These two attacks represent the worst terrorist attacks in Jammu & Kashmir in terms of casualties for the India army, after a relative lull in attacks since last year. The sudden escalation in violence was not unexpected, given Pakistan’s opposition to India holding the first ever G20 summit in Jammu & Kashmir, which Pakistan claims is a disputed area. Pakistan has been vehemently opposed to the G20 meeting in Jammu & Kashmir via diplomacy, political activism, and presumably its proxy terrorist groups in the area as well.

To begin with, Pakistan’s foreign office has come out with a statement condemning India’s proposal to hold G20 summit in Jammu & Kashmir.  Pakistan has stated “India’s irresponsible move is the latest in a series of self-serving measures to perpetuate its illegal occupation of Jammu and Kashmir in sheer disregard of the UN Security Council resolutions and in violation of the principles of the UN Charter and international law.” Again, on the side-lines of the recently concluded Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting in Goa, India, Pakistan Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto threatened India with an “unforgettable response” over India holding the G20 summit in Jammu & Kashmir. Additionally, Pakistan is believed to actively be engaging with G20 members such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the issue. Moreover, groups such as the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which is active in the UK, have started issuing propaganda directed against the G20 event.

Further, on the ground, terrorist groups such as PAFF have been ramping up their propaganda and threats against this G20 summit. The seeds of this opposition for the G20 summit appear to have been sown almost a year ago, when PAFF released two videos of its leaders threatening to target the Indian security forces if the G20 summit was to be held in Jammu & Kashmir.

During mid-2022, PAFF released a video in which one its unidentified members spoke of targeting the Indian army if India goes ahead with the G20 summit in 2023. With a Smith and Wesson magnum in the background, he fumes, “it has come to our notice that India is trying to organise a G20 summit in the Indian-occupied Kashmir… We are saddened and angry that the international community has chosen to stand with our aggressor in legitimising the occupation of Kashmir… This step of the international community will only radicalise people and we all know that desperate people are bound to take desperate steps and peach will never prevail” (sic).

Shortly after this, PAFF released another 1.24-minute video featuring what appeared to be the head of PAFF who again is not identified. In this video, this person with a Heckler and Koch assault rifle (HK 416) in the forefront, refers to the previous video, warning “with Rajouri operation, we begin the process and god willing we will gradually calibrate it the such a level so that the international community will come to know that Kashmir is still an occupied land and a war zone. We are very very determined to not allow India to conduct any G20 meetings in Kashmir and we will do anything and everything to achieve that” (sic).

Given the threats, there is bound to be an escalation in terrorist attacks in Jammu & Kashmir. While the PAFF has targeted the Indian security forces, it would not target international participants directly which may become counter-productive for them. Interestingly, PAFF leaders in both the above videos confirm the same thing, maintaining clarity on not targeting the international community or participants from other countries, and mentioning that the international community needs to be engaged by the Kashmir diaspora.

India at this moment appears to have been caught in a quandary. On one side, New Delhi conducting this summit will be a win for India politically, as this could be claimed as a tacit acknowledgement from the international community of India’s sovereignty over Jammu & Kashmir. Yet India cannot escalate kinetically against Pakistan for fear of falling in Pakistan’s trap of internationalising this issue. Moreover, given the possibility of more terrorist attacks before the G20 summit, the challenge for India would be stop these attacks. Any spectacular attacks at this juncture are bound to draw undue publicity, which would only end up internationalising the Jammu & Kashmir issue – precisely what Pakistan wants. It has now been reported that at least 12 well trained members of this terrorist group are active in Jammu & Kashmir, who may be possibly planning an attack of the likes of 26/11 Mumbai attacks, which drew huge international attention at that time.

In the end, both India and Pakistan are trying to ride the G20 wave. On one hand, Pakistan has been openly opposing G20 summit diplomatically, yet it has also seemingly chosen to activate terrorist groups on the ground who have mounted high casualty attacks in recent weeks, threatening even more graver ones before the G20 summit. India on the other hand, appears in an unenvious position for not being able to mount attacks immediately on terrorist launchpads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, as it had done on previous occasions such as the surgical strikes in 2016 and Balakote airstrikes in 2019. An attack on the terrorist launchpads and camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, now by India before the G20 summit, may escalate into a full-fledged conflict between India and Pakistan, given the current uncertain position of Pakistan’s army after the arrest and release of former prime minister Imran Khan.  Such an escalation is bound to draw unnecessary international attention to the Jammu & Kashmir issue, which would work in Pakistan’s and in its army’s favour, which India would ideally like to avoid. However, any further attacks in the coming days by terrorist groups may unshackle the chains of the self-imposed restraint of India.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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The seeds for this attack may have been sown as early as March 2023, when the Islamic State in its 23rd issue of Voice of Khorasan magazine carried a message entitled ‘A Message to the Inhabitants in the land occupied by Cow and Mice Worshipping Filth’ to its followers in South India, written by an individual with a kunya or nom de guerre Abu Yasir Al-Hindi (a person hailing from Hind in Hindustan). Al Hindi states that all pious Muslims should abandon Dar Al-Kufr (country ruled by non-Muslims) and perform Hijrah (religious migration). Al Hindi further commands: ‘For those who cannot make hijrah, make dar al-kufr your battleground. Put your trust in Allah, take a knife, and slice the Kafir’s throat, poison his food, burn their houses and greenery, turn their joy to sorrow and strike terror in their hearts with Allah’s help (sic).” By referring to India as Dar al-Kufr, the Islamic State has attempted to juxtapose its successful global binary template – Muslims Vs Kafirs (non-believers) – in India as well.

Notwithstanding the fact that there is still no evidence trail to suggest that the words above have actually resulted in such an attack, if it does come to be proven a consequence of the above call to arms, this will set a strong precedent for such attacks in the future by inspiring local modules.

Further, Al-Hindi ends the passage with a sermon on jihad, “Know that Jihad is an obligation on every Muslim whether he likes it or not!! (sic).” Using the concept of defensive jihad and fard al-ayn, meaning jihad becomes a legal obligation on every Muslim when Islam is threatened, Al-Hindi has attempted to strike at the emotions of the 200 million Muslims in India. While propagating the concepts of defensive jihad is not something new in the global context, it is rather a fresh idea being circulated by the Islamic State in India. Al-Hindi’s ideological predecessors, Abdullah Azzam, Anwar al-Awlaki, and Abu Musab al- Zarqawi of Al Qaeda and Zahran Hashim of the Islamic State from Sri Lanka have used this concept to deadly effect, inspiring terrorist attacks at various countries, including in India.

The current attack bears an eerie resemblance to the 2002 incendiary attack on a train near Godhra, Gujarat which killed 59 Hindu volunteers who were going for a temple construction work on a site where Babri Masjid stood. This event triggered a major communal riot in Gujarat which resulted in the death of over 1000 individuals. Another terrorist attack in 2017, a blast in Bhopal Ujjain train which was carried out by an Islamic State inspired module also appears to be similar. This was the first attack under the Islamic State banner in India which happened in the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. Around 10 persons were injured in the blast. However, the Islamic State never claimed responsibility for the blast, which indicates that this was orchestrated by a self-radicalized module. The only difference between Kerala attack and the earlier one in Madhya Pradesh is that the former is an incendiary attack compared to the latter which was a pipe bomb explosion. However, the attack in Kerala has resulted in death of three individuals, which is ostensibly the first known fatalities from an Islamic State attack outside the Jammu & Kashmir theatre.

As highlighted by the Geopolitical Monitor last week, South India has become the focus of the Islamic State and the state of Kerala appears to the core of their focus. Not surprisingly, Kerala is the common denominator in the recent attacks linked to the Islamic State. The perpetrators of the Coimbatore and Mangalore blasts visited Kerala in September 2022. And so did at least three members of the Islamic State module which were involved in the 2017 Bhopal Ujjain train bomb blast. Again, in the current incendiary attack case, this individual hailing from North India, conducting the attack in Kerala, possibly indicates a very strange coincidence.

The use of an incendiary device inside a moving train is much more lethal but less complex for individuals to plan and execute. The relative ease of attacks in terms of planning, financing and execution would be ideal for lone wolves. This may possibly appeal to individuals who may step forward to plan and carry out more such attacks in future. The fact that Islamic State has not claimed responsibility for this attack (through time of publishing) only goes on to prove that it appears to be carried out by an inspired module and not a one directly connected to the core. It would not be surprising if the Islamic State claims responsibility for this attack in Al Naba news or in its forthcoming issues of Voice of Khorasan as they did for the Coimbatore and Mangalore blasts earlier. From an individual’s perspective espousing Islamic State’s ideology and for one who might want to undertake the journey from a mere sympathizer to a loyal follower, it does not make any difference if these attacks are carried out by an Islamic State directed module or one without any links. What would appeal to the individual(s) would be only the brand and brand alone. In that sense, the Islamic State may stand to gain more from this purported attack, as more and more individuals are likely to gravitate toward it in India.

In the end, Islamic State will be pleased that its relentless campaign targeting India, albeit intermittently, is paying dividends which will further embolden the Islamic State core to mount more virulent propaganda in future. This may lead to a spiraling vicious cycle where propaganda would feed violence and violence in turn would feed further vitriolic propaganda. This attack for multiple reasons has hogged the limelight and has become the first of its kind in South India. If it is established that there are linkages to the Islamic State, then this would be the first attack perpetrated in South India by individuals inspired or affiliated to the Islamic State. And the first incendiary attack in South India. And finally, this will also be the first attack by Islamic State-affiliated individuals which is successful in terms of casualties in the whole of India. If indeed this attack is linked to the Islamic State, it will be a shot in the arm of the Islamic State in India, especially in South India.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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The claim of responsibility for the botched attempts was published in its 23^rd issue of Voice of Khorasan which came out in March 2023, almost six months after the actual events occurred. Usually, Islamic State claims its attacks immediately either through its official outlets Amaq News Agency or through statements released by its linked channels or through Al Naba Newsletter, if the attacks are carried out by modules linked to the Islamic State. On the other hand, if the attacks are carried out by inspired modules, then the claim of responsibility comes a little later and at times the attacks are not claimed at all. For instance, some of the terrorist attacks by the Islamic State in Jammu & Kashmir immediately claimed by Amaq News Agency buttress the fact that the Islamic State is swift to claim responsibility for their attacks:

• 06 Oct 2021 – assassination of an individual in Srinagar claimed on 8 Oct 2021
• 16 Oct 2021 – assassination of an individual in Srinagar claimed on 18 Oct 2021
• 02 Dec 2021 – assassination of a police personnel Rajouri, Srinagar claimed on 03 Dec 2021
• 20 April 2022 – incendiary attack in Srinagar claimed on 21 April 2022.
• 12 July 2022 – attack on Patrol in Srinagar, capturing an AK 47 rifle, claimed on 13 July 2022

However, on the contrary, the (failed) Coimbatore and Mangalore blasts were owned up by the Islamic State after an extended gap of almost six months, which is quite unlike the group. Interestingly, previous issue of Voice of Khorasan (#22) carries an article on the February 2023 earthquake in Turkey & Syria, whereas Voice of Khorasan (#23), released in March 2023 takes credit for the failed attempts at Coimbatore and Mangalore which happened in October and November 2022. This indicates that mention of these blasts may have been included as an afterthought, considering the current ground realities in India. Given these facts, one can be certain that the above modules are inspired modules and not possibly linked to the core.  And outside Jammu & Kashmir, the Islamic State has not been able to conduct an attack nor has it taken credit for an attempted one in the past. Intriguing as it may be, the delayed claim by the Islamic State and more importantly, to claim botched attempts, is possibly a ploy to exploit these incidents in order to make an ingress into South India where it has not been able to make any headway when it comes to conducting terror attacks.

This is ostensibly the first time South India has been directly mentioned in a media publication of the Islamic State. This new found posturing by the Islamic State with reference to South India is possibly intended to instigate more youngsters to join its rank in South India. The Islamic State’s specific message targeting South India states “our second message is to mujahedin all over the world, especially to mujahedin in south India. O brothers! O muwahhidin and mujahedin! O you who have been guided to the straight path, the path of truth, the path of triumph and the path of salvation (sic).” The message further threatens of more attacks in South India warning, “O Kuffar in South India, O BJP and police and military officers, By Allah we promise you a bloody revenge in return (sic).” Islamic State has been attempting to make inroads into South India since 2014. There have been multiple modules which have been discovered in the past. Out of the 40 odd cases investigated by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), almost 75% of them pertain to modules predominantly inspired by the Islamic State’s ideology, which were active in South India.  This data may have prompted the Islamic State to focus on South India where it believes that it has more traction with its followers and sympathisers

More importantly, the terrorist group in its 20^th issue of Voice of Khorasan magazine addressed the issue of ban on Popular Front of India by the Indian government. The Islamic State had called out to the supporters of PFI asking them to join its ranks stating, “O supporters of PFI who wanted to bring change through peaceful demonstration, gather under the shadow of Khilafah.” The Popular Front of India (PFI) was started by merging three entities National Development Front (NDF) from Kerala, Karnataka Forum for Dignity (KFD) from Karnataka, and Manitha Neethi Pasarai (MNP) from Tamilnadu. Hence, PFI has considerable following and presence in South India. Following its ban late last year for anti-national activities, some members of PFI switched sides to other political and non-political parties. But a majority have been left in limbo. The Islamic State by giving a clarion call to the PFI cadres who are left in the lurch, has attempted to cash in on their quandary and recruit potential foot soldiers from PFI ranks.

In line with its focus, the Islamic State appears to have started its propaganda campaign in Malayalam again. There has been a flurry of messages since February 2023 in Malayalam targeting potential recruits in the state of Kerala located in South India. This may indicate that a sizeable number of Keralites are still left with the Islamic State who performed Hijrah to Afghanistan a few years back. And there is a strong possibility that these elements could be behind this effort to revive Islamic State in India, especially in South India. The article which has claimed responsibility for the blasts in Voice of Khorasan is believed to be penned by an individual with a nom de guerre Abu Yasir Al Hindi, indicating that he is from India.

To summarise, the attacks in Coimbatore and Mangalore carried out by inspired modules appears to have got the rapt attention of the Islamic State core, albeit belatedly. Islamic State appears to sense an opportunity to capitalise on its existing sympathisers concomitantly attempting to capitalise on the PFI ban and poach its members in South India. By addressing the ban on PFI in its mouthpiece, the Islamic State has touched upon issues which are local to India.

Piggybacking on actions of inspired modules, delayed credit taking, poaching PFI members and addressing local issues, indicate that the Islamic State has realised that it has not been able to do anything substantial and appears to be desperate to prove its presence in South India. Nevertheless, this desperation should not be construed as weakness. Islamic State has been persistent in its attempt to inspire local modules to mount attacks in India since 2014. Despite multiple attempts by inspired modules, they have not tasted success, failing in the initial planning stages. Notwithstanding its previous failures, they almost pulled of two major attacks in Coimbatore and Karnataka late last year. That is precisely the reason why the Islamic State claimed responsibility for these botched attempts after a prolonged gap, hoping that this would inspire like-minded wannabe jihadis to mount terrorist attacks locally. And in its relentless pursuit to conduct attacks in India, Islamic State may find gold very soon, if the sentinels let their guard down.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The post Is South India in the Crosshairs of Islamic State? appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

The last known attack attributed to ISHP was in July 2022 in Jammu & Kashmir. The attack killed a policeman, and was claimed by ISHP’s official media outlet, Amaq News Agency. On the propaganda front, the last issue (#27) of the India-centric mouthpiece “Sawt Al Hind” (Voice of Hind) was released in May 2022. Since then, ISHP has been maintaining a low profile for reasons unknown. But now, ISHP appears to have restarted its campaign against India sometime around the beginning of 2023. This sudden flurry of propaganda activity appears to indicate a sense of urgency on the part of ISHP to reignite its campaign, which had been sagging of late.

On 23 January 2023, Al-Jauhar Media, which is linked to the Islamic State, released its first English-language magazine entitled Serat-u-Haq. The publication, which consists of six pages, criticizes local politicians and issues related to “Love Jihad.” It is still not clear if Al-Jauhar Media is officially recognized and linked to ISHP. This comes close on the heels of images showing purported members of ISHP pledging allegiance to new Islamic State leader Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi. In Dec 2022, Amaq News Agency released a set of pictures showing individuals from Wilayah Hind pledging Bayah (oath of allegiance) to the new Islamic State leader, who was announced as the Caliph in November 2022.

While sympathizers pledging Bayah to a new Caliph is routine, the launch of a new magazine, one specifically targeting Indians, is an interesting development for several reasons.

First, Serat ul Haq carries a Bayah from its team to the new Islamic State leader Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi, indicating that the module behind this magazine is a relatively new and not connected to the preexisting ISHP core media group. According to Riccardo Valle, who specializes in monitoring online terrorist content, Islamic State’s media apparatus targeting India consists of both official mouthpieces and unofficial ones which are run by its sympathizers. He claims that in April 2022, ISHP integrated all of its official channels into a core group called Nashir Al Hind, including Al Qitaal Media which translates Islamic State content into Hindi. Al Qitaal Media also gave Bayah to the previous Caliph Abu Al Hassan at that time and was later merged with the core propaganda unit. According to Valle, similarly, the channel that publishes Sawt Al Hind magazine “is seemingly close to the ISHP group,” indicating that it was not officially linked and may have merged into its network only in April 2022 when it had already published at least 25 of its 27 issues. On the other hand, though the channel Al Jauhar Media which had published Serat ul Haq does not belong to the ISHP media team at present, it will eventually be integrated into its core when it is still in its infancy as it had given Bayah. The impending integration and the early start advantage for Serat ul Haq will help gain more traction among its sympathizers in India.

Second, the content of its earlier magazine Sawt Al Hind covered events and incidents in South Asia, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Though the majority of the content focused on India, some of its editions carried articles covering other regions as well, writes Daniele Garofalo, a Jihadi terrorism analyst who closely follows Islamic State’s propaganda activities. However, going by the first issue of Serat ul Haq, this magazine appears to cover political events and incidents inside India or the content appears to be India-centric. This probably showcases the intent of ISHP to target Indian sympathizers.

Third, in January 2023, the government of India declared an individual named Aijaz Ahmad Ahanger as an individual terrorist suspected to be in charge of propaganda and recruitment for ISHP. Ahanger, who goes by the nom de guerre Abu Usman Al Kashmiri, was the main pivot of ISHP media operations targeting India. Ahanger was arrested along with Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) chief Aslam Farooqui in 2020 by Afghan intelligence in Kandahar, soon after the Gurudwara blast in Kabul. Also noteworthy to mention is that his son, Abdullah Umais, was also a member of the Islamic State and is believed to have been killed in Afghanistan. His son-in-law, Husaifa Al Bakistani was handling the media operations of ISKP and was the chief recruiter targeting Jammu & Kashmir until his death in 2019. Incidentally, Ahanger escaped from Kabul in August 2021 after the Taliban takeover and is currently believed to be reorganizing ISHP media and recruitment operations in India. Born in Jammu & Kashmir, Ahanger is familiar with India and will be able to easily re-establish ISHP infrastructure both inside and outside India. Though Ahanger has been active against Indian interests since 1996, joining various terrorist groups like Lashkar E Toiba, Al Qaeda, and later ISKP, the fact that the Indian government only banned him in 2023 highlights the importance of Abu Usman Al Kashmiri in ISHP recruitment and media operations.

Fourth, and most importantly, being India-centric, Serat ul Haq can cover the activity of its local sympathizers which has not been acknowledged or covered by ISHP core media. India has seen more of Islamic State-inspired modules rather than modules directly connected to the Islamic State leadership. Not all of these find a place in Islamic State’s official media outlets like Amaq, Al Naba, and Sawt Al Hind. Ever since Amaq News Agency announced the creation of Wilayah Hind in May 2019, information pertaining to various activities like Bayah ceremony or terrorist attacks have found little mention in Islamic State’s official mouth pieces. Even those published by the above media outlets often publish only actions perpetrated by officially-linked modules, covering Jammu & Kashmir only. For instance, Amaq has published Bayah activities related to ISHP in March 2022 and December 2022. It appears to have covered only a handful of terrorist attacks in Jammu & Kashmir, including the killing of a street vendor in October 2021. Whereas Wilayah Hind has found mention only three times since 2020 in the Al Naba Newsletter (in September 2022, December 2021, and July 2022). Though Sawt Al Hind did focus on India primarily, its focus largely vectored on modules linked only to the Islamic State core operating in Jammu & Kashmir.

Small autonomous networks inspired by Islamic State ideology, though not connected to the core, have been discovered outside Jammu & Kashmir in other parts of India. These have been ignored by the Islamic State official media apparatus.  The National Investigation Agency has registered around 40 cases related to Islamic State activities in India. The majority of these pertain to Islamic State modules which have been inspired by its ideology but are not directly linked to the core. Some of these cases have been high-profile and have created panic among the general public. For instance, two recent blasts in South India, both involving individuals, were inspired by Islamic State ideology. Jameesha Mobin from Coimbatore died when he attempted to deploy a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu in October 2022. He was killed when the vehicle exploded “accidentally.” Though he was not part of any Islamic State network, investigators later found Islamic State graffiti and other materials in his house showcasing that he was inspired by Islamic State ideology. Similarly. Mohammed Shariq was injured in an accidental explosion when he attempted plant a pressure cooker bomb in Mangalore, Karnataka in November 2022. Again, he appears to not have links to the Islamic State core but was inspired by its ideology.

These incidents have not been mentioned or covered by any of the official media outlets linked to Islamic State. They showcase the fact that activities perpetrated by “inspired” individuals in other parts of India outside Jammu & Kashmir have largely been ignored by the official media outlets linked to the Islamic State. Serat ul Haq may possibly fill this void and attempt to gain mileage out of it.

To summarize, despite the global efforts to clampdown on Islamic State media activities, the terrorist group has managed to survive inorganically to date via mergers and integrations. Though the remnants of official Islamic State propaganda machinery are active today, it is the emergence of smaller propaganda units at domestic levels which indicate that its ideology has had a far-reaching impact, posing a challenge to counter-terrorism regimes the world over, including India. Time and again, one has witnessed new modules inspired by Islamic State ideology in India which are as dangerous as the modules linked to the core. But equally dangerous are local media units like the ones which have released Serat ul Haq espousing Islamic State ideology. These propaganda units attempt to fill in the vacuum where Islamic State’s core is not present. But the real challenge for these local units will be survival, and the key to this survival, given their limited resources, will be determined by the Islamic State’s ideological reach, span, and their eventual integration into the core.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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AQIS’s India-centric Propaganda

Ever since AQIS renamed its Urdu language magazine to highlight India as a new focus area in March 2020, there has been an uptick in India-centric propaganda emanating from AQIS. Time and again, AQIS has released messages instigating Indian Muslims to rise against the Indian government over contemporary issues in Indian politics. Some India-centric messages and statements include:

• May 2020 – AQIS chief Ustad Mahmood issues a message to Muslims urging them to join the Ghazwa-e-Hind.
• June 2020 – AQIS in Nawa-i-Ghazwa-e-Hind magazine publishes a letter from a Kashmiri girl who wanted to be a suicide bomber and kill Indians.
• October 2020 – AQIS in Nawa-i-Ghazwa-e-Hind magazine claims that battle for Ghazwa-e-Hind has begun, inviting members from Dhaka, Delhi, And Mumbai.
• January 2021 – AQIS in Nawa-i-Ghazwa-e-Hind magazine publishes a report on jihad and Babri Masjid.
• Sep 2021 – AQIS in Nawa-i-Ghazwa-e-Hind magazine issues condolences over Kashmiri separatist leader Geelani’s death and extolls about Kashmir.
• October 2021 – AQIS in Nawa-i-Ghazwa-e-Hind magazine carried an article asking Indian Muslims to head to jihadi fields and wage jihad against oppressor polytheists.
• October 2021 – AQIS releases a video calling for jihad in Kashmir and Assam.
• November 2021 – AQIS releases a documentary on atrocities targeting Muslims and calls for jihad against India.
• January 2022 – AQIS in Nawa-i-Ghazwa-e-Hind magazine issues a clarion call for Muslims to be ready for jihad stating ‘Hindus Are Getting Prepared for Muslim Genocide in India.’
• February/March 2022 – AQIS in Nawa-i-Ghazwa-e-Hind magazine carries image of a girl, Muskan Khan, on its cover, who defied a Hijab ban in Karnataka, India
• April 2022 – Al Qaeda leader Ayman Al Zawahiri spoke on Hijab issue and urged Muslims in India to wage jihad and make Hijrah to Assam.
• June 2022 – AQIS releases a statement on blasphemy committed by a Hindu leader in India and urges Muslims to avenge such acts. It also threatens to carry out suicide attacks in Delhi, Mumbai, UP and Gujarat.
• September 2022 – AQIS in Nawa-i-Ghazwa-e-Hind magazine eulogizes those who opposed blasphemers in India.
• November 2022 – AQIS in Nawa-i-Ghazwa-e-Hind magazine carries an article focusing on India.
• Dec 2022 – AQIS in Nawa-i-Ghazwa-e-Hind magazine publishes picture of Babri Masjid on its cover, coinciding with Babri Masjid demolition anniversary on December 6.

Yet despite this apparent focus on India, AQIS has not been able to mount any terror attacks in Jammu & Kashmir let alone elsewhere in India. While this propaganda appears to be mere empty rhetoric sans actions on the ground, one should not discount the fact that AQIS has been able to open another front in Assam in India’s northeast, which is broadly in line with Ayman Al Zawahiri’s April 2022 message calling for Hijrah to Assam.

AQIS’s Assam Outreach

The state of Assam has been the primary focus of AQIS since 2021, Jammu & Kashmir aside. AQIS in October 2021 released a video entitled “Don’t Sit Idly by Grieving,” calling for Muslims to perform Hijrah to Kashmir and Assam. Zawahiri’s April 2022 message also focused on instigating Muslims to perform Hijrah to Assam. Strangely, between the first AQIS message in Oct 2021 and Zawahiri’s Hijrah message in April 2022, Indian intelligence and security agencies broke up at least 5 AQIS cells in Assam itself, suggesting that these messages themselves amounted to a dead giveaway.

Between February 2022 and October 2022, around 53 individuals, including Bangladeshis, have been arrested by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and by Assam police for belonging to an AQIS network. These individuals have been linked to Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) which is affiliated with Al Qaeda. At least 9 AQIS cells are believed to have been neutralized in Assam and in its vicinity, clearly showcasing the fact that AQIS has in fact opened a new front in Assam in India’s northeast. Given the fact that Assam is blessed with around 35% of a Muslim population, along with its geographic proximity to Bangladesh, where Al Qaeda is believed to have a strong presence, AQIS appears to have intentionally chosen Assam as the next Hijrah destination apart from Jammu & Kashmir in India.  The seeds of this effort may have been sown as early as 2018 when AQIS dispatched one Saiful Islam, a resident of Narayanganj district in Bangladesh, into India. Saiful Islam crossed over illegally into India and became an Arabic teacher in a Madrassa. He did not indulge in any terrorist activity but blended into the local society by marrying a local girl. This AQIS network started spreading into other parts of Assam where the Imams and Islamic preachers were also targeted along with young recruits.

The intention of AQIS was simple and envisaged with a long-term plan. AQIS had set up Madrassas for recruitment, religious indoctrination, and training. In this way, AQIS managed to setup at least 3-4 religious centers where young recruits were indoctrinated. Of the 53 individuals arrested, there were at least 5 religious teachers, indicating that the intention was not just to carry out immediate terror attacks but to prepare youngsters for the future. Unlike other terrorist groups, AQIS methodology appears to be built with foresight in mind by gradually creating capacity and setting up physical infrastructure in place, rather than infiltrating terrorists for carrying out one-time attacks.

Understanding the gravity of the situation, the Assam government-initiated measures to regulate the working of Madrassas. To begin with, the Assam government to date has demolished at least 3 Madrassas in Barpeta, Morigaon, and Bongaigaon district, all of which were linked to AQIS. Concomitantly, it has also started merging at least 100 small Madrassas (with 50 Islamic students) with bigger Madrassas, with active involvement from the local Islamic community. Interestingly, the government is also contemplating modernizing the curriculum of the MadrassasInterestingly, the government is also contemplating modernizing the curriculum of the Madrassas.

On the surface, AQIS appears to have failed to match its propaganda with action in India. However, though the threat posed by AQIS may have receded for now, the fact that the group has managed to open another front in Assam given its current constraints speaks a lot about its intentions. AQIS, with its well-calibrated planning, is preparing for the long haul, which in turn has caught many by surprise. In this sense, AQIS did not recruit terrorists for the moment but rather for the future, for the prophesized Ghazwa-e Hind which could one day become a reality if the Indian sentinels don’t wake up from their complacent slumber.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Ghazwa-e-Hind resurrected

“Make Hijrah for Allah, Hijrah to Assam, Hijrah to Kashmir” appeals a sermonic voice purportedly belonging to an individual named “Ustad” in a 1:45 video clip. “Ustad” is otherwise known by his nom de guerre Abu Sufiyan. He is also known by his real name, Farhatullah Ghori, among counter-terrorism experts in India. He is one of the most wanted terrorists with direct links to top leadership of Pakistan based terrorist group Lashkar E Toiba (LeT) and Harkat ul Jihadi al Islami (HUJI) in the 2000s. Considered to be one of the masterminds of the Aksardham Temple attack in Gujarat (2002) and a suicide attack on a Special Task Force camp at Hyderabad (2005), he has evaded arrest ever since. Indian authorities have been chasing this individual, an elusive ghost, despite a Red Corner Notice. Evidence suggests that Ghori was initially in Saudi Arabia but may have moved into Pakistan now.

Ghori has released at least 10 videos since March 2022, the latest coming at the end of June 2022. These videos could not be independently verified, but a report from The Print, indicates that they are most likely made by Ghori or at his behest. “Commence preparations for Jihad” demands Ghori to the Islamic community in a video series titled Ghazwa Series. Ghori’s videos touches upon contemporary issues involving Islamic community in India. While one video talks about 2008 Ahmedabad blast case convictions in February 2022, in which 38 terrorists were sentenced to death for their role, others touch upon the blasphemy issue involving Nupur Sharma, the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), the National Registry for Citizens (NRC), etc., This is not the first time such a clarion call for Ghazwa-e-Hind (the prophesied final battle against India) has been made. The Islamic State and Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) had made similar calls earlier, highlighted by Geopolitical Monitor. Nonetheless, this is the first time, an individual terrorist sans organizational backing, has made such a call. Understandably, Ghori brings up contemporary issues perceived to be against the Islamic community in India, possibly to ignite their passion and push them in the path of jihad. This sudden rise from the deep slumber and his clarion call for Ghazwa-e-Hind is interesting and intriguing. Except for a brief reference in a terror case in Karnataka in 2013, Ghori has remained in hibernation for almost 17 years since 2005 till his current message in March 2022. This unexpected message from Ghori appears to benefit Pakistan and create fallout that may affect India.

Pakistan’s plausible deniability

For Pakistan, any alternative to terrorist groups that allows it to keep India engaged in an asymmetric war is a blessing in disguise. Pakistan is under immense international pressure to clamp down on terrorist groups and its leaders operating from Pakistan. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) brought Pakistan under the “Grey List” in 2018 for failing to take action on terrorist groups and their finances. Pakistan has since been retained in the Grey List by the FATF, at times threatening Pakistan with elevation to the “Black List” and subsequent sanctions which would throw an already economically weakened Pakistan into an economic and social chaos. Fearing the eventuality, Pakistan has shown some progress, albeit superficial, by arresting and convicting leaders of terrorist groups such as Lashkar E Toiba (LeT) and Jaish E Mohammed (JEM). Terrorist leaders Hafiz Saeed, Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi and Abdul Rehman Makki have been convicted for their role in financing terrorism. But more recently, in a desperation to escape the Grey List, Pakistan appears have done the unthinkable: convicted an individual named Sajid Mir in May 2022, someone who was otherwise declared dead in 2021. Mir, one of most wanted terrorists for his role in the Mumbai terrorist attacks (2008) which killed 160 people, was arrested and convicted in May 2022, despite some media claims that he died in 2021, citing Pakistani authorities.

Such a Pakistani Volte-face was on expected lines considering the precarious situation the government finds itself in. As a result, FATF has finally consented to an onsite verification in Oct 2022 to delist Pakistan from the “jurisdiction under increased monitoring” (the ‘Grey List’). Given the unenviable position Pakistan is in, it would be highly risky and foolish to deploy its traditional terrorist groups such as LeT and JeM against India. Any risk of exposure will sabotage the efforts which Pakistan undertook to assuage the FATF. Against this backdrop, activating “Indianized” versions of terror modules, such as the ones which can be operated by individuals like Ghori, is a viable alternative for Pakistan to keep the jihadi flames burning against India. Already some of the groups operating in Jammu & Kashmir have shed their Pakistani color and are trying to project themselves as indigenous ones, claiming to “wage revolutionary war” against an occupying force. A similar template appears to have been used by Pakistan in using Indian citizens, possibly in order to claim plausible deniability amid any future terrorist event against India.

India’s challenge

Firstly, the character of the struggle of these terrorist groups, especially in South India, appears to gradually project more traditional Salafi ideas in order to justify their campaign. The current campaign also appears to incorporate the classic binary concept using the “us vs them” (Islam vs Kufr) analogy. Groups operating in Jammu & Kashmir along with Islamic State-linked modules have been using these Salafi ideas such as Jihad, Tawheed (oneness of Allah), Hijrah (religious migration), and Takfir (excommunication of Muslim deviants) in recent years. Ostensibly, it is the first time that such a campaign has been started outside the Jammu & Kashmir theatre. Ghori attempts to obligate jihad as a religious and legal duly of every Muslim.  “Jihad is the forgotten obligation” pronounces Ghori, echoing the idea that Jihad is the legal obligation of every pious Muslim in India. This interpretation was first expounded by 14th century scholar Abu by Zakaryya Dimashqi al-Dumyati, who authored The Book of Jihad. More recently, this concept of Jihad as a legal obligation was applied on the field by Al Qaeda ideologue Abdullah Azzam who emphasized that jihad is a legal obligation (fard al-ayn) of every Muslim. As did others such as Anwar Al Awlaki (Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula) and Zahran Hashim (Islamic State in Sri Lanka). Drawing parallels, the same template is now being juxtaposed using religious interpretation on various contentious and contemporary issues troubling the Islamic community in India.

Secondly, this latest call may possibly create a new security threat in India – leaderless Jihad, which has not been witnessed before. In a 6:45 video entitled “Important Message on Blasphemy in India – Defend Your Prophet,” Ghori has carefully but intentionally constructed phrases such as “sharpen your knife, O Mujahid, strike their knecks (sic)”. Ghori has attempted to instigate youngsters to mount attacks on civilians and other soft targets which is a key feature of leaderless jihad. He appeals “Prepare O Mujahid and carry out martyrdom attacks,” which does not attribute membership to any organization but appeals to the Islamic community to perform Hijrah and jihad invoking historical instances of Prophet’s companions Salim Ibn Umair and Muhammed Ibn Maslama who killed people who offended Prophet Mohammed. Ghori claims that these revenge attacks happened earlier and will happen now as well citing Charlie Hebdo attacks where the attackers are believed to have shouted “we have avenged the Prophet” during the attacks. He even refers to the Garland Texas attacks on a cartoon competition of the Prophet Mohammed. Both these attacks were carried out by individuals to avenge cartoon depictions of Prophet Mohammed. Additionally, Ghori has used images of Kamlesh Tiwari, a right-wing activist who was killed for his derogatory comments on the Prophet, thus equating local attacks with those outside India for blasphemy. By citing instances of individuals or loosely held groups carrying out revenge attacks globally and in India, Ghori appears to be instigating lone wolf attacks or leaderless jihad in India. Ominous signs are already evident on the ground. Just a week after the video was released, two men beheaded an individual who supported Nupur Sharma for her blasphemous comments regarding Prophet Mohammed. In a classic Islamic State-style execution, the accused Riaz Akhtari and Gos Mohammad, filmed the murder and circulated it on social media. However, there is no evidence yet to suggest that the killers were inspired by these videos from Ghori.

Thirdly, there are at least 36 individuals who are listed under the provisions of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 by the Indian government as hardcore terrorists.  All of these either belong to LeT, JeM or Khalistani groups which have links to Pakistan. Apart from these, some of the Indians who have been involved in acts of terrorism are believed to be hiding in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan under Pakistani protection. Terrorists like Abu Hamsa (aka Abu Bari), Andhra Pradesh, and Abu Bakar Siddiqui are senior terrorist leaders with strong LeT links. It is widely believed among Indian intelligence agencies that both these along with Ghori are tasked with setting up modules in South India. In the past, multiple attempts were made to create cells in South India. Given the above, there may be a new recruitment wave conducted by these operatives, who may be activated by Pakistan till such time it wriggles out of the FATF quagmire.

Conclusion

To summarize, the appeal for Ghazwa-e-Hind appears to be an effort to revive terrorism in India outside Jammu & Kashmir by Pakistan-sponsored groups. Such appeals are common among groups in Jammu & Kashmir. On one hand, Pakistan under pressure from the international community, is likely to gain from the fallout temporarily. On the other hand, the Indian security planners may face new challenges such as increased extremist violence and leaderless jihad. While a reprieve for Pakistan in the FATF may see sudden spurt in jihadist violence in India by terrorist groups, conversely any retention in the “Grey List” may raise the likelihood of new lone wolf attacks in India.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com

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AQIS Takes Aim at Kashmir

In June 2017, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent released a “code of conduct” for its members to follow. This document, which was released by Al Qaeda (AQ)-linked media arm, As-Sahab Media Subcontinent, was widely circulated through pro-AQ social media platforms.

This latest message, in the form of a report, gives a clarion call to implement Sharia and also to unite other Jihadi groups under one single umbrella in the Indian subcontinent. It calls upon other jihadi groups to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State of Afghanistan. It states: “We will work with jihadi groups (that are independent from intelligence agencies influence) in India, Bangladesh and Arakan (Burma), based on these same principles.” The operational arc as outlined by this document encompasses India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma.

The document also lays its main targets which are as follows: “In Pakistan – US interests, military, police, and intelligence officials, the Government of Pakistan, Kafirs (infidels) who suppress Muslims. In India and Bangladesh – police and military officials, heads of Hindu separatist organizations. In Burma – the military and the armed Buddhist groups.”

This newest message is conspicuously different from previous messages released by AQIS. For one, there’s its newfound focus on India, particularly Kashmir. For example, a video message in March 2016 released by AQIS states its main targeting priorities as: “the United States; the military, intelligence, and security agencies in Pakistan; the Pakistani government; persons who extort Muslim businesses and kill Sunni reli­gious scholars and atheists, blasphemers and nonbelievers who actively oppose Islam.” Notwithstanding other direct messages aimed at Kashmir, the above AQIS document stands out as unique as it reflects their objective and purpose for the entire South Asian region. The reason for this focus, AQIS claims, is that the Indian state is the “fundamental obstacle” in the formation of an Islamic India.

Factoring the above, there is an imperative for Indian security planners to understand the timing of this release which would actually be germane to understanding the reasons and the possible impact of this newfound focus of AQIS on Kashmir.

Nationalists versus Islamists

Events preceding this latest release might have played a very important part in shaping the present focus and direction of AQIS.

Firstly, since Burhan Wani’s death last year, Kashmir has been in a state of turmoil. Burhan Wani’s first death anniversary was observed on July 8, 2017, and it was marred by clashes between the security forces and the Kashmiri militants. AQIS has repeatedly tried to leverage the turmoil created by Burhan Wani’s death. AQIS head Maulana Asim Umar has even released an audio recording eulogizing Wani during the anniversary last week.

Secondly, the split in the Hizbul Mujahideen’s ranks created following the departure of Zakir Musa is another important factor. Musa succeeded Burhan Wani as the commander of Hizbul Mujahideen, and he gave a clarion call to enforce Sharia in Kashmir in May 2017. Noticeably, Musa departed from Hizbul Mujahideen’s known position of fighting for Azaad Kashmir to Islamic Kashmir. Musa in his first address on implementing Sharia:

If Hurriyat has to run its politics it shouldn’t be a thorn in our way, otherwise we will chop off their heads. If you will be a thorn in our way, we will leave the infidels and kill you first. These have come to run politics. Our Kashmir war, particularly of the Mujahideen, is only to enforce Sharia. It is an Islamic struggle. The people need not be confused (sic).

Later in June 2017, Zakir Musa floated a new outfit, Taliban-e-Kashmir linked to the Al Qaeda. Zakir Musa on the first anniversary of Burhan Wani’s death in July 2017 stated: “Today the slogan of Shariayat or Shahadat (Islamic divine law or martyrdom) and Caliphate reverberating in Kashmir is because of the mentorship and guidance of Burhan Bhai” (sic). (This message was circulated widely through pro-Kashmiri telegram channels).

This sudden departure from “Azaad Kashmir,” rejecting nationalism to create an “Islamic Kashmir” or “Islamic rectification of the Kashmir struggle,” as the Taliban magazine Nawai Afghan Jihad calls it, has actually found some resonance with local Kashmiri youngsters as well as with AQIS, as it is in alignment with their already stated approach to implementing Sharia in Kashmir.

Against this background, the split in local militant ranks, especially in the Hizbul Mujahideen and the convergence of ideology between the emerging local groups and AQIS, presents AQIS with a window of opportunity to gain entry into India; the group has to date failed to mobilize Indian Muslims to conduct terror attacks within India.

A Wake-Up Call for India

This marriage of convenience would have serious ramifications for India’s internal security:

Integration into the regional jihadi theatre. Firstly, the Kashmiri freedom movement which has largely been relegated among its peer movement in other parts of the world such as the Palestine, Iraq, and Syria in the eyes of the Islamic community, especially the global jihadis, will find its recognition. This is due to the fact that there is a conflation of Sharia ideology between the international terrorist organizations which espouse extremist Islamic ideology and the various emerging Kashmiri militant groups such as those headed by Zakir Musa.

Attempts to highlight the Kashmiri struggle to outsiders on lines similar to Palestine, Sham (Syria), and Khorasan (Afghanistan) are already afoot in social media platforms linked to Kashmiri groups which support the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in Kashmir. Even the semantics used in the messages appear to have undergone transition. Some of the telegram channels are trying to mimic or imitate jargon used on channels such as “Khilafah News” that propagate Islamic State ideology. Terms such as mushriqe (non-believers, referring to the Indian army as a “Hindu” army) and Kashmir as “Hindu-occupied Kashmir” are being repeatedly used in telegram channels supporting Islamic Sharia in Kashmir. Such channels are using terms such as Rahimullah and Hafizullah (while referring to the Mujahideens who have died or still waging jihad respectively).  This kind of terminology is widely used among telegram chats linked to Islamic State and Al Qaeda; it indicates a changing narrative adopted by emerging Kashmiri groups to appeal to the larger section of the Islamic community outside of India, and more particularly – to the jihadis outside India.

This is where AQIS stands to gain as it will find it less difficult at present to gain traction among the indigenous Kashmiri population compared to earlier occasions. AQIS’ primary focus is to integrate jihadi operations from Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar under one single umbrella in South Asia.

Integration of India, especially Kashmir into such a regional jihadi theatre will have serious consequences. It will ensure movement of men, materials, and money across these countries. Such an integration based on establishing an Islamic Caliphate in Kashmir will also increase patronage and will ensure that there is a steady flow of funds into Kashmir from outside India, apart from Pakistan, which has been the primary financier of militancy in Kashmir to date. Ground realities indicate that the concept of “Islamic Caliphate in Kashmir” has already earned support among other jihadi brethren.

Co-option and institutionalization. Two important things stand out from the AQIS document: the call for unity and the call for Sharia. AQIS’s invitation to other likeminded groups to merge or work with them in South Asia is in line AQ’s original objective of co-opting local terrorist networks. This was also emphasized while formally creating AQIS in September of 2014.  In doing this, AQIS intends to institutionalize the operational mechanisms with other smaller terrorists groups in South Asia.

Autonomous modules. Smaller groups such as Zakir Musa’s which are growing in numbers, will gravitate towards AQIS and act as an extended reach of AQIS in India. In the future, larger groups could be replaced with smaller autonomous modules owing allegiance to AQIS. Smaller modules are more efficient and highly difficult to interdict compared to larger groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Hizbul Mujahideen, as they tend to enjoy better advantages such as secrecy of operations and self-sufficiency.

These autonomous, self-contained groups could pose serious problems not only in Kashmir but also in other parts of India. There are already ominous signs of things to come in India. Last year, a small self-contained module owing allegiance to Al Qaeda, known as the ‘Base Movement’ was busted in Tamil Nadu. This cell was responsible for a series of bomb blasts in courts in Kerala, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. This cell did not have any direct links key AQ operatives, though it was inspired by AQ ideology. Similar episodes could well play out in the future in other parts of the country.

Spiraling sibling rivalries among jihadi groups. The swing toward Islamic Caliphate in Kashmir could actually intensify jihadi rivalries there. Groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Hizbul Mujahideen, which strive for Azaad Kashmir supported by Pakistan, will be pitted against transnational groups such as the Islamic State and Al Qaeda respectively who strive for establishing an Islamic Caliphate in Kashmir. In that sense, AQ-linked Zakir Musa group will also directly take on other larger terrorists networks who fight for the nationalist cause. And add to this the existing bitter rivalry between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State elsewhere globally, both of which share Islamic Caliphate ideology. Each of these groups would try to up the ante against each other which would actually translate into spiraling violence in Kashmir. Groups linked to AQIS support Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, commonly referred to as Tahrir al-Sham, which opposes Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. This rivalry would actually play out in Kashmir as well.

Aggressive progenies. Finally, the nationalists vs. Islamic Caliphate debate is going to create vertical splits in larger groups. According to open source reports, Zakir Musa’s group has already succeeded in poaching a sizable number of recruits from other terrorist organizations operating in Kashmir, with estimated strength of 20 to 25 members. Splinter groups are far more ferocious and aggressive compared to their parents as they would try upstage their former allies by ramping up violence levels, thus attracting new recruits and funds.

Conclusion

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent may have just found the opening it has been looking for over the years to gain a foothold in India. Yet, AQIS may also find a bitter enemy in Islamic State and other jihadi groups rather than the Indian state. On one hand, we have groups which espouse a nationalist cause and on the other, groups which espouse the establishment of an Islamist Caliphate. There is no love lost among the groups advocating for an Islamist Caliphate in Kashmir. Thus, there is a vicious triangle of hatred and violence which is bound to escalate as each of these groups attempt to one-up the others.

To summarize, pro-Caliphate graffiti, photos of kids holding jihadist posters, and few armed young men may not mean anything to the Indian security establishment. Yet, if left unchecked, these trends could lead to a groundswell in the future against the Indian government. The Indian government needs to implement various measures in tandem, including the development of approaches such as providing opportunities to youngsters, fine-tuning existing surrender policies as well as organizational approaches such as leader liquidation and restricting funding sources to terrorist groups. In spite of the grave threat that this situation represents, it may also present the intelligence agencies with an opportunity to tap potential fissures among the groups, albeit at high human cost due to the potential for spiraling violence.

In the end, the present turmoil in Kashmir has not been witnessed ever since the militancy broke out. Recent incidents indicate that there is an orchestrated effort to change the color of militancy in Kashmir, i.e., one from Azaad Kashmir to Islamic Caliphate in Kashmir. A clarion call to establish Islamic Kashmir under Sharia may appeal not only to the Kashmiri youngsters but also to other jihadis outside India as well. As the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant is losing territory, the prospect of more and more of the wannabe jihadis looking for greener pastures is growing, and Kashmir could well become one of those greener pastures.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The post Rebranding Kashmiri Militancy: From Independence to an Islamic Caliphate appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

This message comes in the wake of widespread protests in Jammu and Kashmir for the past one week as a result of the death of a popular flamboyant militant leader, Burhan Wani belonging to the Hizbul Mujahideen. The mass protests have left 30 dead and hundreds injured; they have witnessed scenes of army camps being attacked by unruly mobs and weapon snatched from army men. All these occurrences have been mentioned in the AQIS statement as well, indicating a possible change in the AQIS strategy while attempting to up the ante in India. It is quite unlike AQIS to come out with statements in real-time; they rarely coincide with the actual incidents that trigger them. This Kashmir-centric message closely follows an earlier statement by AQIS, which, though not incident or region-specific, also has aimed to instigate Indian Muslims.  The message titled “No to the slogan of disbelief” was released by the head of AQIS, Moulana Asim Umar.

“Even if you come out with merely knives and sword,” proclaims Moulana Asim Umar in the earlier message, “history bears witness – Hindus cannot withstand you.”

Last week, the United States government listed Moulana Asim Umar as a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) and Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO). Additional information provided by the US State Department states that the AQIS was involved in the attack on a naval dockyard in Karachi. As highlighted by Geopolitical Monitor earlier this year, the plan was to attack PNS Mehran, a naval base in Karachi and hijack a warship, the PNS Zulfiqur, to target the Indian coastline and also US warships in the Indian Ocean. The US communiqué also blames AQIS for murders including that of a US citizen in Bangladesh. And most importantly, it also points out that Moulana Asim Umar is a former member of the banned Pakistan based, Harkat -ul-Mujahideen.

The US action follows Moulana Asim Umar’s identification as Sanaul Haq last December, when several operatives of AQIS were arrested by Indian intelligence agencies. Haq’s journey to AQIS started from his hometown in Sambhal district in Uttar Pradesh, which is around 150 kilometers from India’s capital Delhi. Armed with a graduation from the famous Dar-ul-Uloom seminary in Deoband in 1991, Haq’s baptism into extremism happened in 1992 after the demolition of Babri Masjid in Uttar Pradesh before moving to Pakistan in 1995.

According to the Indian Express, Haq joined the Jamia Uloom-e-Islamia-a Karachi seminary that has produced several terrorist leaders such as Maulana Masood Azhar, the leader of the Jaish-e-Muhammad, Qari Saifullah Akhtar, who headed the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, and Fazl-ur-Rehman Khalil, the leader of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. After his studies, he joined the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, imparting his teachings at Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania seminary in Peshawar and training jihadists at training camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). In 2007, Haq came in contact with Illyas Kashmiri, who had close links to Al Qaeda, and gradually move up the ladder in Al Qaeda.

Now coming back to the messages, these two recent messages which have been released in short rapidity have come a long time after the formation of AQIS by Ayman al Zawahiri in September, 2014. Though there is some conflation on certain aspects between these messages, they are perched diagrammatically at opposing ends on aspects which merit further scrutiny. Firstly, both the messages talk about how gullible Muslim clerics in India have deceived the Muslim masses.  By doing so, AQIS is seen attempting to discredit mainstream Muslim organisations which propagate moderate Islamic values in India. Secondly, both the messages advocate lone wolf attacks. While, the Kashmiri message encourages “decentralised” attacks on armed forces using rudimentary tactics such as knifes which have been highly successful in Israel, the other message from Moulana Asim Umar instigates lone wolf attacks on government civil servants and to start riots in turn to cause financial losses.

However, the messages do have some divergent views as well. Firstly, the Kashmiri message provides tactical and operational measures such as using Molotov cocktails (petrol bombs), and measures to reduce the impact of tear gas, etc. This appears to be picked straight out of the Palestine intifada days, where similar tactics were adopted by Palestinians in their struggle against the Israelis.  These measures certainly reflect the mindset of AQIS to escalate the conflict to the next level.

On the other hand, the message from Moulana Asim Umar is more of a sermon, attempting to invigorate the Muslim community, but completely bereft of tactical measures. This message mostly dwells on recent issues which have plagued the communal harmony in India such as the anti-Muslim riots and controversies related to chanting nationalistic slogans such as “Band-e-mataram,” meaning “I bow to thee holy mother”; “Jaey mata,” meaning “long live holy mother”; and “Bharat mata ki jai,” meaning “long live holy mother India,” which AQIS considers un-Islamic.

The primary reason for this divergence could be that AQIS perceives the Kashmir theater to be at a slightly advanced stage of the jihadi struggle compared to the pan-Indian jihadi struggle. In fact, AQIS even eulogizes the Kashmiri freedom struggle as a precursor to the Arab Spring, buttressing the thinking that AQIS accords a different treatment for jihad in Kashmir than the rest of India.

Given the disparate yet common threads of these messages, AQIS’ intended objectives here, when seen from the larger organizational perspective, appears to be more internal. They revolve around the group’s own desperation from not being able to make inroads into India, which is further aggravated by rivalries among the jihadi groups. The only known AQIS module was busted by Indian intelligence when 5 operatives of AQIS were arrested in December, 2015. As opposed to this, the Islamic State has been able to make significant inroads in terms of drawing youngsters who either travel to Syria or form localized cells in India which the AQIS has not been able to match. This fledgling competition with Islamic State and dearth of recruits could be the reason as to why AQIS has come out with messages in such rapid succession.

Interestingly, both the AQIS statements aimed at India have come at a time which coincides with a video released by the Islamic State, showing Indian members of the Islamic State in Syria. This release more or less appears as an AQIS effort to “up the ante” against Islamic State. There is a high possibility that the coming days will witness matching messages and responses directed at each other from both these groups. This sibling rivalry is not only bound to push the actual conflict to higher levels but also the “war of ideas,” each propagating their own ideology.

The post AQIS Ups the Ante, but against India or Islamic State? appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Last week, six heavily armed men stormed the Holey Artisan Bakery and restaurant in Dhaka, killing 22 persons including 11 Italians, 7 Japanese, 2 Bangladeshis, and 1 Indian. This attack stands unrivalled compared to other attacks in Bangladesh in terms of scale and size. The attack was purportedly orchestrated by Islamic State, and it marks a clear departure from the group’s earlier attacks which were quite rudimentary and less sophisticated in nature. However, Dhaka continues to be in denial, and has dismissed the presence of Islamic State in Bangladesh. Dhaka has strongly denied Islamic State’s role in this latest terrorist attack, claiming that the attack was perpetrated by “homegrown” groups, ruling out operational linkages of this group with the Islamic State.

Dhaka’s assertion has thrown up two different hypothesis, both of which are inter-linked with each other. First, whether the Islamic State is present in Bangladesh and the second, whether Islamic State is linked to this latest attack. However, notwithstanding Dhaka’s denial, ground-level realities appear to indicate both the presence of the Islamic State as well as its links to the latest attack in Bangladesh. And more importantly, in what could be even more worrying for the security planners in Bangladesh, is that the Islamic State is ratcheting up its operations to the next level.

Firstly, this latest terrorist attacks is consistent with the intention of the Islamic State to revive the jihad in Bangladesh by targeting soft targets such as foreigners and individuals. As highlighted by the Geopolitical monitor in an earlier article, Bangladesh appears to be the key pivot for Islamic State’s South Asia operations. This is central to the Islamic State’s propaganda theme in recent times. The Islamic State in its English mouth piece Dabiq (#12 & 14) has come out with a dedicated article focusing on Bangladesh and an interview with Shaykh Abu Ibrahim al-Hanif, the Ameer of the Islamic State in Bangladesh respectively. And clearly coinciding with its first article entitled “The Revival of Jihad in Bengal” which was published in issue no 12 of the Dabiq around September-November 2015, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for at least 16 terrorist attacks including the recent killings of a Hindu priest and a Buddhist monk across Bangladesh since September, 2015.

More particularly, Islamic State has already declared its intention to specifically target citizens of Western countries and countries which support the military action against Islamic State. For instance, Islamic State had earlier declared that it will target Japanese citizens as the Japanese government was part of the international coalition against the Islamic State. Issue no 7 of the Dabiq states: “prior to Abe Shinzo’s thoughtless pledge of support for this crusade, Japan was not on the list of priorities to be targeted by the Islamic State, but through Abe Shinzo’s foolishness, all Japanese citizens and interests – wherever they may be found – are now a target for the soldiers and patrons of the Khilāfah everywhere.”

This attack led to the death of 20 foreigners including 7 Japanese citizens. And more particularly, this latest attack by Islamic State appears to reflect a higher degree of sophistication in planning and execution compared to previous attacks. Earlier attacks which were carried out using machetes, low intensity improvised explosive devices, and small arms were quite rudimentary in nature. The target segment of the attacks were also soft targets such as individuals and commoners consisting of Shia Muslims, Hindus, Christians, liberal thinkers and a handful of foreigners.

However, in direct contrast, the current terrorist attack is unique and first of its kind in Bangladesh, for this is the only instance where heavily armed men took foreigners as hostage. This attack is carefully planned as the target appears to be chosen well, after thorough reconnaissance, factoring the foreign guests frequenting this place. This attack has also provided the Islamic State with a huge propaganda edge, compared to their earlier attacks. For example, in India, mainstream print and electronic media covered this story as their main headlines, even a full two days after the attacks, compared to the fleeting mentions about earlier low-profile incidents such as the hackings and machete attacks. Factoring the nature of the attacks as well as the inordinate publicity accorded, this attack has to be conferred with “high profile attack” status. Such a high profile attack, will not only benefit the Islamic State in increasing its recruitment in Bangladesh but also simultaneously announce to the world of its presence.

Secondly, Dhaka has pinned the blame for this attack on Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), an extremist organization which was banned at least a decade ago. The Bangladeshi Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan, who has dispelled the links of the Islamic State to this attack, has gone on record to state that all the attackers are home grown and belonged to JMB. Again, even going by Dhaka’s assertion that they are home grown, it does not necessarily rule out the possibility of elements in JMB acting at the behest of the Islamic State. For instance, JMB’s Rangpur region’s chief Masud Rana had admitted to being behind the killing of Japanese national Kunio Hoshi in October 2015, which was claimed by the Islamic State.

Incidentally, the Islamic State in its English mouth piece Dabiq has showered praises on JMB as the only organization in Bangladesh which is in alignment with Islamic State’s stated objective of establishing the Shari’a law. Islamic State’s Ameer in Bangladesh, Shaykh Abu Ibrahim al-Hanif has already stated that grassroots followers of JMB and other Islamic groups in Bangladesh are joining the Islamic State in large numbers due to the ideological appeal. This conflation of ideologies has driven members of JMB to switch loyalty towards the Islamic State. However, it is imperative to state that JMB as an organization or its leadership has not openly supported the Islamic State. Hence, Dhaka could be right to some extent in saying that the attackers are home grown and are members of JMB, yet they may be wrong in denying any links to the Islamic State given the close ideological connections between these two organizations.

Islamic State affiliated Amaq, posted real time information about the attack including the ghastly images of victims and photo graphs of the attackers, posing with the Islamic State flag as their back ground. At least three of the attackers, Rohan Imtiaz, Shamim Mubashir and Nibras Islam who have been positively identified, have good educational backgrounds. All of them, it appears, have been radicalized online by the Islamic State’s ideology. For instance, According to The Hindu, Nibras Islam was following twitter handle @ShamiWitness which was managed Mehdi Masroor Biswas who is currently imprisoned in India for his links to the Islamic State. Islam also followed Anjem Choudary, a radical preacher based in London. According to a 2014 study conducted by Jytte Klausen entitled “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” published in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Anjem Choudary’s twitter account “stands out” with over 7000 followers playing an important role in the network connected to Western foreign fighters and @shamiwitness figures among the top 10 twitter accounts linked to the Islamic State. These attackers could have drawn inspiration from the Islamic State similar to what London bombers did in 2005 from Al-Qaeda. The exact nature of operational linkages between the attackers and the Islamic State leadership is not clear and hence debatable. Prima facie, these attackers are highly likely to have been motivated by the Islamic State to say the least, leave alone the operational linkages.

On the other hand, even hypothetically assuming that Dhaka’s assertion is correct i.e., that these attacks were planned and executed by homegrown groups without any operational linkages with the Islamic State, then it raises even more serious security issues for Bangladesh and the region as a whole. A terror attack of this nature, planned and executed by a homegrown group without any external support, stands testimony to the ability and the resources of the home grown group. Dhaka should realize that such a group is far more potent and dangerous than the Islamic State.

The extent to which these attacks were externally planned and controlled by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is largely unclear. The choice of target of this latest attack is certainly consistent and in alignment with the stated and the intended position of the Islamic State to revive jihad in Bangladesh. The Islamic State has already warned of more attacks to follow.

According to Site Intelligence, which monitors Islamic State message, a Bangladeshi named Abu Issa al Bengali in a latest video has warned of more attacks. Bengali warns, “What you witnessed in Bangladesh … was a glimpse. This will repeat, repeat and repeat until you lose and we win and the sharia is established throughout the world”

The Islamic State, in an attempt to prove Dhaka wrong, would attempt to follow up this attack with some more spectacular ones in near future. Immediate priority for Dhaka would be to accept the reality i.e., the presence of Islamic State in Bangladesh. If this realization dawns on Dhaka, it would be the first step in the right direction to counter Islamic State. Oblivious to these ground realities, if Dhaka still chooses to be in denial, it will do so only at its own peril.

The post Dhaka in Denial on Islamic State appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Of the three attacks which took place, experts understandably have attached more significance to the attack outside the prophet’s mosque, as it is one of the most revered places of the Islamic community, and also because of the fatalities involved.  However, this focus on the prophet’s mosque attack has diverted much of the attention from the other two failed attacks, most notably, the one near the US consulate in Jeddah.

The Saudi Arabia interior minister had identified the suicide bomber in the US consulate attack as Abdullah Qalzar Khan from Pakistan. The Saudi government claims that Khan came to Saudi Arabia 12 years ago to work as a driver and has been living with his wife and a relative in Jeddah. The Saudi Interior Ministry released the photo of the attacker in its official twitter account @MOISAUDIARABIA on July 4th, 2016.

FayazKagzi, source : cbi.nic.in

source @MOISAUDIARABIA

However, Twitter is abuzz with the latest revelations that the said Abdullah Qalzar Khan is an Indian and not a Pakistani as originally claimed by the Saudis. Top trending hashtags such as #IndianWantedInSaudiBlasts  claim that the said person is actually Fayaz Kagzi hailing from Beed in Maharashtra and not a Pakistani. And as has been claimed, the photographs of both the persons appear to be matching, triggering conjectures and confusions.

Interestingly, Fayaz Kagzi is one of the most wanted men in India and a red corner notice has been issued by the Interpol at the behest of the Central Bureau of Investigation in India. If the identity of this attacker is confirmed as that of Fayaz Kagzi, it will not only set the Indian security planners thinking but also those of the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.

Why is Fayaz Kagzi Important?

Fayaz Kagzi is one of the key operatives of the terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba. Kagzi is wanted in the 2006 arms haul case in Aurangabad as well as the 2010 German bakery blasts in India. Kagzi is also reported to have met most of the operatives of the Indian Mujahideen module based out of Pune which carried out the Pune blast in 2012.

Kagzi escaped from India soon after the 2006 arms haul case to Pakistan. Kagzi who shuttles between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is the key recruiter for the Lashkar-e-Taiba and more importantly, Kagzi is the “go between” man of Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Taiba and India based Indian Mujahideen. He controls the financial networks of the Indian Mujahideen in the Gulf States and runs a labyrinth of Hawala networks. Apart from this, Indian intelligence believes that Kagzi has been managing two operational locations of the Indian Mujahideen, one in Colombo and the other in Nepal.  It is believed Kagzi played a pivotal role in the entire terrorist network of the Lashkar-e-Taiba in the Gulf States and hence is treated with utmost priority by the Indian authorities.

Open source reports indicate that Kagzi left Saudi Arabia in 2013, fearing extradition to India by the Saudi authorities as a couple of his close associates were deported in 2012. Kagzi’s close associate Abu Jundal, who was also a Lashkar-e-Taiba member based in Saudi Arabia, was deported in June 2012 and so was Fasih Mohammed, who was deported in October 2012 by the Saudi Arabian authorities.

Given the significance of Fayaz Kagzi in the Lashkar-e-Taiba, latest revelations that he is the suicide bomber near the US consulate in Jeddah, if confirmed, is bound to have far reaching impact not only in Saudi Arabia but also in U.S., Pakistan, and India as well.

If proven, this will be the first direct attempt by an Indian member of the Lashkar-e-Taiba to conduct a terrorist attack on US interests outside the Af-Pak region. Bringing US interests under the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s cross hairs, points to a change in strategy of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Lashkar-e-Taiba has already been designated by the US government as a foreign terrorist organisation in 2002, yet it continues to operate and receive Pakistan patronage.

Lashkar-e-Taiba’s change in strategy can possibly be attributed to the fierce competition among terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Islamic State, and Al Qaeda. Alternatively, Lashkar-e-Taiba may have chosen US targets in Saudi Arabia in retribution to their recent joint sanctions against the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban in March, 2016.  As Adam J. Szubin, the acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, US Treasury, states on the joint action:

“From terrorizing local populations to exploiting charities and religious institutions, al-Qaida, the Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba have a long history of inflicting violence on Americans and our allies throughout South Asia and the Middle East,” “Today’s action marks yet another step in Treasury’s efforts to financially cripple terrorist financiers and demonstrates the United States’ and Saudi Arabia’s shared resolve to target those who support terrorism.”

However, it is imperative to mention that there is no definitive information about whether present loyalties of Kagzi still lies with Lashkar-e-Taiba. There is always a possibility that Fayaz Kaqzi could have joined the ranks of a terrorist group such as the Islamic State.  Notwithstanding the above, surprisingly, Islamic State which would not miss a single opportunity to flaunt and exhibit its achievement such as this attempted attack has remained mute, and hence is less likely to have been behind this attack, as popularly believed.

Regardless of the various terrorist affiliations, the current situation is certain to present a heightened threat perception to US interests globally and more granularly in the Gulf.  The gulf region especially Saudi Arabia has been a safe haven for terrorists mainly from the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Indian Mujahideen who are operating against Indian interests in India and elsewhere. For instance, most of the extraditions and deportations to India have originated from United Arab Emirates followed by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia had extradited terrorists like Abu Jundal, Fasih Mohammed, Usman Ghani Khan, Zeinul Abedin. However, in all the cases, Saudi Arabia had been procrastinating their extradition/deportation to India, seeking definitive evidentiary trail and information. For instance, Usman Ghani who was working in a Riyadh hospital was detained in 2012 by the Saudi authorities at the Indian government’s request but was cleared of all terror charges and released for unknown reasons. He was eventually deported in 2014.  Similarly, Fasih Mohammed’s deportation was delayed by the Saudi authorities before his eventual deportation in 2012.  In the case of Kagzi, it is believed that Saudi for long had sought more proof to extradite Kagzi to India. In some of the cases, Saudi Arabia had been dragging its feet, despite being clearly aware about the antecedents of some of terrorists who were sought by the Indian authorities.

Given Kagzi’s presence in Saudi Arabia and his reported role as the suicide bomber in the failed attack on the US consulate, one can expect a change in the Saudi Arabia’s stand on terrorists based in Saudi Arabia. This incident could actually become a wake-up call for the Saudi authorities on tacitly harbouring terrorists, sought by other countries. This anticipated change could actually translate into expeditious deportations and extraditions of other wanted terrorists, especially Indians who are still based in Saudi Arabia. And more importantly, operatives of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other groups such as the Indian Mujahideen, who are backed by Pakistan, and who had long been using Saudi Arabia as a safe haven, could lose it soon.

It is a well-known fact that Lashkar-e-Taiba has been under Pakistan’s patronage. Pakistan has always been attempting to shield these terrorists based in Saudi Arabia. In this case as well, if confirmed, Kagzi had been using a fake Pakistani passport during his stay in Saudi Arabia, which in itself stands testimony to Pakistan’s complicity. And Saudi Arabia to some extent has remained oblivious to these facts. The current episode could actually lead to a strain in relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as Saudi Arabia will not be pleased with the terrorist activities in its own soil. Additionally, given the target of the attack as the US consulate, Pakistan will be under double pressure both from the Saudis as well as from the US government to act and curb the activities of Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan as well as outside. To begin with, it would not come as a surprise to serious observers of South Asian politics, if Pakistan is impressed upon to act against the leader of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed who is the primary accused in the Mumbai attacks that took place in November 2008.

On the other hand, India stands to gain most out of this episode. First and the foremost, one of the most wanted and dreaded terrorist stands removed from the network.  Second, India could possibly witness more thrust and support from both Saudi Arabia and the United States. This could set off a domino effect among other countries in the region such as Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait who could also clamp down on terrorists who operate against Indian interests from their respective countries. Terrorist who operate from the Gulf especially from Saudi Arabia, may not find Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region as an attractive safe sanctuary anymore in the future.  Interestingly, India has now been presented with a window of opportunity to exert pressure on the stake holders such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan

To conclude, if the identity of the suicide bomber is confirmed as that of Kagzi, it will signal a change in the focus of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, targeting US interests. By doing so in Saudi Arabia, Lashkar-e-Taiba has attempted to kill two birds with one stone. This episode could also witness the beginning of a transformation in the country to country relations between India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Pakistan could find itself in a quagmire, given its support for Lashkar-e-Taiba and other terrorists groups.  Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has long been blamed for spreading Wahabism across the world which had led to violent extremist movements. Now, it is time for Saudi Arabia to redeem itself from its past actions.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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