The statement mirrors similar demands from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, countries which are currently under military rule. All three have since followed through on their intentions to expel foreign forces. Chad is effectively the last country in the Sahel region that plays host to foreign soldiers. Niger, which was also home to US personnel, requested that the US withdraw its troops in March.

Chad is divided by the arid Sahara Desert to its far north, the tropical savannah to its south, and the Sahel transition zone between them. There are few notable geographic features besides Lake Chad, where the country gets its name. The capital N’Djamena lies near the Cameroonian border on the banks of the Chari River in the west. In the east lies the border region with Darfur in Sudan, to the north Libya, to the south the Central African Republic, and Niger and Nigeria to its west.

Chad has the third youngest population of any country in the world, at an average age of 16.6 years. It is a majority Sunni Muslim country, with a substantial Christian minority inhabiting the south. Most Chadians are secular on political issues, however.

After the death of former Chadian president Idriss Déby in 2021, the military initiated a coup that installed Déby’s son Mahamat. Since then, Mahamat Déby has moved to consolidate power. In 2022, he unilaterally extended the transition period, took up the reins of transitional president, and announced his candidacy for the presidential elections scheduled for May 6. Opposition candidates have had their candidacies rejected. The only candidate left with any hope of challenging Déby in the polls is the current prime minister, Succes Masra. However, Masra’s supportive statements toward the Mahamat Déby administration have tarnished his credibility as an opposition figure. The ultimate result of the upcoming elections will almost surely be a continuation of the present security policy, likely under a Mahamat Deby presidency.

Though only fielding around 30,000 soldiers, the Chadian military has received extensive support from foreign instructors and direct combat assistance. The country has been in a state of war for the better part of 30 years, with a civil war erupting in 2005. The military is battle-tested, not just from delivering the government a victory on the battlefield, but also from years of directly supporting regional militaries in their fight against Islamic extremists, with the 2012 Mali insurgency being one notable example.

Of growing concern to Washington is the potential alignment of Central and West African states like Chad with Russia, specifically through the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company. In an interview with France24, Déby insisted that his country was not a “slave looking to change his master,” suggesting a desire to balance the stakeholders involved. This accords with Chad’s longtime strategy of entertaining foreign backers to maintain a hold over an ethnically and politically fragmented society.

The pivot may be a tactical move by Mahamat Déby meant to boost his chances in the election. Goodwill towards France and the United States regarding their presence in Chad has run thin lately. By appearing to take a stance against historic colonial powers, Déby is galvanizing support from that section of the Chadian electorate.

Electoral politicking, however, may not be necessary. No Chadian election in history has ever been free and fair. Instead, commentators have suggested that it is a bargaining tactic that N’Djamena is using to increase US support for the Chadian government.

Chad’s relationship with France is deeper than France’s relationships with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. As a result, Chad can’t shake the ties off so easily. For now, the French are not likely to immediately follow the Americans should the latter be fully expelled from the country.

The post Chad Looks to Expel US Forces ahead of Polls appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Last year, US crude oil production reached a record high of 4.1 million barrels per day (bpd), underscoring the country’s increasing role as a significant oil exporter. This uptick in production and exports has enabled the United States to penetrate markets in Asia and Europe, traditionally held by OPEC+ members. The exploitation of shale reserves in areas like the Permian Basin, based in the state of Texas, have been central to American export growth. Shale oil is prized for its light density and low sulfur content, which is desirable for refineries as a cheaper alternative to heavier and sour crudes produced by Canada, Mexico, and the Gulf region.

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According to its website, the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party is a bipartisan congressional committee that aims to build consensus “on the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party and develop a plan of action to defend the American people, our economy, and our values.” In pursuit of this goal, the committee adopts a holistic approach, addressing the China challenge across multiple domains including military, economics, and technology.

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• The Marcos administration in the Philippines is internationalizing the South China Sea conflict, scrapping the bilateral approach of the Duterte years.
• US President Biden has reiterated that the US-Philippines mutual defense treaty applies to the South China Sea.
• ‘Gray zone tactics’ that may have worked previously are now more likely to elicit a response from Washington and other littoral claimants.

The United States and Philippines are planning their first-ever military training exercises outside of Philippines’ waters. The exercises are the latest in a series of moves suggesting a more active US stance on defending its allies’ sovereignty in the South China Sea. The overall objective is clear: remove the diplomatic and military ambiguity that China’s gray zone tactics thrive in.

Background

The South China Sea is a critical theater for Beijing, holding out the possibility of material wealth in its underseas mineral deposits and greater military security by pushing out the PLA’s defense perimeter from China proper. But Beijing’s sweeping claims to the waters overlap with other littoral states, namely Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan. The resulting clashes have played out for decades, sometimes producing a sudden redrawing of the map, as was the case after China’s occupation of the Paracel Islands in 1974, and other times leading to a more gradual ‘slicing of the salami’ where a previous status quo slowly gives way to a new one, often by way of gray zone tactics designed to fall short of producing a direct military response.

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Considering China’s growth trajectory leading up to the pandemic, it was anticipated that the country’s GDP would surpass that of the United States by 2035. However, due to slower growth, escalating mismanagement under Xi, and a mounting demographic crisis, it may take several decades before the Chinese economy outpaces the United States, and there’s a possibility it may never do so.

Over the past year or more, manufacturing activity in China has experienced a downward trend, coupled with a decrease in factory gate prices. Although the Purchasing Managers Index (PMI), a gauge of industrial activity, has shown some recovery since the start of 2024, factories are still cutting jobs.

Consumer spending shows little sign of improvement. Additionally, over the past three years, the Chinese stock market has witnessed a loss of $6 trillion in value. Local governments are grappling with mounting debt and potential insolvency, prompting some to halt construction and infrastructure investment. The real-estate market is edging toward crisis levels, with 50 of the leading developers facing potential insolvency. Unfinished construction projects number in the millions of units, leaving homebuyers to contend with the loss of their life savings.

China posted a respectable GDP growth rate of 5.2% last year; however, when adjusted for falling prices, the real growth rate is likely lower. This adjustment factors in the impact of deflation, which could diminish the actual increase in economic output. Furthermore, even a revised growth rate, which has been adjusted downward, is partially attributed to a short-lived surge in consumption following the lifting of COVID restrictions.

Despite a population decline of two million people, youth unemployment remains high. Similar demographic declines are being experienced by other countries, including most of Europe, Japan, and other parts of the developed world. However, the distinction lies in the fact that those countries were already wealthy, with mature economies, before birth rates began to fall. In contrast, although China ranks as the second-largest economy in terms of GDP, it ranks 72nd in terms of nominal GDP per capita. The average Chinese citizen only earns approximately $12,500 per year, which falls below the poverty line in many developed countries. Surprisingly, 75% of the middle class only earn between $10 and $20 per day.

For nearly a decade, Xi Jinping has expressed a desire to shift China from a manufacturing and export-driven economy to one fueled by domestic consumption. However, this vision has yet to materialize due to citizens’ reluctance to spend in China’s struggling economy. Recently, he has been advocating for the New Productive Forces model, aiming to drive economic growth through innovation and new technologies. Technologies like AI could potentially modernize China’s industrial sector, boosting worker productivity and enhancing the competitiveness of Chinese exports. Premier Li Qiang has hailed this shift to New Productive Forces as a “new leap forward,” but it is actually a step backward, as it would mean reverting China to a factory-driven, export-dependent economic model.

Like the other slogans under Xi’s leadership, such as the ‘Chinese Dream,’ ‘Common Prosperity,’ and ‘Dual Circulation,’ the concept of New Productive Forces lacks substantive detail, and the methods by which the CCP intends to achieve this goal remain unclear. However, it is evident that, alongside a return to export-led growth, New Productive Forces will involve government subsidies. This expansion of the government’s role in the economy diverts resources from citizens and public services, potentially hindering consumption. Moreover, prioritizing New Productive Forces could divert attention from addressing systemic issues, such as the real-estate crisis and potential banking crises resulting from defaults in the real-estate sector.

China has traditionally relied on increasing government control during times of crisis, but there are several more constructive measures Xi could consider. He could establish a stabilization fund to bolster struggling equity markets and have unfinished properties taken over by the government to ensure completion, thereby safeguarding buyers from financial losses. Restructuring local government debt and implementing a stimulus program to boost consumer spending are also viable options. Additionally, increasing the social safety net for the elderly could alleviate the burden on working individuals and encourage middle-class spending rather than retirement saving. Revisiting the official retirement age, currently set at 60 for men and 55 for women, is another possibility. However, Xi has yet to pursue any of these avenues.

Going by Xi Jinping’s track record, however, it appears unlikely that he will enact a significant stimulus package or embark on structural economic reforms.

The post Past Is Precedent as Xi Struggles to Fix China’s Economy appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

• The latest US inflation data has surprised on the upside, delaying any plans by the Federal Reserve to cut rates.
• Higher-for-longer interest rates will put pressure on US consumers, who have been piling on credit card debt through 2023.
• There is historical precedent of a twin-peaked inflation crisis in the 1970s.

The latest CPI and PPI inflation data come at a critical juncture for the US Federal Reserve. On the one hand, the US stock market was recently hovering near all-time highs and jobs data shows no signs of retreat from a 3.8% unemployment rate. On the other hand, the March data shows that inflation remains well off the Fed’s 2% target and continues to trend in the wrong direction. Moreover, inflation remains a major political issue with elections looming in November: a recent Gallup poll found that cost-of-living was the foremost concern on the minds of voters.

The data, with CPI surprising on the upside and PPI on the downside, will complicate the Fed’s path to easing, and many are now betting heavily against a cut in the Fed’s June meeting. The Fed will be under pressure to adopt an aggressive anti-inflation stance through to November at the very least – a policy that translates into higher interest rates and a stronger US dollar. These monetary forces will also resonate outside the borders of the United States, inducing capital flight from emerging markets and increasing the servicing costs of debt-distressed states.

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Shortly after his father’s death, twenty-five-year-old Pavel Prigozhin took over the reins of his father’s company, but with limited legitimacy. Little is known of Pavel’s childhood or teenage years, except that he was pampered and traveled on private yachts and jets. He fought in Syria alongside Wagner troops, earning the organization’s “Black Cross” for outstanding military service. He also fought in Ukraine, where allegedly, his social media posts gave away his position, leading to his unit being bombed. Western sanctions have been extended to the children of Yevgeny Prigozhin, making it nearly impossible for Pavel to travel internationally.

Pavel’s age and lack of his father’s skills were ultimately his downfall, and most analysts believed the Kremlin would cut a deal to completely remove him from the picture, allowing Pavel to continue to earn money with the many other companies his father left him in a multibillion-dollar empire. Under Pavel’s leadership, Wagner began recruiting again, but then suddenly stopped. By October or November of 2023, Pavel was no longer leading Wagner. There’s no official confirmation on Pavel’s whereabouts or what happened to him. He may have been sidelined or removed from power struggles within Russia. It’s also possible he’s involved with the PMCs in a less public role. Information about the Wagner Group and its leadership is often opaque and shrouded in secrecy.

While Pavel’s role, and even if he is still alive, remain unknown, it is known that Wagner’s commercial and military interests have been divided between Russia’s numerous intelligence services and Putin’s allies. Parts of Wagner may have been absorbed into Rosgvardia, also known as the Federal Service of the National Guard of the Russian Federation. However, command over the largest part of Wagner’s overseas operations has been assumed by General Andrei Averyanov, a high-ranking officer in Russia’s military intelligence (GRU). General Andrey Averyanov, the former leader of a targeted assassination group, rose to international infamy for the failed poisoning of Russian dissident-in-exile, Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, UK in 2018.

The Defense Ministry established a number of other private military companies (PMCs) to recruit former Wagner men for operations in Africa or the Middle East. A PMC called Redut, established in 2008, has been fighting in Ukraine, while another PMC, Convoy, was established in Russian-occupied Crimea in 2022. Wagner’s Ukrainian operations now come under the name of the Volunteer Corps, while other arms-length, covert operations have been incorporated into the Expeditionary Corps. Effectively, the multibillion-dollar PMC business has been taken over by the Kremlin, with the Expeditionary Corps dubbed “Wagner 2.0.”

Russia’s strategy in using the PMCs is to undermine U.S. power and increase Moscow’s influence while maintaining plausible deniability. They provide security for foreign leaders while also offering training for their troops and sometimes engaging in ground combat, providing combat support, or conducting special operations. The PMCs aid Moscow’s foreign policy objectives by carrying out military operations, projecting Russia’s power, furthering Moscow’s political influence, gathering intelligence, and generating revenue. In Mali and Sudan, the Wagner Group was instrumental in securing gold and diamond mines, ensuring that certain local military leaders continue to benefit from them, while also transporting precious metals and stones back to the Kremlin.

Wagner was active in Libya from 2018. Russian PMCs are also fighting in Syria and Ukraine, and possibly in as many as 30 countries in total. Wagner had been propping up regimes across Africa, as well as controlling mineral extraction activity, namely in gold. Operations in Africa are continuing with mercenaries fulfilling existing contracts. The Kremlin is offering a “regime survival package” to governments in Africa in exchange for access to natural resources. The Russian government is also working to change mining laws in West Africa, attempting to unseat Western companies.

Now, those operations in Africa are continuing under the Africa Corps. Russia is negotiating with the Central African Republic to open a new military base there. The group is also active in Libya, Mali, Sudan, and Burkina Faso. The original plan was to recruit and place 40,000 Russian fighters across Africa. This target was reduced to 20,000, but by the end of 2023, even this reduced target had not been fulfilled. Consequently, the empty billets are being filled with recruits from Africa. Particularly in the Central African Republic (CAR), former fighters are finding that they are unemployable after a UN ceasefire. So, they are taking jobs with the Russian PMCs.

Another region where Russian PMCs are active is the Sahel, encompassing countries bordering the southern edge of the Sahara Desert. It has become known as the ‘coup belt’ due to a recent surge in military takeovers. Since 2020, at least five successful coups have plagued the region, including two in Mali, two in Burkina Faso, and one in Niger. The three nations withdrew from the regional bloc – The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – and created their own “Alliance of Sahel States.”

These coups all shared a similar theme: the new military leaders distanced themselves from Western powers. French troops, deployed for years to combat jihadist activity from groups like the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), were expelled or faced pressure to leave. Additionally, the juntas want the US military out of the region. It’s important to note that public dissatisfaction with government corruption and inability to address security concerns, including the rise of these terrorist groups, were also significant factors behind the coups, not just Western influence.

The United States is struggling to maintain its foothold in Africa’s Coup Belt, particularly after French troops were expelled from Mali and Burkina Faso. Washington seeks to prevent Russian PMCs from filling the security void. However, Moscow holds a certain appeal for the region’s newly established military juntas. Unlike Western powers, Russia doesn’t pressure them on human rights issues or democratic reforms. Additionally, the U.S. operates within the constraints of the international rules-based order, limiting its flexibility in negotiations. In contrast, Russia prioritizes its own interests and operates with less transparency, allowing it to deny involvement with PMCs. This opacity gives Russia an advantage, allowing them to cultivate influence in the region without directly committing troops.

The U.S. has several reasons for wanting to remain in the region. First, reports suggest the effectiveness of Russian PMCs in combating terrorism is debatable. Second, the U.S. is concerned about the potential for a detrimental economic impact on these already poverty-stricken countries. Cutting ties with Europe and facing potential sanctions could leave them economically dependent on Russia, with most of the wealth and benefits concentrated among the military rulers.

Furthermore, the coups have resulted in a curtailment of human rights and basic freedoms, with no expectation of full restoration. Unlike Western partners who would pressure for democratic reforms and respect for human rights, Russian PMCs are unlikely to exert any such influence. This lack of pressure is likely to further erode the quality of life for average citizens in these already struggling nations.

The presence of Russian PMCs is expected to expand in Africa, and with it, Russia’s influence. U.S. influence will decline unless Washington finds some way to dislodge the Russian PMCs. And unfortunately, citizens of these African countries will see a deterioration in their quality of life, standard of living, and general safety.

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This is the fourth MCA exercise conducted in 2024. The first MCA exercise was held in 2023 with the US and Philippine navies, followed by another with the Australian and Philippine navies. During the latest MCA, participating ships included the BRP Gregorio del Pilar and Ramon Alcaraz, the USS Mobile, the JS Akebono, and the HMAS Warramunga.

The Japanese Embassy in the Philippines released a separate statement outlining the scenarios involved in the MCA in greater detail, including anti-submarine warfare training, tactical exercises, link exercises, and photo exercises. During the MCA, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command (STC) announced that it was conducting joint naval and air patrols in the South China Sea on the same day, declaring that “military activities that mess up the situation in the South China Sea and create hotspots are under control.”

These latest naval exercises come after a spate of maritime confrontations between Beijing and Manila. The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) reported on April 6 that ships from the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) harassed Filipino vessels in Philippine Exclusive Exclusion Zone (EEZ) waters in the South China Sea. According to a statement posted by PCG spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela on X, the CCG ships harassed Filipino fishermen supporting ships from the PCG and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) on a mission in Rozul Reef, which is located 128 nautical miles from Palawan, on April 4. Photos of the encounters were also posted on X alongside Commodore Tarriela’s statement. This comes after a series of conflicts over the second half of 2023 centered around the Second Thomas Shoal, a contested South China Sea feature where the Philippines continues to maintain a small detachment of marines on the Sierra Madre, a light transport ship intentionally run aground in 1999.

MCA exercises are unfolding against the backdrop of new talks intended to deepen defense cooperation between Manila and Tokyo. Philippine ambassador to the US Jose Manuel Romualdez said that discussions are planned in the wake of a summit between Manila, Tokyo, and Washington DC, scheduled to be held on April 11. These talks are expected to broach the subject of establishing a legal path for the deployment of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) forces on Philippines territory on a rotational basis under a Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). If the agreement is signed, it would be the third such agreement where the Philippines established security guidelines with partner nations allowing foreign troops to be stationed on Philippine territory, with the other two involving the United States and Australia. Other issues being explored include the possible presence of the JSDF in the annual Balikatan exercises alongside American and Filipino troops, and joint maritime patrols in the South China Sea. Ambassador Romualdez said that a joint statement will be formally issued after the summit in Washington DC. As of 2024, Japan has participated with the two countries alongside American and Filipino marines through the KAMANDAG exercises via the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB).

For Japan, the MCA and upcoming summit come amid a general reorientation of its posture in East Asia, amid an evolving security environment due to threats stemming from a more aggressive Russian foreign policy posture, Chinese aircraft intrusions, and North Korean missile tests near Japanese airspace and waters. Joining the MCA is viewed by Japan as a way to bolster its reputation as a reliable security partner in Indo-Pacific countries and beyond.

As for the Philippines, recent cooperation signals a desire to set up alliances to counter Chinese incursions into Philippine waters. Participating in the MCA with the United States and later, with Australia and Japan, allows Manila to buttress rule of law in Southeast Asian waters, and especially in the South China Sea. Chinese incursions are affecting Manila’s national security, and as such, partnering with like-minded countries is viewed as a way to counter China’s encroachments.

A successful round of MCA exercises reinforces the idea that all parties have the right to safely navigate international waters, without being impeded by one state. In addition to ensuring that China respects the rule of law, the use of maritime exercises can deepen military cooperation with all the allies involved. The trilateral summit also allows the United States to become more involved in the region as a partner with direct interests in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, the MCA can serve as another forum for any and all countries in the Indo-Pacific that wish to participate, as shown by the participation of Australia and Japan when the forum was first launched in 2023.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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