For one thing, it is a nod to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)—among others—which pulled out all the stops to come to Haiti’s aid in this precarious moment.

For another, it provides a much-needed sign of better times to come. Haitians residing in-country have endured years of political instability and hellish lived conditions, a combination of factors which weigh heavily on their everyday milieu.

This reality simultaneously took its toll on democracy rooting itself, just as much as the thin stature of democracy therein has had a bearing on the milieu in question.

On the back of a political history of Duvalier era dictatorship, then, the transition to democracy in Haiti has been fragile. It hit a major stumbling block in 2019, when constitutionally due general elections were called off. Two years later, as Haitian civil society had feared all along, the prospects for the exercise of the franchise by Haitian voters went from bad to worse.

Following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, with Prime Minister Ariel Henry taking up the reins of power thereafter, Haiti’s electoral limbo became all the more acute.

The political developments in Port-au-Prince yesterday, then, show rare progress in the realm of Haitian political change.

The era of the embattled and ad hoc government led by Henry, whose resignation (which has now come to pass) was tied to the advent of this political transition, is over—sort of.

Michel Patrick Boisvert, who served as finance minister in Henry’s government, is the newly-installed interim prime minister. Boisvert will serve in this capacity “until the transition council appoints a new head of government, a cabinet and a provisional electoral council set to pave the way for an eventual vote.”

That Henry lost Washington’s political backing in recent months sped up the groundwork for the ongoing political transition, whose conditions and framing have a lot to do with the yeoman diplomatic efforts of the CARICOM bloc—of which Haiti is a member—to turn things around.

Whether this moment marks a turning point for Haiti, though, is an open question.

The gang-fueled unrest that has beset the country—hardening in place since earlier this year, when this latest crisis was triggered—reportedly continues. This serves as a reality check for the new, albeit, transitory powers that be.

They will likely not have an easy go of it, as they lean in on what hopefully is sustained engagement with a variety of stakeholders—in a purpose-driven manner, seized of the moment of opportunity, but also of peril.

CARICOM and the other key players will no doubt remain engaged in the process, not least because of previously agreed upon arrangements to do so.

This is one key to the hoped-for success of this new, particularly sensitive political era in Haiti.

The hopes of a beleaguered nation and its many backers, in the regional Community and wider international community, are riding on the transitional government’s success at prosecuting a relatively discrete mandate.

The politics involved in seeing a way forward give many pause, though, suggesting that—once again—the significance of this new political moment should not be overstated.

Given the gravity of the crisis currently facing Haiti, the discouraging reality that has befallen it, this is a time for all concerned to continue to put their shoulders to the wheel.

Haiti is not out of the woods yet; not by a long shot.

The bottom line is that the potential for things to go sideways is high, especially if the gang problem is allowed to fester and if political forces sacrifice the country’s renewed (and tentative) democratic march on the altar of power games.

Far from being chastened by the arrival on the political scene of the new government, transitory as it may be, the criminal armed gangs will likely play on the prevailing circumstances—against a backdrop where state authority has long been in collapse and they have increasingly “taken control as democracy withers.”

Those in authority, charged with putting things in place for a transition to electoral democracy, have little choice but to confront the ubiquity of gang influence in societal strata. It will be an uphill battle to wrest Haiti from the hands of gangs, who have historically been ensconced in the country’s political culture. But a third party’s pledge to render requisite assistance—in the wider context of security imperatives—is on the table.

Can these and other pertinent, pressing issues be managed well? We will have to wait and see.

The core question, though, remains the same as it always has regarding Haiti: Can those charged with such awesome responsibility as regards steering the future course of the world’s first Black Republic rise above the (political) fray, such that the country’s peoples can have a real chance to turn the tide in their quest for human and national development?

Absent an answer—to suit the times—to this question, the political  upside of this moment will be fleeting.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The post Is Haiti’s New Transitional Government a Game Changer? appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

This is apparent in a rising chorus of contrarian views in CARICOM member states’ Gaza war-related diplomatic narratives in the United Nations (UN), as compared to the United States’ associated positioning, setting the tone for the daylight between these states and Washington.

Initially, CARICOM adopted a position that was generally more restrained in tone. This was the context in which the bloc began to spend political capital on lending its voice to an already incendiary situation, striving for balance.

This behaviour on the international stage is consistent with the view of international relations scholars that, in international politics, smaller states inter alia “might seek [status-related] recognition by great powers, as useful allies, impartial arbiters, or contributors to systems maintenance” (emphasis added). Yet, in full view of Gazans’ disturbing reality and a region roiled by a metastasizing Gaza war, this type of diplomacy has its limits.

Several months later, in a Statement on the Ongoing Situation in Gaza, CARICOM leaders underscored that they are “deeply distressed” by the ‘deteriorating’ state of affairs in Gaza.” (In line with K. J. Holsti, who calls attention to the signal importance of such foreign policy actors in foreign policy decision-making, it is apt to unpack their pronouncements on the matter at hand.) While they reaffirmed their condemnation of Hamas’ October 7, 2023 assault on Israel and resultant hostage-taking, they pilloried subsequent “Israeli actions that violate international humanitarian law and the human rights of the Palestinian people.”

It is instructive that while US President Joe Biden eventually described Israel’s conduct of its war against Hamas in Gaza as “over the top,” this did not change Washington’s policy course in respect of support for Israel. Along the way, the U.S. repeatedly scuttled UN-related attempts to call for a ceasefire, tying the UN’s hands. This amid Israel’s apparent refutation of a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, in a context where UN-Israel relations have seemingly “reached an all-time low.”

In stark contrast, CARICOM leaders doubled down on unequivocally calling for “an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in Gaza and safe and unimpeded access for the delivery of adequate and sustained humanitarian assistance.” That said, Jamaica’s Gaza war-related voting record in the UN General Assembly and public pronouncements have caused some consternation among commentators; and Prime Minister Andrew Holness had to set the record straight.

CARICOM leaders also contended that, for the regional grouping, Israel’s excesses in the occupied West Bank contribute to international instability. They tied their criticism of Israel’s wanton disregard of calls from within UN bodies for a ceasefire to the provisional measures-related order in the South Africa v. Israel case at the International Court of Justice.

And they did not pull punches when advocating for a two-state solution in keeping with UNSC Resolution 242.

The bloc continues to raise the alarm over this conflict in the Middle East, citing concerns regarding the wider implications for “regional stability and international peace.”

The normative character of CARICOM’s foreign policy approach is apparent in its Gaza war-related diplomatic trajectory, which is also illustrative of a cumulative tension vis-à-vis the United States’ imprint on the said conflict. This is because the United States’ foreign policy intentions qua state behaviour, in the Middle East and elsewhere, hinge on power.

For its part, Guyana has signalled its impatience with Washington’s Israel policy which, for some scholars, centres on a “special relationship”— one that purportedly plays an outsized role in “the totality of American foreign policy in the Middle East.”

Notably, Guyana abstained from a recent, widely criticized US-led draft resolution in the 15-member UN Security Council (UNSC). Guyana was elected in 2023 to join this UN body, for a two-year term (2024-2025), as a non-permanent member. That measure set a low bar. It just made the case for the imperative of an ‘immediate and sustained ceasefire’ in Gaza, compelling Guyana to underscore that the resolution stopped short of aligning with the international community’s call for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza.

Russia and China, two of the UNSC’s five permanent members, voted against the draft resolution. It failed to pass, given the strictures of the UNSC voting system.

Guyana was among the 14 UNSC members which, shortly thereafter, backed another resolution. On this occasion, there was a clarion call qua demand for ‘an immediate ceasefire’ during Ramadan in 2024. The Security Council passed the resolution, with the U.S. conspicuously exercising an abstention regarding the vote-related proceedings.

This only served to further highlight Washington’s growing international isolation regarding foreign policymaking in the face of the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict which, for months now having passed into uncharted waters, has been centre stage in international politics—eclipsing even the Ukraine war.

That the United States is haemorrhaging prestige in the Caribbean has not ceased either. This has ruffled feathers there in this geopolitical moment, putting the most significant strain on US-CARICOM relations since their post-Trump era revamp. No sooner had these relations benefitted from a reset under the Biden administration than have the last few months marked a stress point in those ties, which must be gauged anyway by their historically “mixed success.”

One source of things changing is that as postcolonial states, which are products of the struggle for political independence, CARICOM member states increasingly view the Gaza war through a normative qua ethical prism. In turn, it is a mirror onto their own quest for autonomy and unwavering belief in self-determination. (The fact is that these states’ postcolonial identities anchor their worldview, which is shaped inter alia by legacies of colonialism and the plight of those peoples who are still oppressed.)

Today, countries like Guyana turn to UN bodies like the UNSC to shore up diplomatic positioning in that regard.

In this thinking, all such peoples have a right to self-determination among the community of nations.

Washington’s decidedly skewed Gaza war-related foreign policymaking challenges such postcolonial conceptions anew, having a bearing on these states’ perceptions of their own status in the international system.

This a watershed moment, then, in the sense that coming into focus for CARICOM—indeed, shaping its view of Washington—is how the U.S. will earnestly respond to the international community’s outcry about the devastation wrought by six-plus months of war in Gaza and the ever worsening plight of its peoples.

Reports are Washington has put Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on notice that unless his government changes its war strategy, which has stoked the humanitarian crisis in that enclave, it might have to reassess facets of its Israel policy.

Just recently, though, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a legislative package that provides tens of billions of dollars in security assistance—among others—to Israel. The Senate has since passed the bill. And Iran’s recent direct airborne attack on Israel only galvanized US support for the latter, with this great-power rallying to Israel’s defence.

The question is whether such support emboldens Netanyahu to toe the maximalist line of far-right elements in his government by continuing to wage Israel’s war on Gaza—which, according to some analysts, possibly constitutes a never-ending war with ulterior motives. That Netanyahu now openly scoffs at international pressure for a Palestinian state says it all. This against a backdrop where, even if Netanyahu’s days in government are numbered, “his approach to the war [qua ‘use of force’ per defence establishment thinking on Israel’s National Security Doctrine] has broader support.”

The prevailing cosmopolitan view, which stands in opposition to the Netanyahu government’s position on the matter, is for a two-state solution to come to pass—as the only way to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In a further sign of the (geopolitical) times, though, the UNSC failed to recommend full UN membership for the State of Palestine, owing to the United States’ casting a veto regarding the draft resolution in question.

Guyana was among the 12 UNSC members which voted in favour of the draft resolution, which reads:

“The Security Council, having examined the application of the State of Palestine for admission to the United Nations (S/2011/592), recommends to the General Assembly that the State of Palestine be admitted to membership in the United Nations.”

This draft resolution will go down in the annals of UN-anchored multilateral diplomacy as having produced an important moment for a show of support for Palestine, in what is perhaps Gaza’s darkest hour. It faces unprecedented, horrific destruction.

With the international spotlight on the diplomatic moment personified by the aforesaid UNSC vote, on April 19, 2024, Barbados announced its official recognition of Palestine as a State. Considering its timing, this move is likely intended (at least in part) as a rebuke of the United States’ reasoning behind its vote-related stand.

A few days later, the Government of Jamaica indicated that it took the decision to recognize the State of Palestine. In shedding light on this decision, Senator the Honourable Kamina Johnson Smith, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, called attention to Jamaica’s support for a two-state solution. Minister Johnson Smith said that this is the “only viable option to resolve the longstanding conflict, guarantee the security of Israel and uphold the dignity and rights of Palestinians.” Furthermore, she underscored: “By recognizing the State of Palestine, Jamaica strengthens its advocacy towards a peaceful solution.”

Minister Johnson Smith noted that her country’s decision to recognize the State of Palestine is in keeping with its “strong commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which seek to engender mutual respect and peaceful co-existence among states, as well as the recognition of the right of peoples to self- determination.” She also linked the decision to the Gaza war and the resultant humanitarian crisis, reaffirming inter alia Jamaica’s backing of an immediate ceasefire.

Barbados and Jamaica have cast their lot with the 10 other CARICOM member states which have recognized the State of Palestine. They are St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Haiti, Grenada, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Belize, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Guyana.

Behind the scenes, CARICOM leaders and diplomats have likely (and in no uncertain terms) voiced their misgivings to their American counterparts as regards Washington’s approach to treating escalating tensions in the Middle East. The matter of the groundswell of support in CARICOM for an independent Palestinian State and for it to be afforded all attendant rights have surely come up, too, especially at a time when more countries are prioritizing recognition of that state.

Insofar as it is “embroiled in [the] Gaza conflict,” Washington is regularly in touch with Caribbean capitals. In an attempt to drum up support for what some analysts view as its one-dimensional determinism in foreign policymaking, Washington makes the rounds of these capitals.

This as the influence of the People’s Republic of China—which, along with Russia, is the United States’ strategic competitor—grows in the Caribbean.

To varying degrees—with a healthy respect for long-standing, country-level ties and the record of accomplishment—respective emissaries carry on with the daily business of diplomacy. Having regard to the deep “security and economic ties” between the U.S. and CARICOM, it is also the case that the latter grouping would not lose sight of the importance of the long game in its member states’ respective foreign policy approaches to America.

Still, attuned to their postcolonial identities, CARICOM member states are guarded in this moment. After all, their foreign policy inclination is to embrace “human and global interest.”

Such conviction is side stepped by others—if not rhetorically, then in praxis. For them, the competitive nature of the putative zero-sum international system is such that their own security is the overriding concern.

As CARICOM member states take stock of their contribution to the international community’s contemporary diplomatic manoeuvres on the question of Palestine, they are of the mind that they stand on the right side of history.

Yet for all their attention to the normative grounds for defusing the powder keg that is today’s Middle East, leaning in on the case for approaching the national interest in the same vein, CARICOM members run up against the broader context of their foreign policymaking. Simply put, à la the system-level, international relations are “geopolitically constructed.” This framing is the proximate cause of the Gaza war; but, it is not the only factor that one ought to assess. As already intimated, domestic and “unit-level factors” in foreign policymaking also play a consequential role in the grand scheme of things.

In this schema, it is highly debatable whether the top dogs seriously weigh moral ends.

In standing on principle, strengthening its status-related hand in international politics, CARICOM has notched another victory in the thrust-and-parry of the anarchic global system.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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The question remains: is a European war a genuine possibility, or simply a tactic to garner support for Ukraine? Perhaps it’s both. The warnings could serve as a dual message, deterring Russia while simultaneously pushing for increased aid to Ukraine. However, recent developments, such as the deployment of advanced Russian weaponry and the potential for a renewed offensive this summer, paint a concerning picture regarding the possibility of conflicts.

The tactics employed by both Russian and Ukrainian forces in this ongoing conflict could be readily and easily adapted for a potential hybrid war fought on European soil. The Iranian Shahed-136 drones, with their distinctive motorcycle-like engine roar, have become a constant presence in Ukrainian skies during Russian offensives. It’s not inconceivable to imagine these drones buzzing ominously over European airspace in the not-so-distant future. The geographical proximity of major European cities like Berlin and Warsaw to Ukrainian battlegrounds like Sevastopol and Kyiv (both less than 2,000 miles away) underscores the potential reach of these drones, even if they are not the most cutting-edge technology at Russia’s disposal.

Recent developments, including heavy Russian artillery going over the Polish border, paint a worrying picture. Despite these advancements, there seems to be a collective lack of urgency in acknowledging the seriousness of the situation. This perception, however, is not uniform across Europe.

Despite the increasing concerns, indeed, there is a clear divide between the proactive response of Eastern European countries and the apparent inaction of their Western counterparts.

Living in the shadow of the Russian bear, Eastern European nations have spent the past few months expressing a palpable sense of alarm and actively strengthening their defenses. Lithuania, a NATO member state that is eclipsed in size by countries such as France or Germany, stands out as a leader in dedicating a large portion of its GDP to bolstering its defenses and honing its military muscle – significantly outpacing its Western allies. Similarly, Poland, despite a recent shift in government, continues to grapple with historical and cultural tensions with Russia. Here, the specter of war is a constant vigil, a chilling reality that casts a long shadow over daily life. However, suggesting that their heightened awareness stems solely from geographical proximity would be a dangerous oversimplification. As the conflict in Ukraine tragically demonstrates, modern warfare can transcend mere kilometers.

A continent sleepwalking into conflict?

The European public seems largely oblivious to the potential consequences of war on their doorstep. While media coverage of the war in Ukraine has been extensive, it may not be adequately conveying the seriousness of the situation for Europe itself. Additionally, the daily news cycle often prioritizes domestic issues, potentially creating a sense of detachment from the larger geopolitical picture. This lack of urgency, particularly in contrast to the proactive stance taken by Eastern European nations, raises concerns about Europe’s overall preparedness.

The disparity in perception across Europe can be attributed to several factors. Eastern European nations may well have a historical memory of living under Soviet rule, which shapes their present outlook. They understand the potential brutality and unpredictability of Russia’s leadership, as did Ukrainians after the Crimea invasion. Western Europe, on the other hand, may be experiencing a form of war fatigue. Decades of relative peace have fostered a sense of complacency. Additionally, the economic anxieties associated with a potential conflict could create a strong disincentive to acknowledge the threat.

There may also be a lingering hope for diplomacy to prevail. European leaders and citizens alike may be clinging to the belief that negotiations can de-escalate tensions with Russia. Recent diplomatic efforts by Western European nations might further fuel this hope. However, a healthy dose of realism is necessary. While diplomacy should continue, a failure to adequately prepare for all possible scenarios would be a grave mistake.

A war on European soil could have a profound impact that extends far beyond the immediate conflict. Existing security architecture and alliances could be fundamentally reshaped. Political landscapes would undoubtedly shift, with potential for both increased cooperation and further fractures. The economic impact would be devastating, impacting trade, investment, and overall stability for years to come.

In the aftermath of COVID, a complacent Europe can ill-afford to ignore the gathering storm. The time for denial is over. Europe must confront the threat head-on. Open dialogue with European citizens about the potential for war and its consequences is crucial. This dialogue must move beyond the realm of political rhetoric and delve into the stark realities of the situation.

A multi-pronged approach is the only way to avert the looming shadow of war and ensure a peaceful future for Europe. Continued diplomatic efforts with Russia must remain a priority, but they should be coupled with responsible military preparation. Increased investment in defense capabilities and a renewed commitment to collective security through NATO are essential steps.

However, security goes beyond just military might. Europe needs to work towards a more unified foreign policy and a stronger economic foundation. This will require a renewed commitment to European integration and a willingness to overcome historical divisions.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The post War Drums on the Horizon: Will Europe Wake Up in Time? appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Such unknowables have existed for as long as commodities have been traded. But technology is now intervening to disrupt convention, paving the way for new and ultimately more sustainable paradigms. Asset tokenization via blockchain technology specifically holds out the promise of revolutionizing supply chains by disclosing the mine source, chain of custody, and ESG practices of a given commodity. This information is a game-changer for consumers looking to make informed purchasing decisions: the graphite in their smartphones will finally be able to tell its story.

Technology alone is not enough; traders, investors, and consumers must be able to put it to good use. What’s needed is for companies to step up and bridge the gap. One notable example is Savala, which has partnered with DComm Blockchain to launch an innovative trading platform that will initially focus on premium graphite before expanding into other commodities. Transactions on the platform will be facilitated via the DComm Blockchain Coin ($DCM), marking a leap forward in the marriage of digital currency and commodity trading. But unlike cryptocurrencies, which tend not to be backed by any hard assets, every token will represent one ton of graphite.

This novel approach can help alleviate longstanding issues in the commodity trading space. For one, it allows grassroots investors to engage directly in commodity markets for the first time, thus encouraging the democratization of a market that has historically been dominated by elite interests. Two, it provides a level of transparency hitherto impossible for traders and investors, opening the door to better investment decisions. For example, investments can be guided by a sense of social responsibility (purchasing from miners with a record of ESG best practices) or geopolitical considerations (purchasing from miners unlikely to be targeted by sanctions). And most importantly, trading portals can act as a conduit for ESG-minded miners to raise capital, linking them up with publics that had previously lacked the opportunities and technological means to invest in commodities on their own terms. Commodity traders also benefit from improved price discovery since portals can help pull the curtain back on the opaque and top-heavy arena of privately traded commodities. End users such as auto OEMs can leverage this price discovery to hedge or even buy necessary inputs directly.

It’s no coincidence that Savala has opted to focus on the premium graphite market, as the commodity exemplifies many of the pitfalls of the status quo. In terms of its importance, there can be no question – as a durable and excellent conductor of heat and electricity, graphite finds its way into all manner of industrial and consumer products. Chief among them, at least in the context of the global energy transition, is lithium-ion batteries, which are expected to propel graphite demand to new heights over the coming years. Yet sources of this highly strategic commodity remain restricted to jurisdictions that carry significant geopolitical or ESG risk. China, for example, accounts for 65% of global graphite production and 90% of global refining, but its government instituted export curbs in late 2023 citing national security concerns. Rights organizations have expressed concern about Mozambique, the world’s second-largest graphite producer at approximately 13% of global output, where local livelihoods and ecosystems have allegedly been upended by large-scale mining. In particular, nearly all graphite mining takes place in Cabo Delgado province, home to a bloody and ongoing insurgency that has caused thousands of deaths.

In light of these supply chain issues, it comes as no surprise that Western governments are scrambling to secure new avenues of graphite production and refining capacity. The Savala portal can assist in the effort by tapping into new sources of capital and channeling it toward responsible operators. Amid a global energy transition at a critical time, the stakes couldn’t be higher. But for the first time in human history, we can at the very least hold out hope for a commodity boom that leaves the planet in a better state than what it found it in.

Richard Garner has acted as an advisor to Savala Global. The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The post Can Blockchain Revolutionize Commodities Trading? appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

From the perspective of American and European politicians with an appetite for imported hydrocarbons and black caviar, Azerbaijan is a valuable Western ally. It supposedly provides leverage against Russian and Iranian influence in the Caucasus and is frequently mentioned as a friend of Israel, supplying that country with approximately 60 percent of its oil in exchange for weaponry to fight Armenians.

Too often overlooked in this calculus is a complex web of relationships between the Azerbaijani regime in Baku and the rulers of Russia and Iran.

Azerbaijan’s relationship with Russia is the most obvious and damaging  part of this web. Baku entered a strategic partnership with Moscow, marked by an “Allied Relations” Declaration in February 2022, just two days before Russia invaded Ukraine. This alliance has expanded to include intelligence-sharing and hydrocarbon trade, allowing Azerbaijan to make a mockery of Western sanctions by shipping Russian oil and gas to Europe.

While Azerbaijan’s support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity has at times been loud, the burgeoning financial and political engagements with Moscow have become conspicuous. Azerbaijan is helping Russia evade sanctions and has been one of the top four destinations for Russian oligarchs during the war in Ukraine.

Moreover, the regime in Baku has endorsed Russian mediation efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, while rebuffing initiatives from the U.S. and the EU. Baku also has  welcomed Iranian mediation  based on Tehran’s position that the regional conflicts should be resolved “without the interference of non-regional and Western countries.”

Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran have been strained at times. Tehran has expressed concern for several matters, such as, the use of Israeli-manufactured drones by the Azerbaijani armed forces in the disputed area of Artsakh and the adoption of policies that tolerate or even endorse groups advocating  the secession of Northern Iran, home to many ethnic Azeris.

Even so, recent developments show a warming of ties between Azerbaijan and Iran that should worry policy makers in the West and particularly those in Israel. On October 7, 2023, coinciding with Hamas’s brutal attack on southern Israel, Azerbaijan and Iran signed an agreement concerning the so-called Aras corridor. This project, involving construction of a highway and a railroad bridge, is designed to connect Azerbaijan and its exclave, Nakhichevan, through Iranian territory.

The Aras corridor agreement is part of a broader normalization between Iran and Azerbaijan, including critical agreements signed since September 2023. Moreover, there are reports that Iran will invest in territories acquired by Azerbaijan during and after the 2020 war with Armenia. In addition, there has been a notable surge (33 percent during the first nine months of 2023) in the railway trade between Iran and Azerbaijan, and experts foresee further growth  in bilateral trade following completion of the Aras corridor.

But this isn’t all. On January 7, 2024, Iran and Azerbaijan finalized an accord pertaining to the construction of the Rasht-Astara railway, aimed at eliminating a longstanding gap within the International North–South Transport Corridor, known as the INTSC. The INTSC—a 7,200-kilometer corridor encompassing road, rail, and maritime routes—connects Russia’s second largest city, St. Petersburg, with the port of Mumbai, India, via Azerbaijan and Iran, bypassing the Suez Canal.

Foreseen as a channel for Russia to circumvent Western sanctions, replace European trade routes, and expand its economic influence in South Asia, the INTSC has attracted the financial support of the Putin regime, particularly evident in the funding of the Rasht-Astara railway project.

The imminent completion of the Rasht-Astara railway is poised to enhance trade among Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan. Experts predict that the total volume of cargo shipped  by rail alone will reach at least 15 million tons per year before 2030.

Azerbaijan’s role as a facilitator will bolster Russia’s position in its war against Ukraine. The INSTC offers immense potential for the Russian economy, providing Moscow with access to crucial trade partners and enabling additional funding for its campaign in Ukraine.

This initiative holds considerable significance for Iran as well, offering a way to evade  Western sanctions and establish a direct land connection with Russia, a pivotal  ally. The completion of the INSTC is poised to lift Iran out of isolation, transforming it into a major trade hub in Eurasia.

Under the leadership of the Aliyev family, Azerbaijan has since 1993 operated as an authoritarian regime famous for its lack of free and fair elections, suppression of political opposition, and imprisonment of journalists and activists. War crimes and ethnic cleansing committed by the Azerbaijani regime in 2020 and 2023 in Artsakh only add to Aliyev’s list of bad deeds. Baku’s desire to remain an energy partner for Europe and a supplier for Israel is a key part of the regime’s drive to secure internal and external legitimacy.

Western policymakers therefore face a critical question: is it justified to overlook Azerbaijan’s deepening economic and financial ties with Russia and Iran, along with its abysmal human rights record, merely to secure access to Baku’s diminishing oil reserves? The recent resolution of the European Parliament seems to suggest that this is not a trade-off they are viewing kindly.

Continuing relations with Azerbaijan, despite its authoritarian practices, could prove shortsighted for Israel too. It is time for Israel’s intellectuals and leadership to acknowledge the ethical concerns associated with supporting Azerbaijan against Armenia. What may feel right at this juncture must be critically examined to ensure it aligns with what is truly right.

David A. Grigorian is a Senior Fellow at Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at Harvard’s Kennedy School and a veteran IMF Economist based in Washington. George Meneshian is an Athens-based policy analyst specializing in the Caucasus and the Middle East and a researcher at the Washington Institute for Defence and Security.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The post Is Azerbaijan a Friend of the West? Take a Closer Look appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Competing perspectives of Modi

The vast majority of Chinese internet users have a positive view of India’s leader, calling him ‘Immortal Modi’ or ‘Modi Laoxian’ (‘不朽的莫迪’). Based on data from the popular microblogging platform Weibo (China’s version of Twitter), which has more than 598 million active monthly users, many Chinese people also think that Modi is crucial to preserving the balance of power in the world.

Competing perspectives of Western-style liberal democracy and China’s political model commonly, though unfairly and inaccurately, portray the former as the stable foundation of a well-functioning society, whereas the latter, marked by ardent nationalism and a supreme leader, is viewed as volatile. Weibo users’ comments shed light on their perceptions of democracy as a fundamentally unstable political system beset by internal conflicts, corruption, and misrepresentation. Indeed, they frequently dismiss the concept of democracy as a whole process. Many Chinese people believe that larger nations, even ones that claim to be democratic, tend to adopt authoritarian characteristics.

Western media often express this erroneous belief when reporting on political developments in India. During Modi’s tenure, debates about the essence of Indian democracy have shifted, which is consistent with Chinese perspectives on the democratic system in general but not on India’s democratic system specifically. This lively but partisan debate, not confined to academia, centers on the purported new chapter in Indian history, where Modi’s leadership has distanced the nation from the fundamental principles of democracy, minority rights, and executive accountability.

Nitasha Kaul, a well-known Modi critic, writes for the Australian Institute of International Affairs that ‘the Modi myth proffers the idea of a paternal, ascetic, and efficient leader at the helm of a civilizational resurgence of India as a “Vishwa Guru” (world leader).’ In 2021, Jostein Jakobsen and Kenneth Bo Nielsen of The Centre for Development and the Environment at the University of Oslo added India under Modi to their list of ‘authoritarian, populist, and right-wing regimes.’ In 2023, The Guardian published an article calling Modi’s government ‘autocratic’ and ‘illiberal.’ Similarly, a Financial Times piece from the same year highlighted Modi’s alleged ‘authoritarian streak’ as a major concern for the West.

However, China’s recent mention of Modi contrasts sharply with the much-embellished portrayal of India during his tenure. On 2 January 2024, Zhang Jiadong, the director of the Centre for South Asian Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, expressed his admiration for Modi, his economic and foreign policy, and his ‘Bharat narrative’. Zhang claimed that India has become more proactive and self-assured on a national and international level. His remarks were published by the state-run newspaper Global Times. Coming from the Chinese government, these statements might seem unconventional, but when considering India’s efforts to create a multi-aligned system in international affairs and the Western disapproval of India following the West’s unsuccessful attempts to steer Modi towards Western alignment, they have geopolitical relevance, particularly regarding China’s relationship with India under Modi.

Though he and his party greatly benefit India, Modi now poses a challenge to governments, intellectuals, and people of Western and Indian ancestry who support Congress. India has a strong governance framework, making it difficult for a single person or political party to attain widespread popularity. For the past nearly 23 years, he has served as Prime Minister of India and Gujarat State Chief Minister, owing to his and his party’s perseverance and nationalist, India-focused agenda, not because he is a despot or authoritarian. People understand how regional and global environments are degrading and changing, as well as where India should rank as a developed country on the world map. They are electing him and his party to govern India (or Bharat). Furthermore, the Supreme Court, as the pinnacle body in India’s robust judicial structure, keeps a watchful eye and is well-equipped to deal with any violations of democratic institutions by any person or entity.

The BJP/Modi government at the helm is now well-positioned to bolster India’s economic standing without yielding to any internal or regional pressures. A landslide victory in the upcoming election may allow Modi and his right-wing nationalist government to reshape India into a Hindu nation, with the goal of amending the Constitution to dilute the problematic principles of secularism and socialism while curbing illegal immigration and ethnic separatism, as well as addressing the challenges posed by rising Islamism. In countering Islamism and terrorism in India, the emphasis is on confronting the activities of a subset of extremist Sunni Muslims. This group, while not substantially contributing to the broader Indian society, is increasingly mobilizing for communal interests, becoming susceptible to the influence of a transnational Islamist agenda and global caliphate bogey. Any potential Modi-led government plan will include a comprehensive approach to addressing the dangers posed by these dynamics while also ensuring national security and social harmony. These objectives broadly align with Beijing’s policies in the context of Chinese society.

Tensions

Although most Chinese people have a positive perception of and interest in the Indian prime minister, the relationship between China and India has been tense for many years, creating an environment conducive to the emergence of new and escalating conflicts between the two countries.

Since his initial election in 2014, China has warmly welcomed Modi, and both parties are optimistic about a new era of India-China relations under the BJP. The first encounter between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi took place in Fortaleza, Brazil, ahead of the 6th BRICS Summit that same year. Xi conveyed to Modi that China and India are long-term strategic and collaborative allies rather than adversaries, underscoring their common goal of ‘national rejuvenation’ and asserting that cooperation is the most efficient way to achieve it. Despite their outward amicability, India and China continue to have geopolitical conflicts.

The India-China border dispute, which began in May 2020, has been a frequent topic of discussion between Xi and Modi. Furthermore, there have been ongoing clashes and instances of Chinese aggression along the 4,057 km Line of Actual Control (LAC), a notional boundary, particularly in the Ladakh region. China and India have had territorial disputes along their shared border since the countries’ modern beginnings. Both nations engaged in a bloody conflict over this issue in 1962, but it was the only one. However, violent incidents have increased in recent years. Modi, in his third term, cannot ignore or avoid the negative consequences of the current situation for India-China relations. India and China’s reluctance to withdraw along the LAC reflects their postures and aspirations on their respective home fronts, as well as on the international stage, where they both desire to expand their influence as emerging global powers.

The Tibet question

Given the intricacies of historical tensions and Chinese provocations, heightened by the Tibet ‘issue’, handling toxic border relations is bound to be tough. The Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, who will be 88 in July, and, more importantly, the future Dalai Lama, are major issues in both India and China. India’s stance on Tibet is mainly spiritual, with Tibet’s geographical location leaving ample leeway for potentially significant political consequences. India has the largest number of Tibetan refugees, and the Dalai Lama issue will have an impact on the country. Given India’s rebirth of Buddhism, the country’s next and future prime ministers will take a more active position in any Buddhist-related matters, particularly those involving China.

India has yet to make significant use of the Tibet card in its political dealings with China; nevertheless, on March 9, 2024, Modi paid an official visit to Arunachal Pradesh, India’s Tibet-border state, where he announced, among other efforts, the important Sela Tunnel Project. Beijing claims the state is part of its territory, Southern Tibet (藏南地区), and calls India’s claims ‘ridiculous.’ For China, Tibet represents the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism (or ‘splittism’), and religious extremism. Under Xi, China is aggressively reinforcing its security in Tibet through increasing militarization, surveillance, and other actions. Both countries have dramatically increased Tibet’s geopolitical, cultural, and ecological significance, making it crucial to both.

Cooperation and conflicting conditions

India and China are economically interdependent, and both are important components of a multipolar, multi-aligned world system. The border dispute is still a major worry, especially in light of the fact that both countries have lost soldiers in armed battles. Nonetheless, the prospect of cooperation holds significance, particularly considering the plethora of opportunities for relationship-building and pursuing shared interests. Climate change is one such common problem, necessitating collaboration to decarbonize energy systems and diversify energy sources, while others include addressing security problems in a rapidly changing global environment. At COP28, India and China failed to endorse a promise to triple renewable energy sources by 2030, despite a pledge to transition away from fossil fuels. This highlights the paradoxical nature of power rivalry in international relations and between the two most populous countries, led by Modi and Xi, respectively.

One of Xi’s biggest challenges is the continuing deflationary pressures caused by rising property prices and diminishing construction output. In contrast, if Modi wins, he will inherit a stable rupee and surging Indian markets. India and China have differing inflation rates, but India is in a favorable economic position, and Modi would inherit India’s rising economy and foreign investment opportunities. Overall, India’s economy is strong and steady. India’s and China’s economic positions can have an anchoring effect, limiting or increasing their political capacity and leaders’ influence. Inflammatory or aggressive acts by Xi or Modi would have economic consequences for both, potentially causing additional political turbulence on their respective domestic fronts and increasing economic troubles in an already volatile global context. Neither leader will want this.

India-China relations are unique in nature. And, while Modi and Xi have shown open political affection and promised to address common concerns, the two countries, each with over a billion people, are geopolitical rivals with the ability to influence global affairs in both positive and negative ways. As has been the case in recent years, India-China relations will continue to be stable yet sensitive despite their historical, contemporary, and probable future challenges.

Scott N. Romaniuk is a research fellow at the Corvinus Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies (CAS), Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies.

Animesh Roul is the executive director of the New Delhi-based policy research group, Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict. He specializes in counterterrorism, radical Islam, terror financing, and armed conflict and violence in South Asia.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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The F-15EX, like the F-15, is an air superiority fighter with limited ground attack capabilities. The F-15EX is the latest upgrade of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas’ F-15 multi-role strike fighter which entered service with the United States Air Force (USAF) in 1976. As a result of the termination of the F-22 production line, the 116^th U.S. Congress decided to procure 144 F-15EXs to add more air superiority fighters to the USAF fleet. The F-15EX can carry 12 AIM-120 air-to-air missiles and has next-generation electronic warfare systems that serve to enhance the survivability of the aircraft by jamming adversary systems.

Source: Inventory data is derived from IISS Military Balance 2024 and aircraft age data is from Janes Defense

A survey of the capabilities of Israel’s main state adversaries, Iran and Syria, reveals that Israel does not face a modern fixed-wing threat that would justify the procurement of an advanced air superiority platform. The most advanced fixed-wing combat aircraft fielded by Iran and Syria is the Su-24MK – a tactical bomber introduced by the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The two Iranian aircraft produced in the new millennium are Yak-130 trainer aircraft whose combat credibility is speculative at best. Israel, a state that operates 39 F-35s as of February 2024, can-handedly defeat any Iranian or Syrian jet in an air-to-air engagement. As a result, the aerial threat environment does not provide a sufficient answer for Israel’s interest in the F-15EX. Rather, the combat range of the aircraft may provide some clues concerning Israeli interest in the F-15EX.

Source: The above figures are derived from Janes Defense. The combat range of an aircraft is generally determined by taking a third of the aircraft’s total range without factoring in aerial refueling as it is assumed that the operator will exhaust significant portions of fuel in combat operations before returning to base.

Factoring in Israel’s threat environment, any combat aircraft in the Israeli Air Force’s fleet can strike into Syria without aerial refueling. However, the Israeli Air Force cannot strike deep into Iran. Even from Israel’s closest airbase, the Ramat David Air Base, Israeli aircraft would have to fly approximately 948 miles to reach Tehran. The F-15EX comes closer than other aircraft by over a hundred miles but still falls short by about 150 miles.

However, efficient flight paths mixed with aerial refueling have enabled the Israeli Air Force to penetrate Iranian air space with the F-35 in the past. Though how far the Israeli F-35s went into Iran is unclear, a similar operation with F-15EXs could likely put several Iranian nuclear facilities in the crosshairs of Israeli pilots. Specifically, the Bushehr reactors and Rudan Nuclear Research Center in southern Iran could be easily reached by the F-15EX granted it received mid-air refueling as a component of a hypothetical strike operation.

Israel’s strike on April 4, 2024, on the Iranian Embassy in Syria with US-provided F-35s coincided with the Biden administration’s authorization to transfer F-35s to Israel. As a result, Iran perceives the United States as involved in the April 4 strike despite the operation being carried out by Israeli forces. As the world awaits the Iranian response, the United States, with several thousand personnel deployed in the Middle East, may find itself the victim of the consequences of an Israeli operation.

Arguments to arm Israel with the capability to strike Iran generally center around deterring Iranian aggression. Despite the deterrent value of possessing a capability designed to harm an adversary, the dynamics shift when a state is willing to exercise force with little regard for the consequences. International relations literature accepts the premise that the perceptions of an adversary are integral to establishing deterrence. In the adversary’s mind, there must be ambiguity regarding the state’s exercise of force to deter the adversary and not invite preemptive aggression.

In the Israeli-Iranian case, the current leadership in Israel has overtly called for aggressive actions against Iran for decades. Additionally, Israel has an established history of preventative strikes against regional adversaries. The rhetoric of the current Israeli leadership and the normalization of preventive strikes is enough evidence to raise concerns regarding Israeli intentions and lack of restraint.

Throughout Israel’s conflict in Gaza, the United States has been unable to effectively shape Israeli decision-making despite the measurable humanitarian and political implications of Washington’s failure to do so. Israel’s current leadership has thus far demonstrated itself to be inflexible and unwilling to cooperate with the United States’ regional interests. Israel’s stubbornness is especially surprising given the United States provides substantive defense material and security guarantees.

As long as these dynamics continue to define the US-Israeli relationship, the United States should not authorize the transfer of the F-15EX to Israel. Israel has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to strike adversary targets in a manner that escalates tensions and puts US personnel at risk. Should Israel acquire the F-15EX, or any improvements to its combat aircraft’s operational range, there is no other mission than to be able to strike targets in Iranian territory. Should Israel acquire these capabilities, there is little indication to demonstrate that it will refrain from escalating tensions with Iran.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Nearly 230,000 children, pregnant women and new mothers in Sudan could die from starvation in the coming months, experts have warned.

Sudan has been consumed by war and fighting since April 2023, a period that has seen over 10 million people forced to flee their homes, making it the world’s largest internal displacement crisis. Hunger, dehydration and disease are all on the rise.

The situation in Sudan is not just alarming; it is a harbinger of a disaster that threatens to spill across borders, potentially destabilizing an entire region. Sudan is on the brink of becoming the next Yemen, a byword for humanitarian catastrophe.

South Sudan and Chad are already shouldering the weight of refugees who carry little more than hope for safety and sustenance. These nations, with their own internal challenges, are now stretched to their limits as they struggle to provide for the added numbers.

Egypt, too, faces an influx of Sudanese nationals, a situation that adds to the existing strain on its economy and resources. Moreover, Sudan’s pivotal role as a conduit for trade and transport is now compromised; the disruption of these routes affects the entire East African region, leading to reduced availability and increased costs of food staples.

The current conflict in Sudan has torn through the nation’s delicate social and economic fabric. Two military factions vie for control, disregarding the cost to human lives and livelihoods. This power struggle has resulted in the worst hunger levels ever recorded during the harvest season—a time typically associated with abundance. The conflict’s impact on Sudan’s food systems is not incidental. Rather, it is a deliberate strategy by the warring factions and foreign agents such as the Russians; a weapon as potent as any firearm.

Averting Famine

The window for action is rapidly narrowing. Preventing Sudan from descending into the world’s largest hunger crisis in decades requires an immediate and multifaceted response. To avert a disaster of unprecedented scale, a robust and immediate response is essential. The crisis demands not just attention but action, starting with increased diplomatic and economic pressures aimed at bringing an end to the hostilities that have choked Sudan’s lifelines. This is coupled with an urgent need for a significant scale-up of humanitarian assistance from the EU, the United States, the UK, Norway, and UN partners.

Such aid must not be a mere stopgap but should represent a sustained commitment to rebuild Sudan’s agricultural sector, the backbone of its food system. Furthermore, supporting regional stability is crucial. The neighboring countries hosting refugees and managing the indirect consequences of Sudan’s conflict require support to maintain food security and manage the socioeconomic impacts. The international community must marshal its collective resources and willpower to prevent Sudan from descending into the abyss of famine. The lessons from Yemen’s ongoing crisis are clear—the cost of inaction is measured in human lives, and the time for decisive action is slipping away.

The crisis in Sudan calls for an urgent convergence of international will, resources, and strategy. The global community has a moral imperative to act before Sudan becomes an echo of Yemen’s tragedy. Food, after all, is not just a commodity—it is the lifeline of a nation, the sustenance of its people, and the bedrock of its stability.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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The rise of AI in the military domain is rapidly changing the face of warfare, as AI-enabled weapon systems potentially diminish the meaningful role of human decision-making. As defined by Nils Adler (2023) in an article publish by Al Jazeera English “autonomous weapon systems can identify their targets and decide to launch an attack on their own, without a human directing or controlling the trigger.” There is a global consensus that “cutting-edge AI systems herald strategic advantages, but also risk unforeseen disruptions in global regulatory and norms-based regimes governing armed conflicts.”

Experts and scholars believe that AI-enabled weapon systems will have a major impact on warfare, as the full-autonomy of weapon systems would negate battlefield norms established over the course of centuries. According to the European Research Council (ERC), “militaries around the world currently use more than 130 weapon systems which can autonomously track and engage with their targets.”

Despite advancements in this domain, there is no globally agreed definition on what constitutes a lethal autonomous weapon system; the question of autonomy on the battlefield remains subject to interpretation. The US Department of Defense (DOD) defines LAWS as “weapon systems that once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”  Such a concept of autonomy in weapon systems is also known as ‘human out of the loop’ or ‘full autonomy.’ In a fully autonomous weapon system, targets are selected by the machine on the basis of input from AI, facial recognition, and big data analytics, without any human crew.

Another category of autonomy in weapon systems is semi-autonomous or ‘human in the loop’ weapon systems. Such weapons are self-guided bombs and missile defence systems that have existed for decades.

The rapid advancement in the use of LAWS has created the need to develop a regulatory framework for the governance of these new weapon systems. Accordingly, various states have agreed to enter into negotiations to regulate and possibly prohibit LAWS. The United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) has made several efforts in this direction by initiating an international dialogue on LAWS since 2014. The Sixth Review Conference of UN CCW in December 2021 was concluded with no positive outcome on the legal mechanism and an agreement on international norms governing the use of LAWS. Despite the stalemate, there was consensus that talks should continue.

In 2016, a Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) was also established with the mandate to discuss and regulate LAWS. But the participating countries have yet to make headway on a legal framework to regulate and proscribe the development, deployment, and the use of LAWS.

As the world advances in the use of AI in the military domain, states have moved to take divergent position in the UN CCW on the question of development and use of LAWS. Incidentally, certain countries would only find it in their interest to sit down for arms control measures once they have achieved a certain degree of technological advancement in this domain.

It should be noted that major powers such as the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union (EU) either do not outright prohibit or have sought to maintain ambiguity on the matter of autonomous weapons. A US Congressional Research Service report, updated in February 2024, highlighted that “the United States currently does not have LAWS in its inventory, but the country may be compelled to develop LAWS in the future if its competitors choose to do so.”

China is the only P-5 country in the UN CCW calling for a ban on LAWS, stressing the need for a binding protocol to govern these weapon systems. China at the UN CCW debates has maintained that “the characteristics of LAWS are not in accordance with the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL), as these weapon systems promote the fear of an arms race and the threat of an uncontrollable warfare.”

Russia remains an active participant in discussions at the UN CCW, opposing legally binding instruments prohibiting the development and use of LAWS.

The EU has adopted a position in accordance with IHL which applies to all weapon systems. The EU statement at GGE’s meeting in March 2019 stressed the centrality of human control on the weapon systems. EU maintains that human control over the decision to employ lethal force should always be retained.

World leaders, researchers, and technology leaders have raised concerns that the development and use of LAWS will adversely impact international peace and security. In March 2023, leaders in various high-tech fields signed a letter calling for a halt in the development of emerging technologies for the next six months. The letter warned of the potential dangers to society and humanity as the tech giants race to develop fully autonomous programs.

History reminds us that a virtual monopoly on technological development can never be maintained and upheld for long. In the 1940s, for example, when the United States developed a nuclear bomb under the Manhattan Project, other powers caught up and built their own bomb. However, it took more than two decades for the global community to formalize an agreement to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The unregulated growth and proliferation of LAWS threatens to unleash a new era of warfare fueled by autonomous platforms, compromising human dignity, civilian protection, and the safety of non-combatants. Henceforth, there is a need for states to find common ground to regulate and formalize an understanding of human control over the use of force. Global values, ethics, and rules of warfare that have guided humanity over the last two thousand years remain imperative for upholding international peace and security.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthis share the Islamic Republic of Iran as a primary ally and financier, forming a coalition known as the “Axis of Resistance.” Facilitated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), these groups receive support in the form of financial aid, military training, chemical weapons, advanced drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, and precision-strike ballistic missiles. In addition, we’ve also been witnessing direct missile attacks from Tehran in Iraq, Syria and Pakistan, underscoring the depth of their involvement in the region.

Tehran strategically allocates an estimated annual budget of 20-25 billion dollars towards its military expenditures, reflecting a substantial commitment to sustaining and expanding its influence in the region. This financial dedication becomes particularly pronounced when considering the specific support to groups like Hamas. According to the U.S. State Department, Iran directs 100 million dollars annually to fund Hamas alone. This commitment not only illustrates Iran’s active involvement in regional dynamics but also emphasizes the significant financial backing provided to various groups, shaping the geopolitical landscape in the process.

While projecting power and influence on the international stage, concerns arise about the well-being of various groups within Iran. The civil unrest that erupted in September 2022 and persisted for months following the murder of Mahsa Amini accentuates the pressing need for Tehran to prioritize the welfare and prosperity of its citizens at home. In light of domestic challenges, it should be imperative for the government to adopt a balanced approach that takes into account both domestic and foreign policies to maintain an equilibrium for the stability of the nation.

However, despite the apparent importance of achieving this balance, the reality on the ground unfolds the contrary. Iran, with its ethnically diverse population, gender apartheid, and dependence on fundamental internal colonial policies, witnesses the pervasive economic and social suffering of its people under the rule of this authoritarian regime. A recent demonstration of discontent emerged in the form of protests in West Azerbaijan province by the residents of Qara Qishlaq. Unfortunately, these protests were met with brutal suppression, leading to the arrest of 70 individuals.

The catalyst for these protests stemmed from the announcement of Kaveh Soda company’s intention to construct a glass production plant. Kaveh Soda, a company blatantly affiliated with the IRGC, carries a concerning track record as a harbinger of environmental disasters through its disposal of chemical waste into the land and water. A notable example of the company’s impact unfolded after it inaugurated a plant in the city of Maragha, East Azerbaijan province in 2013. The operation resulted in severe pollution of both underground and surface water, as well as pastures within a radius of 150 km. The aftermath of Kaveh Soda’s activities in Maragha was particularly grim, with several villages, including Yengikend, Chilgayi, and Garachopuq, being depopulated due to the barrenness of 450 hectares of farmland, rendering it unsuitable for the livelihoods of the villagers.

In a parallel fashion, the ChlorPars plant situated in the Basmanj region of Tabriz indiscriminately releases toxic liquids and wastes into local irrigation ditches during its production processes. This unethical practice has resulted in the pervasive pollution of the region’s groundwater and springs. Similarly, the discharge of hazardous liquids and sewage directly into the Baliglu River, which flows through the city of Ardabil, has taken a toll on the environment, gradually contributing to the erosion of valuable agricultural lands in the vicinity. The environmental impact of such activities necessitates urgent attention and intervention to mitigate the detrimental effects on both the local ecosystem and the surrounding communities relying on those lands for their survival.

Azerbaijani environmental activists have been diligently working to raise awareness about the alarming and preventable drought of Urmia Lake for decades as well. According to NASA observatory, the lake has now been transformed into a vast, dry salt flat for the most part. Once a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve and home to a variety of creatures like flamingos and white pelicans, it is becoming a herald of salt storms, bad air quality, infertile land, forced migration, and a surge in cancer and respiratory diseases.

The dire state of Lake Urmia is primarily attributed to the excessive construction of unproductive dams, mismanagement of water resources, and a deliberate lack of attention from the government. For instance, the Iranian authorities block the Barandouz River, one of the 14 water sources for Lake Urmia, from flowing into the lake during winter. This dire situation has not only devastated the ecological balance of the region but has also left the inhabitants of surrounding cities enraged as they grapple with the severe consequences of environmental degradation.

The Iranian regime persistently obstructs the collection and sharing of data, creating obstacles in obtaining accurate insights into the socio-economic landscape. Nevertheless, estimates indicate that around one-third of the population lives below the absolute poverty line. Reports published by Iran’s own institutions in 2021 revealed a poverty rate exceeding 30%. The actual figures are expected to be significantly higher, especially when factoring in inflation and the economic repercussions following the post-COVID conditions.

Moreover, It is crucial to underline that numerous sources, including Amnesty International, have consistently reported on the continued under-investment in minority-populated regions of the country to exacerbate poverty and marginalization. This systemic neglect further contributes to the challenges faced by vulnerable communities such as Azerbaijani Turks, Ahwazi Arabs, Baluchis, and members of the Baha’i faith, emphasizing the need for comprehensive efforts to address both economic disparities and social inequities in Iran.

While the inhumane treatment of girls and women in the country remains widely acknowledged, the distressing issue of child brides often goes unreported. A confluence of factors, including poverty, a perspective that regards women as property, and a legal system rooted in Sharia, has rendered young girls particularly vulnerable, subjecting them to arguably the most defenseless conditions.

Contrary to a positive trend, the practice of child marriages witnessed an alarming increase in 2020, with Iranian institutions reporting a rise of over 10% in the number of girls between the ages of ten and fourteen entering into marriages. This troubling trend intersects with the level of education provided to each girl. The Ministry of Education shared that in 2022, 20% of girls aged 15 to 18 had to leave school prematurely due to early marriages. Although data on this issue can sometimes be inconsistent, the harsh reality prompted UNICEF to designate Iran as one of the top five countries with a high incidence of child espousal in 2020.

In Iran, being a female exacerbates challenges and hardships across various domains, particularly evident in the arrest and detention of women activists. Within the legal and prison systems, these activists frequently face gender-specific challenges and encounter additional forms of discrimination. Disturbingly, reports highlight instances of rape and various forms of sexual violence being perpetrated against them, underscoring the gravity of the hardships endured by women activists in Iran.

Another widespread form of oppression against thousands of political prisoners detained in Iran revolves around the systematic denial of adequate and effective medical services within detention centers and prisons. The 2023 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Narges Mohammadi falls victim to this mistreatment amongst others. Despite grappling with heart failure and being in a critical health condition, she was unjustly barred from being transferred to the hospital simply due to her non-compliance with strict hijab rules.

Furthermore, the Iranian government continues to show a lack of commitment towards investing in the preservation of its rich historical and cultural heritage. The intricate tapestry of cultures and histories within Iran, stemming from its diverse ethnic and linguistic landscape, is unfortunately met with neglect and discrimination in terms of governmental support and investment. This is particularly evident in the insufficient backing for crucial aspects such as museums, cultural festivals, and the preservation of historic sites. A glaring example of this neglect was disclosed by the Minister of Cultural Heritage, Tourism, and Handicrafts, Ezatollah Zarghami, who revealed that the government budget allocated for the preservation of each historical site is equivalent to a mere 50 cents per day. Such minimal funding undermines the essential efforts to safeguard and showcase the nation’s cultural and historical treasures.

Additionally, the practical ban on educational programs in minority languages compounds the challenges confronting diverse communities. This prohibition not only erases the rich history, culture, and language of minority groups but also intensifies social divisions and marginalization. By restricting access to education in minority languages, the government not only undermines cultural diversity but also reinforces a homogenous Shiite-Persian dominant society. This approach effectively presents Persian as the sole culture and language of the people in Iran, perpetuating a system of assimilation that diminishes the distinct linguistic and cultural identities of minority communities.

The imposition of oppression extends to religious freedom within Iran, where the regime, in an effort to maintain control and project the image of a uniform “Islamic” nation as per its official designation, discriminates against and oppresses the Baha’i Faith community. Beyond the blatant denial of religious freedom and civil rights, this group endures systematic discrimination characterized by targeted harassment, property confiscation, and, alarmingly, the deprivation of education aimed at impoverishing its members.

The disparity in investment priorities between external agendas and domestic policies unmistakably highlights the Iranian regime’s profound neglect for its own people. The financial trail and investment records reflect a regime that is willing to allocate substantial funds for proxy wars while proving incapable of meeting the basic necessities of its citizens. The accelerated erosion of trust in the government, coupled with a surge in long term instability, may signal the potential demise of the Iranian regime.

Turkan Bozkurt is a Canada-based paralegal, researcher and human rights activist who focuses on minority rights from an intersectional feminist perspective. She conducts comparative research on colonial oppression and exploitation of BIPOC in North America with minority issues in Iran. She’s also a student of legal philosophy.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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