In recent years, there has been a significant influx of Chinese farmers and migrant labor into the Russian Far East, stoking fears within the local population about the potential loss of land and economic sovereignty in the region. What lends credence to these fears is the fact that, only a year after the onset of Russia’s war in Ukraine, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources issued an order in February 2023 mandating the use of former Chinese names of its lost territories in neighboring countries, including in Russia’s Far East.

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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine triggered not only the largest war in Europe since World War II, but also the start of the first open cyber war. Western governments believed Ukraine would be quickly defeated on the physical battlefield and experts predicted that Ukraine would face a “Cyber Pearl Harbor.”

Instead, Ukraine shocked the world with its heroic resistance on the battlefield while Russia’s vaunted cyber campaign was also thwarted. More than ever, Ukraine needs Western weaponry on the physical battlefield to defeat Russia. But at the same time, Ukraine must be supported with additional capabilities that will enable it to expand its cyber campaign against Russia. In turn, this cyber campaign enhances Ukraine’s military and political objectives.

A few months after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began two years ago, Russia threatened that Western cyberattacks against Russia risked a direct military clash, and that any attempts to challenge Russia in the cyber sphere would lead to targeted countermeasures from Moscow. Russia said that its critical infrastructure was being targeted by cyberattacks coming from the United States and Ukraine.

Despite Russia’s vocal threats against the advanced weaponry supplied by the West to Ukraine, such as ATACMS or Storm Shadow missiles, Moscow has, so far, refrained from following through on its cyber threats. No one knows where the red lines stand. Yet, despite Putin’s posturing, there has been no strong reaction from Russia to tactics like increasing the supply of weapons, nor to recent Ukrainian strikes on occupied Crimea. The disconnect between Russia’s vocal saber-rattling and the reality of their muted response suggests the West may be too cautious in its approach to supporting Ukraine on the physical battlefield. The same lesson ought to be applied to the cyber domain.

The withdrawal of Western technology from Russia accelerates the pressure on Russian state actors, who may soon face technological debt due to a shortage of essential hardware and software updates, also potentially forcing a turn to less-reliable Chinese alternatives. This situation could gradually undermine the security and efficiency of Russia’s domestic telecommunications, surveillance infrastructure, and advanced cyber research organizations.

If Russia continues using Western tech, it is harder for Western and Ukrainian cyber warfare entities to exploit zero-day attacks because Western countries don’t have a good way to handle the potential collateral damage. However, if Western tech is removed from Russia, and it must use its own or Chinese alternatives, attacking with zero-day exploits becomes easier because there’s less worry about accidentally damaging Western systems. As a result, the West should expect the amount of vulnerabilities, including zero-days, to rise domestically in Russian infrastructure.

It is in the interest of the West to help give Ukraine the cyber weaponry that is needed to address the West’s security concerns in the region. This includes sharing, prior to public disclosure, information on zero-day vulnerabilities—known to Western technology firms, security researchers, and intelligence agencies—with Ukraine. Such intelligence sharing would enable Ukraine to strategically target Russia’s economic and infrastructural capacities, further undermining its war efforts.  Tech companies and governments in the West should carefully assess the risks and, where suitable, contemplate supplying intelligence to Ukraine.

However, in addition to assisting Ukraine in conducting wider cyberattacks against Russia, such transfer of cyberweapons to Ukraine could also lead to greater Russian pressure to attack Ukraine. If Ukraine (and the West) were willing to take this risk, it could allow Western countries to study how zero-day vulnerabilities will be exploited in future wars, helping them to adapt defensive strategies accordingly. Much as Ukraine was a testing ground for Russian cyberattacks in 2014–2022, Russia could become a testing ground for Western cyberweapons launched by Ukraine.

The West must reframe its thinking about how it supports Ukraine as it helps to improve Ukraine’s capabilities to conduct a larger cyber offensive against Russia in support of its battlefield objectives. Russia’s cyber war against Ukraine and the West is part of its wider campaign to prevail on the physical front and destroy Ukraine before moving further West. Supporting the defence of Ukraine won’t bring victory and peace, but giving it the abilities and means to win on the digital and physical fronts will protect the Western world.

If the West fails to properly support Ukraine in this cyber war, it will also undermine its own ability to fight on the battlefield in the future. It further undermines the West’s investment in conventional armaments if physical operations are not supported by cyber.

What happens on the cyber front isn’t merely related to Ukraine and Russia, but has a direct impact on the West because Russia has already been waging hybrid warfare for years. As cyber remains a grey area, Russia will continue to increase its attacks on the West, especially as the world becomes even more digitally dependent. Thus, reinforcing Ukraine’s cyber capabilities not only addresses immediate threats but also strategically curbs Russia’s capabilities.

The 19th-century wartime strategist Carl von Clausewitz understood that only great strength of will can lead to the desired outcome. Clausewitz emphasized the importance of willpower in achieving victory, both on the part of military leaders and their forces. He understood that war is not only a physical struggle but also a moral one, where the determination and resolve of the combatants can be as critical as their material resources.

If the West is genuinely committed to supporting Ukraine’s victory on the battlefield, it must broaden its consideration of the resources it provides. This support should encompass not only conventional weaponry for physical combat but also include advanced cyber capabilities to bolster Ukraine’s defense and offensive strategies in the digital realm.

Assisting Ukraine’s cyber campaigns will help to begin defining cyber red lines for NATO that do not currently exist as Russia continues to push boundaries and attack critical infrastructure. If Ukraine is able to wage larger-scale cyber campaigns against Russia with Western support effectively, it could serve to deter other nation states like China, Iran, and North Korea from launching devastating cyberattacks in the future.

David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based think tank. He can be found on X @DVKirichenko.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The post The West Should Help Expand Ukraine’s Cyber Offensive against Russia appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Some experts believe Russia is already at war with the West, utilizing various forms of hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare refers to a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and cyber warfare with other influencing methods such as propaganda and disinformation. Hybrid warfare requires delicacy in inflicting harm on the target country without escalating into a full-blown conventional war. Russia is often accused by experts and Western governments of employing such tactics to undermine the stability and influence of Western democracies. The strategy involves leaving a sufficiently faint footprint to deter military retaliation, as such a response would be seen as a violation of international norms.

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These agreements are interesting for several reasons in the context of global geopolitics. They represent a firm stance from European actors, which appears to contrast with the shaky US support, held in check by a Republican Party that is calling for a closer eye toward Mexico. It is not unlikely that this call for a change in focus is due to the fact that the immigration issue is more palpable to the American public than the Ukraine issue, especially in light of upcoming elections.

Washington’s support for Ukrainian military development has been fundamental over the past two years and has played a crucial role in maintaining balance in the conflict. However, this support is now decreasing, possibly due to a shift in US priorities in both the short- and long- term.

The presidential elections are now looming, and the Ukrainian issue alone may not be enough of a rallying point to convince any candidates to feature it in their campaigns.

Over the past two years, Ukraine has been portrayed more as an ideal than a country, a democratic savior against totalitarianism, much as the United States once represented. This image seemed to be closely tied to the leadership of Zelensky, whose charismatic figure was largely useful to the United States in continuing to project its soft power into the NATO sphere. However, due to increasing distrust from both within and outside Ukraine (with only 1 in 10 Europeans believing Ukraine will win the war), it has increasingly become a challenge to present this issue to the US electorate.

More specifically, new surveys revealed that Volodymyr Zelensky’s leadership in Ukraine is now reaching new lows, as Ukrainians’ confidence in the leader who inspired the world enough to earn him Person of the Year in 2022 plummets. Contributing factors to the current situation probably include the stalemate in the war, the halt in allied aid, doubts about the decision to postpone elections, which effectively keeps President Zelensky in power indefinitely, and, most recently, the decision to change the head of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

On the long-term side, it is no secret that the U.S. is now more concerned about China’s superpower status than its old rival, Russia. Despite its slowing economy, China now seems to pose the greatest threat to an US hegemony, weakened by sluggish population growth and a growing distrust among younger generations towards the American dream, resulting in a decreased willingness to sacrifice for it.

Given all of the above, a reduction of US aid now seems possible, along with potentially even Washington’s gradual or complete withdrawal from the conflict, particularly if Donald Trump, the main advocate for US withdrawal, wins the 2024 elections. This stands as one of the main reasons for the emergence of European actors on the geopolitical scene, evident in the recent signings of several bilateral agreements.

Europe’s long-awaited pivot toward geopolitical independence?

If Europeans do not believe that Ukraine can win the war, then why are they signing these agreements?

It seems that European actors are taking on a more prominent role in filling the geopolitical void increasingly left by the United States. Since World War II, NATO has been the only major actor on the continent. However, today the scene is more fragmented, with many smaller actors now able to act independently. It is not surprising that Germany, one of the first countries to sign bilateral agreements with Ukraine, is now aiming to be “the backbone of European defense.”

Similarly, there is a relatively uniform position on the part of the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, with pledges of financial and, in some cases, military support for Ukraine. The common front could stem from an increased cohesion within Europe, which some believe is beginning to emerge as a unified political (and perhaps in the future, military) actor.

With these agreements, it could be argued that a new season in the war in Ukraine has begun. It seems that European actors will play a more prominent role than the American giant, even though the agreements themselves are signed with a focus on the future rather than the current invasion.

Finally, it is worth noting that this change comes at a sensitive time, as Sergej Lavrov, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, has recently stated that Russia is willing to halt the invasion with the concession of already occupied territories.

This statement comes as no surprise to anyone who has been following the issue in recent years, as it has been often repeated how Russia has tried to make a “peace” deal by bypassing Kiev and trying to negotiate directly to Washington. Lavrov’s public statement may have been intended to send a signal to both Ukraine and its allies, as evidenced by its peculiar publication by the Russian state media agency TASS.

Moscow may have made these intentions public due to the changing geopolitical scenario as described above, or it may have made them because of the death of Alexei Navalny, the most famous representative of Putin’s opposition, has caused civil unrest and risks greater internal instability. Moscow may be seeking to secure its victory and focus on internal stability. It could also suggest that Vladimir Putin is betting on a Trump presidential win, which could result in more favorable terms for Moscow and a blow to Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

However, these declarations could also indicate a desire for dialogue with new players in the aftermath of failed negotiations overseas. In this regard, for the first time in two years, European actors could finally become actual parties to the conflict and contribute to its resolution, thus gaining significant and real geopolitical and diplomatic relevance for the first time in decades. This is no easy task, however, with radically conflicting demands for negotiations from both the Russian and Ukrainian sides.

The hypothetical future: peace negotiations impossible without sovereignty

For both Ukrainians and Russians, this is an existential war, albeit for symmetrical but opposite reasons: neither side seems willing to retreat from its victories on the ground, even if they are not the ones it sought.

Many Ukrainians would swear that Putin is not genuinely interested in achieving peace. Similarly, residents of Baltic countries fear that Putin’s territorial ambitions extend beyond Ukraine.

Whether negotiations take place on US or European soil, it is unlikely that the Western stance on Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity will change in the next year. Acknowledging Ukrainian territorial integrity as negotiable would be in stark contrast not only with Ukraine, but also with the position of Eastern European allied states, particularly Poland, who advocate for a stricter stance due to fears of Russian military expansion. Given their crucial position for European defense, particularly in light of Transnistria’s upcoming referendum and the volatile predicament of the Kaliningrad enclave, it is unlikely that Western Europe will want to antagonize them.

Whether the West wants to listen to the Eastern European strongholds or think strategically about the future of Europe, where a concession of Ukrainian territory would set a dangerous precedent, the outcome of the negotiations is likely to follow the line of preserving Ukraine’s sovereign integrity as much as possible and pleading for an end to a conflict that has torn Europe apart.

The post The Ukraine War: Europe’s Declaration of Geopolitical Independence? appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

A more balanced Armenian foreign and security policy is to be welcomed. It will take time to gradually move out of Russia’s orbit while being very difficult to withdraw Armenia from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Armenia also has Russian military bases on its territory, Russia’s Federal Bureau of Security (FSB) assist in the protection of Armenia’s borders, while Armenia’s military is trained by Russia and mainly uses Russian military equipment.

In 2013, Russia successfully pressured Armenia to not sign an Association Agreement with the EU and instead join the EEU. Serzh A. Sargsyan, then Armenian president, was a member of the pro-Russian ‘Karabakh Clan’ which viewed Russia as a guarantee of an indefinite freezing of Armenia’s irredentist occupation of a fifth of Azerbaijan, including the Karabakh region, after it had won the First Karabakh War.

Pro-Russian forces suffered double blows in Armenia. The first was in 2018 when Pashinyan led a color revolution against the corrupt Sargsyan regime and brought a more pro-European, younger generation to power which sought to increase Armenia’s integration with Europe. The second was in 2020-2023 when Azerbaijan took back first its areas surrounding Karabakh and then Karabakh itself.

The pro-Russian ‘Karabakh clan’ is no longer powerful in Armenia. Pro-Russian forces will suffer from a third blow next year when Azerbaijan advises Russia that it will not renew its five-year peacekeeping mandate. Russia’s so-called peacekeeping forces have nothing to peace keep as Azerbaijani lands are no longer occupied and a peace treaty between both countries is soon to be signed.

Nevertheless, Pashinyan would do well to end Armenia’s role as one of the main conduits helping Russia evade Western sanctions. This practice both expands corruption in Armenia, strengthens corrupt Armenian-Russian networks and, in cementing Armenia’s links to Russia, makes it more difficult for Pashinyan to pursue European integration.

Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are leading conduits for the evading Western sanctions against Russia. According to Robin Brookes, former chief economist at The Global Association of the Financial Industry and chief FX strategist at Goldman Sachs, Armenia’s exports to Russia are up 430% from before the 2022 invasion, which are composed of re-exports from the EU and China to Russia. Armenia’s exports to Kazakhstan increased to 1,200%, to Kyrgyzstan 1,600%, to Uzbekistan 250%, and to the UAE 900%, all of which are likely being re-exported to Russia.

During a visit to Yerevan in summer 2022, CIA Director William Burns warned Armenia about assisting Russia to evade Western sanctions, including high technology, imposed in response to the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February. In March 2023, the US listed Armenia as a country involved in smuggling to Russia. A recent EU sanctions package ‘focused on preventing third-country circumvention also lists entities in Armenia among the culprits.’

The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has been relatively slow to act against Armenia and other Eurasian sanctions busters. Two Armenian registered companies with Russian owners, TAKO LLC (registered in Yerevan in May 2022) and AO PKK Milandr have been sanctioned.

The US Treasury Department’s OFAC ruled that TAKO, ‘materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technical support for, or goods and services to or in support of Radioavtomatika.’AO PKK Milandr is a Russian microelectronics company that is part of the Russian military research and development defence technology firm Radioavtomatika that supplies electronic goods to the Russian military.

Armenian banks (e.g., AreximBank, GazpromBank Group, VTB Bank, Bank Mellat) are handsomely profiting from the war in Ukraine. Armenia and Georgia have experienced a huge influx of refugees from Russia, many of whom have brought capital and launched new business ventures. Financial transfers from Russia to Armenia reached $3.5 billion in 2022, a massive increase from $865 million in 2021.

In 2022, the first year of the invasion, EU exports to Russia declined by nearly half (47%). In the same year, imports from the EU to Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan grew by 48%. These five countries do not have the populations and purchasing power to consume such a large volume of products and therefore there is little doubt these imports were re-exported to Russia.

Armenia’s exports to Russia almost tripled in 2022, growing by 187% over the previous year. At least half of this trade consisted of the re-export of Western goods with the remainder Armenian products. Some of these were dual use goods, such as washing machines, for the consumer market and military. In 2022, Armenia imported more washing machines than all the member states of the EU!

Armenia’s economy boomed in 2022, growing by a record 14.2%. Under the impact of Russia’s invasion, Ukraine’s economy declined by a third. Armenia’s economy had been expected to decline due to its heavy reliance on Russia and yet grew by a record figure.

Imports into and exports from Armenia grew by record figures in 2022. Armenia’s trade turnover increased by 68.8% in 2022 over the previous year while imports grew by 63.5% over 2021.  This included a two-fold increase of goods imported from the EU. Armenian exports to Russia grew three-fold in 2022, at least half of which were reexports.

Of the Eurasian sanction busters, Armenia has become the main hub for Western goods reaching Russia. In addition to dual-use consumer goods, these include microchips, transportation equipment, technical components, old and new cars, smartphones, and computers.

Tens of thousands of cars in Armenia and Georgia are destined for Russia where Western showrooms for cars closed following the invasion. Armenia does not produce cars; nevertheless, exports of cars to Russia increased from $800,000 in 2022 to $180 million a year in the following year. Cars arriving in the Georgian port of Poti are brought to Armenia for duty free customs clearance through the EEU’s free trade agreement with Russia. They are then taken via Georgia to Russia.

Armenia increased its import of precious metals and stones by a whopping 200%, new vehicles by 170%, electronics by 100%, iron and steel by 76%, machinery and mechanical devices by 52% and technical and medical equipment by 42%. In the same year, Armenia increased the export of precious metals and stones by a suspiciously high 200% and technical and medical equipment by 400%.

Armenia’s 2.8 million population does not have the capacity to purchase such large quantities of commodities. In addition, these commodities were not traditionally found in Armenian exports to Russia. Re-exports to Russia are the only answer explaining Armenia’s massive growth in trade. For example, Armenia increased its imports of microchips from the US by 515% and from the EU by 212% in 2022. Nearly all of these (97%) were reexported to Russia where they are used by Russia’s military industrial complex.

Armenia, alongside Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, have been assisting Russia to evade Western sanctions imposed after the invasion of Ukraine. Four of these five countries (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) are members of the CSTO and EEU.

Of the five countries assisting Russia in evading Western sanctions, Armenia and Georgia pursue duplicitous foreign policies. While ostensibly seeking European integration they are assisting Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine which the Kremlin views as a war against Western democracies to destroy the so-called US-led unipolar world.

Of these two countries, Armenia is playing for both teams. Armenia cannot hope to convince Brussels and Washington it is pursuing a more balanced foreign policy through greater European integration while it is at the same assisting Russia’s war against the democratic West.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and the editor of Russian Disinformation and Western Scholarship (2023)

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Ukraine is not exactly a stranger when it comes to the notion of neutrality. In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the country expressed an intention in its declaration of state sovereignty of 1 July 1990 to become a permanently neutral state that would shun participation in military blocs and show a commitment to denuclearization. This largely nonaligned status resulted in a vacillating foreign policy, which nonetheless appeared to be conducive to the pursuit of amicable relations with both the European Union (EU) and Russia, before being ultimately abandoned in December 2014 in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the start of the Donbas war. In February 2019, with the overwhelming approval of the Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament of Ukraine), the Ukrainian constitution was amended, setting the country on a course toward full membership in the EU and NATO. Nonetheless, in late March 2022 Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy was still prepared to discuss the possibility of Ukraine taking a neutral position as part of a potential peace deal with Russia to halt the invasion.

Yet there are quite a few practical and moral reasons as to why the train of neutrality should now be considered to have long left the station.

Neutrality, which remains a somewhat imprecise concept and was famously characterized in 1956 by former American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles as an “obsolete conception,” may be regarded as a state of mind or a normative self-conceptualization of the political elite and the citizens, rather than a status that a country is bound to by balance of power considerations. Arguably, the more nuanced understanding of neutrality is even more relevant in the case of consolidated democracies. Public support for Finland joining NATO (the country officially became a member on 4 April 2023) rose from approximately 33% of Finns in 2018 to close to 80% of Finnish citizens in 2022, which was clearly a significant factor when it came to the decision taken by the country’s political establishment to submit a membership request in May 2022.

Ukraine is certainly on a path towards becoming a full-fledged democracy, as a result of which any decision to either adopt neutrality or stick to an explicitly pro-Western geopolitical course needs to reflect the wishes of the general population, which are not set in stone and will not in any way be compatible with the narrow definition of Ukrainian neutrality that is likely to be put forth by the negotiators on the Russian side.

What Russian policymakers do not seem to fully realize is that the Russian troops’ actions in Ukraine have unleashed what could be described as a generational hostility directed not only toward the Russian elites but also toward the Russian people themselves, which has also had implications beyond the realm of politics. In Croatian historian Domagoj Krpan’s words, this internecine war may become the founding narrative when it comes to building a new Ukrainian national identity in the 21st century. Assuming some form of neutrality is essentially forced upon Ukraine, a de jure neutral Ukraine will continue to instinctively gravitate towards the West, will be unwilling to perceive itself as a bridge between the Occident and the “Russian world”, and will inevitably evaluate its foreign policy options through an anti-Russian prism, for instance when it comes to the manner of its voting on United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolutions.

Given that many neutral countries such as Switzerland maintain capable armed forces with a full readiness for engaging in combat, it would be quite unrealistic, even if ironclad security guarantees are provided to Ukraine by Western actors, for Ukraine to be expected to scale down its military forces to the extent that the country would remain virtually without a standing army. Thus, it is difficult to see how, especially with trust between Russia and the West being in even shorter supply than before, a solemn proclamation of Ukrainian neutrality coming from the Ukrainian government and the main Western countries supportive of Ukraine (unless it occurs at a time when the Ukrainian military has been reduced to a shadow of its current strength) would satisfy one of the conditions still insisted upon by Russia for ending the invasion, namely “demilitarization.”

In contrast to previous instances in which a neutral status was essentially imposed on a country in a manifestly weaker position than its adversary, the present state of the conflict does not necessitate the adoption of such an approach. For example, unlike in the case of Finnish neutrality during the Cold War, which was not negotiated by the Finns from something approaching a position of strength, but was a way to guarantee Finland’s national existence and security by avoiding invasion or occupation by Soviet forces, Ukraine has already had its territorial integrity blatantly violated by Russia while at the same time it has demonstrated that it can hold its own on the battlefield against the Russian forces and is unlikely to find itself, unless Western support completely dries up, in the desperate position of having to sue for peace. Thus, a settlement that includes the adoption of a neutral status will not be palatable to the majority of Ukrainian citizens, especially if it does not entail the return to Ukraine of all Russian-occupied territories. The latter prospect does not mesh that well with the current military realities on the ground and continues to be a non-negotiable issue from the perspective of the Putin administration.

From a moral standpoint, requiring Ukraine to declare neutrality is also likely to be perceived by the country’s citizens as a betrayal of them by the collective West, with the latter appearing to bow down to one of the main demands stated by Russia, especially given the enormous personal sacrifices that Ukrainian people have made for advancing the cause of European security. According to a Gallup opinion poll from October 2023, there is already a creeping sense of disillusionment among ordinary Ukrainians with regard to the level of assistance provided by the USA.

Western policymakers should also be cognizant of the reality that neutrality has often been a contrivance of statecraft associated with small states. An adoption of neutrality may be regarded as a failure on the part of the Western countries to properly acknowledge that Ukraine, which prior to 2022 was already considered by a number of scholars to be part of the ranks of the middle powers, is currently yielding vast amounts of soft power and has actually contributed (courtesy of its ability to define regional and global agendas) to elevating the status of other middle powers in international relations. Political realists such as John Mearsheimer have criticized the USA for desiring, by relying on sanctions and other punitive measures, to knock Russia out of the ranks of the great powers. However, Russia’s own culpability (since the late 2000s) with respect to fomenting justifiable concerns among many of its neighboring countries due to the former’s actions weakening the norm of state sovereignty cannot be ignored. On the other hand, symbolically relegating Ukraine (through no fault of its own) from the status of a middle power to that of a small state by requiring it to adopt neutrality would constitute a misreading of the changing dynamics within the international system and would also represent an implicit admission on the part of the West that Ukraine does not deserve to have the same agency as that of the great powers, including those of them that are not averse to engaging in gross violations of the principles of international law.

The importance of (perceived) agency is not to be underestimated because while Ukrainian neutrality could theoretically go hand in hand with a potential membership in the EU, it may become an additional stumbling block by making the country’s future accession, already viewed in a somewhat lukewarm fashion by Germany and France, an even less attractive proposition. For instance, since the launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in defense at the end of 2017, the EU has become more active when it comes to military matters, but some of the neutral EU member states have not been able to make full use of the new opportunities afforded for military cooperation. Ukraine has already displayed increased interoperability with many EU countries that are also members of NATO, so being forced to opt out of common military initiatives due to a formal commitment to neutrality would be rather counterproductive with regard to both Ukrainian and EU security interests.

Even the most politically astute analysts are finding it difficult to forecast how the conflict in Ukraine will eventually end. What is virtually certain is that the (re)emergence of a neutral Ukraine should be regarded as one of the least viable scenarios, and one that will not be helpful in terms of firmly placing the country in the Western camp, where it belongs.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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While the arrest warrant created legal and diplomatic hurdles for the Kremlin, it has also aided Putin’s survival domestically and advanced Russia’s union with Washington’s adversaries. Although the indictment is legally justified, it is practically unattainable because arrest and extradition – while not impossible – remain highly improbable. Coupled with economic sanctions, global asset forfeitures, and cultural prohibitions, the indictment serves as another example – in legal form – of the comprehensive political, economic, and social isolation imposed by the West. Putin touts these measures as the existential struggle between the Russian people and the West to garner political support at home and abroad.

The indictment’s implications extend beyond the legal risks to Putin by introducing diplomatic costs that are irritating and isolating Moscow from Western capitals. Mr. Putin has since limited his international travels to Western nations and those that are party to the Rome Statute. Notably, he skipped out on the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg out of fear of arrest and extradition. But the Kremlin’s world hasn’t shrunk entirely, and the implications are largely inconsequential for the Russian president personally. As the door to the West closed, another has opened to the East.

Contrary to its intent, the warrant all but ensures Putin’s continued reign and Russia’s enduring pivot toward the East. Putin’s meetings with North Korean and Iranian leaders inside Russia, coupled with his recent trip to China, illustrate Moscow’s budding relationship with Washington’s foes. His tour around the Middle East shows that even the West’s partners value the Kremlin’s friendship.

The West has little leverage to isolate Russia from Iran and North Korea, whose values and human rights records are far more egregious than Moscow’s. China will not be convinced to roll back their friendship with Moscow as Beijing benefits from their energy deals. And the West’s Gulf allies – who have appalling human rights records of their own – are keen on taking less direction from Washington and are willing to cooperate with Moscow on energy, trade, and defense. Thus, Moscow is broadening its relationship with nations who share its values and economic interests, as well as who view Washington as being hypocritical.

The ICC’s indictment still poses some degree of risk to Putin’s freedom. He faces the remote chance of arrest and extradition to The Hague if he travels outside of Russia without explicit assurances of his safety. But a looming threat of arrest and extradition while traveling is highly unlikely if he remains president. The Kremlin will ensure any trips exclude the 123 countries obligated to enforce the Statute while he remains in power. His praetorian guard and Russia’s intelligence service are obligated to protect him while he is head of state.

Of greater concern is the possibility of any arrest and extradition attempts inside his own borders. Although this remains highly unlikely, it still poses a lingering threat to Putin personally should he be ousted from power. Both scenarios are added motivation to stand for and win re-election.

Otherwise, a loss exposes the potential that a coalition government of political opponents might use their electoral victory as an opportunity to exile him to The Hague. Thereby eliminating Putin as a political opponent, signaling a break in Russia’s adversarial foreign policy, and achieving a strategic rapprochement with the West in one move. Observers point to then-Yugoslav President Milosevic’s extradition to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as an example to support this scenario.

This comparison ignores important details. Legally, Russia’s constitution prohibits extradition of any citizens, let alone former presidents. Any democratic leaning government would be hard pressed to allow such a move, as tempting as it might be, since extradition would surrender Moscow’s sovereignty to an international body. This would dent Russia’s power and prestige, signal weakness, and be interpreted as an embarrassment by its citizens. Such a decision might usher in more problems, risking the opposition’s coalition and mandate. Observers forget that Milosevic’s extradition was a highly controversial event in post-conflict Yugoslavia, one that caused a rift in the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) and aided the eventual fall of the coalition government.

More importantly, commentators overlook the fact that Yugoslavia had no alternative but to cooperate with the Tribunal. The international community maintained substantial leverage over Belgrade, which was subjected to some of the harshest sanctions measures after a decade of war – and as a result, required economic relief, development aid, and political support for a European Union future, contingent on cooperation with the Hague.

Russia’s current reality is nowhere near that of Yugoslavia’s. The international community lacks the same leverage and Russia is neither entirely isolated nor hampered by the current sanctions regime. A non-existent and jailed opposition cannot form a coalition let alone provide a political alternative. Even if he lost, there is no assurance of a new government being significantly democratic or Western leaning.

The arrest warrant will continue to isolate Putin, and Russia by extension, from the West. This will lead to a small, albeit noticeable, decline in international influence. But that may be the indictment’s biggest success given the unlikely chance of arrest. Still, Putin’s de facto persona non grata label will not curtail all of Moscow’s diplomatic strength, as evidenced by the growing ties between Moscow, Tehran, Beijing, and other capitals.

Just as economic sanctions have not changed Russia’s decisions toward Ukraine, the ICC’s indictment will not force Putin’s arrest. So long as he remains wanted in the West, Russia will continue its attempts to strengthen its influence with like-minded nations elsewhere to offset the relative loss of influence as the door to the West remains shut.

The lingering indictment will continually motivate Putin’s need to stay in power. His predecessors’ political careers are not a suitable scenario for comparison. Unlike Yeltsin – who received political assurances and a tacit pardon for his excesses – or Gorbachev – who oversaw the Soviet Union’s dissolution – Putin will not resign. This means that the indictment, inadvertently, re-enforces Putin’s prevailing resolve to win the upcoming elections in 2024, and most likely in 2030.

Therefore, Western policymakers need to consider the implications of a Russia led by a wanted and unwelcomed Mr. Putin. How will U.S. and EU relations with Russia evolve or devolve over this period? Will Russia be the enduring foe so long as Putin is president and can a reset in relations occur while the ICC continues to pursue Putin for his crimes?

At the end of the day, it is hard to seek peace while criminally pursuing the very person that is a factor in attaining it. Cooperation with an alleged criminal that has been isolated and believes he is in an existential battle for his country’s survival will be difficult without undermining the very institution that has charged him. Resetting relations with Russia while Putin is president might risk opening the West to increased criticisms of hypocrisy levied by others. Therefore, the messaging remains murky, is peace in Ukraine or a reset in relations attainable with Putin as president – and if it is not – what strategy will guide engagement with Russia led by the incumbent?

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense (DoD) or the U.S. Government. Additionally, the appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) of the linked websites, or the information, products or services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find in these locations.

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As last year closed out, Moscow predicted annual economic growth of 2.8 per cent, following contraction in 2022 when the sanctions noose was tightened considerably following the invasion of Ukraine. A surge in defense spending and high oil prices have helped to buoy the economy, and Russian private companies have apparently adapted well to the new economic realities. At the same time, the country has not seen the wholesale Western business exodus that appeared in the cards at the start of the conflict.  Many companies chose to remain,  some curtailing operations and investments. Yet, they still contribute billions to Kremlin coffers.

Nonetheless, underlying conditions are not great. High interest rates and inflation, a weak rouble, and big labor shortages do not augur well, especially when much of the country’s still substantial foreign reserves have been frozen by the West and most Russian banking system assets are sanctioned. True, the Russian economy is weaker than it was prior to the invasion but, to the frustration of Western policymakers, sanctions evasion and Moscow’s pivot East have helped to keep the country afloat.  A US study showed that by the autumn of 2022, Russian imports had rebounded from a steep fall in the  aftermath of the invasion.

Soon after the tightening of Western sanctions, as Russian forces advanced deep into Ukraine, Moscow looked to circumvent the restrictions. It built up a shadow tanker fleet to get round an oil price cap and looked to grow parallel imports – goods exported to unsanctioned countries, then re-exported to Russia without manufactures’ knowledge or consent. Moscow formalized the practice in May 2022, listing goods, ranging from auto parts to consumer goods, that could be imported in this way. The West, in particular the US, has sought to put pressure on exporting countries – notably Turkey, Kazakhstan and the UAE. Yet, it is unclear how effective this has been.  Moscow doesn’t seem too troubled. It claimed in December that parallel imports amounted to over 70 billion dollars’ worth of goods over the last two year.

Moscow had already been pivoting eastwards before the Ukraine war to boost economic growth. The invasion has expedited the geostrategic shift, with President Vladmir Putin finding willing trade and investment partners, apparently undeterred by the threat of sanctions. Trade between Russia and China rose by nearly 30 per cent to exceed $200 billion in the first 11 months of last year, with the Chinese exports to Russia surging by 50 per cent.  Half of Russia’s oil and petroleum exports went to China in 2023, with 40 per cent going to India. Overall, Russian-Indian bilateral trade doubled to over $50 billion between January and October last year.

On the military front, Russia has turned to rogue states like North Korea and Iran for direct weapon supplies, and is suspected of purchasing technology with civilian and military uses (subject to export controls)  from other friends, including Turkey and China.  According to US intelligence, Beijing has not only been providing Russia with vital economic assistance, but likely also military and dual-use technology, including navigation equipment, jamming technology and fighter-jet parts. The US think tank the Atlantic Council recently pointed out that open-source trade data suggested “a surge in imports of Chinese-manufactured goods with important military uses played a key role” in keeping Russia equipped and supplied to resist Ukraine’s recent counteroffensive.

Russia’s dependence on China to mitigate the impact of sanctions is such that a fifth of its imports by the end of 2022 are reported to have been invoiced in Chinese yuan, while Beijing has markedly increased the use of the currency to pay for Russian commodities. And while the West has sought to squeeze investment in Russia, Moscow has turned to China to fill in some of the gaps. Beijing, which has called for greater cross-border connectivity, has invested in transport infrastructure projects. It has also agreed to cooperate on a major mining project, is  considering joint development of oil and gas fields, and plans to collaborate on a  trans-shipment oil complex.

Moscow’s economic ties with Beijing seem to be getting closer and closer, so much so that there’s now a debate over whether Russia is becoming a vassal state.  But for China, India, and other smaller countries  eager to step up trade with Russia, commercial opportunity, it seems, is the main driver. “Russians are short of goods, so we’ll supply them and try not break sanctions whilst we’re at it,” they might argue.

The US and the EU will continue to penalize those that do, but this may represent just a fraction of illicit transactions. Moreover, what to do with all the legitimate trade that is undeniably helping Russia to weather the West’s sanctions regime? These questions will no doubt loom large in the minds of Western policymakers as Putin prepares to secure a fifth presidential term in March.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Admiral Stavridis’s point of view has family roots, and as the admiral says, “the Korean War is iconic in my family. My father fought there in the early 1950s as a young US Marine officer. He often said to me that what happened in the years immediately after was nothing short of a miracle.”

In 1953, after the signing of the armistice, the Republic of Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world, with destroyed infrastructure, a weak and predominantly agrarian economy, and high levels of corruption. According to the Korean government, the war damage to industrial facilities, equipment, public institutions, private residences, and vehicles (excluding military installations) in South Korea amounted to approximately $3 billion. According to Charles R. Frank Jr., Kwang Suk Kim, Larry E. Westphal, this amount was almost equal to the country’s GNP for 1952 and 1953 combined.

In March 2023, the World Bank estimated the cost of reconstruction and restoration of Ukrainian infrastructure at $411 billion, which is almost three times its annual GDP for 2023. That is, the amount of damage caused by the war to Ukraine has already exceeded the similar losses incurred by South Korea in the 1950-1953 war.

Thus, the main thesis issued by Admiral Stavridis is that there are no miracles in the post-war recovery of a country. Reconstruction of the country is a collective effort of partners who have a responsibility and interest in security in the region. But, assistance for post-war reconstruction is only one side of the coin. There is another, which extends into the realm of geopolitics – security guarantees. This is an area in which miracles are absolutely excluded, because it has to be a collective effort.

Therefore, a second critical factor for Ukraine, as mentioned by admiral Stavridis, will be obtaining ironclad security guarantees. Probably, that means, plain and simple, North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership. This is similar to what South Korea was granted as a full U.S. treaty partner in 1953. The accession of Ukraine to NATO needs certain and explicit decisions and probably, the time.

Here it is worth mentioning Henry Kissinger, who in January and May 2023 made meaningful statements about the arguments for Ukraine’s accession to NATO. At the same time, Kissinger noted that immediately after the end of the war, Ukraine should be provided with security guarantees from Western countries to ensure Ukraine’s safe movement to NATO as an interim step.

The US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, signed in October 1953, two months after the end of the Korean War, has guaranteed South Korea’s national security. Two months since the end of the war is like a technical episode, because it is virtually impossible to develop effective and large-scale security guarantees in two months. Much more time is needed, and the parties to the treaty on guarantees should already have significant developments by the time the war ends.

How significant are the developments in terms of security guarantees for Ukraine from Western partners? Are they sufficient to come into effect quickly enough after the war is over?

In early August 2023, almost a year and a half after the start of Russia’s large-scale invasion, Ukraine began negotiations with the United States on a bilateral agreement on security guarantees, as envisaged in the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, which is the basis for the development of relevant bilateral agreements. “It is symbolic that the United States of America, our largest strategic partner, was the first country with which Ukraine started this process. In this way, we are creating a successful model for other partners,” emphasized Head of the Presidential Office Andriy Yermak, who headed the Ukrainian delegation to Washington. Thus, the negotiations on security guarantees have been launched.

By the end of 2023, Ukraine had hoped to sign the first agreements with partners on security guarantees, but this did not happen. The Office of the President of Ukraine set a new deadline that would meet their expectations – February 24, 2024, the second anniversary of the beginning of the war. But even here, according to insider information provided by a leading Ukrainian media outlet, there are problems: “It seems that no one wants to be the first. Everyone is glancing back at the United States, but Washington is in no hurry.”

At the same time, media outlet report that the first drafts have already been prepared. Yet it is not yet known what the documents being prepared will be called — agreements (as Ukraine insists) or joint declarations (the position of our partners). As for the content, the texts will be of the same type, but not identical: they declare long-term assistance to Ukraine in security and defense matters, financial, economic and technical support, and assistance in European integration.”

What will these security guarantees to Ukraine finally look like?

President Biden made a statement in an interview with CNN on Friday, July 7 to answer this question. He emphasized that the United States, before joining NATO, can provide Ukraine with the same security guarantees that Israel receives. “Ukraine needs to be offered a rational way to join NATO. And while Ukraine is not in NATO, the United States will provide it with the same security guarantees as Israel,” said Biden. According to him, such security guarantees include the provision of military and financial assistance, as well as the possibility of joint production of weapons.

The joint declaration of the leaders of the Group of Seven (G7: USA, Canada, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan) and Ukraine on security guarantees for Ukraine, adopted in Vilnius (Lithuania) on July 12, was joined by 31 states (including Ukraine). Bilateral consultations have been started with all the countries of the Group of Seven, the Netherlands and the European Union regarding agreements on providing security guarantees to Ukraine. France, Italy, Germany and Great Britain handed over the drafts of the relevant agreements. Seven countries of the European Union and NATO (Austria, Croatia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Turkey) have not joined the Joint Declaration.

When will Ukraine receive security guarantees from the Western partners?

The US President declared that Ukraine can receive such security guarantees “if there is a ceasefire, if there is a peace agreement.” So, these are post-war guarantees.

It should be clarified that negotiations on post-war security guarantees for Ukraine accelerated significantly in December 2023. At the same time, from August to early December, Ukraine and its partners already have a lot of work done on security guarantees.

According to Borrell, the European Council approved the framework of the document on security guarantees for Ukraine. Following discussions with Kyiv that happened on December 5, Borrell will officially present these proposals to EU leaders before the end of the year. The package for Ukraine encompasses nine priority areas for future security commitments from the EU to Ukraine, including assistance with military equipment and hardware; training for Ukrainian military personnel; collaboration with the Ukrainian defense industry; and countering cyber and hybrid threats.

On Wednesday, 20 December, Ukraine and the United Kingdom held a second round of consultations on the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on security guarantees for Kyiv.

Ukraine and Germany held a fourth round of consultations on concluding a bilateral agreement to provide security guarantees to Kyiv on Thursday, 21 December.

The acceleration of the process of working on security guarantees, along with the complication of further assistance to Ukraine by both the US and the EU, which has the effect of “forcing peace,” are indirect signs of the West’s desire to reduce the intensity of the war and create the preconditions for its end. According to President Biden’s statement, Ukraine will receive security guarantees after that. Thus, the completeness of the security guarantees for Ukraine and the willingness to sign them by the US side not only affects the process of providing guarantees by other Western partners, but also creates preconditions for ending the war, transforming coercion to peace into encouragement of peace by the West.

Recently, Ukraine is working on developing a military component of security guarantees, and the relevant developments will be submitted to partner states upon completion of this work. This was stated by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the end-of-year press conference in Kyiv on December 19, 2023.

“A lot depends on us on the platform of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. The military component – we have to convey our vision to our partners, and this is a significant core for security guarantees. We have not yet conveyed it. There are many challenges, a lot of work, but the ball is now in our court in this matter,” Volodymyr Zelenskyy said.

It seems that Ukraine can end the war only if it has agreed drafts of relevant bilateral agreements with its partners, which will only be waiting to be signed after the war. Zelensky argues Ukraine must keep fighting because no one has yet offered the country security guarantees.

Peacemaking as a process, coercion to peace and post-war security guarantees as its integral parts are interlinked. Coercion to peace is hardly possible to succeed without post-war security guarantees to Ukraine. In November 2023 Anatol Lieven wrote  that “the full engagement of the United States in the peace process from the outset will be necessary if negotiations are to have any chance of success. Only a US administration can bring sufficient pressure to bear on the Ukrainian government, while also offering reasonably credible security guarantees for the future.” Therefore, the role of the USA can not be underestimated, as well as its responsibility.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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History teaches us that the formula for ending a war almost always has one important component: promoting peace, as a method to deliver wisdom for the conflict resolution in a direct or indirect ways. History shows that promoting peace, even bordering on coercion, has been used successfully by large and experienced countries. Let us recall the Korean War with reference to Dr. Carter Malkasian and his book “The Korean War 1950-1953.” Already at the end of the negotiations, the United States felt resistance from the South Korean population to end the war, because the South Koreans did not want Korea to be divided into two parts – North and South, and were also against the deployment of the Chinese army in North Korea. There were protests in South Korea, but the United States and its partners resorted to peace enforcement by offering South Korea good postwar security guarantees, assistance in the development of the Korean army, and leaving their 8th Army, which had participated in the war, in South Korea. The coercion to peace worked – the war ended in two months and has never resumed.

What is happening now in the world and in Ukraine looks like coercion to peace. The postponement of aid because of the debate in the US Congress, the postponement of aid from the EU, the reduction of arms and ammunition supplies starting in late summer, the decision of the European Council to start negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU, but subject to certain conditions until March of this year – all of this, to one degree or another, is evidence of coercion to peace in Ukraine by partner countries. It is likely that the delayed US and EU assistance is intended to fill in for post-war security guarantees for Ukraine, or the West’s first contribution to Ukraine’s post-war security, and the EU wants to start accession talks with Ukraine, where the war has already ended, because the negotiation process looks more predictable to Europeans, as does the result: Ukraine’s accession to the EU. NATO’s perspective is realistic, because without Ukraine in NATO, there will be no security in Europe, and Russia will be constantly swayed from the outside. Ukraine should probably receive an invitation to join NATO as an EU member.

For the West, Ukraine has already won, having defended the main objective – state sovereignty and independence, as Finland did in the days of Mannerheim, having defended its right to exist and define itself in the war against the huge USSR. The Finns have never considered this a defeat, nor has any Western partner. It was their victory, securely engraved in history.

In his press conference with President Zelensky on  December 12, 2023 President Biden made one statement that Ukraine has already won a great victory in the war by defeating the initial Russian plan to subjugate the whole of the country.

The experience of ending the war in Finland and Korea, as well as the German experience of managing the situation in the postwar period, with West Germany joining NATO and the final stage of peaceful reunification of Germany, should be useful to Western countries in ending the war in Ukraine.

A recent CNN article by Matthew Schmidt provides a meaningful analysis of the war’s developments, drawing on the wisdom of history. Here is one of the theses of what such a wise decision might look like:

“The second option — one less dependent on immediate deliveries of high-tech weapons, followed by a quick and drastic battlefield success — is for Zelensky to freeze the fighting and play a long-term strategy to get his territory back over time. This is a back-up plan if the first fails to happen or fails to work. One might call it the “Berlin option.”

Over the 32 years of independence, the Ukrainian government has made many mistakes. This includes the long-standing pursuit of the idea of “neutrality” in relations between Western countries and Russia, which left Ukraine as a buffer zone and tempted Russia to commit aggression. A superficial attitude to the development of the country’s defense capabilities, which led to the sale of a large number of conventional weapons during the first two decades of Ukraine’s independence. A very long and uncertain process of shaping public opinion on joining NATO, which changed dramatically in favor of joining NATO only as a result of Russia’s aggression in 2014. Ukraine has recognized all these mistakes. Russia’s aggression in 2022 is the latest tragic lesson that Ukraine has learned.

At the same time, Western countries should frankly recognize their mistakes as well. For example, the uncompromising process carried out by the United States in the 1990s, which left Ukraine without a deterrent – nuclear weapons.

Peter Hilpold in his recent paper gave an excellent description of one of this historical episode: “To read today Professor Mearsheimer’s analysis of ‘The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,’ published nearly 30 years ago, might leave a somewhat ghastly impression: How is it possible that a political analyst, shortly after Ukraine had become independent, developed such an accurate prediction of the events that would unfold, slowly but inevitably, in the following decades? A development that would end up in the disastrous Russian aggression against Ukraine? At the center of Professor Mearsheimer’s prophecy stood the prescience that abandoning her nuclear deterrent capacity would expose Ukraine, sooner or later, to an invasion by her ancient nemesis Russia.”

How can we not recall the infamous Budapest Memorandum of 1994. It is also worth recalling George Kennan’s warning against NATO’s eastward expansion, in which Western countries overlooked Ukraine’s buffer status and did not have an effective strategy in case of Russian aggression. Frank Castigliola has recently made a very meaningful attempt to revisit George Kennan’s warning in the context of the war in Ukraine.

If the United States were to take away Ukraine’s nuclear weapons, it would have to accept Ukraine into NATO along with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Taking away Ukraine’s nuclear deterrent in the 1990s, the West should have extended its nuclear deterrence to Ukraine through NATO membership.

It’s also worth mentioning an article by Steven Pifer written in 2011: “After the Trilateral Statement and Budapest Memorandum were signed, implementation proceeded relatively smoothly. By June 1, 1996, Ukraine had transferred the last of the nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia for elimination, and the last START I-accountable strategic nuclear delivery vehicle, an SS-24 missile silo, was eliminated in 2001. More broadly, Ukraine’s denuclearization opened the way to an expanded US-Ukrainian bilateral relationship. Among other things, by the end of the 1990s, Ukraine was among the top recipients in the world of US assistance. Denuclearization also removed what would have been a major impediment to Ukraine’s development of relations with Europe. In 1997, NATO and Ukraine agreed to a “distinctive partnership” and established the NATO-Ukraine Council.” Recently, we see that Ukraine’s denuclearization opened the way to the Russia invasion of Ukraine.

The issue of geopolitical status should have become a matter of constant dialogue between all countries interested in this issue as soon as the last nuclear warhead left Ukraine in June 1996. What security mechanism did Ukraine receive to replace nuclear deterrence? As events since 2014 have shown, Ukraine has not received any effective security mechanism from its Western partners and Russia.

What could such a dialog look like in terms of context and publicity? Here’s an example of such a dialogue, which began in July 2023, on the occasion of the NATO Summit in Vilnius.  In this series from the American Statecraft Program, James Goldgeier and Joshua Shifrinson discuss and debate the issues surrounding NATO enlargement in a twenty-first-century exchange of letters. A dialogue of this level of substance and intensity on Ukraine’s security status and the role of NATO should have been initiated by the leaders of the world’s leading countries back in 1996, and perhaps even earlier, when Ukraine became an independent state in 1991.

Part of what has happened since 2014 – Russia’s aggression in Ukraine – is the result of Western countries putting the issue of Ukraine’s geopolitical status on the back burner. Western countries must assume responsibility for Ukraine’s post-war security and the restoration of Ukraine. Coercion to peace, even in an indirect form, requires Western countries to answer the question honestly: What will happen after the war? Western countries have no right to repeat the mistakes of the past, because this is a matter of European and global security, i.e. their own security.

For coercion to peace to work as well in Ukraine today, as it did in 1953 during the Korean War, Western countries must provide Ukraine with a clear postwar perspective, taking out of the geopolitical desk the dusty-covered security issues that have been in need of resolution since the 1990s.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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