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]]>The stakes are high for Vietnam. They must convince the Biden administration that they have taken the necessary steps to make strides in market-based reforms, especially in modernizing and enhancing the transparency of its monetary policy and exchange rate management framework.
With the burgeoning trade flows between the two countries and the White House’s push for the establishment of partnership agreement on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), market status recognition would help Vietnam expand its trade and investment with the United States. Washington is presently Vietnam’s second-largest trading partner behind China and its largest export marker, with bilateral trade in 2022 valued at almost $139 billion.
The bilateral benefits for US companies derived from recognition of Vietnam as a market economy include market access and export opportunities, namely in agriculture, machinery, aircraft, and pharmaceutical products, all of which contribute to the development of a supply chain that suits America’s interests.
Over the past decade, Vietnam has emerged as a major manufacturing center, and remains a major source for consumer electronics, furniture, semiconductor and other components, apparel, and footwear imports.
Market-status recognition would also contribute to a reduction in trade barriers, making it easier and cheaper for US businesses to export goods and services to Vietnam.
With the ongoing trade tensions between the US and China, recognition of Vietnam as a market economy could further incentivize US companies to diversity their supply chains away from China and towards Vietnam. Additionally, lower import prices and improved market access could enable US companies to increase their output and production in Vietnam. This offers the potential to generate increased sales revenues and profitability for American companies operating in Vietnam
The US-ASEAN Business Council (USABC) plans to send a record-breaking number of US businesses to Vietnam later this month, surpassing last year’s delegation of 52 firms. This signals the expanding interest of US businesses in Vietnam.
Telecommunications, information technology, power generation, transportation infrastructure construction, environmental project management, and technology will continue to offer promising opportunities for US companies.
“The U.S. should grant Vietnam market economy status, especially after the two countries agreed during Biden’s visit in September to establish a comprehensive strategic partnership. Other countries that have a non-market economy status are mainly ones which the U.S. has confrontational or strained relations, such as China and Russia,” claims Murray Hiebert, Head of Research at Bower Group Asia in Washington, D.C. He is quick to add, that maintaining the NME status on Vietnam is arbitrary, counterproductive, and no way to treat one of Washington’s closest partners in Southeast Asia.
Companies from Apple to Intel have already made increased investments into the country to diversity their supply chains, and along the way, spurring Vietnam’s economic expansion. There’s also increasing interest from the US Chamber of Commerce in support of Vietnam’s recognition as a market economy.
A total of 72 countries have now recognized Vietnam as a market economy, notably the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Japan.
The US Department of Commerce has established six criteria that must be satisfied to grant market economy status, yet several of these criteria are mainly subjective. They include: 1) convertible currency; 2) wages are determined through free bargaining; 3) foreign investment allowed; 4) state ownership of means of production; 5) state controls over prices and output by companies; 6) other factors the U.S. deems relevant.
Vietnam more than meets all these requirements, including the fact that state ownership of companies is shrinking significantly. In 2020, Vietnam had over 660 thousand non-state enterprises, accounting for almost 96.5 % of the total number of enterprises in the country. Wages are determined by free bargaining between labor and management and the country has ratified 25 International Labor Organizations (ILO) and conventions, also joining the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women.
Moreover, the U.S. Treasury Department has confirmed that Vietnam does not manipulate currency and in April 2021, Vietnam was formally taken off the list of countries that undervalued its currency and only included on the Monitoring List of major trading countries that merit close attention to their currency practices. They have continued to be excluded from any further placement on the Monitoring List prepared by the U.S. Treasury Department.
It has been two decades since the U.S. deemed Vietnam a non-market economy (NME) in the anti-dumping investigation against certain frozen fish fillets in 2002. Since then, the world has witnessed the once war-torn nation’s meteoric economic development and reforms. It is worth mentioning that Vietnam’s designation as a non-market economy in anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations concluded on December 31, 2018, following the expiration of its commitment period.
Labor protection is not perfect in Vietnam but many would agree that it is not as bad as many other countries that possess market economy status.
For example, labor law mandated by the government covers Nike’s more than 530,000 factory workers. A wide range of employment facets, spanning working hours, wages, occupational safety and health, social insurance, and the rights of workers to organize and negotiate collectively, meets the protection of workers.
Incidentally, Vietnam agreed with US negotiators to adopt many labor reforms as part of its accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnerships, a trade agreement that the U.S. abandoned during the Trump presidency.
Vietnam’s diligent endeavors to foster a conducive and equitable business environment for international investors have yielded significant results. The World Bank’s “Doing Business 2020” report has placed Vietnam at the commendable rank of 70th out of 190 economies, reflecting its commitment to nurturing favorable conditions for business operations. Furthermore, U.S. News and World Report ranked Vietnam #7 among 78 countries in which to start a business in 2021, up 5 spots from a year earlier.
Vietnam’s Communist Party Chief’ Nguyen Phu Trong’s anti-graft campaign has been widely portrayed as part of the nation’s attempt to bolster its appeal for foreign investment. In 2023, it led to the forced resignations of several high-ranking officials and now is regarded as the most comprehensive anti-corruption effort in the nation’s history.
The implementation has translated as favorable outcomes for the economy, such as reducing informal business costs, streamlining bureaucratic procedures within specific sectors, and dismantling entrenched interest groups to foster a more equitable business environment.
Vietnam’s economic growth for 2024 is expected to fall within the range of 5.6% to 6%, despite uncertainties arising from geopolitical tensions and ongoing worries about recession in developed countries.
It’s now time for the U.S. Department of Commerce to recognize Vietnam’s achieved market economy status. The decision reaches beyond goodwill between two partners since there are increasing environmental, economic and security threats that both nations can better address together.
James Borton is a non-resident senior fellow at Johns Hopkins/SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and the author of Dispatches from the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground.
The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
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]]>On cross-strait relations and this is chiefly what Washington is viewing — all three candidates share similarities: a rejection of any formal independence declarations, saying no to China’s maritime territorial claims, and a firm commitment to U.S. relations.
For now, the U.S. Congress appears to be in bipartisan lockstep about the Biden’s administration firm commitment to a policy of maintaining democratic Taiwan’s de-facto independence in the face of Chinese Communist Party threats to annex the island of 23 million people by political, military, or economic means.
No matter who wins the Taiwan general election, there will be no change in Washington’s position on Taiwan. Numerous bipartisan Congressional leaders have already introduced legislative bills to counter China’s threats to US national security, the South China Sea, and to extend support for Taiwan. In fact, led by the two very different administrations from former President Trump to Biden, defending the U.S. against adverse Chinese attacks and practices has remained at the top of U.S. national security priorities.
This rise in attention is revealed in the more than 250 bills related to China from January 2023 through May 2023. While the US Congress has at times displayed complete dysfunction on debt ceilings and overall budgets, there is agreement across the aisles on China’s clear and present danger. As a result, US lawmakers have been unified on a range of bills and issues ranging from trade, national security, and sanctions, to human rights, democratic values, Taiwan, and China’s global influence.
The primary trends seen in U.S. legislation introduced in 2023 show little signs of change in 2024:
Washington is currently focused on addressing multiple challenges posed by Beijing. China is actively working to undermine U.S. power and influence while seeking dominance in the Asian region. Secondly, there is growing concern over Chinese initiatives aimed at controlling high-technology industries and the related supply chains. One aspect that has been underreported is Beijing’s sway over rare earth elements and its strategic plan to exploit the ocean floor through seabed mining. This effort aims to secure control over energy rich nodules containing essential elements such as cobalt, lithium, and manganese, crucial for powering the transition to renewable energy. These minerals will play a critical role in the U.S., contributing to national interests in transportation, defense, aerospace, electronics, and energy.
Taiwan’s National Security Importance to US
In the eyes of the Biden administration and among U.S. Congressional members, Taiwan figures prominently in Washington’s efforts to curb and defend against China’s challenges. Congress has increasingly sought to reduce U.S. reliance on Chinese imports. Lawmakers have placed great emphasis on concerns about supply chain resilience. These areas include strategically critical sectors or economically significant sectors such as solar and renewable energy.
Where the sensitive issue of Taiwan is concerned, bipartisan members have continued to propose and develop deterrence measures in case of “aggression by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan” or “a military invasion of Taiwan.” These legislative bills include S.477 Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act that authorizes the President to “use force for the purpose of securing and defending Taiwan against armed attack.” Another bill that protects Taiwan is one that Sanctions Targeting Aggressors of Neighboring Democracies (STAND) with Taiwan Act of 2023, which places sanctions on Chinese leaders, officials, and financial institutions should Chinese “aggression” occur.
Finally, although the Biden administration, like the previous one, calls for “onshoring” semiconductor manufacturing, the US needs Taiwan’s high technology industries, especially their critical semiconductor manufacturing. The U.S. recognizes how the island’s dominance in semiconductor manufacturing is critical to its economic security. It’s highly unlikely that the U.S. will allow the CHIPS and Science Act to threaten or destabilize Taiwan’s economic pillar; however, they can take steps together to curb Chinese advanced-chip production.
As America’s general election campaigns move into full swing, there will be continued political rhetoric from some of the Republican candidates challenging front-runner and former President Donald Trump to support Taiwan. But for the most part, these may prove to be mere spotlight-grabbing gestures. On the other hand, the Biden administration most certainly will remain steadfast in its preexisting commitments to Taiwan.
The world is now on fire with crises, notably in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict, which could have far reaching implications for the broader Middle East. Despite these pressing issues, there is no clear blueprint for a comprehensive strategy for immediate peace; nor is there any imminent threat of Chinese directed invasion of Taiwan. Taiwan remains as a focal point in US-China relations, exerting influence over geopolitics and the military equilibrium of Asia.
James Borton is a non-resident senior fellow at Johns Hopkins SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and the author of Dispatches from the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground.
The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
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]]>The post Funan Techo Project Calls for Joint Approach to Mekong Development appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.
]]>Recently, several of my Khmer friends have reminded me of a well-known saying: “Where there is water, there are fish. Where there is land, there are Chinese.” This historical connection between Cambodia and China has gained renewed significance, especially in light of the upcoming project to develop a waterway along the remnants of an ancient water passage.
This initiative is poised to improve water transportation and logistics in Cambodia, leading to a reduction in transportation costs and helping to bridge connections with the international community, bypassing the need to go through Vietnam. However, many voices across the border in Vietnam’s lower delta are already expressing concerns that this waterway may impact the flow of water downstream into the already environmentally challenged Mekong Delta.
The ambitious canal plan will take four years to construct, traversing 160 kilometers at a width of 80-100 meters. It starts from the Mekong River, connecting the Bassac River, and spilling out into the Gulf Of Thailand.
In 2021 China’s state-owned company, China Communication Construction conducted its own feasibility study; and as a result, Mekong experts are expressing concerns. “This artificial canal project could be the final nail in the (Mekong Delta) coffin,” claims Brian Eyler, Southeast Asia Program Director at the Stimson Center.
Across generations, indigenous farmers in the Mekong Delta have depended entirely on the river’s abundant fish resources and rice crops for their livelihoods. The lifeblood of their existence is intricately tied to the river’s constant flow. However, more water experts caution that the elaborate network of the Mekong river system—encompassing its captivating tributaries and canals—is facing a serious threat. The natural rhythm of the water is being disrupted due to the adverse impacts of water flow issues stemming from upstream hydropower dams in China.
Eyler, along with hydrologists, worry that the canal project could cause even more harm to the downstream communities, particularly the Vietnamese farmers on the lower delta who are already dealing with serious challenges related to climate change. The issues is that the canal will require over 80 million cubic meters of water for trade, which will deplete the levels of the Mekong and Bassac rivers.
On April 27, 2020, in an online symposium hosted by the Mekong Environment Forum, a domestic non-government organization (NGO), located in Can Tho, Vietnam, researcher Philip Minderhoud and Sepher Eslami Arab of Utrecht University, who are part of the Rise and and Fall Project, shared the results of their six-year investigation. Their research on the Mekong Delta verified that less than five percent of saltwater incursion is caused by climate change. Rather, the growth of hydropower is primarily to blame. The two researchers claim that the upstream dams are to blame for the over 90 percent reduction in the Delta’s supply of river sediment.
Their research, along with others’, illustrates the impact of alterations in upstream hydro-infrastructure on various aspects such as fish production, biodiversity, bed and bank stability, sediment and nutrient transport, and the biology of basin flow regimes. The depletion of sediment flow to riverbeds and banks is occurring more rapidly than climatic changes.
Current evidence indicates that upstream dams are inflicting irreparable damage on the delta, disrupting fragile ecosystems and jeopardizing the livelihoods of farmers who cultivate along the river. Since 2010, the Mekong Delta has experienced recurring and record-breaking droughts every four years.
Notably, Vietnam and Cambodia have a long history together along the Mekong River, and the growing problem of water shortage in the area now defines much of the their relationship. This challenge is exacerbated by factors such as population growth, urbanization, industrialization, energy demand, and the impacts of climate change. As the economic and strategic value of water rises, so does the competition for access to the increasingly scarce resource.
The Mekong River Commission (MRC), an intergovernmental organization, has been established by four out of five of the six countries that share the Mekong River, namely, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam.
Its mission is to oversee the sustainable and equitable management of this transboundary water resource. According to Cheang Vannarith, Executive Director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), “National sovereignty remains a challenge for this intergovernmental organization to agree on any binding policy or principle to guide the management of the river.”
The Xayaburi dam and other Chinese massive dams that have been built on the upper reaches of the Mekong, have had a direct impact on food security in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, where 18 million people live. Vietnam is the world’s second largest rice exporter and the Mekong Delta –already one of the areas most vulnerable to sea-level rise produces half of its rice crop.
So any new upstream project, whether it’s another dam or canal that drains water from the Mekong River, requires independent studies. It’s already acknowledged by many hydrologists that the Mekong River Commission has repeatedly failed in its mission to halt the downstream damage inflicted on the alluvium, agricultural, and fishery products. The sediment that has flowed from the Yunnan province in China to Vietnam for thousands of years has been severely depleted due to the number of hydropower dams built on the Chinese stretch of the river, as well as large-scale sand mining from the riverbed.
Despite Prime Minister Hun Manet’s recent efforts to alleviate Vietnam’s concerns during his visit to Hanoi, assuring that the canal will not harm the shared Mekong River crucial for food security in the Mekong region, Vietnam’s skepticism persists about Chinese funded Belt and Road Initiative flagship projects.
This planned transboundary water project offers an opportunity for Cambodia and Vietnam to involve their scientists and engineers in a thorough examination of the proposed canal plan. Temporarily setting aside China’s “run of the river” approach could pave the way for embracing the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of the International Watercourses. Both countries stand to gain significant advantages in safeguarding Cambodia’s Tonle Sap and Vietnam’s Mekong Delta through collaborative efforts.
The proposed construction of this waterway involves tracing the path of an ancient water passage, serving not only as a means of connectivity but also as a symbolic bridge between two neighboring countries that share the river of life.
James Borton is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at Johns Hopkins/SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and the author of Dispatches from the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground.
The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
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]]>Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a serious global problem that threatens ocean ecosystems and sustainable fisheries. That’s why the European Union (EU) officials continue to monitor Vietnamese fishermen after they received a “yellow card” in 2017. Exporting countries to the EU are categorized and subject to penalties using a color-coded card system; the colors are green, yellow, red, and, in the worst-case situation, a complete halt to trade.
Fortunately, Vietnamese fishing captain Tran Hong Tho, an experienced fisherman and thousands of others, have seen positive improvements in their fisheries management as a result of these EU fines.
This is not to argue that there have not been disputes over fisheries in the disputed South China Sea or East Sea, as the Vietnamese refer to it. However, there are fewer occurrences, which is great news for Tho, considering that in 2017, a Chinese vessel sank his own customary wooden fishing boat. But the news is bad for fish.
Authorities have not yet prevented Vietnamese illegal fishing in neighboring countries’ exclusive economic zones. In 2022, 919 people and 104 Vietnamese fishing boats were detained on suspicion of participating in illegal fishing overseas. Vietnam’s attempts to have its yellow card erased are still being undermined by these violations.
Fish stocks, like the snappers and Spanish mackerel caught in the South China Sea, have been depleted by 70-95 percent since the 1950s according to experts at the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). China consumes half of the world’s seafood, which propels the country’s nearly 5,000-vessel distant-water fleet- the largest in the world- to plunder the ocean.
For the EU and also the U.S., the international regulatory environment requires traceability of imported seafood. This includes fishing ground, fishing time, type of vessels, ports for their departure and return, and compliance with fisheries laws.
Over the past six years, Vietnam has undertaken bold and transparent steps to meet international fishery requirements. This has included enacting the Fisheries Law and the establishment of transparent fishing vessel data covering registration and the proper issuance of fishing licenses.
“Combatting IUU is not just a form of response, but it is for the interests of the nation and people,” says Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh. Government officials understand that their certification compliance helps preserve the nation’s image, fulfills international commitments, and affirms Vietnam as a responsible member of the international community.
Hanoi’s political leadership in concert with the Maritime Affairs and Fisheries DG-MARE of EC has prompted Vietnam to make significant gains as a responsible and sustainable fisheries industry.
However, the imposed ‘yellow card’ has led to a consistent decline in overall export sales to the European Union. Statistics from the Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP) reveal that in the first nine months of 2023 the total turnover of seafood was $6.6 billion exported to the EU – a decrease of 22 percent on year.
However, according to Enrico Brivio, a spokesman for the EU’s Environment, Marine Affairs, and Fisheries, Vietnam is actively pursuing the implementation of four specific recommendations from the European Commission: bolstering the legal framework; controlling fishing vessel operations; certifying output and tracing exploited aquatic products; and bolstering law enforcement.
Before venturing out into the vast blue sea to catch fish and make sure their counterparts are abiding by fishery laws, fishermen in Ham Ninh hamlet, one of the oldest villages in Vietnam, which is located on the east coast of Phu Quoc island, voluntarily register and obtain licenses to use their fishing vessels.
The fishing community has also established local inspection teams of its own. Every fishing vessel involved in these operations has Zalo communications software installed, enabling them to stay connected and communicate.
This information technology initiative aims to create suitable and effective role models for fishing communities in accordance with regulations, minimizing negative impacts on water environment quality. It does this by combining tradition and application of IT to effectively communicate environmental protection regulations to fishermen and small businesses at the boat dock.
The installation of monitoring and supervisory equipment on over 98% of Vietnam’s offshore fishing vessels has contributed to the nation’s fisheries compliance status. Additionally, the chain of harvesting, processing, and exporting has reflected a course correction on seafood traceability. Furthermore, there has been an 84% decrease in fishing vessel infractions related to trespassing in foreign waters.
Vietnam deserves praise for the openness with which fishery management in at least 28 coastal communities has shared data and information during sporadic inspections by the EU. However, the fact that Vietnamese fishermen are still being arrested in other nations’ exclusive economic zones worries inspectors and local officials.
The E.C. Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MARE) IUU Fisheries Policy Unit’s Roberto Cesari urged authorities to strive for the implementation of efficient fleet monitoring and to guarantee uniform enforcement from the federal to local levels last year.
However, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) evaluation, states that local too many fishing vessels continue to breach international waterways.
Vietnam needs to decrease its production of marine exploitation in order to get rid of the EC’s “yellow card” for seafood, but it also needs to raise the value of seafood in order to grow its economy and protect the livelihoods of fishermen.
In the wake of the recent APEC 2023 summit, held in San Francisco with the US as acting host, and keeping in mind the agreed upon comprehensive strategic partnership that now exists between the US and Vietnam, it seems that there’s even greater impetus to get the onerous EU ‘yellow card lifted, otherwise there may be restrictions imposed on access to the American market.
There’s reason for optimism since the U.S. Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing through multiple federal agencies has effectively reached out to targeted countries for collaboration in efforts to combat IUU. Their September visit to Vietnam highlights Vietnam’s willingness to partner in assessing capabilities, identified areas for improvement, and in developing a multi-year plan to strengthen Vietnam’s capacity to address these IUU problems.
Their discussions offered critical and practical areas for collaboration, spanning training, guidance, legal advice and operations. The blueprint for Vietnam is clear: they must reduce marine exploitation, and in the process develop the economy and ensure fishermen’s livelihoods by increasing the value of seafood.
For fisherman like Tho and other fishermen crossing the rough and dangerous waters in their wooden boats, the future may hold a promising safety net below for better and safer fishing.
James Borton is a non-resident senior fellow at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Foreign Policy Institute and the author of Dispatches from the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground.
The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
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]]>In response, the Carnegie Corporation of New York has supported the US Naval Institute’s Maritime Counterinsurgency Project, which aims to bring together prominent maritime strategy experts to analyze effective ways for the U.S. and its allies to shine a brighter light on China’s escalating illegal activities to harass, intimidate, and bully other states in the South China Sea.
The new project’s collaborators include well-known South China Sea experts: James Holmes, Geoffrey Till, Bryan Clark, Peter Swartz, Brent Sadler, Steve Wills, and Collin Koh.
Timing is everything. China is currently implementing a two-pronged approach, wherein it is both prepared for potential conflicts between states and actively striving to achieve its objectives through non-military means.
China’s most recent high stakes maritime moves occurred on October 22 with two ship collisions at the Ayungin Shoal (also known as the Second Thomas Shoal), both well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. A Chinese Coast Guard vessel brushed up against a tiny Philippines government-contracted resupply boat; then a Chinese armed militia vessel bumped into a smaller Philippines Coast Guard vessel.
Although “grey zones” and maritime insurgency are not synonymous, they are both part of the greater security issues in the conflict zone. The risks to international maritime law may soon necessitate more than enhanced Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs). Over the last decade, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has swiftly modernized and expanded its capabilities by investing in new ships, submarines, and naval technologies.
On August 28, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources made another bold move when it published what it has referred to as a new standard map, which now includes 10 dash lines – an expansion from the nine-dash line that was already rejected by the United Nations’ Law of the Sea tribunal.
China’s actions prove alarming in light of Washington’s new bilateral defense guidelines with the Philippines, released in May 2023, which clarify the circumstances under which American soldiers would come to the rescue of their Philippine counterparts under the terms of their mutual defense pact. The instructions signaled a shift in American policy in the South China Sea from “scrupulous noninvolvement” to preventing provocative Chinese acts in “grey zone” circumstances.
Hunter Stires, the director of the U.S. Naval Institute’s Maritime Counterinsurgency Project, emphasizes a widely held belief in Washington that offers a counter-intuitive perspective: Beijing’s advancement of sophisticated military capabilities potentially serves as a strategic maneuver aimed at diverting the attention of U.S. policymakers and discouraging responses to Chinese counterinsurgency operations.
China’s ongoing efforts to undermine the US- led rules-based international order, which has garnered significant attention due to its potential implications for future conflicts, have achieved substantial progress without resorting to military action. This is evident in their flagrant maritime crimes, including illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing and robberies and damage inflicted upon Vietnamese fishing vessels.
In order to thwart these unlawful actions, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia urgently need to cooperate in sharing maritime monitoring practices and in participation in global maritime forums to help curb China’s maritime violations.
At last week’s 15th annual South China Sea Conference, hosted by Vietnam’s Diplomatic Academy, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Do Hung Viet, spoke about the significance of China’s grey zones. “Grey zone activities significantly increase the risk of confrontation, destabilize the governance of regional law and order, and undermine law, trust, and the political will for cooperation.”
Additionally, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) of which the U.S. is a member, has promised to work with regional partners to combat illegal fishing by providing real-time radio frequency data collection.
China’s modus operandi calls for tactics that fall below the level of military combat to impose control over the sizable civilian maritime population of Southeast Asia, rather than waging an expensive and dangerous large-scale aggressive war. Over 3.7 million people reside in this region, and their daily survival depends on having access to the South China Sea.
The Chinese Coast Guard and members of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) continue to seize fishermen’s catches, destroy their ship’s radio and navigational equipment essential for safe maritime operations, and contaminate the drinking water supplies on fishing vessel, forcing them to return to land.
Furthermore, alleged kidnapping incidents involving Vietnamese fishermen held captive by Chinese paramilitary troops in exchange for money go unreported.
China has emerged as the world’s top fisheries exploiter on a global, rather than regional scale. Chinese boats are active in oceans far from China’s coastlines, and the increase in their catch threatens to exacerbate the already grave depletion of world fisheries.
Whether or not China’s repeated maritime acts are considered state piracy, it is apparent that their strategic purpose is to undermine the established international legal system that supports the idea of freedom of the sea. This principle is fundamental to the national interest of the United States.
Beijing continues to impose its own rigid and self-serving idea of sea sovereignty, which is defined by a hierarchical structure. By claiming authority over vast offshore waters it refers to as “blue national soil,” this strategy prevents smaller coastal states from exercising their rights to exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and other fundamental maritime rights.
Marine scientists, like Dr. John McManus, a notable University of Miami coral reef specialist, who has regularly visited the region for more than a quarter of a century, has been raising alarm over the destruction of coral reefs in the South China Sea that are critical for the marine environment and for preventing a collapse in fish stocks.
“Territorial disputes have led to the establishment of environmentally destructive, socially and economically costly military outposts on many of the islands,” claims the ecologist.
With the U.S. hosting the Asia Pacific Economic Conference in San Francisco next month, a key opportunity presents itself not only to showcase Washington’s economic leadership and multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific, but also to highlight its commitment to an open and free South China Sea supporting the efficient and unimpeded delivery of goods.
More broadly, the U.S. cannot afford to be blindsided by any future incidents and dangers posed by China’s maritime ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region.
The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
James Borton is a non-resident Senior Fellow at Johns Hopkins/SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and the author of Dispatches from the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground.
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]]>Following the agreement’s conclusion, in order to implement the newly reached deal, Vietnam Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh is scheduled to meet various US federal and local officials in Washington DC and San Francisco on his trip to the US later this month, which also includes attending the high-level meetings of the 78th Session of the General Assembly in New York.
There are some opinions that the threat from China, especially Beijing’s assertive actions in the South China Sea, may be part of the reason why the United States and Vietnam are moving closer. However, the actual roadmap for developing relations between Hanoi and Washington dates back 50 years, after the last US soldiers departed Vietnam. The mistrust and hostility between the two parties was challenging to overcome. Changing relations with America required Hanoi to adopt “new thinking” or “renovation” in the 1980s. Vietnam made further efforts to diversify its economy and broaden its diplomatic area of influence after the fall of the Soviet Union.
The majority of post-Vietnam War analysts concur that the opening of the POW/MIA accounting office in Hanoi, together with Washington’s humanitarian aid, contributed to a thawing of relations between the two nations. Former President Bill Clinton’s decision to normalize relations in 1995 was one of the key openings. Reconciliation was undoubtedly facilitated by a variety of methods, including specific acts made by both countries to mend the severe wartime scars.
Through the efforts of the late Senator John McCain, a former Navy pilot and POW, and Senator John Kerry, a fellow war veteran, the U.S. Congress assisted in fostering confidence between Washington and Hanoi. Additionally, Democratic Senator from Vermont Patrick Leahy played a crucial role in getting Congress to approve aid for Vietnamese citizens who have been injured by landmines and explosive ordnance.
Potential cooperation areas are opening under the new relationship framework
Few countries have staged as dramatic a turnaround in relations as the United States and Vietnam. Normalization ushered in a huge growth in trade between the two countries and has increased by more than 200 times since then. As a result, more Americans opted to travel to Vietnam and helped fuel the nascent tourism industry with increasing numbers of former Vietnam War veterans, and former refugees “Viet Kieu” and their families. US schools and companies in turn have attracted thousands of Vietnamese students and recent graduates. It helps that Vietnam, still recognized as an emerging economy has nearly a 98% literacy rate.
A key foundation of the educational connection and development is the impressive new Fulbright University Vietnam (FUV) located in Ho Chi Minh City. Established in 2016, it is the nation’s first fully independent, non-profit university and is a cornerstone of the US-Vietnamese partnership. This institution is modeled on the American traditions of a liberal arts education but also rooted in Vietnam’s culture and heritage, where I was invited to present a lecture on the South China Sea. The implementation of the new relationship framework is expected to bring many benefits to both countries in most fields, especially the development of Vietnam’s semiconductor industry, educational and scientific cooperation, 5G technology, artificial intelligence, modernizing the education and improving defense capability of Vietnam.
According to a Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) report, foreign direct investment from the United States into Vietnam has increased from under $1 billion in 2011 to over $2.6 billion in 2019. Due to the trade war with Beijing, some US companies sought to diversify their supply chains out of China. Vietnam’s proximity to China, alongside its improving business environment, young and highly educated workforce, and entrepreneurial mindset helped make it one of the few beneficiaries of the US-China trade war.
The evolution of cooperation extends to science and technology, as seen in the $15.5 billion Just Energy Transition Partnership agreed to in 2022. It brings considerable investment to help Vietnam achieve the ambitious targets its sets forth of limiting greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, capping coal capacity, and accelerating the adoption of renewables to account for 47 percent of electricity generation by 2030. Also, over the last five years, USAID support spurred more than $300 million of investment in solar and wind projects in Vietnam.
The United States and Vietnam have collaborated on various security projects, such as helping the Vietnam Coast Guard; combating transnational organized crime, including the trafficking of people, drugs, and chemical precursors as well as wildlife; addressing illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; and enhancing Vietnam’s capacity to maintain awareness of the maritime domain to protect its sovereignty.
General Secretary Trong oversaw all of the above measures. The anti-corruption efforts led by the Party Secretary have garnered significant acclaim from US investors and other stakeholders. Under his leadership, Vietnam has made notable progress in its standing on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. However, it is important to acknowledge that further action is required, as Vietnam currently holds the 77th position among 189 nations in the index.
Vietnam has defied geopolitical instability and a turbulent global economy. The country’s political leadership is translating into increased foreign investment, reaching an all-time high of $22.4 billion in 2022. The first quarter results for 2023 are also record-breaking, with inflows at $10.13 billion and estimates that it might reach as high as $36 billion by year-end. A key part of Vietnam’s strategy is to attract high-tech and high-value foreign investments and help advance Vietnam’s technological capabilities.
The main goal is to enhance Vietnam’s public administration and business climate in order to create a more favorable policy environment for international investors.
US Investment in Vietnam
The United States has emerged as a leading force in establishing investments in Vietnam, with more than 52 multinational corporations such as Apple, Boeing, Lockheed, Meta, and Space X taking the lead. These investments are crucial in supporting Vietnam’s ambitious goal of developing its digital economy, creating fresh prospects across several sectors including video streaming and military. Based on a report jointly conducted by Google, Bain, and Temasek, it is projected that Vietnam’s digital economy will attain a value of over $49 billion by the year 2025.
The lifting of the post-war arms embargo in 2016 was another factor in the two countries’ evolving relationship. As a result, the United States exported defense platforms such as Boeing ScanEagle drones, several Coast Guard cutters, and at least 24 patrol boats to Vietnam to support its efforts to uphold stability and peace in the South China Sea.
For now, the advantages of increasing Vietnam’s ties with the US significantly exceed the disadvantages. The difficulty for Hanoi is to make sure that Washington keeps its word in order to secure real benefits from this strengthened strategic alliance.
The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
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]]>Strong headwinds never fail to deter Chinese coast guard vessels and fishing trawlers from sailing into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). While most policy analysts simply regard Beijing’s brazen acts of intimidation as routine, Vietnamese citizens recoil since they are all too familiar with Chinese advances into their sovereign territory.
Last month, a Chinese research vessel, Xiang Yang Hong, protected by an entourage of a dozen other ships, was dispatched into Vietnam’s EEZ’s oil and gas fields. This expansion of China’s maritime militia has been widely recognized as a maneuver to achieve their control in disputed waters.
This unauthorized survey action was met by a rare public protest and resulted in the ship’s departure from the area.
In a Voice of America interview, Van Pham, head of the nonprofit South China Sea Chronicle Initiative says, “Exploring the deep South China Sea has become China’s strategy for obtaining valuable information for economic and military intelligence.”
Pham and other commentators may recount the founder of modern Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh’s quote, “Land is the house, and sea is the door. How can we protect the house without guarding the door?” The nation’s revolutionary leader and the Communist Party (CPV) acknowledge that their East Sea (SCS) is central to its national security and territorial integrity.
By guarding the sea, Vietnam seeks to safeguard its maritime sovereignty and protect its territorial claims. Despite its remarkable economic, industrial, and technological strides achieved over the past two decades, Vietnam faces real challenges in preventing Chinese vessels from entering its waters.
The sheer vastness of the maritime area, the complexity of disputes, and the disparity in naval capabilities between Vietnam and China make it difficult for Vietnam to keep Chinese boats out of their East Sea.
In 1974, in a bloody conflict, China annexed the Paracel Islands. It also failed to honor all of its law of the sea agreements including one reached in 2011 that sought to contain the dispute over the sea and the Paracels.
China, as a major super regional power, continues to rewrite the rules of freedom of navigation as it bolsters its maritime claims and exploits vital marine resources. Of the more than 3.1 million fishing vessels in Asia, China operates 864,000 of them according to a report from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN.
With this hyper-competition over fish, there are continued run-ins between Chinese and Vietnamese fishing boats, often resulting in the sinking of Vietnam’s traditional colorful wooden boats.
Hanoi has dealt swiftly with China’s past assaults into its territory, including in 1979 when Beijing launched its offensive into La`o Cai, along Vietnam’s northern border. Vietnamese forces inflicted significant casualties and forced China to withdraw.
That conflict has never receded from the memory of either nation.
Ten years later, during Vietnam’s renovation in the late 80s, China saw economic opportunities and recognized the potential of Vietnam’s emerging market and its strategic location in Southeast Asia.
By investing in Vietnam, China could and did establish a strong foothold in their neighbor’s country to tap into its resources and labor pool. China, known for its manufacturing capabilities, saw Vietnam as a location for outsourcing labor-intensive industries. It is one of the country’s largest investors injecting almost $2.52 billion trailing only Singapore, Korea, and Japan.
At first glance by policy observers, the troubled history and distrust between the two nations belies this economic relationship. Although Vietnam’s economy has experienced a strong rebound, with growth reaching nearly 8% according to the World Bank, and strengthened its economic self-reliance, Hanoi does not like to admit that its financial debt to Beijing is at $16.3 billion or nearly 3% of the GDP.
For now, Vietnam navigates safely along a fast-moving geopolitical and economic highway. Hanoi has positioned itself as a responsible leader engaged in diplomatic talks with China to resolve maritime disputes. It has also embraced the legal mechanisms, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to support its international claims and challenge China’s incursions.
Additionally, the nation has strengthened regional cooperation with other countries facing similar challenges in the South China Sea, such as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. By collaborating on joint patrols, information sharing, and coordinated responses, all parties can seek common ground to collectively address China’s assertive actions.
The China-US-Vietnam triangle
As relations between the US and China continue to slide to their lowest point since the 1970s, the Biden administration has been pulling out all the stops to strengthen its ties with governments of Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam.
Vietnam is located in a strategically important region, where both the United States and China have significant interests, and this presents an alliance conundrum for Hanoi. Vietnam shares a land border with China and has its ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea, where the interests of the US and China remain on a high-level collision course.
As a result, Vietnam must chart a safe and stable road with both countries to protect its sovereignty and security.
Although this year Hanoi and Washington celebrate the 10th anniversary of the signing of the comprehensive partnership, it also marks the 15th anniversary of a comprehensive strategic partnership between Vietnam and China.
Both China and the US are courting Vietnam with stronger diplomatic overtures. Despite a visit by US Secretary Antony Blinken, the construction of a $1.2 billion new Embassy in Hanoi and finalizing the shipment of another naval coast guard cutter, Washington appears to remain a mere runner-up.
Victor Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington, DC, stated in a recent interview that “Beijing is more confident that Vietnam is an independent actor and steadfast in its refusal to undertake any action that Beijing would view as hostile to Chinese interests.”
The geopolitical balancing line between Vietnam and Washington is proving more difficult to chart as Hanoi remains most reluctant to formally upgrade the relations with its former enemy, while it has not hesitated to augment its military and trade relationships with Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea.
What is clear is that the long history of conflict and mistrust between China and Vietnam appears not to weaken their economic interdependence and socialist solidarity.
James Borton is a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins/SAIS and the author of Dispatches from the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground.
The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
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]]>The United Nations Human Rights Council, responsible for promoting and defending human rights globally, has 47 members who are elected for three-year terms, and are based on equitable geographical distribution.
While critics have submitted censorious reports of Vietnam’s human rights record with the imprisonment of bloggers and select environmentalists, the Human Development Index (HDI) in the nation has increased by 45% between 1990-2019, placing Vietnam on the list of countries with the highest HDI growth rates.
This is also the second time that Vietnam has been nominated to join the UN Human Rights Council. They were elected to the Council for the 2014-2016 term. Additionally, as a responsible member, the nation has sent delegates to attend the Annual Summit of the Human Rights Council.
For Hanoi, their representation has enabled them to demonstrate that the Communist Party’s leadership has enshrined citizens’ rights through legislation to participate in the management of the state and to exercise their freedoms of religion, belief, and movement.
Despite Vietnam’s one-party state, the once embattled war-weary nation’s political leadership understands that their future has always been tied to reforms, a balanced policy, and expansion of a free market economy. All while leaving the country’s underlying political economy largely intact.
Although Vietnam does not embrace a Western model democracy, it offers a National Assembly, a 498-member unicameral body elected to a five-year term, that meets twice a year to appoint a president, a prime minister and a chief justice of the Supreme People’s Court of Vietnam. Additionally, debates at the Vietnamese National Assembly are broadcast live.
Vietnam’s 2013 Constitution dedicates over 36 Articles to expressly stipulating human rights and citizens’ fundamental rights and obligations. Since then, the country has amended and supplemented more than 100 laws relating to human rights and citizens’ rights.
Furthermore, the country attaches great importance to the adherence of international treaties in protecting and promoting human rights and is presently State Party to 25 conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO). This has set the foundation for future ratification of an ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize.
“Vietnam as a developing country has considerable experience in meeting the UN Sustainable Development Goals and can provide practical policy advice on issues affecting comprehensive human rights globally and regionally,” claims Carl Thayer, Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales and director of Thayer Consultancy.
The CPV has also established measures to promote “grassroots democracy” at local levels following province-wide mass organizations staged by farmers in Thai Binh province nearly two decades ago against unlawful land seizures. The government’s ordinance on “grassroots democracy” was formally adopted in 2008 and is now mandatory in the nation.
According to the Government Committee for Religious Affairs, religious activities in Vietnam are becoming far more open. In 2006 Vietnam had only 6 religions and 16 religious organizations recognized and registered, but by 2020 there were 38 organizations associated with 16 different religions with over 25 million followers. From 2001 to 2017, the number of followers of recognized religious organizations increased by 6% of the total population.
Coupled with this expression of religious freedom is the emergence of a nascent civil or civic society that has different meanings from various mass associations in Vietnam. Non-government organizations (NGOs), formally autonomous of the Party, continue to participate in policy advocacy and engagement with environmental issues.
Civil Society bolsters government’s responses to environmental crisis and Covid-19
As a result of Vietnam’s framework for climate-change mitigation, new actors, largely from civil society, have emerged to push the agenda for climate change and environmentalism forward.
The foundation of civil society began at the village level. It was the successful expansion of the nation’s economic renovation, or doi moi reforms that led to the participation of local citizens to discuss policy and projects. Groups like the Vietnamese Women’s Association, Ho Chi Minh Youth Union and the Vietnamese Farmers Association, must be given credit for their active environmental participation as they rallied support towards climate change, nature loss and pollution.
With climate-change threats in the Mekong Delta, the nation’s rice bowl, it’s no wonder that at the UN, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chin called for a global approach and international solidarity in response to climate change in an informal Leaders’ Roundtable in New York.
Vietnam’s government has undertaken a number of steps in formulating a National Strategy for Green Growth 5 (NSGG) as early as 2012. The government has also called on young citizens to become engaged in “Youth4Climate” to put forward collective actions and ideas for climate adaptation.
At the same time, new technologies and social-media platforms are enabling a wave of civic-minded environmentalism and with it ushers in an emergence of young voices to signal urgent climate change problems and an online civic society. According to the Ministry of Information and Communications, Vietnam has more than 93.5 million smartphone subscribers reaching nearly 73% of the nation.
This online freedom was best exemplified during Covid-19 when the government encouraged the use of social media, including Facebook, to promote public health messaging and to dispel misinformation to better curb the spread of the deadly virus.
The expansion of organized civil or citizen society in the past two decades has been remarkable. There are over 70,000 active associations in Vietnam representing the youth, women, workers, farmers, the elderly, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.
Integration with the West underscores UN Leadership Role
Since Vietnam became an official member of the UN in September 1977, the country has effectively contributed to UN activities in peace-building, development and human rights. With near unanimous approval, Vietnam secured a seat on the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member in the 2020-2021 tenure at the 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly following their successful 2008-2009 term.
Along with its participation in the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Vietnam has actively promoted UN Conventions against Torture and other Cruel and Inhumane Treatment or Punishment, the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
During Vietnam’s UN tenure, the nation has successfully focused on the promotion of multilateralism, international law, cooperation between the Council and regional organizations, post-conflict reconstruction, peace building and universal principles that have been recognized internationally.
A central part of the Vietnam’s openness and engagement with the world has been the nation’s willingness to acquire a more prominent voice and position in the United Nations. With the world’s situation increasingly more complicated, Hanoi continues to demonstrate a peaceful approach in the complex sovereignty issues in the South China Sea.
Vietnam’s bid for election to the UNHRC not only deepens its integration into the international system, but also offers a chance to promote human rights in the country.
James Borton is a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Foreign Policy Institute and the author of Dispatches from the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground.
The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com
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]]>The post Environmental Volunteerism on the Rise in Vietnam appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.
]]>Vietnam’s rapid development from one of the five poorest countries in the world in 1985 to one of the world’s fastest growing economies has resulted in dramatic environmental consequences from polluted rivers, biodiversity loss, and air quality depletion.
Climate and disaster risks are widely viewed as a direct threat to Vietnam’s aspiration to become a high-income economy. This is especially true in the nation’s deltas from the Red River to the Mekong. The nation is one of the most hazard-prone countries in the Asia Pacific region. With an extensive coastline stretching over 2025 miles, citizens are regularly exposed to severe storms, cyclones, typhoons, floods, landslides, and coastal erosion.
It’s no wonder that the government’s call to environmental action comes with such urgency, and, with nearly half of the country’s population of 98 million under the age of 25, much of the burden inevitably falls on the youth. This grassroots environmental volunteerism is especially evident during the summer when students are not in school.
Mai and other students believe that not only Vietnamese youth but also global youth should care about the environment. “Volunteering in the summer helps me not to waste my time on mobile devices, or just stay at home. I have learned practical social skills and to help others from my summer volunteer experiences.” Although still in secondary school, she’s hopeful that next year she will be accepted into the Diplomatic Academy in Hanoi.
Others like Nguyen Long, 21, a student at Hanoi University of Science and Technology, understand that the main challenge for Vietnam is to manage its economic development in a sustainable manner and to prevent adverse impacts of environmental degradation and climate change. Duong Hai Phong, an 18-year-old high school student from Hung Yen province, emphasizes that social media helps broadcast messages about the environment and this includes announcing competitions and events that will attract more volunteers.
For some student volunteers, participation in the Youth Union is also a fast-track road for political advancement in the Communist Party. Many senior officials were previous Youth Union leaders. Former Prime Minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, previously served as secretary of the Youth Union. His youngest son, Nguyen Minh Triet is now President of the Vietnam Students Association. Other Party members who served as Youth Union volunteers include Vo Van Thuong, Permanent Member of the Central Party Committee’s Secretariat and member of the Politburo and Vu Trong Kim, a member of the National Assembly Justice Committee.
Mr. Nguyen Truong Lan, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ho Chi Minh Youth Union, in a speech at a past conference, reinforces the role of the Youth Union to encourage participation in conservation and promotion of cultural values. Furthermore, the passage of the Youth Law in 2005 inscribed the rights of young people in Vietnam. The law created a legal platform that describes the ‘rights and responsibilities of the youth. To be clear, the Law mandates that the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union (HCMCYU) assume a critical role in all youth movements and makes relevant proposals to the authorities to address youth issues.
The nation’s revolutionary founding father, President Ho Chi Minh established The Youth Union in 1931. The YU, along with the Vietnam Youth Federation, has over 7 million members. Past Party Congresses have also adopted Ho’s views on environmental protection in building a sustainable developed society. The volunteers’ actions model the former leader’s beliefs in protection of the country’s ecological environment, as he famously once said: “Forests are gold and the ocean silver.”
In 1986 the Vietnam Communist Party adopted economic reforms or “doi moi.” It was the Youth Union, joined by international non-profit organizations like the United Nations Volunteers (UNV), that also mobilized nation-building efforts. In December 2021, UNESCO in Vietnam and the Communist Youth Union also signed a letter of understanding for the period of 2021 to 2025. This is a milestone for the strategic and close cooperation between the two organizations since they share common ground in promoting student engagement with their communities.
Dr. Le Thu Mach, a lecturer at Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics, recalls her social work volunteerism twenty years ago in Sapa, in the Lao Cai province, where the Vietnam Youth Federation awarded her a national certificate of merit. She says, “today student volunteerism is all year round, not just in the summer and it is community-based.”
While some non-state actors in the form of non-government organizations (NGOs) in Vietnam continue to face challenges, there’s no turning back the actions and voices of community-based youth volunteers since they are future agents for a changing environment.
NGOs like Pan Nature continue to be engaged in World Environment Day by planting trees in Van Ho Commune in Son La, where the population of black-cheeked Gibbon live and the endangered rare white Gibbon. This volunteer activity is part of a long-term plan to restore 630 hectares of forest and conserve the rare Gibbon species. “While we do not have any formal partnership with the national Youth Union, we do work with the local Youth Union through capacity building and other initiatives, says executive director Trinh Le Nguyen.
The government’s national directive about the importance of conservation and sustainability of the environment is reflected in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment’s (MONRE) upcoming June 4 environmental awards program to organizations, individuals, and communities with excellent performances in environmental protection.
The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com
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]]>While tensions between Washington and Beijing have been exacerbated by the launch of several Asian trade agreements, this Summit offers an opportunity to commemorate the 45th anniversary of the relationship; one that validates the administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy as well as charting the future direction of America with ASEAN’s 10 member states.
If one of the goals of hosting this organization comprising Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam is to secure their participation in a multi-partner Indo-Pacific Pax Americana or “rules-based international order” to curb China’s rising power in the disputed South China Sea, then what better timing for the U.S. to join the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)?
Since Washington has been recalibrating its foreign policy relationship with NATO in a concentrated response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the interests of the Biden administration and Congress’ interests may also be well served by bringing to vote the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (UNCLOS), the recognized legal instrument to define issues relating to sovereignty, territorial waters, and rights and obligations of a maritime state.
While this summit serves to explain America’s Indo-Pacific mission, which reinforces a commitment to international law, the ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea would convince members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that the U.S. is no longer merely offering empty promises and geopolitical rhetoric.
China’s offensive maritime maneuvers and its militarization of outposts in the South China Sea, do much more than highlight the need for the U.S. Senate to ratify UNCLOS. Two months ago, the U.S. House passed a bill, America COMPETES Act of 2022 aimed at increasing U.S. economic competitiveness with China. (The Act stands for Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science).
The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted in 1982. One hundred and sixty-two countries, including China and Russia, are signatories to the treaty that governs the world’s oceans. The U.S. is not.
Past endorsements from presidents Bill Clinton, George W Bush, and Barack Obama, have failed to move the needle forward for the bill’s passage.
Some Washington policy observers don’t think that the recent resolution from the US House of Representatives is anything more than performative.
“The Biden administration has shown no interest in bringing the treaty up for consideration again, and even if they did, it would be doomed. The last time there was an effort was in 2012 when John Kerry championed it as chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Democrats had a 53-seat majority,” says Gregory Poling, a senior fellow for Southeast Asia and director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.
However, increasing numbers of proponents argue that the agreement will give Washington more leverage in pressuring other nations to do the same. The US Navy and Coast Guard already largely follow the rules of navigation the treaty lays out.
The time has come to put partisan politics aside and focus on national interests. While the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet continues to reinforce freedom in the South China Sea’s troubled waters, UNCLOS defines limits of a country’s territorial sea, and establishes clear rules for transit through “international straits” and “exclusive economic zones (EEZs).”
With ratification, the United States would have legal standing to bring any complaints to an international dispute resolution body and thus avoid possible confrontation with Chinese naval forces and paramilitary fishing trawlers in the Spratly Islands.
Vietnam, a former chair of ASEAN and a comprehensive partner of the U.S., has been one of the most vocal critics of China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea. Hanoi is also quick to support the Law of the Sea as a vital instrument for maintaining peace, security, and freedom of navigation and over flight above the challenged sea. The Vietnamese, along with the Philippines and Malaysia, are growing more impatient waiting for Washington to effectively address and manage China’s ongoing aggressive actions to expand its power and influence in the contested sea.
There is increasing consensus among leadership of Joint Chiefs at the US Defense Department, US Chamber of Commerce executives, the oil and gas industry, ocean policy experts, and environmental groups for ratification of the Convention in the Senate.
At present, the U.S. recognizes most parts of UNCLOS as customary international law, but that is a much weaker position than ratification and one that leaves the U.S. open to criticism from China, a signatory of the treaty. For many ASEAN leaders, America’s failure to sign on to the treaty serves to weaken its Indo-Pacific pledges.
U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) and combatting illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUFF) as challenges to international law are weakened by the Convention’s non-ratification.
US foreign policy has emphasized the role of multilateralism and repudiated efforts led by Beijing to address problems with Southeast Asian nations in response to South China Sea territorial issues. For sure, there’s a loss of moral ground for the U.S. if there’s a failure to ratify the most comprehensive mechanism for multilateral resolution of maritime disputes.
Furthermore, the treaty provides formal cooperation with other countries, because almost all of America’s allies, neighbors, and friends are party to the Convention. The political mantra is clear and simple: The U.S. requires maximum freedom both for naval and commercial vessels to navigate and operate off foreign coasts without interference.
The U.S. currently asserts its rights to freedom of navigation through customary international law, which is subject to change, and diplomatic interpretations. Ratification of UNCLOS would enable the U.S. to regain its rightful strategic place in the Pacific and transform rhetoric into action.
Just as the world watches and waits to see how American actions and rhetoric converge to help Ukraine, it’s also imperative that the U.S. makes a bold decision to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty to demonstrate its commitment to deepening its partnership with Southeast Asian nations.
James Borton is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and the author of Dispatches from the South China Sea: Navigating to Common Ground.
The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com
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