For one thing, it is a nod to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)—among others—which pulled out all the stops to come to Haiti’s aid in this precarious moment.

For another, it provides a much-needed sign of better times to come. Haitians residing in-country have endured years of political instability and hellish lived conditions, a combination of factors which weigh heavily on their everyday milieu.

This reality simultaneously took its toll on democracy rooting itself, just as much as the thin stature of democracy therein has had a bearing on the milieu in question.

On the back of a political history of Duvalier era dictatorship, then, the transition to democracy in Haiti has been fragile. It hit a major stumbling block in 2019, when constitutionally due general elections were called off. Two years later, as Haitian civil society had feared all along, the prospects for the exercise of the franchise by Haitian voters went from bad to worse.

Following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, with Prime Minister Ariel Henry taking up the reins of power thereafter, Haiti’s electoral limbo became all the more acute.

The political developments in Port-au-Prince yesterday, then, show rare progress in the realm of Haitian political change.

The era of the embattled and ad hoc government led by Henry, whose resignation (which has now come to pass) was tied to the advent of this political transition, is over—sort of.

Michel Patrick Boisvert, who served as finance minister in Henry’s government, is the newly-installed interim prime minister. Boisvert will serve in this capacity “until the transition council appoints a new head of government, a cabinet and a provisional electoral council set to pave the way for an eventual vote.”

That Henry lost Washington’s political backing in recent months sped up the groundwork for the ongoing political transition, whose conditions and framing have a lot to do with the yeoman diplomatic efforts of the CARICOM bloc—of which Haiti is a member—to turn things around.

Whether this moment marks a turning point for Haiti, though, is an open question.

The gang-fueled unrest that has beset the country—hardening in place since earlier this year, when this latest crisis was triggered—reportedly continues. This serves as a reality check for the new, albeit, transitory powers that be.

They will likely not have an easy go of it, as they lean in on what hopefully is sustained engagement with a variety of stakeholders—in a purpose-driven manner, seized of the moment of opportunity, but also of peril.

CARICOM and the other key players will no doubt remain engaged in the process, not least because of previously agreed upon arrangements to do so.

This is one key to the hoped-for success of this new, particularly sensitive political era in Haiti.

The hopes of a beleaguered nation and its many backers, in the regional Community and wider international community, are riding on the transitional government’s success at prosecuting a relatively discrete mandate.

The politics involved in seeing a way forward give many pause, though, suggesting that—once again—the significance of this new political moment should not be overstated.

Given the gravity of the crisis currently facing Haiti, the discouraging reality that has befallen it, this is a time for all concerned to continue to put their shoulders to the wheel.

Haiti is not out of the woods yet; not by a long shot.

The bottom line is that the potential for things to go sideways is high, especially if the gang problem is allowed to fester and if political forces sacrifice the country’s renewed (and tentative) democratic march on the altar of power games.

Far from being chastened by the arrival on the political scene of the new government, transitory as it may be, the criminal armed gangs will likely play on the prevailing circumstances—against a backdrop where state authority has long been in collapse and they have increasingly “taken control as democracy withers.”

Those in authority, charged with putting things in place for a transition to electoral democracy, have little choice but to confront the ubiquity of gang influence in societal strata. It will be an uphill battle to wrest Haiti from the hands of gangs, who have historically been ensconced in the country’s political culture. But a third party’s pledge to render requisite assistance—in the wider context of security imperatives—is on the table.

Can these and other pertinent, pressing issues be managed well? We will have to wait and see.

The core question, though, remains the same as it always has regarding Haiti: Can those charged with such awesome responsibility as regards steering the future course of the world’s first Black Republic rise above the (political) fray, such that the country’s peoples can have a real chance to turn the tide in their quest for human and national development?

Absent an answer—to suit the times—to this question, the political  upside of this moment will be fleeting.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The post Is Haiti’s New Transitional Government a Game Changer? appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

This is apparent in a rising chorus of contrarian views in CARICOM member states’ Gaza war-related diplomatic narratives in the United Nations (UN), as compared to the United States’ associated positioning, setting the tone for the daylight between these states and Washington.

Initially, CARICOM adopted a position that was generally more restrained in tone. This was the context in which the bloc began to spend political capital on lending its voice to an already incendiary situation, striving for balance.

This behaviour on the international stage is consistent with the view of international relations scholars that, in international politics, smaller states inter alia “might seek [status-related] recognition by great powers, as useful allies, impartial arbiters, or contributors to systems maintenance” (emphasis added). Yet, in full view of Gazans’ disturbing reality and a region roiled by a metastasizing Gaza war, this type of diplomacy has its limits.

Several months later, in a Statement on the Ongoing Situation in Gaza, CARICOM leaders underscored that they are “deeply distressed” by the ‘deteriorating’ state of affairs in Gaza.” (In line with K. J. Holsti, who calls attention to the signal importance of such foreign policy actors in foreign policy decision-making, it is apt to unpack their pronouncements on the matter at hand.) While they reaffirmed their condemnation of Hamas’ October 7, 2023 assault on Israel and resultant hostage-taking, they pilloried subsequent “Israeli actions that violate international humanitarian law and the human rights of the Palestinian people.”

It is instructive that while US President Joe Biden eventually described Israel’s conduct of its war against Hamas in Gaza as “over the top,” this did not change Washington’s policy course in respect of support for Israel. Along the way, the U.S. repeatedly scuttled UN-related attempts to call for a ceasefire, tying the UN’s hands. This amid Israel’s apparent refutation of a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, in a context where UN-Israel relations have seemingly “reached an all-time low.”

In stark contrast, CARICOM leaders doubled down on unequivocally calling for “an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in Gaza and safe and unimpeded access for the delivery of adequate and sustained humanitarian assistance.” That said, Jamaica’s Gaza war-related voting record in the UN General Assembly and public pronouncements have caused some consternation among commentators; and Prime Minister Andrew Holness had to set the record straight.

CARICOM leaders also contended that, for the regional grouping, Israel’s excesses in the occupied West Bank contribute to international instability. They tied their criticism of Israel’s wanton disregard of calls from within UN bodies for a ceasefire to the provisional measures-related order in the South Africa v. Israel case at the International Court of Justice.

And they did not pull punches when advocating for a two-state solution in keeping with UNSC Resolution 242.

The bloc continues to raise the alarm over this conflict in the Middle East, citing concerns regarding the wider implications for “regional stability and international peace.”

The normative character of CARICOM’s foreign policy approach is apparent in its Gaza war-related diplomatic trajectory, which is also illustrative of a cumulative tension vis-à-vis the United States’ imprint on the said conflict. This is because the United States’ foreign policy intentions qua state behaviour, in the Middle East and elsewhere, hinge on power.

For its part, Guyana has signalled its impatience with Washington’s Israel policy which, for some scholars, centres on a “special relationship”— one that purportedly plays an outsized role in “the totality of American foreign policy in the Middle East.”

Notably, Guyana abstained from a recent, widely criticized US-led draft resolution in the 15-member UN Security Council (UNSC). Guyana was elected in 2023 to join this UN body, for a two-year term (2024-2025), as a non-permanent member. That measure set a low bar. It just made the case for the imperative of an ‘immediate and sustained ceasefire’ in Gaza, compelling Guyana to underscore that the resolution stopped short of aligning with the international community’s call for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza.

Russia and China, two of the UNSC’s five permanent members, voted against the draft resolution. It failed to pass, given the strictures of the UNSC voting system.

Guyana was among the 14 UNSC members which, shortly thereafter, backed another resolution. On this occasion, there was a clarion call qua demand for ‘an immediate ceasefire’ during Ramadan in 2024. The Security Council passed the resolution, with the U.S. conspicuously exercising an abstention regarding the vote-related proceedings.

This only served to further highlight Washington’s growing international isolation regarding foreign policymaking in the face of the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict which, for months now having passed into uncharted waters, has been centre stage in international politics—eclipsing even the Ukraine war.

That the United States is haemorrhaging prestige in the Caribbean has not ceased either. This has ruffled feathers there in this geopolitical moment, putting the most significant strain on US-CARICOM relations since their post-Trump era revamp. No sooner had these relations benefitted from a reset under the Biden administration than have the last few months marked a stress point in those ties, which must be gauged anyway by their historically “mixed success.”

One source of things changing is that as postcolonial states, which are products of the struggle for political independence, CARICOM member states increasingly view the Gaza war through a normative qua ethical prism. In turn, it is a mirror onto their own quest for autonomy and unwavering belief in self-determination. (The fact is that these states’ postcolonial identities anchor their worldview, which is shaped inter alia by legacies of colonialism and the plight of those peoples who are still oppressed.)

Today, countries like Guyana turn to UN bodies like the UNSC to shore up diplomatic positioning in that regard.

In this thinking, all such peoples have a right to self-determination among the community of nations.

Washington’s decidedly skewed Gaza war-related foreign policymaking challenges such postcolonial conceptions anew, having a bearing on these states’ perceptions of their own status in the international system.

This a watershed moment, then, in the sense that coming into focus for CARICOM—indeed, shaping its view of Washington—is how the U.S. will earnestly respond to the international community’s outcry about the devastation wrought by six-plus months of war in Gaza and the ever worsening plight of its peoples.

Reports are Washington has put Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on notice that unless his government changes its war strategy, which has stoked the humanitarian crisis in that enclave, it might have to reassess facets of its Israel policy.

Just recently, though, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a legislative package that provides tens of billions of dollars in security assistance—among others—to Israel. The Senate has since passed the bill. And Iran’s recent direct airborne attack on Israel only galvanized US support for the latter, with this great-power rallying to Israel’s defence.

The question is whether such support emboldens Netanyahu to toe the maximalist line of far-right elements in his government by continuing to wage Israel’s war on Gaza—which, according to some analysts, possibly constitutes a never-ending war with ulterior motives. That Netanyahu now openly scoffs at international pressure for a Palestinian state says it all. This against a backdrop where, even if Netanyahu’s days in government are numbered, “his approach to the war [qua ‘use of force’ per defence establishment thinking on Israel’s National Security Doctrine] has broader support.”

The prevailing cosmopolitan view, which stands in opposition to the Netanyahu government’s position on the matter, is for a two-state solution to come to pass—as the only way to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In a further sign of the (geopolitical) times, though, the UNSC failed to recommend full UN membership for the State of Palestine, owing to the United States’ casting a veto regarding the draft resolution in question.

Guyana was among the 12 UNSC members which voted in favour of the draft resolution, which reads:

“The Security Council, having examined the application of the State of Palestine for admission to the United Nations (S/2011/592), recommends to the General Assembly that the State of Palestine be admitted to membership in the United Nations.”

This draft resolution will go down in the annals of UN-anchored multilateral diplomacy as having produced an important moment for a show of support for Palestine, in what is perhaps Gaza’s darkest hour. It faces unprecedented, horrific destruction.

With the international spotlight on the diplomatic moment personified by the aforesaid UNSC vote, on April 19, 2024, Barbados announced its official recognition of Palestine as a State. Considering its timing, this move is likely intended (at least in part) as a rebuke of the United States’ reasoning behind its vote-related stand.

A few days later, the Government of Jamaica indicated that it took the decision to recognize the State of Palestine. In shedding light on this decision, Senator the Honourable Kamina Johnson Smith, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, called attention to Jamaica’s support for a two-state solution. Minister Johnson Smith said that this is the “only viable option to resolve the longstanding conflict, guarantee the security of Israel and uphold the dignity and rights of Palestinians.” Furthermore, she underscored: “By recognizing the State of Palestine, Jamaica strengthens its advocacy towards a peaceful solution.”

Minister Johnson Smith noted that her country’s decision to recognize the State of Palestine is in keeping with its “strong commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which seek to engender mutual respect and peaceful co-existence among states, as well as the recognition of the right of peoples to self- determination.” She also linked the decision to the Gaza war and the resultant humanitarian crisis, reaffirming inter alia Jamaica’s backing of an immediate ceasefire.

Barbados and Jamaica have cast their lot with the 10 other CARICOM member states which have recognized the State of Palestine. They are St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Haiti, Grenada, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Belize, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Guyana.

Behind the scenes, CARICOM leaders and diplomats have likely (and in no uncertain terms) voiced their misgivings to their American counterparts as regards Washington’s approach to treating escalating tensions in the Middle East. The matter of the groundswell of support in CARICOM for an independent Palestinian State and for it to be afforded all attendant rights have surely come up, too, especially at a time when more countries are prioritizing recognition of that state.

Insofar as it is “embroiled in [the] Gaza conflict,” Washington is regularly in touch with Caribbean capitals. In an attempt to drum up support for what some analysts view as its one-dimensional determinism in foreign policymaking, Washington makes the rounds of these capitals.

This as the influence of the People’s Republic of China—which, along with Russia, is the United States’ strategic competitor—grows in the Caribbean.

To varying degrees—with a healthy respect for long-standing, country-level ties and the record of accomplishment—respective emissaries carry on with the daily business of diplomacy. Having regard to the deep “security and economic ties” between the U.S. and CARICOM, it is also the case that the latter grouping would not lose sight of the importance of the long game in its member states’ respective foreign policy approaches to America.

Still, attuned to their postcolonial identities, CARICOM member states are guarded in this moment. After all, their foreign policy inclination is to embrace “human and global interest.”

Such conviction is side stepped by others—if not rhetorically, then in praxis. For them, the competitive nature of the putative zero-sum international system is such that their own security is the overriding concern.

As CARICOM member states take stock of their contribution to the international community’s contemporary diplomatic manoeuvres on the question of Palestine, they are of the mind that they stand on the right side of history.

Yet for all their attention to the normative grounds for defusing the powder keg that is today’s Middle East, leaning in on the case for approaching the national interest in the same vein, CARICOM members run up against the broader context of their foreign policymaking. Simply put, à la the system-level, international relations are “geopolitically constructed.” This framing is the proximate cause of the Gaza war; but, it is not the only factor that one ought to assess. As already intimated, domestic and “unit-level factors” in foreign policymaking also play a consequential role in the grand scheme of things.

In this schema, it is highly debatable whether the top dogs seriously weigh moral ends.

In standing on principle, strengthening its status-related hand in international politics, CARICOM has notched another victory in the thrust-and-parry of the anarchic global system.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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According to its website, the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party is a bipartisan congressional committee that aims to build consensus “on the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party and develop a plan of action to defend the American people, our economy, and our values.” In pursuit of this goal, the committee adopts a holistic approach, addressing the China challenge across multiple domains including military, economics, and technology.

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There were reasons why it evaded the notice of many, but first and foremost, we should mentally map the area. The Central Caucasus, comprised of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, is a historically constructed, complex political concord, embodying a geopolitical tapestry woven over centuries and forming a culturally, ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse area stretched between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.

In the geopolitical discourse, as explained by Saul Bernard Cohen, an eminent American geographer, the axiom stands firm: “Geopolitics is a product of its time.” Each historical period has produced a geopolitical model offering a lens through which to interpret the world map and the world order of that time. In imperialist geopolitical writings of the 19th to early 20th centuries when a state’s greatness lay in its maritime power and/or in domination of the Heartland (the territory ruled by the Russian Empire and later by the Soviet Union), the distance of the Central Caucasus from the Anglo-American space resulted in little to no mention of the region.

Whilst the strategic location of the Central Caucasus temporally escaped the attention of imperialist writers, historically, the region carried geopolitical importance for three major Eastern powers: The Persian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Empire. Already in the early 1800s, the region acted as a buffer zone between Orthodox Christianity and the Muslims of the Middle East. Russia’s expansion into the Caucasus in the sixteenth century additionally carried economic considerations, evident in projects like the Trans-Caspian railway, which facilitated access to Central Asia and control over Caspian oil supplies. Next to its geographical advantages, the Central Caucasus was a boon for natural resources. Besides Petroleum, the region is rich in copper ore. The minerals also attracted foreign investors and as of 1870, Rothschild and Shell was extracting oil, while Siemens mined copper.

After World War II, the political picture drastically changed and a new international system emerged, with multipolarity giving way to bipolarity. During the Cold War, geopolitics became associated with the two leading ideologies of that time: Communism and Western Democracy. Geopoliticians, thus, were mostly preoccupied with the rivalry between the two blocs of the West and the East. When the Soviet Union established its rule over the Central Caucasian states, the region once again became extraneous to the interests of international observers and witnessed its geopolitical role as a bridge for regional and international trade routes reduced to serving the southeastern border of Europe with Communist Russia and the Middle East.

By the 1980s, however, “winds of change” were blowing on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain, and with Mikhail Gorbachov’s policies of glasnost and perestroika, the Cold War was nearing its logical end, giving way to a new world order. Simultaneously, geopolitical concepts were updated to understand the new world map and where geopolitical pivots had moved, which came to be known as the New World Order in an academic context. While some rejoiced in triumph of the Western ideology and others coined a neologism “Geo-economics” to explain the substantial penetration of economics into geopolitics, a drastically different approach was undertaken by Samuel P. Huntington to explain the geopolitical setting and patterns of this “new world.” He emphasized cultural differences as the primary basis for identity and conflict, predicting that nations would align along cultural lines rather than ideological or economic ones, leading to conflicts at local and global levels. Huntington identified several fault lines, including the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, as areas where clashes between civilizations were likely.

Now, in addition to its geographically determined strategic function as a buffer and bridge on two axes – West-East and North-South, the region’s ethnoreligious mosaic was also put under the spotlight of geopolitical works and international actors. Geographically situated between Orthodox and Islamic civilizations, the region has fostered a diverse ethno-religious mosaic. Despite religious differences, examples of religious tolerance can be found in cities like Derbent, Dagestan, and Tbilisi, Georgia. Additional emphasis is given to the role of customs, which in the Caucasus is referred to as ‘adat.’ It is argued that customs (or adats) in the region are stronger than confessions, and even contend for superiority over the latter. The custom-based relationship between the peoples of religion facilitated their peaceful coexistence, tolerance, and mutual understanding. The historical background of peaceful coexistence and distinct patterns of Caucasian, custom-based relations between different religions and ethnicities, provided the understanding behind the harmonious relationship between the Caucasian people.

The Russian Effect

The demise of the Soviet Union, however, did not mean the end of the Cold War rationale. Russia – as the heir of the Soviet Union – after disappointing the hopes of anticipated democratization was still considered a power whose influence had to be contained. Zbigniew Brzezinski, like many of his contemporaries and those before him, assumed that Russia at some point in post-Cold War history, whether voluntarily or not, would choose the path of Western development, a hope that remains unrealized to this day. The reasons behind this can be traced back to the Russian understanding of the world system, which has been incautiously neglected by Western academia and which is vividly illustrated by the Russian geopolitical school: Eurasianism. All important contributors to the development of Russian Geopolitics (Nikolai Trubetzkoy, Peter Savitsky, Lev Gumilev, Aleksandr Dugin) emphasized Eurasia’s distinct cultural-geographic and socio-historical pattern and rejected Western universal ideas of the cultural and historic development of mankind. It was believed that it was Russia’s mission to unify Eurasia and maintain this unity, asserting that it was the destiny of the Eurasian people to be concerted.

It is important to understand that Eurasianinism and Moscow’s approaches toward the Caucasus correspond to each other. In this regard, the Central Caucasus is considered as Russia’s backyard. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, the Black Sea, and the Caspian Sea constitute strategic dimensions for Russia. The latter is determined to dominate the region and uses the “ethnic card” to keep the countries of the Central Caucasus off balance. From the Russian standpoint, any foreign influence in its “near abroad” is seen through the prism of its national security. Such a menace should be thwarted by any means, as Moscow made clear more than once that it does not entertain any notion of conceding territories of its utmost geopolitical interests.

As the successor of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced the heaviest losses in terms of territory, resources, influence, economy, as well as international image. Its borders were pushed back from the west, south, and east. To add fuel to the fire, the divorce of the Central Caucasian states from Russian influence and the emergence of newly independent states in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan with nationalist-minded political elites reinforced the fears of a resurgence of the deep-rooted Russian-Turkish rivalry over influence in the region. A prominent Eurasianist Alexandr S. Panarin argued, that “the geopolitical concessions which post-Soviet Russia made to the West are the maximum Russia will ever concede. Any further attack by the West Belt in the form of further enlargement of NATO or by playing the Ukrainian, Georgian, Azeri, or Central Asian ‘cards’ would mean that the aforementioned concessions by Russia were like the concessions to Hitler at Munich.”

Dominating the Caucasus for Russia also translates into being closer to the Mediterranean and Balkans. Some of the imperialist-minded politicians, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, expressed the ambition of obtaining access to a warm water port on the Indian Ocean. Needless to say, conceding the vital Caspian Sea resources it could potentially lose with the opening of the market to the west – along with flows of Western investment following the breakup of the USSR – would substantially weaken Russia.

The Caucasian Chalk Circle

In the context of the so-called emerging New World Order, Russia was at first left on the periphery, while Turkey and Iran were the first countries affected by geopolitical turbulence. Entering the ‘Mittlespiel’ of this ‘Great Chess Game,’ the United States and the European Union quickly exploited the opportunity to increase their influence in the region of the Central Caucasus. Hence the latter soon became a space of competition between original geopolitical players and so-called ‘newcomers.

Iran is one of the classical players in the Central Caucasus, however, due to its internal turbulence and international pressures, it was forced to temporarily retreat from the contest. The latest trends show the revitalization of Iran’s interests in the Central Caucasus. In the regional context, Iran is an ally of Armenia and Russia.

Turkey, as Brzezinski suggests, must not be alienated from geopolitical calculations, because a rejected Turkey can not only become strongly Islamic but will be able to upset the region’s stability. Turkey’s role in this contest, along with its geopolitical inclinations, is to counter-balance Russia’s domination over the region. That is why Brzezinski argues that political developments in Turkey and its orientation will be crucial for the states of the Central Caucasus.

The EU presence in the region is perceptible as well. In the framework of its Eastern Neighborhood Partnership, the Union encouraged countries of the region toward reform and as an accolade granted Georgia candidacy status. Furthermore, the location and the mentioned potential to provide transit roads allow Central Caucasus to serve as an energy security guarantee to Europe. In line with this, Europe needs to assist the region in its peaceful development and assure its security as a strategic partner.

Contrary to Armenia and Georgia, Azerbaijan does not openly express willingness to join either military or economic blocs. The country is neither pro-Russian, nor pro-Western, but emphasizes the importance of regional cooperation. Consequently, the countries are at different steps in the process of Europeanization. Nevertheless, the EU’s need for a reliable partner in the Central Caucasus is currently at odds with Turkey’s estrangement from the Union and Russia being non-responsive to sanctions.

The United States has long viewed the region, and especially Georgia as a strategic buffer zone to assist its interests in the Middle East, as well as against the expansion of terrorism. In 2016, Donald Rumsfeld, former US Secretary of Defense, highlighted the strategic location of Georgia in his article in The Wall Street Journal, by stating that “[Georgia] provides a barrier to the flow of jihadists from other parts of the former Soviet Union to the Middle East. And it will doubtless figure large in the strategies of any NATO consortium for securing the Black Sea and ‘New Europe’ against Russian adventurism.”

An additional newcomer to the regional chess game is China with its growing geopolitical influence, making the region’s importance even greater through participation in the Chinese Silk Road project and, since 2017, in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route project.

The cultural dimension, specifically the ethno-religious factor, in a time of growing resurgence of nationalism and fundamentalism, is a factor directly influencing geopolitical considerations. Historical differences have shaped difficult relations between Turkey-Armenia and Armenia-Azerbaijan, leading to friendship between Russia and Armenia. Russia’s betrayal and mistreatment of Georgia has alienated the country from its northern neighbor, with whom it shares a common religion. Despite diverse religions, Georgia maintains a friendly relationship with Turkey and Iran, with the latter enjoying a somewhat positive attitude among all the Caucasian republics.

Its location and its experience as a borderland of various religions and ethnicities permit the region to be crucial in what is claimed to be the primary menace and security challenges of the 21st century- terrorism, further enhancing the Central Caucasus’s role as a border of civilizations.

As observed, the developments of the post-Soviet era brought new actors such as the US, EU, and China into the contest of imposing influence over the region, as well as extracting benefits from it. Such unfolding of events, however, runs contrary to the aspirations of the major neighboring geopolitical powers, such as Russia, Turkey, and Iran; the concentration of political interests of the great powers in such a small region emphasizes its favored geopolitical position and economic advantages.

Borrowing from Bertolt Brecht’s theatrical play The Caucasian Chalk Circle, the configuration of international interests in the region spotlights power conflicts. Such concentration of global powers in its turn shapes the foreign orientations of the countries of the Central Caucasus. In the realm of geopolitical discourse, a region can be geopolitically significant if it serves the geopolitical and economic benefits of major geopolitical players or has the potential to challenge such political-economic aspirations of great powers. The Central Caucasus, as a result of its strategic location and diversity, possesses both characteristics. Consequently, Central Caucasus stands amid a complex geopolitical landscape, and next to presenting economic opportunities for great powers, finds itself in the hotspot of 21st-century security considerations.

The post The Geopolitics of the Central Caucasus appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

• The Marcos administration in the Philippines is internationalizing the South China Sea conflict, scrapping the bilateral approach of the Duterte years.
• US President Biden has reiterated that the US-Philippines mutual defense treaty applies to the South China Sea.
• ‘Gray zone tactics’ that may have worked previously are now more likely to elicit a response from Washington and other littoral claimants.

The United States and Philippines are planning their first-ever military training exercises outside of Philippines’ waters. The exercises are the latest in a series of moves suggesting a more active US stance on defending its allies’ sovereignty in the South China Sea. The overall objective is clear: remove the diplomatic and military ambiguity that China’s gray zone tactics thrive in.

Background

The South China Sea is a critical theater for Beijing, holding out the possibility of material wealth in its underseas mineral deposits and greater military security by pushing out the PLA’s defense perimeter from China proper. But Beijing’s sweeping claims to the waters overlap with other littoral states, namely Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan. The resulting clashes have played out for decades, sometimes producing a sudden redrawing of the map, as was the case after China’s occupation of the Paracel Islands in 1974, and other times leading to a more gradual ‘slicing of the salami’ where a previous status quo slowly gives way to a new one, often by way of gray zone tactics designed to fall short of producing a direct military response.

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From the perspective of American and European politicians with an appetite for imported hydrocarbons and black caviar, Azerbaijan is a valuable Western ally. It supposedly provides leverage against Russian and Iranian influence in the Caucasus and is frequently mentioned as a friend of Israel, supplying that country with approximately 60 percent of its oil in exchange for weaponry to fight Armenians.

Too often overlooked in this calculus is a complex web of relationships between the Azerbaijani regime in Baku and the rulers of Russia and Iran.

Azerbaijan’s relationship with Russia is the most obvious and damaging  part of this web. Baku entered a strategic partnership with Moscow, marked by an “Allied Relations” Declaration in February 2022, just two days before Russia invaded Ukraine. This alliance has expanded to include intelligence-sharing and hydrocarbon trade, allowing Azerbaijan to make a mockery of Western sanctions by shipping Russian oil and gas to Europe.

While Azerbaijan’s support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity has at times been loud, the burgeoning financial and political engagements with Moscow have become conspicuous. Azerbaijan is helping Russia evade sanctions and has been one of the top four destinations for Russian oligarchs during the war in Ukraine.

Moreover, the regime in Baku has endorsed Russian mediation efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, while rebuffing initiatives from the U.S. and the EU. Baku also has  welcomed Iranian mediation  based on Tehran’s position that the regional conflicts should be resolved “without the interference of non-regional and Western countries.”

Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran have been strained at times. Tehran has expressed concern for several matters, such as, the use of Israeli-manufactured drones by the Azerbaijani armed forces in the disputed area of Artsakh and the adoption of policies that tolerate or even endorse groups advocating  the secession of Northern Iran, home to many ethnic Azeris.

Even so, recent developments show a warming of ties between Azerbaijan and Iran that should worry policy makers in the West and particularly those in Israel. On October 7, 2023, coinciding with Hamas’s brutal attack on southern Israel, Azerbaijan and Iran signed an agreement concerning the so-called Aras corridor. This project, involving construction of a highway and a railroad bridge, is designed to connect Azerbaijan and its exclave, Nakhichevan, through Iranian territory.

The Aras corridor agreement is part of a broader normalization between Iran and Azerbaijan, including critical agreements signed since September 2023. Moreover, there are reports that Iran will invest in territories acquired by Azerbaijan during and after the 2020 war with Armenia. In addition, there has been a notable surge (33 percent during the first nine months of 2023) in the railway trade between Iran and Azerbaijan, and experts foresee further growth  in bilateral trade following completion of the Aras corridor.

But this isn’t all. On January 7, 2024, Iran and Azerbaijan finalized an accord pertaining to the construction of the Rasht-Astara railway, aimed at eliminating a longstanding gap within the International North–South Transport Corridor, known as the INTSC. The INTSC—a 7,200-kilometer corridor encompassing road, rail, and maritime routes—connects Russia’s second largest city, St. Petersburg, with the port of Mumbai, India, via Azerbaijan and Iran, bypassing the Suez Canal.

Foreseen as a channel for Russia to circumvent Western sanctions, replace European trade routes, and expand its economic influence in South Asia, the INTSC has attracted the financial support of the Putin regime, particularly evident in the funding of the Rasht-Astara railway project.

The imminent completion of the Rasht-Astara railway is poised to enhance trade among Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan. Experts predict that the total volume of cargo shipped  by rail alone will reach at least 15 million tons per year before 2030.

Azerbaijan’s role as a facilitator will bolster Russia’s position in its war against Ukraine. The INSTC offers immense potential for the Russian economy, providing Moscow with access to crucial trade partners and enabling additional funding for its campaign in Ukraine.

This initiative holds considerable significance for Iran as well, offering a way to evade  Western sanctions and establish a direct land connection with Russia, a pivotal  ally. The completion of the INSTC is poised to lift Iran out of isolation, transforming it into a major trade hub in Eurasia.

Under the leadership of the Aliyev family, Azerbaijan has since 1993 operated as an authoritarian regime famous for its lack of free and fair elections, suppression of political opposition, and imprisonment of journalists and activists. War crimes and ethnic cleansing committed by the Azerbaijani regime in 2020 and 2023 in Artsakh only add to Aliyev’s list of bad deeds. Baku’s desire to remain an energy partner for Europe and a supplier for Israel is a key part of the regime’s drive to secure internal and external legitimacy.

Western policymakers therefore face a critical question: is it justified to overlook Azerbaijan’s deepening economic and financial ties with Russia and Iran, along with its abysmal human rights record, merely to secure access to Baku’s diminishing oil reserves? The recent resolution of the European Parliament seems to suggest that this is not a trade-off they are viewing kindly.

Continuing relations with Azerbaijan, despite its authoritarian practices, could prove shortsighted for Israel too. It is time for Israel’s intellectuals and leadership to acknowledge the ethical concerns associated with supporting Azerbaijan against Armenia. What may feel right at this juncture must be critically examined to ensure it aligns with what is truly right.

David A. Grigorian is a Senior Fellow at Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at Harvard’s Kennedy School and a veteran IMF Economist based in Washington. George Meneshian is an Athens-based policy analyst specializing in the Caucasus and the Middle East and a researcher at the Washington Institute for Defence and Security.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Competing perspectives of Modi

The vast majority of Chinese internet users have a positive view of India’s leader, calling him ‘Immortal Modi’ or ‘Modi Laoxian’ (‘不朽的莫迪’). Based on data from the popular microblogging platform Weibo (China’s version of Twitter), which has more than 598 million active monthly users, many Chinese people also think that Modi is crucial to preserving the balance of power in the world.

Competing perspectives of Western-style liberal democracy and China’s political model commonly, though unfairly and inaccurately, portray the former as the stable foundation of a well-functioning society, whereas the latter, marked by ardent nationalism and a supreme leader, is viewed as volatile. Weibo users’ comments shed light on their perceptions of democracy as a fundamentally unstable political system beset by internal conflicts, corruption, and misrepresentation. Indeed, they frequently dismiss the concept of democracy as a whole process. Many Chinese people believe that larger nations, even ones that claim to be democratic, tend to adopt authoritarian characteristics.

Western media often express this erroneous belief when reporting on political developments in India. During Modi’s tenure, debates about the essence of Indian democracy have shifted, which is consistent with Chinese perspectives on the democratic system in general but not on India’s democratic system specifically. This lively but partisan debate, not confined to academia, centers on the purported new chapter in Indian history, where Modi’s leadership has distanced the nation from the fundamental principles of democracy, minority rights, and executive accountability.

Nitasha Kaul, a well-known Modi critic, writes for the Australian Institute of International Affairs that ‘the Modi myth proffers the idea of a paternal, ascetic, and efficient leader at the helm of a civilizational resurgence of India as a “Vishwa Guru” (world leader).’ In 2021, Jostein Jakobsen and Kenneth Bo Nielsen of The Centre for Development and the Environment at the University of Oslo added India under Modi to their list of ‘authoritarian, populist, and right-wing regimes.’ In 2023, The Guardian published an article calling Modi’s government ‘autocratic’ and ‘illiberal.’ Similarly, a Financial Times piece from the same year highlighted Modi’s alleged ‘authoritarian streak’ as a major concern for the West.

However, China’s recent mention of Modi contrasts sharply with the much-embellished portrayal of India during his tenure. On 2 January 2024, Zhang Jiadong, the director of the Centre for South Asian Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, expressed his admiration for Modi, his economic and foreign policy, and his ‘Bharat narrative’. Zhang claimed that India has become more proactive and self-assured on a national and international level. His remarks were published by the state-run newspaper Global Times. Coming from the Chinese government, these statements might seem unconventional, but when considering India’s efforts to create a multi-aligned system in international affairs and the Western disapproval of India following the West’s unsuccessful attempts to steer Modi towards Western alignment, they have geopolitical relevance, particularly regarding China’s relationship with India under Modi.

Though he and his party greatly benefit India, Modi now poses a challenge to governments, intellectuals, and people of Western and Indian ancestry who support Congress. India has a strong governance framework, making it difficult for a single person or political party to attain widespread popularity. For the past nearly 23 years, he has served as Prime Minister of India and Gujarat State Chief Minister, owing to his and his party’s perseverance and nationalist, India-focused agenda, not because he is a despot or authoritarian. People understand how regional and global environments are degrading and changing, as well as where India should rank as a developed country on the world map. They are electing him and his party to govern India (or Bharat). Furthermore, the Supreme Court, as the pinnacle body in India’s robust judicial structure, keeps a watchful eye and is well-equipped to deal with any violations of democratic institutions by any person or entity.

The BJP/Modi government at the helm is now well-positioned to bolster India’s economic standing without yielding to any internal or regional pressures. A landslide victory in the upcoming election may allow Modi and his right-wing nationalist government to reshape India into a Hindu nation, with the goal of amending the Constitution to dilute the problematic principles of secularism and socialism while curbing illegal immigration and ethnic separatism, as well as addressing the challenges posed by rising Islamism. In countering Islamism and terrorism in India, the emphasis is on confronting the activities of a subset of extremist Sunni Muslims. This group, while not substantially contributing to the broader Indian society, is increasingly mobilizing for communal interests, becoming susceptible to the influence of a transnational Islamist agenda and global caliphate bogey. Any potential Modi-led government plan will include a comprehensive approach to addressing the dangers posed by these dynamics while also ensuring national security and social harmony. These objectives broadly align with Beijing’s policies in the context of Chinese society.

Tensions

Although most Chinese people have a positive perception of and interest in the Indian prime minister, the relationship between China and India has been tense for many years, creating an environment conducive to the emergence of new and escalating conflicts between the two countries.

Since his initial election in 2014, China has warmly welcomed Modi, and both parties are optimistic about a new era of India-China relations under the BJP. The first encounter between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi took place in Fortaleza, Brazil, ahead of the 6th BRICS Summit that same year. Xi conveyed to Modi that China and India are long-term strategic and collaborative allies rather than adversaries, underscoring their common goal of ‘national rejuvenation’ and asserting that cooperation is the most efficient way to achieve it. Despite their outward amicability, India and China continue to have geopolitical conflicts.

The India-China border dispute, which began in May 2020, has been a frequent topic of discussion between Xi and Modi. Furthermore, there have been ongoing clashes and instances of Chinese aggression along the 4,057 km Line of Actual Control (LAC), a notional boundary, particularly in the Ladakh region. China and India have had territorial disputes along their shared border since the countries’ modern beginnings. Both nations engaged in a bloody conflict over this issue in 1962, but it was the only one. However, violent incidents have increased in recent years. Modi, in his third term, cannot ignore or avoid the negative consequences of the current situation for India-China relations. India and China’s reluctance to withdraw along the LAC reflects their postures and aspirations on their respective home fronts, as well as on the international stage, where they both desire to expand their influence as emerging global powers.

The Tibet question

Given the intricacies of historical tensions and Chinese provocations, heightened by the Tibet ‘issue’, handling toxic border relations is bound to be tough. The Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, who will be 88 in July, and, more importantly, the future Dalai Lama, are major issues in both India and China. India’s stance on Tibet is mainly spiritual, with Tibet’s geographical location leaving ample leeway for potentially significant political consequences. India has the largest number of Tibetan refugees, and the Dalai Lama issue will have an impact on the country. Given India’s rebirth of Buddhism, the country’s next and future prime ministers will take a more active position in any Buddhist-related matters, particularly those involving China.

India has yet to make significant use of the Tibet card in its political dealings with China; nevertheless, on March 9, 2024, Modi paid an official visit to Arunachal Pradesh, India’s Tibet-border state, where he announced, among other efforts, the important Sela Tunnel Project. Beijing claims the state is part of its territory, Southern Tibet (藏南地区), and calls India’s claims ‘ridiculous.’ For China, Tibet represents the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism (or ‘splittism’), and religious extremism. Under Xi, China is aggressively reinforcing its security in Tibet through increasing militarization, surveillance, and other actions. Both countries have dramatically increased Tibet’s geopolitical, cultural, and ecological significance, making it crucial to both.

Cooperation and conflicting conditions

India and China are economically interdependent, and both are important components of a multipolar, multi-aligned world system. The border dispute is still a major worry, especially in light of the fact that both countries have lost soldiers in armed battles. Nonetheless, the prospect of cooperation holds significance, particularly considering the plethora of opportunities for relationship-building and pursuing shared interests. Climate change is one such common problem, necessitating collaboration to decarbonize energy systems and diversify energy sources, while others include addressing security problems in a rapidly changing global environment. At COP28, India and China failed to endorse a promise to triple renewable energy sources by 2030, despite a pledge to transition away from fossil fuels. This highlights the paradoxical nature of power rivalry in international relations and between the two most populous countries, led by Modi and Xi, respectively.

One of Xi’s biggest challenges is the continuing deflationary pressures caused by rising property prices and diminishing construction output. In contrast, if Modi wins, he will inherit a stable rupee and surging Indian markets. India and China have differing inflation rates, but India is in a favorable economic position, and Modi would inherit India’s rising economy and foreign investment opportunities. Overall, India’s economy is strong and steady. India’s and China’s economic positions can have an anchoring effect, limiting or increasing their political capacity and leaders’ influence. Inflammatory or aggressive acts by Xi or Modi would have economic consequences for both, potentially causing additional political turbulence on their respective domestic fronts and increasing economic troubles in an already volatile global context. Neither leader will want this.

India-China relations are unique in nature. And, while Modi and Xi have shown open political affection and promised to address common concerns, the two countries, each with over a billion people, are geopolitical rivals with the ability to influence global affairs in both positive and negative ways. As has been the case in recent years, India-China relations will continue to be stable yet sensitive despite their historical, contemporary, and probable future challenges.

Scott N. Romaniuk is a research fellow at the Corvinus Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies (CAS), Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies.

Animesh Roul is the executive director of the New Delhi-based policy research group, Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict. He specializes in counterterrorism, radical Islam, terror financing, and armed conflict and violence in South Asia.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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In recent years, there has been a significant influx of Chinese farmers and migrant labor into the Russian Far East, stoking fears within the local population about the potential loss of land and economic sovereignty in the region. What lends credence to these fears is the fact that, only a year after the onset of Russia’s war in Ukraine, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources issued an order in February 2023 mandating the use of former Chinese names of its lost territories in neighboring countries, including in Russia’s Far East.

The post Biding Time? China’s Slow Takeover of Russia’s Far East appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

The Paris Meeting

Moldova’s Minister of Defense Anatolie Nosatîi and his French counterpart, Sébastien Lecornu, signed the agreement at the Elysée Palace, with presidents Sandu and Emmanuel Macron present. According to Chisinau, the cooperation agreement will address a variety of issues, including defense policy, participation in international missions and operations, airspace control and management, military information and telecommunications technology, military surveying, human resources management, language training, logistics, military medicine, and financial and budget management.

“If until now, the cooperation between the Republic of Moldova and France in the field of defense was limited to the exchange of military students (cadets) and the professional training of the force, based on the agreement signed in Paris on July 15, 1998, then the agreement signed today contributes significantly to the modernization of the National Army,” said Minister Nosatîi.

Defense Relations

The new cooperation agreement does not occur in a vacuum, as the two ministries of defense and militaries have generally cordial relations, including the 1998 defense agreement. However, interactions have increased since the war in Ukraine commenced in 2022. High-level bilateral meetings have become common. Minister Lecornu visited Chisinau in September 2023 to discuss the French-Moldovan partnership. France has also assigned a defense attache to Chisinau.

Defense cooperation now also includes the transfer of military technology. The Moldovan ministry has acquired one air-defense Ground Master (GM) 200 medium-range radar from the French company Thales to better control Moldovan airspace, given that fragments from Russian drones and missiles have crashed in Moldovan territory close to the border with Ukraine. The purchase of a second radar has been rumored. Also, in November 2023, Moldova received “the first batch of assistance… containing individual equipment, logistical supplies, light infantry weapons, and ammunition,” transferred by Paris to improve the Moldovan military’s capabilities. French-Moldovan troops have also trained together in military exercises, most recently during the multinational exercise Livex Sarmis 2023 in Romania.

Article 11 of the Moldovan constitution states that the country is neutral; hence, Chisinau cannot join military alliances like NATO. Thus, increasing bilateral defense partnerships with key allies like France, Romania, and the United States are vital for capacity building and the modernization of the Moldovan armed forces.

Other Aspects of the Relationship

The cornerstone of the growing relationship between Chisinau and Paris is the friendship between the two presidents. Presidents Sandu and Macron have met many times since she came to power. Moreover, Paris has become a supporter of the tiny Eastern European state. In 2022, France organized the first summit of the new European Political Community (EPC) and supported Moldova’s application to host the second summit, which Moldova hosted in 2023. Paris has also endorsed Moldova’s application to the European Union.

Paris also regularly praises Moldova’s stance vis-a-vis Russia and Ukraine. During a 29 February press briefing by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a spokesperson confirmed that “we support — and this is not new support… the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Moldova.” Moreover, at the March presidential meeting in Paris, the French president said in a statement, “France restates its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders.”

When President Sandu traveled to Paris, she met with several high-ranking French government officials. One of the meetings was with the French Development Agency (Agence Francaise de Development: AFD); one signed agreement involved the transfer of 40 million euros and a grant of 1.2 million euros to strengthen Moldova’s forest sector. “The funds allocated by the French partners will help us plant forests, including buying the necessary equipment and machinery, and to reform the forest fund according to European standards,” explained President Sandu in a social media post. Previously, in October 2023, the French embassy in Moldova explained that the AFD has committed “40 million euros to support the reform of [Moldova’s] energy sector” via a six-year program, as well as greater cooperation for forest management, and cooperation for better energy efficiency of public buildings.

There are also strong ties at the people-to-people level, as a sizable Moldovan diaspora is living in France. According to the Moldovan news agency Newsmaker, around 100-160,000 Moldovans live in France, making the country the third largest concentration of Moldovan migrants, after Russia (over 350k) and Italy (250-300k). During her March visit to Paris, she met with the Moldovan diaspora to convey a simple message, “we all want our country to be between friends, integrated into the EU family.” The Alliance Francaise also has a location in Chisinau to promote the French language and culture to the Moldovan population. On the occasion of the celebration of International Francophonie Day, on 20 March, President Sandu posted on X (formerly Twitter) that she is “very proud of the over 100,000 young Moldovans who are studying French and the values of Francophonie.”

On the other hand, trade and investment are limited. Bilateral trade relations, which the French embassy in Chisinau defines as “modest,” are governed by a 2014 trade agreement signed between Moldova and the European Union. French business entrepreneurs from both countries have met several times, including last June in Chisinau, to “discuss collaboration opportunities and identify new markets for their products and services.” The entrepreneurs came from industries like the pharmaceutical sector, security, construction, furniture, and hotel equipment manufacturing. During the March meetings in Paris, the Moldovan Ministry of the Economy Dumitru Alaiba and the French Foreign Affairs Minister, Stéphane Séjourné, also signed a new agreement that will rule bilateral economic cooperation and activities for the 2024-2029 period. It is debatable how much bilateral trade and investment can grow though, given the small size of the Moldovan market and other French priorities.

Analysis

France was one of the first countries to establish an embassy in Chisinau after Moldova became independent from the Soviet Union. A French embassy was opened in 1992, while Moldova opened its embassy in France in 1997. A year later, in 1998, then-President Jacques Chirac carried out a historic visit to Moldova. Almost a quarter of a century would have to pass before another French president traveled to Moldova. President Macron visited the country in June 2022 and a year later, in 2023, for the EPC summit.

The defense cooperation agreement will elevate defense relations between France and Moldova to a new level. Moreover, there is a solid government-to-government relationship. During the presidential meeting, the two presidents issued a joint statement that said, “France, co-founder of the support platform for Moldova, contributes to strengthening the resilience and capacities of the Republic of Moldova, in all areas,” adding that “France also set out, during the conference in support of Ukraine held in Paris on February 26, to mobilize international partners to support the sovereignty, resilience and security of the Republic of Moldova.”

One fundamental challenge is that the relationship only increased when President Sandu came to power. Previous Moldovan presidents have had other foreign policy priorities, as some Moldovan leaders were focused on befriending Russia, like former president Igor Dodon (2016-2020). Hence, an obvious concern is that if Sandu is not reelected and a more pro-Moscow president takes power, then this special relationship, as I define it, could dissolve.

Defining a special relationship between governments is challenging to determine in real-time. With that said, the close presidential relations, increasing defense relations, and growing cooperation in energy and environmental issues suggest we are witnessing the beginning stages of a special relationship between Moldova and France. The next test of the relationship will be the upcoming Moldovan elections in autumn. Special relationships must be strong enough to withstand leadership changes; thus, should Sandu not be reelected, this special relationship may dissolve quickly.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. He covers geopolitical, defense, and trade issues in the Western Hemisphere, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. He has monitored Moldovan foreign policy and defense affairs for over a decade.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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The UNCLOS treaty boasts a membership of 168 countries, along with the European Union. Additionally, 14 United Nations Member States have signed UNCLOS but have yet to ratify it. Notably, only 16 United Nations Member and Observer States have refrained from both signing and ratifying UNCLOS. Among them is the United States of America, which has signed but not ratified the treaty.

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