzegovina contribute to this issue, acting as a platform for conflicts between the two countries. Factors such as destabilization efforts by President Milorad Dodik in Republika Srpska, challenges with the Electoral Law, non-compliance with the Constitution, and disregarding decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina are among the significant issues in this highly divided country.

The largest employer in Serbia is undeniably the state itself, under the control of President Vučić’s associates, strategically utilized to shape the narrative of state politics, foreign policy, and the economy. In such a system, achieving a genuinely free market or facilitating foreign investments becomes exceedingly challenging, given the bureaucratic hurdles and the dominance of businessmen affiliated with the ruling party. The primary objective behind this structure is evidently to exert control over the day-to-day affairs in Serbia and financial resources. These funds were instrumental in influencing the elections on Sunday, December 17, with advertisements, media presence, and various means of “buying votes” deemed crucial for President Vučić and his party to consolidate their ultimate authority over Serbia.

The upcoming year holds great significance in global affairs and geopolitics, prompting President Vučić to proactively initiate extraordinary elections in Serbia. The move is aimed at positioning himself and Serbia strategically ahead of major elections in Europe, Russia, and the United States. Vladimir Putin continues to regard Vučić as a significant ally within the Russian sphere.

Despite the relatively muted response from the United States regarding the illegal invasion of Kosovo and the near outbreak of war in the Western Balkans this year, there is an acknowledgment that Vučić is willing to withdraw when instructed. The US also expects increased involvement from the EU in addressing these matters. While the EU remains Serbia’s primary trade partner and financier, there is an unspoken understanding on both sides that Serbia’s European path is effectively delaying tactics for the predictable future.

President Vučić, while affirming Serbia’s dedication to the European path in the current period, notably underscores the phrase “for now.” This emphasis is crucial to understanding his approach of upholding relations with the EU for economic advantages while concurrently fostering ties with Russia. Vučić ‘s strategy involves navigating both sides to attain benefits from two prosperous sources, with the aim of securing financial gains for his friends and colleagues. Another aspect of this diplomatic balancing act is his anticipation of the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine and the future direction of the EU. Vučić intends to position himself favorably based on the more prosperous outcomes in these geopolitical developments.

China expresses satisfaction with its relationship with Serbia, particularly highlighted by the strengthened friendship between President Xi and President Vučić through the recently established Free Trade Agreement of two months ago. The agreement further solidifies Serbia’s position as a significant European outpost within China’s geopolitical initiative, the Belt and Road project. The mutual interests on both sides are expected to yield benefits for individuals associated with President Vučić and Chinese businesses, positioning Serbia as a gateway to the EU.

Considering the inherent corruption in Serbia, there is anticipation of a transitional import/export arrangement for Chinese goods, clearing the way for the Western Balkans market and potentially even the EU. Additionally, this presents an opportunity for China to extend its geopolitical influence and interests into the Western Balkans, like its expansion in Africa. Croatia is expected to play a crucial role in defending the EU’s external borders and the Schengen Zone within this context.

A significant portion of the Serbian population appears to be swayed by nationalist rhetoric, directing attention towards issues that do not fully focus on the challenges facing the country’s development. President Vučić and his party keeps warning the nation that they have enemies and that they are victims of foreign powers. In such a way they are creating an atmosphere where people think that the authorities are the only ones to protect them and Serbia’s national interests. Consequently, there is less enthusiasm for EU integration and engaging in negotiations, especially considering the rivalry and stronger economic position of Croatia, a target of the ‘Greater Serbia’ aspirations. This way nationalist rhetoric is influencing the public and using relations with Croatia to create “savior” and “protector” role of President Vučić, which generates favorable opinions in most of the elder and rural Serbian population.

The opposition and students in Serbia organized a protest yesterday outside the headquarters of the Republic’s Electoral Commission. During the demonstration, they presented evidence of electoral rule violations and called for the annulment of the election results. The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed concerns about the breach of electoral rules and the use of unethical methods to secure votes. This adds to the growing doubts regarding the fairness of the elections and supports my earlier predictions about the electoral process in Serbia. Russia supports the victory of President Vučić’s party and the US is taking a diplomatic position, stating that it looks forward to cooperation with the new government. The EU observer mission member for the elections in Serbia and MEP Andreas Schieder of Austria has criticized elections and stated that there is no place for stealing of votes and corruption in democratic world.

The political stance of “Serbia above everybody” is unlikely to pave the way for a positive future for the nation. While democracy in Serbia faces threats, the current focus of European leaders, the United States, and the United Kingdom lies on urgent internal and foreign policy matters. On the other side, Aleksandar Vučić, as the leader, may be seen as acceptable because he is already familiar to both Western and Eastern powers, allowing for a level of control through various deals, agreements, threats, and corruption. Therefore, after Sunday’s elections in Serbia we have Milosevic after Milosevic with predictable next political moves.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Recent dialogue between India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and his Iranian counterpart, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiyani, has refocused attention on this corridor. This backgrounder will consider the distinct roles and interests of the corridor’s four primary participants: India, Iran, Russia, and Azerbaijan. Special attention will be given to India’s current presidency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the intent to further develop the INSTC in line with the economic and geopolitical interests of these four nations.

Background of the INSTC

The INSTC was established in 2000 and ratified by India, Iran, and Russia in 2002. Its primary purpose was to provide an efficient trade route connecting the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf with the Caspian Sea, extending further to Northern Europe. The corridor offers an attractive alternative to the traditional Suez Canal route, with the potential to reduce transit times by 40% and freight costs by 30%.

Understanding the strategic importance of the project, India views the INSTC as pivotal to the strengthening of ties with Central Asia, a region rich in hydrocarbons and of key geopolitical significance. That move was followed up by India’s ascension to full membership in the SCO. However, the project’s implementation was delayed due to sanctions imposed on Iran.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed by Iran and several world powers, including the US, in July 2015, momentarily alleviated these difficulties by lifting some sanctions and boosting prospects of the INSTC. However, the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, followed by the imposition of stricter sanctions on Iran, introduced new challenges, causing significant delays in infrastructure projects related to the INSTC.

The post Backgrounder: International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.