One of the biggest uncertainties ahead is whether Erdogan, who is prohibited from running for a fourth term as a prime minister by internal party rules, will run for president instead. An AKP convention last week voted to support him as their preferred candidate, yet the president in Turkey lacks significant executive powers and Erdogan has been lukewarm to this option in his official statements (he could instead try to change the AKP regulations and run for a prime minister anyway). Besides, the current president Abdullah Gul is also a leading AKP figure who has ruled out a potential “Putin-Medvedev”-style swap, and the possibility that the two might run against each other is unnerving to many AKP members and voters.

Even if Erdogan were to find an elegant solution to this dilemma, the task of leading his party to victory in the presidential elections would likely prove a difficult one. Though the opposition is divided on most other issues, many of the 55 percent of citizens who voted for other parties in the local elections are united against him and could be expected to vote against the AKP candidate in a widely expected run-off in the presidential vote. His main strategy has been to attract Kurdish voters with his professed desire to end the decades-long conflict in southeastern Turkey—yet the peace process, too, has stagnated and it is uncertain how many Kurds would actually vote for the AKP.

While Erdogan’s supporters have consolidated behind him, his enemies are multiplying as his crackdown on dissent intensifies. In response to a major graft probe against his allies launched in December 2013, his government unleashed purges on the police and the judiciary and blocked access to the social media sites Twitter and YouTube, where leaks were published anonymously. After the constitutional court overturned the Twitter ban, Erdogan became the first prime minister in Turkey’s history to sue the state for damages. The constitutional court recently overturned a law designed to tighten the government’s control over the independent judiciary, and several other bills that recently passed parliament, including one to expand the prerogatives of Turkey’s main intelligence agency, are threatened by a similar fate. At the same time, protests and confrontations with the police continue in the streets of Istanbul and other major cities and critics worry that violent confrontations between government supporters and opponents could escalate.

To make matters worse, the Turkish economy, widely viewed as one of the “Fragile Five” in the world, is facing significant challenges. While unemployment has fallen slightly over the last year, so too has the value of the Turkish currency—and foreign investors have been spooked by the growing instability in the country. Recent data published by the daily Hurriyet shows that capital inflow has shrunk significantly in the period from December 2013 to March 2014, with only $3.1 billion coming in through official channels to balance a deficit of $16.5 billion. Credit agencies such as Moody’s have lowered Turkey’s outlook, and analysts speculate that Erdogan may choose to pull general elections forward, currently scheduled for next year, if the threat to Turkish economic stability continues to grow.

Turkey also faces a crisis with its neighbors as well as with its main allies abroad. Erdogan’s attempts to stifle domestic dissent and to blame various Western-sponsored “lobbies” for his problems have run afoul of the European Union and the United States, while his failed attempts to bring down the Syrian regime and to prop up the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood have isolated him in the Middle East. His government’s trademark policy of “zero problems with neighbors” from a few years ago has mostly run aground.

While Erdogan remains Turkey’s most popular and successful politician since the secular republic’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, his government faces unprecedented challenges in 2014. How he will handle these challenges will determine his political future as well as that of his country—and will influence that of the entire region.

The post Turkey’s Erdogan: Not out of the Woods Yet appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

This year’s election will be a litmus test for Afghanistan’s decade-long effort to move beyond warlord politics and establish the conditions for a peaceful transition of power

Candidates

Though Afghanistan has seen large numbers register as candidates, the election has crystalized into a three-way race between the following:

Abdullah Abdullah (National Coalition of Afghanistan)

Abdullah Abdullah heads the National Coalition of Afghanistan (Etelaf-e Milli), a loose coalition of politicians opposed to Karzai. Abdullah was the runner-up in 2009 elections, having lost to Hamid Karzai in the runoff poll. Half Tajik and half Pashtun, Abdullah has had a difficult time appealing to Pashtun voters. However, he has cultivated a fair amount of support by virtue of having lived the majority of his life in Afghanistan, rather than abroad as many of his opponents have. This has helped give him the image of being able to better understand the issues that are important to average Afghans. He is also the secretary general of the Massoud Foundation, a health care and education NGO.

Abdullah favors a deal with Washington to keep American troops in the country beyond the 2014 pullout date, as well as establishing warmer relations with regional powers like China, Pakistan, and Russia. Though previously opposed to peace talks with the Taliban, Abdullah now supports more negotiations. He is one of the election’s front-runners.

Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (Independent)

Since losing to Karzai by a wide margin in the 2009 elections, the technocratic Ghani has made a strong comeback. Ghani has the support of Afghanistan’s educated elites. He is Pashtun, who are typically dominant in Afghanistan’s south, but he has built a significant base of support in the country’s east as well. In 2011, he was appointed co-ordinator of the security handover from NATO to the Afghan military, allowing Ghani to travel across the country and meet with local military and political leaders, building up cross-country networks. Having lived in the United States, together with his credentials as a prominent intellectual (ex-finance minister, worked at the World Bank, university chancellor, and a one-time UN secretary general nominee), Ghani has a fair amount of support in the West, who see him as the most reform-minded candidate in this election.

Ghani is running with Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek warlord who fought against the Taliban during the civil war of the 1990s. Dostum brings with him a large block of ethnic Uzbek and Turkmen votes in Afghanistan’s north, who view him as a guarantor against the Taliban. Pairing with a figure as controversial as Rostum, however, has cost him support among young pro-reform voters.

Zalmay Rassoul

Former minister of foreign affairs in Hamid Karzai’s government, Zalmay Rassoul is a doctor by profession.  Like Ghani, Rassoul is Pashtun, and is also considered to be a pragmatic technocrat. Rassoul has the tacit support of outgoing president Karzai, who encouraged his brother Qayum Karzai to drop out of the race and throw his weight behind Rassoul. Karzai has remained officially neutral, but should this change, he could mobilize significant levels of support for Rassoul’s bid. He is viewed with suspicion, however, given his poor command of the Pashto language and for being unmarried.

Three Key Issues to Watch

Security and the Washington connection

Security is unsurprisingly the biggest issue affecting both the election and Afghanistan’s future.  An attack on the offices of the Independent Election Commission on Saturday March 29 served as a very overt reminder of the country’s tenuous security outlook. Afghanistan’s police and armed forces will be hard-pressed not to repeat the mistakes of the 2009 presidential election, and ensure that violence on election day is stopped or at least suppressed.

This is no easy task in light of the Taliban’s blunt message to use “all force at its disposal” to disrupt the elections. Militants have attacked campaigners, foreigners, police stations, and in a particularly daring example, attacked the IEC’s headquarters. The ramped-up attacks have led to the large-scale departure of foreigners, which threatens to hamper independent monitoring on election day.

ISAF soldiers are set to pull out at the end of 2014, leaving the country’s security objectives squarely in the hands of the Afghan National Army. Afghanistan’s next president will also have to contend with stalled talks with Washington concerning any future US troop presence in the country.

Electoral fraud

Ballot disruption has been a serious issue in past elections. With a literate population of only 28%, the basic logistics of Afghanistan’s election are immense, taking weeks to count and tabulate the country’s votes (experts expect the winner to take office by August at the earliest). The 2009 elections were marred by voter fraud, including the registration of phantom voters, closing of certain polling stations, and outright bribery. It is quite likely that this will happen again, adding another layer of complication to the IEC’s job. Curbing fraud requires multi-pronged solutions from both the IEC and from the candidates themselves. Vulnerable polling stations should be identified and assigned increased security, while candidates should work to rein in their supporters.

Ethnic and tribal divisions

A hallmark of Afghanistan has long been the division and animosity between the country’s various ethnic and tribal groups. The presidential candidates are only too aware of the need to bridge these divides. The current field of candidates is hardly neatly-divided – both Ghani and Rassoul are competing for Pashtun votes, and Ghani’s running-mate Dostum has allowed him to make inroads in Abdullah’s northern heartland.

Allegations of ethnic imbalance in the 2009 elections proved to be a major issue. The Pashtun-dominated regions in the south, making up nearly 40% of Afghanistan’s population, were considered too dangerous for polling stations to be set up. This kept voter turnout low in these areas, leading to a widespread sense of disenfranchisement among Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group. The 2010 parliamentary elections saw the same scenario play out in Ghazni province. Though its population is mixed Pashtun and Hazara, all 11 members of parliament elected were Hazara, leading to months of instability. If a similar situation unfolds this year, many fear that it could drive many Pashtuns into the arms of the Taliban and fuel the insurgency.

Economic Impact

It is without question that the winner of Afghanistan’s election faces a multitude of problems. Afghanistan’s GDP has grown consistently since 2002, but the country is still plagued by grinding poverty and widespread corruption. Opium production in Afghanistan is currently at record levels, presenting a double-edged sword: cultivation is a large source of income for the Taliban and corrupt officials, but it is also a key crop for many of the country’s poorest farmers. The election’s winner will have to walk a fine line in dealing with this issue.

The discussion of Afghanistan’s economic future is intimately tied to its security. The country holds vast mineral reserves – some 1400 fields – containing more than $3 trillion worth of deposits. The economic potential of these sites has gone untapped because of the ongoing insurgency. Should a lasting peace agreement be struck with the Taliban, Afghanistan could harness these commodities and begin a new era of international investment and economic development.

The post Election Report: Afghanistan appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Given the current state of the political opposition in Hungary, few would doubt Fidesz’s ability to legitimately win a “free and fair” election. There are those, however, who doubt that this year’s election will be anything but fair. It has become increasingly clear, over the last four years, that Fidesz has pursued a myriad of ways in which to secure its next electoral victory. Everything under the election umbrella, from the newly devised electorate system, institutions, and laws, favours Fidesz. The opposition is now forced to contend with a number of new rules and regulations that have made campaigning increasingly difficult. Orban and his ilk have managed to monopolize the media, particularly offline sources, and have found innovative ways to circumvent laws that they themselves have introduced as means to limit the opposition’s national reach.

The neutered state of political opposition in Hungary, which at times borders on ineptitude, has undoubtedly not helped matters. Despite a great deal of in-fighting, a tacit understanding among much of Hungary’s political opposition emerged that left the country’s centre-left opposition with no other recourse but to band together and establish a united front against a better funded and highly organized Fidesz political machine. Agreeing to a common platform has been nothing short of an arduous journey for the opposition, and one that has made for strange bedfellows. The time needed to form consensus among divergent parties, however, allowed Fidesz the opportunity to further organize and spread its message.

Among the most dubious pre-election tactics employed by Fidesz has been its approach to political advertising.  Political advertising has been considerably restricted by the Fidesz party, with state-owned stations restricted to eight hours of political advertising over the course of 50 days of official campaigning. This has been coupled with commercial television stations being barred from charging money for political advertising. Outdoor advertising, particularly in Budapest, has also been severely curtailed. Interestingly enough, however, outdoor advertising restrictions do not apply to so-called independent groups. Such has been the case with the pro-Orban Civil Union Forum, which receives a great deal of its funding from a Fidesz foundation.  As a result, the circumvention of political advertising rules through soft money has given Fidesz a decisive advantage, leaving the opposition ill-equipped to catch up. No political rival is capable of competing with the combination of what are possibly illegally-acquired funds and the sheer total spending power of Fidesz.

In short, these measures on political advertising have enabled the Fidesz party to tilt the playing field in its favour.  Former Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai, who has been targeted in Fidesz ads, says of Fidesz’s approach:  “It’s in their interest to limit political advertising — the public media is under their control. Half of the billboard posts around the country are owned by their oligarchs, and the rest is being flooded by state-owned company advertising, so there is no room for us.”

Most telling, however, is a new election framework that makes it virtually inevitable that Fidesz will retain its two-thirds parliamentary majority, even if it receives less than half the overall vote. Analysts have predicted that the united opposition coalition would need about 6% more votes than Fidesz to win a simple majority. Fidesz could get away winning another majority with only 48% of the vote. If Fidesz were to repeat its previous electoral result of 53%, it would win 76% of the seats in parliament, as opposed to the 68% it won in the last election.

Ultimately, Fidesz has designed an electoral system that minimizes the possibility of defeat. A system where the opposition needs to win by a substantial margin can hardly be deemed fair. The Fidesz position has been further bolstered by its ability to isolate the opposition from the media. Although the election result has been all but a foregone conclusion for some time now, it is disconcerting to know that the party has already established the necessary preconditions to steal future elections.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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When asked whether the respondents still believe that the PKS is a “clean party,” about 66% said “not sure.” Only 15.7% of respondents believe that the PKS is still a “clean party,” the rest (18.3%) did not know. When asked which party cadres are most involved in corruption cases, as many as 67.3% of respondents mentioned the Democratic Party. PKS came in as a distant second at 5.8%, taking over from Golkar Party in third (5.2%). When asked which party they would support if elections were held today, only 6.9% of respondents would vote for the Democratic Party, and 2.6% for PKS – much lower than their result in 2009, which was 8%.

In terms of electability, the Golkar Party remained in the top position with 18.9%. When referring to the results of a survey of various other research institutions, Golkar’s chances to win the 2014 election seem pretty open. The Golkar Party is still being trailed by PDI-P with a rate of 16.8% electability. Gerindra, which in the 2009 elections ended in eighth place, has now reached the level of 10.3% for third.

The high electability of the Golkar Party is apparently inversely proportional to chairperson Aurizal Bakrie (ARB), who is in fifth position as presidential candidate with 8.7%. This is far behind Joko Widodo (Jokowi), who ranks as the first public option among the most potential candidates (15.1 %).

Jokowi is a new symbol of hope for the people. He is simple, honest and populist. Jokowi is showing togetherness between the leaders and the led, evident in his frequent visits to slums in Jakarta. As was the case in the United States when people were disappointed with the war on terrorism of President Bush and elected Barrack Obama, it is possible that if Jokowi steps forward as a 2014 presidential candidate, the Indonesian people will choose him owing to their disappointment over the war on corruption under President Yudhoyono during his second term in office.

Prabowo Subianto versus Jokowi

Jokowi’s electability levels surpass his competitors. The nearest challenger is Prabowo Subianto (13.9%), if the 2014 presidential election took place in two rounds where Jokowi went head-to-head with Prabowo. However, Prabowo Subianto and the Gerindra Party will need extra efforts to garner support from other parties in order to form a coalition. In preparation, he is meeting with various factions in order to garner support, such as with Hatta Rajasa, chairman of the PAN, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the chairman of the Democratic Party (PD). He is also diligent in communicating with a number of leaders of other parties, including the PDI-P. As a presidential candidate, Prabowo fits the bill on a number of levels. He was Megawati’s running mate in her unsuccessful 2009 campaign, and he will have learned much from that. His reputation feeds off a belief that Indonesia needs a return to assertive leadership, while his association with the former first family strikes a chord among a cross section of Indonesians who feel let down by democracy and who harbor a genuine nostalgia for the Suharto era.

Currently, the contending candidates are not incumbents or a candidate supported by the ruling party. The two biggest names, Jokowi and Prabowo, come from the opposition party. There is excitement to correct public policy and seek a different atmosphere from the color of the current ruler. These two figures represent the antithesis of SBY. Jokowi is a rustic figure, common people, not handsome, simple, informal, and so on. This contrasts with SBY; handsome, elegant, charming, and formalistic. While Prabowo represents nationalistic thinking, assertive, and pro-people – at least in his speeches. This is in contrast with the image of SBY who over considers the interests of the world and foreign investors, closer to the elite, and too cautious in his decision making.

The 2014 presidential election is not as simple as one might imagine, especially over the spread of electability numbers of various polls. The numbers are not fully pro-Jokowi. And there is still a possibility for surprises. First, if the courts annul the candidacy requirement of 20 percent and switch to three percent. Secondly, if there is a mistake made by Governor Jokowi or his supporters (the latter’s fanatical attitude as shown in the world of social media and the birth of the pro-Jokowi movement is a potential weak point unto itself). Third, if a new figure exists that could encapsulate all the expectations of the voters. Prabowo Subianto, who has a handicap in the past, was accepted because he carries this message. This expectation is also reflected in the high popularity of Dahlan Iskan and Jusuf Kalla. Still, the popularity of the president also shows that the public wants harmony, order, and decency.

Based on this survey’s findings, people crave the emergence of an alternative leadership figure. The people like leaders who have a love of integrity, and who are honest, clean,  populist, and have a strong commitment to the reform agenda, particularly in the eradication of corruption. The people would consider a candidate who has a proven ability to solve national problems, especially economic ones.

According to results from various surveys, Prabowo Subianto, electability-wise, is by far the strongest competitor for Jokowi. According to media monitoring, including social media, it is obvious that Prabowo – as well as Jokowi – is the leader figure that people are talking about. Prabowo’s popularity is able to counterbalance that of Jokowi’s. The public perceive Prabowo as a firm and bold figure. Not only that, he is also considered have the capability to solve Indonesia’s chronic problems, which are corruption, poverty, and security. Prabowo is being assessed as a candidate with the clearest and definite vision and mission compared to others, especially the one that related to his “Ekonomi Kerakyatan” program, like the one of 1 billion fund policy for every village in Indonesia.

Prabowo is clearly supported by Gerindra party as their 2014 presidential candidate, whereas Jokowi, who still leads all other 2014 presidential candidates’ in electability, is still waiting to be nominated as his party’s, PDI Perjuangan, presidential candidate. Meanwhile, the main problem for Prabowo centers on whether Gerindra will be able to break through the 20 percent parliamentary threshold required to avoid being forced into a coalition with other parties and be able to nominate their own candidate(s). Moreover, nominating Prabowo Subianto as their presidential candidate is a must for them. If Gerindra can achieve 20 percent of legislative slots, then the next strategy, which will be crucial, for Prabowo is his eye in choosing the perfect companion for the vice president position, who would be able to widen the public’s support for him.

Trends to Watch

In general, the results of the survey show several interesting trends:

There is a real possibility that the Democratic Party will be replaced as the largest political party by Golkar or PDI-P. The apparently never-ending internal conflicts surrounding the alleged involvement of some party leaders in a number of corruption cases is hijacking the Democratic Party and this could drag into next year. Not to mention the issue of dynastic politics, of which President SBY is often criticized.

The political map in the House of Representatives will likely become much simpler. This is owing to the decreasing number of political parties that will secure national parliamentary seats, as the parliamentary threshold is increased from 2.5 to 3.5 percent.

It is possible that the largest political party will not get more than 30 percent. Seats will be more evenly distributed over all parties participating in the elections. Indonesian voters tend to make their choices based on emotion. For either party that can maintain a good image, there is an abundance of opportunities from swing voters. But parties that suffer from bad press caused by “cases” will likely lose disproportionally. PDI-P and the Golkar Party tend to have a stable electorate.

There is a possibility that Islamic and Islamic-based political parties will be eliminated in the 2014 election. Factors are public policy mistakes by these parties and the absence of presidential candidates or high-profile leaders. The declining electability of Islamic parties could bring about “poros tengah” (central axis) discourse, or a coalition between Islamic parties, considering there is still electoral potential given the mostly-Muslim Indonesian population.

The 2014 election will be driven by the momentum of the transition generation. Currently only the PDI-P and the Democratic Party give ample space for the emergence of young leaders in 2014. About 40-70% of the productive age group (18-40 years) who become potential voters want change in 2014. The Democratic Candidates convention November 2013-March 2014 has a chance to end the gerontocracy (rule led by the majority of the elderly) in Indonesia. In the 2014 general election, there will be a potential for novice voters, most of which consist of young people comfortable with using the internet, to count for as much as 40 percent of total voters.

There will be a tendency of people not exercising their right to vote in the upcoming election (abstentions). This is also reflected in the considerable number of swing voters, i.e. those who do not or not yet provide a political choice (undecided voters).

The post Voter Trends in Upcoming Indonesian Elections appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

With a general election set for May 7, 2014 will be uncharted waters for South Africa. These polls will be the first since the death of Nelson Mandela in December last year, and they also represent the first time that the post-Apartheid generation will be eligible to vote.

Economic issues will feature prominently in the run-up to election day. A staggering 24% of the population is unemployed, public services are languishing, and corruption is rife. And though 2014 alone is not likely to bring a seismic shift in South African politics, it will surely herald some shifting electoral winds.

Parties and Politicians

African National Congress (ANC)

South Africa’s ruling party since 1994, the ANC is no longer the party of Madiba. Though expected to win the 2014 elections with another parliamentary majority, the ANC is finding itself besieged on all fronts.

The party, beset by ceaseless in-fighting, has failed to deliver the growth and employment that would lift millions of black South Africans out of poverty. Party leader and current president Jacob Zuma has been implicated in numerous scandals, including the alleged siphoning of $21 million of public funds to upgrade the presidential residence. Basic services have also suffered considerably over the past five years of the Zuma presidency, such that they have now become a major concern for many South Africans.

On top of this, the party has the “born-frees” to worry about – the post-apartheid generation that is less willing than their elders to view the ANC as South Africa’s natural governing party. ANC opinion polling – conducted by pollster Stanley Greenberg – shows that it is most vulnerable to voters under 40.

Ever sensitive to criticism, the party has gone to great pains to remind South Africans of its various achievements over 20 years of rule. These include building millions of homes, a successful fight against HIV/AIDS infection rates, and increased access to education.

In spite of these problems, the ANC is expected to win handily in upcoming elections, albeit with a reduced mandate. President Zuma’s goal of garnering 75% of the vote, which comes with the tantalizing ability to dominate parliament and freely amend the constitution, seems unlikely. Analysts predict that the ANC’s vote share could drop to 53%, down from 65% in 2009, and the party risks losing electoral control of the economic stronghold of Gauteng.

Democratic Alliance (DA)

Centered in the province of Western Cape, the centre-left Democratic Alliance has long been the only viable alternative to the ANC. In spite of this, the party holds only 18% support. Though helmed by anti-Apartheid veteran Helen Zille, DA is widely seen as “too white” by many South Africans. This perception drove the DA to seek a merger with Agang in late January, with prominent anti-Apartheid activist Dr. Mamphela Ramphele running as the party’s candidate. Less than a week later however, Ramphele reneged on the agreement, dealing a significant blow to the DA’s rebranding efforts.

Congress of the People (COPE)

Formed in 2009 as a breakaway faction of the ANC, COPE garnered 7.4% of the vote in the 2009 general elections. The party has been ravaged by infighting as Mosiuoa Lekota’s leadership is disputed by former Gauteng Premier Mbhazima Shilowa. COPE was able to capture the third-largest share of votes in the 2009 election – a feat it is unlikely to repeat this year.

Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)

Led by long-time leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the IFP’s primary support base is Zulu-speaking South Africans. The IFP has seen its support decline from its early 1990s heyday contesting the ANC. It has kept a relatively low profile during this electoral season, though the IFP recently struck a pact with the EFF to protect one another during campaigning.

Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)

A newly-formed party launched by former ANC youth leader Julius Malema, the EFF espouses a left-wing populist platform, billing itself as a “radical, leftist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist” party. Some of the more extremist policies championed by the EFF include the expropriation of South African farmland from white farmers and the nationalization of mines and banks. The EFF is rumoured to be financially backed by Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF party, upon which many of its policies are modelled.

Malema himself has proven a controversial figure. During his stint as ANC youth leader, he built a reputation for bombastic rhetoric against the country’s white minority, excessive personal spending, and the odd corruption charge. He was expelled from the ANC in 2012 for sowing division within the party. Though his EFF claims to champion the interests of the poor, Malema himself has been charged with fraud, corruption, and laundering millions of dollars.

Agang South Africa

A centre-left party founded by anti-Apartheid icon Dr. Mamphela Ramphele. Her impressive credentials as a physician, co-founder of the Black Consciousness Movement, and managing director at the World Bank led to much fanfare following the party’s founding in February 2013. However, Agang SA has so far failed to connect with voters and capitalize on widespread discontent towards the ANC. Recent Ipsos polling shows Agang support hovering around 1%. Agang SA and the Democratic Alliance had been set to merge with Ramphele running as the joint candidate, but the move was criticized as the DA simply “renting a black face” for electoral gains. It has been reported that while Agang’s financial backers had supported the deal, the party’s network of followers did not. The fallout from the aborted merger, however, will likely prove more detrimental to Agang SA’s credibility than had it actually gone through with the deal.

Three Key Issues to Watch

Who will the “born-free” generation gravitate towards?

The term born-free refers to the generation of South Africans born after the end of apartheid, or those too young to remember the struggle for multi-racial democracy. 2014 will mark the first elections that this demographic – which makes up some 40% of South Africa’s population – will be eligible to vote. Critics have charged that the born-frees are too apathetic towards the country’s political process, and that the post-Apartheid generation has no appreciation for the sacrifices made by their parents and grandparents. While in some ways true, especially with regards to how younger generations view established political parties, polls also show that born-frees are more willing to socialize with other ethnic groups – a positive sign pointing to the realization of the 1994 dream of a “rainbow nation.” Results from South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission also show a record number of new voter registrations under the age of 30.

Jacob Zuma and the ANC see the born-frees as a time-bomb. The unemployment rate for 15-24 year-olds stands at an immense 51% (compared with 24% for South Africa overall). Though born-frees are typically more optimistic than other age groups, this is likely to sour as they enter a stagnating workforce with limited job prospects. Born-frees are less willing to stake their loyalty behind the ANC, as they have no memory of the Congress acting as the vanguard of the anti-Apartheid struggle.

Interestingly, none of South Africa’s political parties have utilized the born-frees in their campaign rhetoric.

Erosion of ANC support and the rise of the EFF

The ANC is heading into tough waters. The party’s support has been steadily dwindling over its twenty years in power, a trend that opposition parties are eager to seize upon.

Though the DA is South Africa’s second-largest party, this election’s defining battle may be between the ANC and the upstart EEF. The DA continues to struggle with its image, opening the door to angry contenders like the EFF. Malema’s brand of left-wing populism resonates with many in the ANC’s traditional support base who are increasingly fed up with the scandal-plagued government. Even more worrying for the ANC is the EFF’s appeal among young, disenfranchised South Africans. A large number of the born-frees view the ANC as having failed their generation and Malema’s bombastic promises could well resonate with this demographic.

The ANC may not lose power, but it will increasingly see key voting blocs being tapped into by new parties. As one Nomura International analyst summarizes, “Demographics are nibbling away at the ‘liberation debt’ owed to the ANC.” 2014 may well mark the beginning of the ANC’s slow electoral decline.

Discontent in the platinum belt

The mining industry has long been the driving force behind the South African economy. With a 77% share of global production, South Africa is also the world’s largest platinum producer. Simmering tensions in the country’s platinum belt – located in the northwest – have already boiled over several times, most notably in August 2012 with the shooting deaths of 44 striking miners. Miners in the Rustenburg platinum mines have been on strike since the end of January, prompting viability concerns among Anglo American and other major mining corporations. How this issue is resolved, or not resolved, will loom large over various party campaigns leading up to the election.

Economic Impact

Though the ANC is set for victory, South Africa’s economic woes will continue. The ANC has so far shown itself incapable of managing the economy – GDP expanded by less than 2% in 2013, and there is little optimism that things will radically change under a renewed ANC mandate.

The winners will also have to contend with the ongoing issues affecting South Africa’s mining industry. Platinum exports account for 6% of South Africa’s GDP and 60% of the country’s exports, meaning long-term instability in the sector threatens to be particularly painful. Wide-reaching reforms targeting the country’s mining industry will also have to deal with the phenomenon of illegal gold mining operations, where accidents and fatalities are rife.

The possibility of the EFF raking in a substantial share of votes could also have a potential negative impact on the economy, especially if it garners substantial support among the born-frees.  The EFF’s extreme platform of mass nationalization and land confiscation could lead to foreign investors thinking twice about conducting business in South Africa, and as such, EFF support levels can be taken as a crude barometer for anti-investment populist sentiment.

The post Election Report: South Africa appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

On March 30, Turkey will hold local elections which will serve as a prelude to presidential elections in the summer and parliamentary elections which are currently scheduled for next year. They come at a very sensitive time for the country: lauded until recently as a paradigm of political and economic stability in the Middle East, Turkey is reeling from a major corruption scandal that is threatening to undermine its main institutions and to drive investors away—perhaps also undermining other emerging markets. In addition, the policies of the current government have polarized Turkish society, as attested to by the widespread protests in Istanbul and other major cities this summer, and upcoming local elections are widely seen as a crucial vote of confidence in Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, one that may chart the near future of the country.

A Referendum on Erdogan

Paradoxically, the most important players to observe in these elections are not the parties whose candidates will be running against each other, of which there are four: the ruling moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), the left-leaning secularist Republican People’s Party (CHP), the right-wing (often described as far right) Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). But while it is true that several races—especially in Istanbul, Ankara and the Kurdish areas—will be significant for Turkish politics, the main challenge for the prime minister currently comes from some of his own former close allies and supporters.

Erdogan, who has won sweeping election victories three times in a row and has been in power since 2002—making him the most popular politician since the secular republic’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk—is prohibited from running for a fourth term by the internal rules of his own party. He has two options to stay in power: he could either try to change the rules, or he could switch places with the president, who is also a founding member of the AKP, and increase the powers of the presidency by passing a new constitution. While both of these would come at a price, most of his efforts in the last few years have arguably gone toward the latter goal.

He is facing some major obstacles, however. He recently got into a bitter fight with a rival Islamist movement which was for many years his close ally against the once-powerful military—and whose members are firmly embedded in most state institutions as well as the ruling party. Erdogan accused the Hizmet (“Service”) movement, headed by the charismatic US-based preacher Fethullah Gulen, of orchestrating a major corruption probe that started on December 17 and toppled four government ministers as well as some of his other key allies. His government proceeded to purge hundreds of high-ranking police officers and prosecutors, blocking further waves of arrests and calling into question the independence of the judiciary; in turn, this spooked investors whose flight from the country triggered a sharp drop in the value of the Turkish lira and threatened to undermine the economy.

Gulen’s movement is not represented by a political party, and though there has been a lot of speculation whether or not he would support one of the opposition parties—such as the CHP—most analysts believe that his influence with voters is fairly minor (estimates range between one and six percent, certainly not enough to singlehandedly cause a major upset). On the other hand, his power within the ruling party is believed to be considerable. All eyes are therefore on Turkish President Abdullah Gul, whose prerogatives as head of state are largely ceremonial, but who could turn out to be a dangerous opponent for Erdogan should he decide to do so. His relationship with Gulen is unclear (in the past, he has made a point of visiting international schools run by Gulen while on official trips abroad, though this in itself proves little), his popularity is growing, and he has tried to market himself as the responsible adult in Turkey. There is a significant possibility that he may run against Erdogan in the presidential elections—or even challenge him over the leadership of AKP—and amid all the turmoil that has gripped Turkish politics, the local elections will be a key test for Erdogan’s power that may seal his political fate.

The opposition parties are bitterly divided in their ideology, and individually they lag far behind the AKP in polls throughout much of the country. However, the AKP has strongly antagonized them all in recent months, and there is a chance they may unite to achieve an upset in some of the key races, particularly if there is a run-off between an AKP candidate and a challenger. The races in Istanbul and Ankara, in particular, carry a special symbolic significance, and there is a saying in Turkey that who wins Istanbul will go on to win Turkey. Erdogan himself was the mayor of Istanbul before becoming a prime minister, and losing Istanbul—or even the significant parts of Istanbul that are currently controlled by the AKP—would be a major psychological blow to him and his party that would increase discontent with his leadership. Conversely, a decisive victory would provide him with the much needed political capital to cement his grip on power.

Issues to Watch

As a result of this complex situation, three main topics of national importance are expected to trump local issues in these elections. One is the economy—over the past decade or so, Turkey has experienced steady growth and unprecedented prosperity. Erdogan has claimed most of the credit for this and owes much of his popularity to it. But now the economy is under pressure: to stem the seeming free fall of the lira last month, itself a major threat since many Turkish businesses have taken on significant amounts of foreign-denominated debt (to the tune of $170 billion last November, according to data cited by Bloomberg), the Turkish central bank was forced to sharply increase its interest rates. This, however, threatens to slow growth and pass the burden onto a similarly highly-indebted electorate (according to al-Monitor, total credit card debt in the country last December was $45 billion, with $14 billion of it in nonperforming loans). To avert a crisis, the prime minister has been talking about an “out of the ordinary” package for the economy without specifying further—we can expect surprises in the run-up to the election.

Another big issue is the rolling back of civil liberties and perceived attacks on the separation of powers in Turkey, which critics say gravely threatens the country’s democracy. From purging prosecutors and police officers investigating the government to clamping down on internet and the media (for a second year in a row, Turkey was the “the world’s leading jailer of journalists” last year, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists) to restricting the sale of alcohol, numerous policies recently implemented by Erdogan have raised major concerns with citizens and observers alike. One thing to watch for is how Gul responds to these policies—the government recently passed a highly controversial internet bill through parliament, for example, and it is now up to the president, who has spoken out in favor of unrestrained access to the internet in the past, to sign it into law or to veto it.

The third issue is the peace process with the Kurds, which Erdogan has been pushing for the past couple of years but which has contributed to the rift between him and Gulen—as well as others in Turkey, particularly among the nationalist camp. The prime minister has been walking a fine line, with Kurds accusing him of stalling and nationalists rallying against him, but so far he has been able to keep the process going. The talks could be expected to influence the vote mostly in the country’s southeast, where the majority of Kurds live, but they have major national and transnational implications as well—a breakthrough, for example, would increase investor confidence and could facilitate oil transfers from Iraqi Kurdistan that would help bring down Turkey’s soaring energy bill. It would also lessen the negative effects of the civil war in neighboring Syria, where an autonomous Kurdish region is taking shape next to the Turkish border.

It remains to be seen which way these issues will tilt the local elections, but one thing is certain:  the result will reverberate loudly not only across Turkey, but internationally as well.

The post Local Elections in Turkey: A Referendum on Erdogan appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Two national elections will be held in Indonesia this year. The first one, the national legislative election, will be held in April, setting the stage for a presidential election in the summer. The parliamentary election is critical not just in its determining of which political parties earn the privilege of nominating a presidential candidate, but also because it will provide an early insight into the shifting political mood in Indonesia.

The political establishment in Indonesia has never seemed less popular. Stalled democratization initiatives and rampant corruption in the halls of political and military power have not gone unnoticed by the Indonesian public. Party loyalty has hit rock bottom, and an increasingly cynical electorate is eager to find alternatives to the status quo. Parties that can convincingly adopt the mantle of reform and field new faces will enjoy great electoral success, while parties that promise business as usual while fronting traditional figures are at risk of falling behind.

Those hoping for a new breed of politics are focused on Joko Widodo, better known as Jokowi, the meteoric governor of Jakarta and unofficial presidential hopeful. Though he has thus far abstained from national politics, his rising star would no doubt be singularly influential should he throw his lot in with a particular party and confirm a bid for the presidency.

The absence of a fresh political brand has led to many disengaged voters in Indonesia, who view the major parties as largely interchangeable. But with the buzz surrounding Jokowi, and a clear incentive for parties to enlist young, reform-minded leaders, the 2014 elections may see voters taking a renewed interest as they try to cast out the old for the new.

Parties and Politicians

Indonesia’s party landscape is diverse and shifting, and coalition governments have historically been the norm. No democratically-elected party has ever managed to secure enough of the People’s Representative Council (DPR) to operate without needing to assemble a ruling bloc.

Much of this shifting nature has to do with the relationship between parties and presidential nominees. Unfulfilled promises of democratization and little activity in parliament have left many Indonesian voters disillusioned. Rather than adhere to party ideologies, which often overlap (all the leading parties are secular and nationalist), Indonesian voters tend to throw their support behind strong or charismatic individuals, whenever such figures arise. As a result, leaders may be popular but not their parties, or vice versa, and parties within the coalition-dense system tend to rely heavily on partnerships and running-mates to gather support.

Though a dozen parties will be vying for parliamentary seats, only a few have a plausible chance of securing the 20% of seats – or 25% of the popular vote – necessary to put forth a presidential candidate.

Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP)

Though he has yet to announce his candidacy, Jokowi is a clear favourite be elected president. But what remains to be seen is if he will be nominated by his party, the firmly-established Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). The PDIP is a nationalist, secular party which constitutes the current core of the opposition coalition, but it has not successfully fielded a presidential candidate in a decade. The current PDIP leader is former president Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president. Support for Megawati has been steadily dwindling since her defeat in 2004, and she is considered by her detractors to be an ineffectual figure tied to the traditional political establishment. She has been fostering a public relationship with Jokowi, and if she manages to capitalize on his popularity it could translate into big gains for the party, which recent polls reveal to have the support of roughly 18-20% of the population – well ahead of all other parties except Golkar.

Democrat Party (PD)

The current ruling party is the Democrat Party (PD), founded in 2004 on a conservative ideology and the principles of national identity. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the party’s founder and the reason for its inception, cannot legally run for another term. PD’s next candidate has not been selected yet, but Yudhoyono’s popularity has suffered of late, all but ruining his party’s credibility and its chances of securing a nomination. Disapproval of the PD is widespread, and voters will likely relegate the party to obscurity come April.

Golkkar

Golkar is allied with PD as part of the current governing coalition. A relatively old party, Golkar saw periods of fairly undemocratic, stability-focused politics in the 1970s under the leadership of Suharto. It has since undergone significant transformation, and is now a nationalist party chaired by Aburizal Bakrie, a successful tycoon and the party’s presidential candidate. However, Bakrie is a consistently unpopular figure who is commonly associated with a 2006 mudflow disaster caused by a drilling venture jointly-owned by a Bakrie conglomerate. Due to a lack of widespread support, his leadership and presidential nomination will hurt Golkar’s electoral outcome, though the old, well-established party is neck-and-neck with the PDIP, polling at roughly 16-18% popular support in recent months.

Gerindra & Prosperous Justice

Among the various small parties remaining, the left-leaning, socialism-focused Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) is gaining importance. Gerindra has boosted its influence by announcing it would select former general Prabowo Subianto as its candidate if it is able. Prabowo is viewed as a credible, capable figure and is second only to Jokowi in the presidential polls. Though the party currently holds very few seats and is mostly popular among the rural poor, Prabowo’s popularity has seemingly had a significant impact on Gerindra’s fortunes. January polls revealed that Gerindra’s popular support has risen to roughly 9% – twice what it received in 2009.

Several other political parties are in contention, including a handful Islamist parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). These will almost certainly not win the seats necessary to field a presidential candidate or hold much sway in the legislature, and unlike Gerindra, none have selected a star nominee to boost their popularity.

Three Key Issues to Watch

Where will Jokowi stand?

The current governor of Jakarta, Joko Widodo is a former furniture salesman and man of the people. He is noted for his relative youth and his uncommonly high level of community engagement – a style of politics that Indonesian voters are gravitating towards with enthusiasm. If Megawati steps aside and allows the PDIP to nominate Jokowi for president, it would virtually guarantee success. Otherwise, she can continue her own campaign and receive dwindling support from a population that has seemingly already decided they do not want her back.

If Megawati chooses to stand as the PDIP candidate again, she also runs the risk, though slim, that another party will nominate Jokowi. In the summer of 2013, it seemed that a Megawati-Jokowi ticket was likely. However, this idea seems to have lost steam, likely due to fears that tying Jokowi to the uninspiring Megawati would diminish his popular support. If Jokowi decides to pursue national office, and if Megawati is unwilling to step aside entirely for him, he may choose to align with another party, though there is little indication of this scenario so far.

Will this election signal a new direction for the Islamist parties?

Islamist parties are being forced to recalibrate in the face of dwindling electoral fortunes. A focus on the spread of Sharia law, which the average Indonesian voter does not support, has hurt the Islamists’ popular appeal. Thus, in anticipation of the upcoming elections, they are tending to downplay that aspect of their politics and focus more on democratic ideals.

Such pro-democracy and transparency rhetoric is present among the other parties, too, but the mainstream leaders have shown themselves as unwilling or incapable of making significant strides. In the wake of the corruption and weak democratic gains under Yudhoyono, some voters may be willing to give a new group the chance to make good on some of the PD’s broken promises. It will not be enough to make the Islamist bloc a major player on its own by April, but it may signal the beginning of a new political trend for religious parties moving forward.

Will the United States be engaged?

The United States has repeatedly stated its commitment to foster accountability and democracy in Southeast Asia, though it has mostly fallen short of these aspirations. Commitments elsewhere have dominated American foreign-policy thinking, and there has been little attention paid to the region. However, with an extremely young population full of first-time voters, populist and reform candidates like Jokowi, and widespread disillusionment over corruption and a lack of transparency, it would be a good time for the United States to step up its support for Indonesia’s democratic process. American assistance and statements in support of accountability and voter turnout could foster optimism and spur renewed efforts to promote democratization once the election is over.

Economic Impact

Although economic growth has recently receded throughout Southeast Asia, there are optimistic outlooks for the Indonesian economy. Foreign investments flows have slowed vis-à-vis the taper in the United States, but popular political disillusionment does not seem to be affecting Indonesian consumer confidence, and economic gains in the region seem fairly entrenched.

In fact, the entire election season is a boon to consumer spending (one of the conventional strengths of the Indonesian economy). Due to shifting loyalties and the politics of personality, political campaigns often consist of vote-buying, with large rallies, parties, merchandise, and giveaways. These efforts pump money into local economies, and sometimes divest cash and food gifts directly into the hands of voters. Though opposed by several national anti-corruption groups, the practice shows no signs of disappearing ahead of this year’s elections.

Most of leading parties believe in economic liberalisation, and once elected would strive to attract greater foreign investment and free trade. Economic policies under PDIP with the populist Jokowi at the helm may lean towards a slightly more socialist model, with greater state-intervention in the economy, but this is largely speculative, as Jokowi himself has not commented firmly on national issues. As it stands now, there are no fundamental differences in economic or monetary thinking between the country’s leading parties.

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