The F-15EX, like the F-15, is an air superiority fighter with limited ground attack capabilities. The F-15EX is the latest upgrade of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas’ F-15 multi-role strike fighter which entered service with the United States Air Force (USAF) in 1976. As a result of the termination of the F-22 production line, the 116^th U.S. Congress decided to procure 144 F-15EXs to add more air superiority fighters to the USAF fleet. The F-15EX can carry 12 AIM-120 air-to-air missiles and has next-generation electronic warfare systems that serve to enhance the survivability of the aircraft by jamming adversary systems.

Source: Inventory data is derived from IISS Military Balance 2024 and aircraft age data is from Janes Defense

A survey of the capabilities of Israel’s main state adversaries, Iran and Syria, reveals that Israel does not face a modern fixed-wing threat that would justify the procurement of an advanced air superiority platform. The most advanced fixed-wing combat aircraft fielded by Iran and Syria is the Su-24MK – a tactical bomber introduced by the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The two Iranian aircraft produced in the new millennium are Yak-130 trainer aircraft whose combat credibility is speculative at best. Israel, a state that operates 39 F-35s as of February 2024, can-handedly defeat any Iranian or Syrian jet in an air-to-air engagement. As a result, the aerial threat environment does not provide a sufficient answer for Israel’s interest in the F-15EX. Rather, the combat range of the aircraft may provide some clues concerning Israeli interest in the F-15EX.

Source: The above figures are derived from Janes Defense. The combat range of an aircraft is generally determined by taking a third of the aircraft’s total range without factoring in aerial refueling as it is assumed that the operator will exhaust significant portions of fuel in combat operations before returning to base.

Factoring in Israel’s threat environment, any combat aircraft in the Israeli Air Force’s fleet can strike into Syria without aerial refueling. However, the Israeli Air Force cannot strike deep into Iran. Even from Israel’s closest airbase, the Ramat David Air Base, Israeli aircraft would have to fly approximately 948 miles to reach Tehran. The F-15EX comes closer than other aircraft by over a hundred miles but still falls short by about 150 miles.

However, efficient flight paths mixed with aerial refueling have enabled the Israeli Air Force to penetrate Iranian air space with the F-35 in the past. Though how far the Israeli F-35s went into Iran is unclear, a similar operation with F-15EXs could likely put several Iranian nuclear facilities in the crosshairs of Israeli pilots. Specifically, the Bushehr reactors and Rudan Nuclear Research Center in southern Iran could be easily reached by the F-15EX granted it received mid-air refueling as a component of a hypothetical strike operation.

Israel’s strike on April 4, 2024, on the Iranian Embassy in Syria with US-provided F-35s coincided with the Biden administration’s authorization to transfer F-35s to Israel. As a result, Iran perceives the United States as involved in the April 4 strike despite the operation being carried out by Israeli forces. As the world awaits the Iranian response, the United States, with several thousand personnel deployed in the Middle East, may find itself the victim of the consequences of an Israeli operation.

Arguments to arm Israel with the capability to strike Iran generally center around deterring Iranian aggression. Despite the deterrent value of possessing a capability designed to harm an adversary, the dynamics shift when a state is willing to exercise force with little regard for the consequences. International relations literature accepts the premise that the perceptions of an adversary are integral to establishing deterrence. In the adversary’s mind, there must be ambiguity regarding the state’s exercise of force to deter the adversary and not invite preemptive aggression.

In the Israeli-Iranian case, the current leadership in Israel has overtly called for aggressive actions against Iran for decades. Additionally, Israel has an established history of preventative strikes against regional adversaries. The rhetoric of the current Israeli leadership and the normalization of preventive strikes is enough evidence to raise concerns regarding Israeli intentions and lack of restraint.

Throughout Israel’s conflict in Gaza, the United States has been unable to effectively shape Israeli decision-making despite the measurable humanitarian and political implications of Washington’s failure to do so. Israel’s current leadership has thus far demonstrated itself to be inflexible and unwilling to cooperate with the United States’ regional interests. Israel’s stubbornness is especially surprising given the United States provides substantive defense material and security guarantees.

As long as these dynamics continue to define the US-Israeli relationship, the United States should not authorize the transfer of the F-15EX to Israel. Israel has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to strike adversary targets in a manner that escalates tensions and puts US personnel at risk. Should Israel acquire the F-15EX, or any improvements to its combat aircraft’s operational range, there is no other mission than to be able to strike targets in Iranian territory. Should Israel acquire these capabilities, there is little indication to demonstrate that it will refrain from escalating tensions with Iran.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Alongside the obvious danger of attacks on government satellite systems, attacks on commercial satellites could also risk data loss. Such loss or theft could prove perilous in the hands of hacktivists and nation-state actors alike, including obstructed visibility into Iran’s nuclear activities. Further, for both federal and commercial systems, respectively, stolen defense-related data as well as the protected health information (PHI) of patients cared for by hospitals with affected satellites could be fatal.

In addition to the well-known distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) and supply chain methods of attack used to overwhelm and infiltrate respectively, backdoor attacks present a more elusive attack that exploits vulnerabilities in aerospace systems. To explore this subject in greater depth, MIT-trained Assistant Professor at Cornell University’s Aerospace ADVERSARY Lab, Dr. Gregory Falco, LEED AP, was consulted. Dr. Falco detailed the following (text minimally revised for context):

The bus is what facilitates all communication across the space vehicle. Usually, subsystems are reporting telemetry data over the bus to the brains of the satellite for consistent coordination. When something is chatty, it could either mean that it is programmed incorrectly or it’s sending too much data back. It could be sending data back to the brain to flood the brain with errant messages or for other malicious activity.

In terms of how a chatty bus might indicate an attack attempt, such as a DDoS or even a supply chain or backdoor, against a satellite system, Dr. Falco elaborated:

These kinds of vulnerabilities are also often used in supply chain attacks due to the many legacy parts of the satellite vehicle in question. [These parts] are [sometimes] operated or managed by an old supplier who does not bother to update their codebase or has third party entities engaging with operations and over-the-air updates. A chatty bus is a common sign of a backdoor installation but given the lack of runtime monitors on the edge of the vehicle, it is difficult to decipher the cause of the chattiness [noise].

In the face of potential adversarial activity conducted to gain a competitive edge in the aerospace sphere, defenders can take a step further by investigating beyond a DDoS or supply chain attack to also considering the stealthier backdoor. Artificial intelligence (AI) can be used to help analyze noise captures in either audio or text format, ideally equipped with a translation feature. This function would be further supplemented by a Persian Farsi human interpreter and translator to clarify the audio noise and any corresponding text captured via an AI speech-to-text dictation capability.

Regarding prevention, the AI could be trained to detect potential backdoors installed by Iranian actors by searching for Farsi words or code strings during code reviews. Such reviews should be conducted as a routine practice of input sanitization, alongside remaining up to date with the latest security patches. Coupled with regular security audits and code scans, following the principle of least privilege should help prevent threat actors from penetrating a system in the first place.

A Persian-language translation specialist could then advise on any whether any of the satellite system server logs contain text that, when rendered in English, would resemble common backdoor code.

Provided the ever-present insider threat due to social engineering, phishing also remains a hotbed for attacker penetration of any network or system. As Iranian social engineering attempts against Israel and the U.S. have spiked against the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas war, aerospace organizations should remain vigilant toward emails and other forms of communication with geopolitical themes. These communications might be composed in English, Hebrew, or another language spoken in a country seen as supportive of Israel and might focus on the Israel-Hamas war or similar political themes. If a user opens and clicks on a malicious link or downloads a malicious executable within, a backdoor could be installed on the corresponding device or system. An example might be an email composed using terms such as “war” (Hebrew: מלחמה, milkhama) or even “negotiation” (Farsi: مذاکره, mezakereh), pertaining to negotiations surrounding nuclear and political themes to put forth a false sense of diplomatic intentions.

Messages can be analyzed for spoofed sender addresses by comparing the email header’s From field against its return-path. If these entries do not match, analysts should use open-source tools alongside device and network logs to investigate any other instances of the domain names and email addresses observed in the return-path, with emphasis on Farsi words or other potential ties to Iran. Phishing attempts can be further suspected when conducted parallel to other potential attacks against satellite systems, such as DDoS attacks which attackers sometimes use to distract security analysts from penetration by other means.

When watching for possible infiltration tactics, defenders should be on the lookout for a wide range of techniques, possibly occurring simultaneously and against multiple geopolitical targets. In the case of Iran during the Israel-Hamas war, threats against both government and private satellite systems pose the unique threat of obscuring not only monitoring of Iranian nuclear capabilities but also of the targets’ accessibility to and retention of their own data.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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The demonstrable use of drones by the Iran-backed Houthi group in Yemen is a clear example of how nations are utilizing such technologies to influence and advance their geopolitical agenda. In this respect, the United States’ Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has recently confirmed that the Houthis’ in Yemen are using Iranian UAVs in their attacks across the Middle East. The report by the DIA further highlights that since 2014, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) has provided the Houthis with an arsenal of sophisticated weapons, and that the aid received from Iran has empowered the Houthis to conduct a campaign of UAV attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden since November 2023, which has negatively affected the safety of commercial shipping in one of the world’s most critical waterways, which roughly sees almost 15% of global trade passing through it.

In 2019, the Houthis revealed a range of UAVs, glimpsed in various media reports. The Houthis primarily use Hudhed-1, Raqib, Rased, and Sammad-1 for reconnaissance, with the option of equipping the Sammad-1 platform with weapons. Additionally, there are Qasef-1, Qasef-2K, Sammad-2, and Sammad-3, which are combat UAVs. Although the Houthis state that they have produced the UAVs domestically, it might be more reasonable to assume that they primarily depend on smuggling smaller components, which are becoming more advanced in design and construction, with support from Iran.

Although Iran is not directly involved in the Houthis’ Red Sea UAV attacks, its UAV technology supply and operational expertise have allowed it to indirectly influence regional tensions and the intensity of UAV attacks on commercial vessels, as well as on military vessels taking part in the US-led operation in the Red Sea. Iran has also supplied UAVs to its loyalists and proxy groups in other parts of the Middle East as a part of its strategy to enhance its regional reach. This includes the supply of UAVs to Hezbollah in Lebanon and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria. Looking at the broader Middle East, reports have indicated that Iran has supplied UAVs to Algeria for the use of the Polisario guerrilla fighters, which has been a major concern for Morocco and has triggered concern about stability in North Africa. However, the threat to the African region is not only posed by the supply of Iran’s UAVs to Algeria; Iran’s UAVs and technical expertise are believed to also be influencing the course of the ongoing civil war in Sudan.

Further afield, it is reported that Venezuela is also assembling Iranian UAVs. Although reports on Iran’s cooperation with Venezuela over UAVs as well as other industrial sectors go back more than a decade, the cooperation has appeared to intensify over the past few years. This has also presented the opportunity for both countries to forge a closer oil alliance as US sanctions on the Venezuelan oil industry are expected to return in April. In the same vein, since the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Iran has supplied at least 6,000 Shahed drones to Russia. Even though this happened under the radar of the West, the strategic cooperation over UAVs between Russia and Iran and the support Iran has provided to Russia allowed both sides to form closer ties across different fronts. With both sides facing international sanctions, this strategic cooperation is intensifying day by day.

Although Iran’s track record of supplying UAVs has been mainly associated with non-state actors, militias, and sanctioned governments, Iran appears to be positioning itself in the international UAV market. In this regard, Iran has officially exhibited at Qatar’s Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference (DIMDEX 2024), where it presented its “GAZA” UAV, which is capable of carrying a payload of up to 500 kg. During the conference, one of Iran’s booth representatives indicated that all displayed armaments are available for export to any country except the United States and Israel.

With no legal restrictions that prevent it from selling its UAVs around the world, Iran is clearly aiming to supply its UAVs to all geopolitically tense regions where it can gain a political advantage or influence. Moreover, Iran is apparently not worried that these products will fall into the hands of dangerous non-state actors or terrorist groups. How the international community reacts to the rapidly emerging threat posed by Iran’s mounting UAV capabilities, along with its increasing export reach and the utilization of such in its strategic diplomatic endeavors, remains a critical aspect that will require international coordination and cooperation.

A major risk already exists for neighboring Gulf countries and the broader Middle East when it comes to how continuously and rapidly Iran is innovating its domestic UAV ecosystem and operating it with low-cost and relatively easily assembled UAVs with increasing ranges and payloads. Although Iran’s UAV programs have been present for over three decades, the international and regional threat from them continues to evolve at an unprecedented rate. This has been demonstrated directly and indirectly by Iran’s UAV capabilities and expertise in Iraq, Yemen, and the ongoing war in Ukraine.

International cooperation to collectively counter such threats should occur on multiple fronts. Firstly, targeting the global supply chain when it comes to the components brought into Iran and used for the domestic production of UAVs. In this respect, assessing the commonalities in the construction of Iran’s UAVs remains a key aspect. Understanding the lines of supply with which UAV components are procured and shipped to Iran and its regional proxy groups is key to identifying the parties responsible for their supply. Secondly, effectively targeting the supply routes utilized by non-state actors in the Middle East and globally will deter and prevent such UAVs from reaching such groups in the first place. In this regard, further enhancing intelligence cooperation among Middle Eastern and Western nations remains the core factor when it comes to sharing knowledge of Iranian-backed non-state actors’ capabilities in obtaining, assembling, and using armed UAVs.

Officially preventing foreign states from acquiring Iranian UAV technologies remains a challenge. However, the international community can effectively counter Iran’s UAV supply to other nations by pursuing a comprehensive strategy that includes diplomatic engagement, economic pressure, intelligence sharing and military cooperation.

The post Iran’s UAV Diplomacy Resonating in Conflicts in MENA and Beyond appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

The UNCLOS treaty boasts a membership of 168 countries, along with the European Union. Additionally, 14 United Nations Member States have signed UNCLOS but have yet to ratify it. Notably, only 16 United Nations Member and Observer States have refrained from both signing and ratifying UNCLOS. Among them is the United States of America, which has signed but not ratified the treaty.

The post What Drives US Opposition to the Law of the Sea Treaty? appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

The rise of AI in the military domain is rapidly changing the face of warfare, as AI-enabled weapon systems potentially diminish the meaningful role of human decision-making. As defined by Nils Adler (2023) in an article publish by Al Jazeera English “autonomous weapon systems can identify their targets and decide to launch an attack on their own, without a human directing or controlling the trigger.” There is a global consensus that “cutting-edge AI systems herald strategic advantages, but also risk unforeseen disruptions in global regulatory and norms-based regimes governing armed conflicts.”

Experts and scholars believe that AI-enabled weapon systems will have a major impact on warfare, as the full-autonomy of weapon systems would negate battlefield norms established over the course of centuries. According to the European Research Council (ERC), “militaries around the world currently use more than 130 weapon systems which can autonomously track and engage with their targets.”

Despite advancements in this domain, there is no globally agreed definition on what constitutes a lethal autonomous weapon system; the question of autonomy on the battlefield remains subject to interpretation. The US Department of Defense (DOD) defines LAWS as “weapon systems that once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”  Such a concept of autonomy in weapon systems is also known as ‘human out of the loop’ or ‘full autonomy.’ In a fully autonomous weapon system, targets are selected by the machine on the basis of input from AI, facial recognition, and big data analytics, without any human crew.

Another category of autonomy in weapon systems is semi-autonomous or ‘human in the loop’ weapon systems. Such weapons are self-guided bombs and missile defence systems that have existed for decades.

The rapid advancement in the use of LAWS has created the need to develop a regulatory framework for the governance of these new weapon systems. Accordingly, various states have agreed to enter into negotiations to regulate and possibly prohibit LAWS. The United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) has made several efforts in this direction by initiating an international dialogue on LAWS since 2014. The Sixth Review Conference of UN CCW in December 2021 was concluded with no positive outcome on the legal mechanism and an agreement on international norms governing the use of LAWS. Despite the stalemate, there was consensus that talks should continue.

In 2016, a Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) was also established with the mandate to discuss and regulate LAWS. But the participating countries have yet to make headway on a legal framework to regulate and proscribe the development, deployment, and the use of LAWS.

As the world advances in the use of AI in the military domain, states have moved to take divergent position in the UN CCW on the question of development and use of LAWS. Incidentally, certain countries would only find it in their interest to sit down for arms control measures once they have achieved a certain degree of technological advancement in this domain.

It should be noted that major powers such as the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union (EU) either do not outright prohibit or have sought to maintain ambiguity on the matter of autonomous weapons. A US Congressional Research Service report, updated in February 2024, highlighted that “the United States currently does not have LAWS in its inventory, but the country may be compelled to develop LAWS in the future if its competitors choose to do so.”

China is the only P-5 country in the UN CCW calling for a ban on LAWS, stressing the need for a binding protocol to govern these weapon systems. China at the UN CCW debates has maintained that “the characteristics of LAWS are not in accordance with the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL), as these weapon systems promote the fear of an arms race and the threat of an uncontrollable warfare.”

Russia remains an active participant in discussions at the UN CCW, opposing legally binding instruments prohibiting the development and use of LAWS.

The EU has adopted a position in accordance with IHL which applies to all weapon systems. The EU statement at GGE’s meeting in March 2019 stressed the centrality of human control on the weapon systems. EU maintains that human control over the decision to employ lethal force should always be retained.

World leaders, researchers, and technology leaders have raised concerns that the development and use of LAWS will adversely impact international peace and security. In March 2023, leaders in various high-tech fields signed a letter calling for a halt in the development of emerging technologies for the next six months. The letter warned of the potential dangers to society and humanity as the tech giants race to develop fully autonomous programs.

History reminds us that a virtual monopoly on technological development can never be maintained and upheld for long. In the 1940s, for example, when the United States developed a nuclear bomb under the Manhattan Project, other powers caught up and built their own bomb. However, it took more than two decades for the global community to formalize an agreement to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The unregulated growth and proliferation of LAWS threatens to unleash a new era of warfare fueled by autonomous platforms, compromising human dignity, civilian protection, and the safety of non-combatants. Henceforth, there is a need for states to find common ground to regulate and formalize an understanding of human control over the use of force. Global values, ethics, and rules of warfare that have guided humanity over the last two thousand years remain imperative for upholding international peace and security.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Egypt’s geopolitical importance is difficult to overstate. Strategically located at the crossroads of Africa and Asia, Egypt controls the Suez Canal, one of the world’s key maritime choke points. Each year, a significant portion of the world’s trade, including a substantial percentage of global oil shipments, passes through the canal, making its security and uninterrupted operation a prerequisite for stable global supply chains. Egypt’s geopolitical weight is further buttressed by Cairo’s historical role as a cultural and political leader in the MENA region. The country has the largest population in the Arab world at approximately 102 million, serving as a significant cultural, educational, and political hub. Its peace treaty with Israel and strategic partnerships with Western countries, especially the United States, alongside its influence in the Arab League, all cast Egypt as a pivotal player in Middle Eastern politics and peace efforts, whether in Gaza or Sudan. Consequently, the stability and policy direction of the regime directly impact regional security, counter-terrorism efforts, and the dynamics of the broader Middle East and North Africa region.

A New President for Life?

Egyptians went to the polls in 2023 amid a bleak economic outlook. The outcome of the contest was a foregone conclusion, as President Abdel Fatteh el-Sisi – the military leader who had stepped in to remove Mohamed Morsi in 2013 – took 89.6% of the vote against a withering field of competition. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, the election was marred by repression of civil society, arrests, intimidation, and the lack of any viable alternative.

The post Geopolitical Snapshot: Egypt appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

In a landmark deal, Egypt has announced a staggering $35 billion investment from the United Arab Emirates. The agreement, centered on the development of Egypt’s Ras El Hekma peninsula, marks a significant shift in regional dynamics and promises a considerable uplift for Egypt’s struggling economy.

Through its sovereign investment fund ADQ, the deal will focus on developing Egypt’s strategic northwestern coast area along the Mediterranean Sea. This project, envisioned as a “next generation city,” aims to encompass technology and light industry sectors, amusement parks, a marina, an airport, and residential developments, with the Egyptian government retaining a 35% stake.

The post Understanding the UAE’s $35 Billion Investment in Egypt appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthis share the Islamic Republic of Iran as a primary ally and financier, forming a coalition known as the “Axis of Resistance.” Facilitated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), these groups receive support in the form of financial aid, military training, chemical weapons, advanced drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, and precision-strike ballistic missiles. In addition, we’ve also been witnessing direct missile attacks from Tehran in Iraq, Syria and Pakistan, underscoring the depth of their involvement in the region.

Tehran strategically allocates an estimated annual budget of 20-25 billion dollars towards its military expenditures, reflecting a substantial commitment to sustaining and expanding its influence in the region. This financial dedication becomes particularly pronounced when considering the specific support to groups like Hamas. According to the U.S. State Department, Iran directs 100 million dollars annually to fund Hamas alone. This commitment not only illustrates Iran’s active involvement in regional dynamics but also emphasizes the significant financial backing provided to various groups, shaping the geopolitical landscape in the process.

While projecting power and influence on the international stage, concerns arise about the well-being of various groups within Iran. The civil unrest that erupted in September 2022 and persisted for months following the murder of Mahsa Amini accentuates the pressing need for Tehran to prioritize the welfare and prosperity of its citizens at home. In light of domestic challenges, it should be imperative for the government to adopt a balanced approach that takes into account both domestic and foreign policies to maintain an equilibrium for the stability of the nation.

However, despite the apparent importance of achieving this balance, the reality on the ground unfolds the contrary. Iran, with its ethnically diverse population, gender apartheid, and dependence on fundamental internal colonial policies, witnesses the pervasive economic and social suffering of its people under the rule of this authoritarian regime. A recent demonstration of discontent emerged in the form of protests in West Azerbaijan province by the residents of Qara Qishlaq. Unfortunately, these protests were met with brutal suppression, leading to the arrest of 70 individuals.

The catalyst for these protests stemmed from the announcement of Kaveh Soda company’s intention to construct a glass production plant. Kaveh Soda, a company blatantly affiliated with the IRGC, carries a concerning track record as a harbinger of environmental disasters through its disposal of chemical waste into the land and water. A notable example of the company’s impact unfolded after it inaugurated a plant in the city of Maragha, East Azerbaijan province in 2013. The operation resulted in severe pollution of both underground and surface water, as well as pastures within a radius of 150 km. The aftermath of Kaveh Soda’s activities in Maragha was particularly grim, with several villages, including Yengikend, Chilgayi, and Garachopuq, being depopulated due to the barrenness of 450 hectares of farmland, rendering it unsuitable for the livelihoods of the villagers.

In a parallel fashion, the ChlorPars plant situated in the Basmanj region of Tabriz indiscriminately releases toxic liquids and wastes into local irrigation ditches during its production processes. This unethical practice has resulted in the pervasive pollution of the region’s groundwater and springs. Similarly, the discharge of hazardous liquids and sewage directly into the Baliglu River, which flows through the city of Ardabil, has taken a toll on the environment, gradually contributing to the erosion of valuable agricultural lands in the vicinity. The environmental impact of such activities necessitates urgent attention and intervention to mitigate the detrimental effects on both the local ecosystem and the surrounding communities relying on those lands for their survival.

Azerbaijani environmental activists have been diligently working to raise awareness about the alarming and preventable drought of Urmia Lake for decades as well. According to NASA observatory, the lake has now been transformed into a vast, dry salt flat for the most part. Once a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve and home to a variety of creatures like flamingos and white pelicans, it is becoming a herald of salt storms, bad air quality, infertile land, forced migration, and a surge in cancer and respiratory diseases.

The dire state of Lake Urmia is primarily attributed to the excessive construction of unproductive dams, mismanagement of water resources, and a deliberate lack of attention from the government. For instance, the Iranian authorities block the Barandouz River, one of the 14 water sources for Lake Urmia, from flowing into the lake during winter. This dire situation has not only devastated the ecological balance of the region but has also left the inhabitants of surrounding cities enraged as they grapple with the severe consequences of environmental degradation.

The Iranian regime persistently obstructs the collection and sharing of data, creating obstacles in obtaining accurate insights into the socio-economic landscape. Nevertheless, estimates indicate that around one-third of the population lives below the absolute poverty line. Reports published by Iran’s own institutions in 2021 revealed a poverty rate exceeding 30%. The actual figures are expected to be significantly higher, especially when factoring in inflation and the economic repercussions following the post-COVID conditions.

Moreover, It is crucial to underline that numerous sources, including Amnesty International, have consistently reported on the continued under-investment in minority-populated regions of the country to exacerbate poverty and marginalization. This systemic neglect further contributes to the challenges faced by vulnerable communities such as Azerbaijani Turks, Ahwazi Arabs, Baluchis, and members of the Baha’i faith, emphasizing the need for comprehensive efforts to address both economic disparities and social inequities in Iran.

While the inhumane treatment of girls and women in the country remains widely acknowledged, the distressing issue of child brides often goes unreported. A confluence of factors, including poverty, a perspective that regards women as property, and a legal system rooted in Sharia, has rendered young girls particularly vulnerable, subjecting them to arguably the most defenseless conditions.

Contrary to a positive trend, the practice of child marriages witnessed an alarming increase in 2020, with Iranian institutions reporting a rise of over 10% in the number of girls between the ages of ten and fourteen entering into marriages. This troubling trend intersects with the level of education provided to each girl. The Ministry of Education shared that in 2022, 20% of girls aged 15 to 18 had to leave school prematurely due to early marriages. Although data on this issue can sometimes be inconsistent, the harsh reality prompted UNICEF to designate Iran as one of the top five countries with a high incidence of child espousal in 2020.

In Iran, being a female exacerbates challenges and hardships across various domains, particularly evident in the arrest and detention of women activists. Within the legal and prison systems, these activists frequently face gender-specific challenges and encounter additional forms of discrimination. Disturbingly, reports highlight instances of rape and various forms of sexual violence being perpetrated against them, underscoring the gravity of the hardships endured by women activists in Iran.

Another widespread form of oppression against thousands of political prisoners detained in Iran revolves around the systematic denial of adequate and effective medical services within detention centers and prisons. The 2023 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Narges Mohammadi falls victim to this mistreatment amongst others. Despite grappling with heart failure and being in a critical health condition, she was unjustly barred from being transferred to the hospital simply due to her non-compliance with strict hijab rules.

Furthermore, the Iranian government continues to show a lack of commitment towards investing in the preservation of its rich historical and cultural heritage. The intricate tapestry of cultures and histories within Iran, stemming from its diverse ethnic and linguistic landscape, is unfortunately met with neglect and discrimination in terms of governmental support and investment. This is particularly evident in the insufficient backing for crucial aspects such as museums, cultural festivals, and the preservation of historic sites. A glaring example of this neglect was disclosed by the Minister of Cultural Heritage, Tourism, and Handicrafts, Ezatollah Zarghami, who revealed that the government budget allocated for the preservation of each historical site is equivalent to a mere 50 cents per day. Such minimal funding undermines the essential efforts to safeguard and showcase the nation’s cultural and historical treasures.

Additionally, the practical ban on educational programs in minority languages compounds the challenges confronting diverse communities. This prohibition not only erases the rich history, culture, and language of minority groups but also intensifies social divisions and marginalization. By restricting access to education in minority languages, the government not only undermines cultural diversity but also reinforces a homogenous Shiite-Persian dominant society. This approach effectively presents Persian as the sole culture and language of the people in Iran, perpetuating a system of assimilation that diminishes the distinct linguistic and cultural identities of minority communities.

The imposition of oppression extends to religious freedom within Iran, where the regime, in an effort to maintain control and project the image of a uniform “Islamic” nation as per its official designation, discriminates against and oppresses the Baha’i Faith community. Beyond the blatant denial of religious freedom and civil rights, this group endures systematic discrimination characterized by targeted harassment, property confiscation, and, alarmingly, the deprivation of education aimed at impoverishing its members.

The disparity in investment priorities between external agendas and domestic policies unmistakably highlights the Iranian regime’s profound neglect for its own people. The financial trail and investment records reflect a regime that is willing to allocate substantial funds for proxy wars while proving incapable of meeting the basic necessities of its citizens. The accelerated erosion of trust in the government, coupled with a surge in long term instability, may signal the potential demise of the Iranian regime.

Turkan Bozkurt is a Canada-based paralegal, researcher and human rights activist who focuses on minority rights from an intersectional feminist perspective. She conducts comparative research on colonial oppression and exploitation of BIPOC in North America with minority issues in Iran. She’s also a student of legal philosophy.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Beijing’s new focus on a smaller, smarter, and greener Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the West’s commitment to infrastructure adhering to ESG standards could, in theory, help turn a new generation of roads, railways, dams and ports into economic assets that effectively mitigate debt, corruption and environment risks.

There is a huge global infrastructure investment gap.  Among developing nations, it’s particularly acute, making it hard to tackle the demands and challenges of rapid population growth. Moreover, the funding shortfall limits these countries’ financial prospects at best, deepening poverty and, ultimately, threatening to destabilize them at worst.

Just over ten years ago, Beijing recognized the investment need – and, its critics would argue, the economic and political influence that addressing the need could leverage. China became the developing world’s biggest lender, largely through the BRI, whose membership runs to over 150 countries, more than a dozen of them EU states. But some recipients of loans have struggled to repay. As of October, member countries owed more than $300 billion dollars to the Import-Export Bank of China, according to Chinese officials.

At the same time, the Chinese economy has cooled, leaving less room for foreign expenditure. And, as their own economic circumstances have worsened, there are signs that some Chinese are beginning to question the merits of spending billions abroad.  Against this background, investment in the BRI has declined significantly. Long critical of its lack of transparency and debt implications, and concerned over the geopolitical influence it allows China to wield, the West has now sensed an opportunity to roll out rival infrastructure schemes.

Launched with great fanfare in 2013, the BRI was intended to present China as a champion of the developing world, though there was an important domestic economic driver too. The country needed to secure new markets for excess capacity after the global financial crash when Beijing invested heavily to stimulate in its own economy (China now has a substantial trade surplus with BRI members). The BRI has also been seen as a means of promoting Beijing’s authoritarian model of governance and advancing its geostrategic goals, primarily by shifting countries out of America’s sphere of influence.

Under the BRI, Beijing has loaned around one trillion dollars to low- and middle-income economies to develop sectors such as transport, logistics, utilities and energy. As part of the initiative,  health and education programs have also been pursued. Infrastructure outcomes have been mixed. Many BRI signatory states have benefited substantially, particularly in Southeast Asia. Yet a sizeable minority of infrastructure projects, reports AidData, have experienced major implementation problems (including corruption, labor violations, and environmental hazards).

While a significant number of BRI countries have fallen into heavy debt, requiring bailouts from China,  there is limited evidence to suggest that Beijing is engaged in debt-trap diplomacy, essentially the claim that it looks for economic concessions from countries struggling to repay loans. Indeed, in recent years it has sought to  de-risk or future-proof investments, by putting in place “stronger loan repayment and project implementation guardrails,” according to Brad Parks, the executive director of AidData.

At the third Belt and Road Forum in October, China said it would commit more than $100 billion for what looks like a rebranding of the BRI – notably coinciding with an uptick in BRI expenditure last year, the highest since 2018.  Beijing seems to have acknowledged that the problems that have dogged the BRI should be addressed if it is to be credible. And the rebrand has not come out of the blue, seemingly building on efforts in previous years to make the BRI more sustainable  through a series of green policies and guidelines.

In the new iteration of the BRI,  provision will be made for big-ticket and “small yet smart” infrastructure, including green and low-carbon energy projects, with signs of possibly a more cautious financing approach, says China Dialogue. Also there’s a new emphasis on host country agency; an effort to combat the narrative that BRI projects directly benefit China. And to address integrity and compliance issues, companies participating in projects will come under closer scrutiny.

The rebranding of the BRI has emerged as the West attempts to give developing countries alternative options. The European Union’s Global Gateway, launched in 2021, aims to raise up to 300 billion euros of public and private funds for sustainable and high-quality infrastructure projects, which comply with social and environmental standards.

As of October, 89 projects have got under way globally, with 66 billion euros so far committed. The same month, the European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen was very clear about the purpose of the Global Gateway, insisting it was about “better choices” for developing nations. “For many countries around the world, investment options are not only limited, but they all come with a lot of small print, and sometimes with a very high price,” she said.

In 2022, the US and its G7 allies formally launched the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), which is looking to mobilize 600 billion US dollars of public and private investment  for quality, sustainable infrastructure.  Its two signature projects are transport corridors, one linking India, the Arabian Gulf, and Europe, the other in Africa connecting Angola, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The PGII, like Global Gateway, makes no bones about its intentions. It says it offers “a positive alternative to models of infrastructure financing and delivery that are often opaque, fail to uphold environmental and social standards, exploit workers, and leave the recipient countries worse off.”

While Western attempts to lower the risks associated with large infrastructure projects is a step in the right direction, doubts remain about the feasibility of these initiatives.  Amid the global slowdown, will creditor governments be able to raise the funds needed?  And will the schemes attract sufficient private investors if investment-recipient countries are politically and financially unstable, raising ROI uncertainty? Moreover, it might turn out to be hard to identify and then deliver projects that adhere to high ESG standards.

At the same time, questions could also be raised about China’s infrastructure rebrand. Developing nations that have had bad experiences of the BRI may wonder whether there’s any real substance behind the new offering.  Not least those that have incurred big debts – once bitten, twice shy. And countries concerned about the BRI pushing them further into China’s sphere of influence might also have second thoughts, especially if there are more attractive Western projects on the table.

While the geopolitical rivals’ schemes have their doubters, it must be said that the West’s recognition of the sustainable infrastructure needs of the developing world and China’s apparent willingness to draw lessons from the past are positive moves. Emerging economies will now have choices, at least. Previously, there would have been few if they turned down Chinese overtures. Moreover, a decade after the launch of the BRI, they will be – or should be – more aware of, and better able to assess, the relative merits and potential pitfalls of big infrastructure projects.

Yigal Chazan is an international affairs journalist, with a special interest and expertise in geoeconomics.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The post BRI, PGII, and Global Gateway: Infrastructure Development Goes Global appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

In fact, several recent surveys highlight the growing importance of geopolitical risk for companies, investors, and the global economy. According to an Oxford Economics survey, companies view geopolitical tensions as the biggest threat to the global economy, with the majority acknowledging these tensions as a significant risk in the years ahead. Echoing the sentiment is a recent survey among Goldman Sachs clients, which cited geopolitical as a top concern for investors in 2024.

As these sentiments indicate, it is evident that geopolitical risk is increasingly impacting the global economy and influencing the course of globalization. As noted, the surge in geopolitical disruptions leads to the return of trade protectionism and industrial policy. However, it is crucial to recognize that not every geopolitical event or trend affects globalization and its stakeholders in the same manner. In fact, distinct dimensions of globalization can be identified, each disrupted in a unique way by geopolitical events.

The DHL Global Connectedness Index report conducts an annual review of the state of globalization, examining flows between countries categorized into four components: trade, capital, information and people. These components can be seen as different dimensions of globalization. Geopolitical shocks affect all of these dimensions, although some of them are not traditionally at the forefront of geopolitical scrutiny for companies, investors, and economic actors.

Red Sea Tensions and Global Information Flows

An illustrative example of that is the recent cutting of underwater cables in the Red Sea, an act that some parties attribute to Houthi rebels in Yemen. While the Houthis officially denied any responsibility, one of the affected telecoms cable operators told the Associated Press that the ‘affected segment lies within Yemeni maritime jurisdictions in the Southern Red Sea.’ Furthermore, the officially-recognized Yemeni government had warned about potential Houthi sabotage of submarine cables in the Red Sea, after a Houthi-linked Telegram channel published a map of the underwater network.

While disruptions in shipping, and consequently, trade, receive the majority of attention from analysts and the press regarding Houthi actions in the Red Sea, potential disruptions to information flows are often overlooked. This is because information flows are more commonly associated with cyber-attacks, generally falling within the domain of cybersecurity.

In general, disruptions to the global flow of capital and trade get most of the attention when considering geopolitical shocks, especially concerning their potential economic effects. One example is the increasing competition between the U.S. and China, which has resulted in many companies looking to relocate their assets to territories with reduced risk of geopolitical disruptions. Furthermore, trade flows are also widely known to be affected by geopolitical risk, as the very disruptions on the Red Sea due to Houthi attacks to commercial vessels have shown, among other several examples.

Nonetheless, the cutting of the undersea cables demonstrates that, in this era of growing geopolitical volatility, all dimensions of globalization can be impacted by these conflicts. While disruptions to trade and capital flows will undoubtedly remain pressing issues for economic stakeholders, underestimated aspects such as information flows merit closer examination. The undersea cables remain crucial in this regard.

The Importance of Undersea Cables

The immense importance that undersea cables represent in the wider global economy was highlighted by Admiral James Stavridis, a former US navy officer, who stated that “it is not satellites in the sky, but pipes on the ocean floor that form the backbone of the world’s economy.” Indeed, cables provide a significantly larger capacity for information transmission, and in a considerably more cost-effective way. In fact, 99% of international information traffic travels through these cables. Thus, ensuring their physical security remains a key component of global economic stability.

The Red Sea incident resulted in damage to four undersea cables, significantly affecting 25% of data traffic flowing from Asia to Europe. The unclear cause of the damage underscores an intrinsic problem with undersea infrastructure when it comes to risk assessment. Over 70% of cable faults result from accidental damage, such as fishing nets, anchors, or shark bites, creating an ideal ‘gray zone’ for potential attackers. Establishing culpability in such cases is extremely challenging, amplifying the vulnerability of undersea cables to intentional or unintentional threats.

States have become increasingly aware of the significant risks posed by threats to cables and the severe disruptions they can cause to information flows, as evidenced by the recent establishment of  NATO’s Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure. Nevertheless, this critical issue tends to be widely overlooked in corporate geopolitical risk assessments and strategy, as they primarily focus on disruptions to other dimensions of globalization.

Evaluating the risks associated with disruptions in information flows is a pressing concern for multinationals, investors, and anyone engaged in global economic activities. The recent Red Sea tensions serve as a poignant illustration highlighting that geopolitical events compel stakeholders to cultivate a comprehensive understanding of today’s and tomorrow’s challenges.

Fernando Prats is the Director of the Latin America Programme at London Politica, specializing in Latin American politics and geopolitical risk. His works have been featured in consultancy firms, think tanks, and media outlets in the U.S., the U.K., India, and Argentina.

The post Weak Link in Globalization? Red Sea Tensions and Global Information Flows appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.