• The Marcos administration in the Philippines is internationalizing the South China Sea conflict, scrapping the bilateral approach of the Duterte years.
• US President Biden has reiterated that the US-Philippines mutual defense treaty applies to the South China Sea.
• ‘Gray zone tactics’ that may have worked previously are now more likely to elicit a response from Washington and other littoral claimants.

The United States and Philippines are planning their first-ever military training exercises outside of Philippines’ waters. The exercises are the latest in a series of moves suggesting a more active US stance on defending its allies’ sovereignty in the South China Sea. The overall objective is clear: remove the diplomatic and military ambiguity that China’s gray zone tactics thrive in.

Background

The South China Sea is a critical theater for Beijing, holding out the possibility of material wealth in its underseas mineral deposits and greater military security by pushing out the PLA’s defense perimeter from China proper. But Beijing’s sweeping claims to the waters overlap with other littoral states, namely Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan. The resulting clashes have played out for decades, sometimes producing a sudden redrawing of the map, as was the case after China’s occupation of the Paracel Islands in 1974, and other times leading to a more gradual ‘slicing of the salami’ where a previous status quo slowly gives way to a new one, often by way of gray zone tactics designed to fall short of producing a direct military response.

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Such unknowables have existed for as long as commodities have been traded. But technology is now intervening to disrupt convention, paving the way for new and ultimately more sustainable paradigms. Asset tokenization via blockchain technology specifically holds out the promise of revolutionizing supply chains by disclosing the mine source, chain of custody, and ESG practices of a given commodity. This information is a game-changer for consumers looking to make informed purchasing decisions: the graphite in their smartphones will finally be able to tell its story.

Technology alone is not enough; traders, investors, and consumers must be able to put it to good use. What’s needed is for companies to step up and bridge the gap. One notable example is Savala, which has partnered with DComm Blockchain to launch an innovative trading platform that will initially focus on premium graphite before expanding into other commodities. Transactions on the platform will be facilitated via the DComm Blockchain Coin ($DCM), marking a leap forward in the marriage of digital currency and commodity trading. But unlike cryptocurrencies, which tend not to be backed by any hard assets, every token will represent one ton of graphite.

This novel approach can help alleviate longstanding issues in the commodity trading space. For one, it allows grassroots investors to engage directly in commodity markets for the first time, thus encouraging the democratization of a market that has historically been dominated by elite interests. Two, it provides a level of transparency hitherto impossible for traders and investors, opening the door to better investment decisions. For example, investments can be guided by a sense of social responsibility (purchasing from miners with a record of ESG best practices) or geopolitical considerations (purchasing from miners unlikely to be targeted by sanctions). And most importantly, trading portals can act as a conduit for ESG-minded miners to raise capital, linking them up with publics that had previously lacked the opportunities and technological means to invest in commodities on their own terms. Commodity traders also benefit from improved price discovery since portals can help pull the curtain back on the opaque and top-heavy arena of privately traded commodities. End users such as auto OEMs can leverage this price discovery to hedge or even buy necessary inputs directly.

It’s no coincidence that Savala has opted to focus on the premium graphite market, as the commodity exemplifies many of the pitfalls of the status quo. In terms of its importance, there can be no question – as a durable and excellent conductor of heat and electricity, graphite finds its way into all manner of industrial and consumer products. Chief among them, at least in the context of the global energy transition, is lithium-ion batteries, which are expected to propel graphite demand to new heights over the coming years. Yet sources of this highly strategic commodity remain restricted to jurisdictions that carry significant geopolitical or ESG risk. China, for example, accounts for 65% of global graphite production and 90% of global refining, but its government instituted export curbs in late 2023 citing national security concerns. Rights organizations have expressed concern about Mozambique, the world’s second-largest graphite producer at approximately 13% of global output, where local livelihoods and ecosystems have allegedly been upended by large-scale mining. In particular, nearly all graphite mining takes place in Cabo Delgado province, home to a bloody and ongoing insurgency that has caused thousands of deaths.

In light of these supply chain issues, it comes as no surprise that Western governments are scrambling to secure new avenues of graphite production and refining capacity. The Savala portal can assist in the effort by tapping into new sources of capital and channeling it toward responsible operators. Amid a global energy transition at a critical time, the stakes couldn’t be higher. But for the first time in human history, we can at the very least hold out hope for a commodity boom that leaves the planet in a better state than what it found it in.

Richard Garner has acted as an advisor to Savala Global. The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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The real estate crisis in China has been characterized by a slowdown in the market and declining property prices, placing financial strain on developers and homebuyers alike. Evergrande, the country’s largest developer, was ordered to liquidate last year after missing two years of payments on its $300 billion in debts. Similarly, Country Garden slipped into default while carrying approximately $187 billion in liabilities. About two-thirds of the remaining real estate developers have already defaulted or are facing defaults on upcoming payments. This downturn has direct implications for the banking sector, as real estate loans account for a quarter of bank loan portfolios. If the market continues to slump, defaults on these loans could jeopardize the stability of financial institutions.

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From the perspective of American and European politicians with an appetite for imported hydrocarbons and black caviar, Azerbaijan is a valuable Western ally. It supposedly provides leverage against Russian and Iranian influence in the Caucasus and is frequently mentioned as a friend of Israel, supplying that country with approximately 60 percent of its oil in exchange for weaponry to fight Armenians.

Too often overlooked in this calculus is a complex web of relationships between the Azerbaijani regime in Baku and the rulers of Russia and Iran.

Azerbaijan’s relationship with Russia is the most obvious and damaging  part of this web. Baku entered a strategic partnership with Moscow, marked by an “Allied Relations” Declaration in February 2022, just two days before Russia invaded Ukraine. This alliance has expanded to include intelligence-sharing and hydrocarbon trade, allowing Azerbaijan to make a mockery of Western sanctions by shipping Russian oil and gas to Europe.

While Azerbaijan’s support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity has at times been loud, the burgeoning financial and political engagements with Moscow have become conspicuous. Azerbaijan is helping Russia evade sanctions and has been one of the top four destinations for Russian oligarchs during the war in Ukraine.

Moreover, the regime in Baku has endorsed Russian mediation efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, while rebuffing initiatives from the U.S. and the EU. Baku also has  welcomed Iranian mediation  based on Tehran’s position that the regional conflicts should be resolved “without the interference of non-regional and Western countries.”

Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran have been strained at times. Tehran has expressed concern for several matters, such as, the use of Israeli-manufactured drones by the Azerbaijani armed forces in the disputed area of Artsakh and the adoption of policies that tolerate or even endorse groups advocating  the secession of Northern Iran, home to many ethnic Azeris.

Even so, recent developments show a warming of ties between Azerbaijan and Iran that should worry policy makers in the West and particularly those in Israel. On October 7, 2023, coinciding with Hamas’s brutal attack on southern Israel, Azerbaijan and Iran signed an agreement concerning the so-called Aras corridor. This project, involving construction of a highway and a railroad bridge, is designed to connect Azerbaijan and its exclave, Nakhichevan, through Iranian territory.

The Aras corridor agreement is part of a broader normalization between Iran and Azerbaijan, including critical agreements signed since September 2023. Moreover, there are reports that Iran will invest in territories acquired by Azerbaijan during and after the 2020 war with Armenia. In addition, there has been a notable surge (33 percent during the first nine months of 2023) in the railway trade between Iran and Azerbaijan, and experts foresee further growth  in bilateral trade following completion of the Aras corridor.

But this isn’t all. On January 7, 2024, Iran and Azerbaijan finalized an accord pertaining to the construction of the Rasht-Astara railway, aimed at eliminating a longstanding gap within the International North–South Transport Corridor, known as the INTSC. The INTSC—a 7,200-kilometer corridor encompassing road, rail, and maritime routes—connects Russia’s second largest city, St. Petersburg, with the port of Mumbai, India, via Azerbaijan and Iran, bypassing the Suez Canal.

Foreseen as a channel for Russia to circumvent Western sanctions, replace European trade routes, and expand its economic influence in South Asia, the INTSC has attracted the financial support of the Putin regime, particularly evident in the funding of the Rasht-Astara railway project.

The imminent completion of the Rasht-Astara railway is poised to enhance trade among Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan. Experts predict that the total volume of cargo shipped  by rail alone will reach at least 15 million tons per year before 2030.

Azerbaijan’s role as a facilitator will bolster Russia’s position in its war against Ukraine. The INSTC offers immense potential for the Russian economy, providing Moscow with access to crucial trade partners and enabling additional funding for its campaign in Ukraine.

This initiative holds considerable significance for Iran as well, offering a way to evade  Western sanctions and establish a direct land connection with Russia, a pivotal  ally. The completion of the INSTC is poised to lift Iran out of isolation, transforming it into a major trade hub in Eurasia.

Under the leadership of the Aliyev family, Azerbaijan has since 1993 operated as an authoritarian regime famous for its lack of free and fair elections, suppression of political opposition, and imprisonment of journalists and activists. War crimes and ethnic cleansing committed by the Azerbaijani regime in 2020 and 2023 in Artsakh only add to Aliyev’s list of bad deeds. Baku’s desire to remain an energy partner for Europe and a supplier for Israel is a key part of the regime’s drive to secure internal and external legitimacy.

Western policymakers therefore face a critical question: is it justified to overlook Azerbaijan’s deepening economic and financial ties with Russia and Iran, along with its abysmal human rights record, merely to secure access to Baku’s diminishing oil reserves? The recent resolution of the European Parliament seems to suggest that this is not a trade-off they are viewing kindly.

Continuing relations with Azerbaijan, despite its authoritarian practices, could prove shortsighted for Israel too. It is time for Israel’s intellectuals and leadership to acknowledge the ethical concerns associated with supporting Azerbaijan against Armenia. What may feel right at this juncture must be critically examined to ensure it aligns with what is truly right.

David A. Grigorian is a Senior Fellow at Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at Harvard’s Kennedy School and a veteran IMF Economist based in Washington. George Meneshian is an Athens-based policy analyst specializing in the Caucasus and the Middle East and a researcher at the Washington Institute for Defence and Security.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The post Is Azerbaijan a Friend of the West? Take a Closer Look appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

Competing perspectives of Modi

The vast majority of Chinese internet users have a positive view of India’s leader, calling him ‘Immortal Modi’ or ‘Modi Laoxian’ (‘不朽的莫迪’). Based on data from the popular microblogging platform Weibo (China’s version of Twitter), which has more than 598 million active monthly users, many Chinese people also think that Modi is crucial to preserving the balance of power in the world.

Competing perspectives of Western-style liberal democracy and China’s political model commonly, though unfairly and inaccurately, portray the former as the stable foundation of a well-functioning society, whereas the latter, marked by ardent nationalism and a supreme leader, is viewed as volatile. Weibo users’ comments shed light on their perceptions of democracy as a fundamentally unstable political system beset by internal conflicts, corruption, and misrepresentation. Indeed, they frequently dismiss the concept of democracy as a whole process. Many Chinese people believe that larger nations, even ones that claim to be democratic, tend to adopt authoritarian characteristics.

Western media often express this erroneous belief when reporting on political developments in India. During Modi’s tenure, debates about the essence of Indian democracy have shifted, which is consistent with Chinese perspectives on the democratic system in general but not on India’s democratic system specifically. This lively but partisan debate, not confined to academia, centers on the purported new chapter in Indian history, where Modi’s leadership has distanced the nation from the fundamental principles of democracy, minority rights, and executive accountability.

Nitasha Kaul, a well-known Modi critic, writes for the Australian Institute of International Affairs that ‘the Modi myth proffers the idea of a paternal, ascetic, and efficient leader at the helm of a civilizational resurgence of India as a “Vishwa Guru” (world leader).’ In 2021, Jostein Jakobsen and Kenneth Bo Nielsen of The Centre for Development and the Environment at the University of Oslo added India under Modi to their list of ‘authoritarian, populist, and right-wing regimes.’ In 2023, The Guardian published an article calling Modi’s government ‘autocratic’ and ‘illiberal.’ Similarly, a Financial Times piece from the same year highlighted Modi’s alleged ‘authoritarian streak’ as a major concern for the West.

However, China’s recent mention of Modi contrasts sharply with the much-embellished portrayal of India during his tenure. On 2 January 2024, Zhang Jiadong, the director of the Centre for South Asian Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, expressed his admiration for Modi, his economic and foreign policy, and his ‘Bharat narrative’. Zhang claimed that India has become more proactive and self-assured on a national and international level. His remarks were published by the state-run newspaper Global Times. Coming from the Chinese government, these statements might seem unconventional, but when considering India’s efforts to create a multi-aligned system in international affairs and the Western disapproval of India following the West’s unsuccessful attempts to steer Modi towards Western alignment, they have geopolitical relevance, particularly regarding China’s relationship with India under Modi.

Though he and his party greatly benefit India, Modi now poses a challenge to governments, intellectuals, and people of Western and Indian ancestry who support Congress. India has a strong governance framework, making it difficult for a single person or political party to attain widespread popularity. For the past nearly 23 years, he has served as Prime Minister of India and Gujarat State Chief Minister, owing to his and his party’s perseverance and nationalist, India-focused agenda, not because he is a despot or authoritarian. People understand how regional and global environments are degrading and changing, as well as where India should rank as a developed country on the world map. They are electing him and his party to govern India (or Bharat). Furthermore, the Supreme Court, as the pinnacle body in India’s robust judicial structure, keeps a watchful eye and is well-equipped to deal with any violations of democratic institutions by any person or entity.

The BJP/Modi government at the helm is now well-positioned to bolster India’s economic standing without yielding to any internal or regional pressures. A landslide victory in the upcoming election may allow Modi and his right-wing nationalist government to reshape India into a Hindu nation, with the goal of amending the Constitution to dilute the problematic principles of secularism and socialism while curbing illegal immigration and ethnic separatism, as well as addressing the challenges posed by rising Islamism. In countering Islamism and terrorism in India, the emphasis is on confronting the activities of a subset of extremist Sunni Muslims. This group, while not substantially contributing to the broader Indian society, is increasingly mobilizing for communal interests, becoming susceptible to the influence of a transnational Islamist agenda and global caliphate bogey. Any potential Modi-led government plan will include a comprehensive approach to addressing the dangers posed by these dynamics while also ensuring national security and social harmony. These objectives broadly align with Beijing’s policies in the context of Chinese society.

Tensions

Although most Chinese people have a positive perception of and interest in the Indian prime minister, the relationship between China and India has been tense for many years, creating an environment conducive to the emergence of new and escalating conflicts between the two countries.

Since his initial election in 2014, China has warmly welcomed Modi, and both parties are optimistic about a new era of India-China relations under the BJP. The first encounter between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi took place in Fortaleza, Brazil, ahead of the 6th BRICS Summit that same year. Xi conveyed to Modi that China and India are long-term strategic and collaborative allies rather than adversaries, underscoring their common goal of ‘national rejuvenation’ and asserting that cooperation is the most efficient way to achieve it. Despite their outward amicability, India and China continue to have geopolitical conflicts.

The India-China border dispute, which began in May 2020, has been a frequent topic of discussion between Xi and Modi. Furthermore, there have been ongoing clashes and instances of Chinese aggression along the 4,057 km Line of Actual Control (LAC), a notional boundary, particularly in the Ladakh region. China and India have had territorial disputes along their shared border since the countries’ modern beginnings. Both nations engaged in a bloody conflict over this issue in 1962, but it was the only one. However, violent incidents have increased in recent years. Modi, in his third term, cannot ignore or avoid the negative consequences of the current situation for India-China relations. India and China’s reluctance to withdraw along the LAC reflects their postures and aspirations on their respective home fronts, as well as on the international stage, where they both desire to expand their influence as emerging global powers.

The Tibet question

Given the intricacies of historical tensions and Chinese provocations, heightened by the Tibet ‘issue’, handling toxic border relations is bound to be tough. The Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, who will be 88 in July, and, more importantly, the future Dalai Lama, are major issues in both India and China. India’s stance on Tibet is mainly spiritual, with Tibet’s geographical location leaving ample leeway for potentially significant political consequences. India has the largest number of Tibetan refugees, and the Dalai Lama issue will have an impact on the country. Given India’s rebirth of Buddhism, the country’s next and future prime ministers will take a more active position in any Buddhist-related matters, particularly those involving China.

India has yet to make significant use of the Tibet card in its political dealings with China; nevertheless, on March 9, 2024, Modi paid an official visit to Arunachal Pradesh, India’s Tibet-border state, where he announced, among other efforts, the important Sela Tunnel Project. Beijing claims the state is part of its territory, Southern Tibet (藏南地区), and calls India’s claims ‘ridiculous.’ For China, Tibet represents the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism (or ‘splittism’), and religious extremism. Under Xi, China is aggressively reinforcing its security in Tibet through increasing militarization, surveillance, and other actions. Both countries have dramatically increased Tibet’s geopolitical, cultural, and ecological significance, making it crucial to both.

Cooperation and conflicting conditions

India and China are economically interdependent, and both are important components of a multipolar, multi-aligned world system. The border dispute is still a major worry, especially in light of the fact that both countries have lost soldiers in armed battles. Nonetheless, the prospect of cooperation holds significance, particularly considering the plethora of opportunities for relationship-building and pursuing shared interests. Climate change is one such common problem, necessitating collaboration to decarbonize energy systems and diversify energy sources, while others include addressing security problems in a rapidly changing global environment. At COP28, India and China failed to endorse a promise to triple renewable energy sources by 2030, despite a pledge to transition away from fossil fuels. This highlights the paradoxical nature of power rivalry in international relations and between the two most populous countries, led by Modi and Xi, respectively.

One of Xi’s biggest challenges is the continuing deflationary pressures caused by rising property prices and diminishing construction output. In contrast, if Modi wins, he will inherit a stable rupee and surging Indian markets. India and China have differing inflation rates, but India is in a favorable economic position, and Modi would inherit India’s rising economy and foreign investment opportunities. Overall, India’s economy is strong and steady. India’s and China’s economic positions can have an anchoring effect, limiting or increasing their political capacity and leaders’ influence. Inflammatory or aggressive acts by Xi or Modi would have economic consequences for both, potentially causing additional political turbulence on their respective domestic fronts and increasing economic troubles in an already volatile global context. Neither leader will want this.

India-China relations are unique in nature. And, while Modi and Xi have shown open political affection and promised to address common concerns, the two countries, each with over a billion people, are geopolitical rivals with the ability to influence global affairs in both positive and negative ways. As has been the case in recent years, India-China relations will continue to be stable yet sensitive despite their historical, contemporary, and probable future challenges.

Scott N. Romaniuk is a research fellow at the Corvinus Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies (CAS), Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies.

Animesh Roul is the executive director of the New Delhi-based policy research group, Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict. He specializes in counterterrorism, radical Islam, terror financing, and armed conflict and violence in South Asia.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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Considering China’s growth trajectory leading up to the pandemic, it was anticipated that the country’s GDP would surpass that of the United States by 2035. However, due to slower growth, escalating mismanagement under Xi, and a mounting demographic crisis, it may take several decades before the Chinese economy outpaces the United States, and there’s a possibility it may never do so.

The post Past Is Precedent as Xi Struggles to Fix China’s Economy appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

• The latest US inflation data has surprised on the upside, delaying any plans by the Federal Reserve to cut rates.
• Higher-for-longer interest rates will put pressure on US consumers, who have been piling on credit card debt through 2023.
• There is historical precedent of a twin-peaked inflation crisis in the 1970s.

The latest CPI and PPI inflation data come at a critical juncture for the US Federal Reserve. On the one hand, the US stock market was recently hovering near all-time highs and jobs data shows no signs of retreat from a 3.8% unemployment rate. On the other hand, the March data shows that inflation remains well off the Fed’s 2% target and continues to trend in the wrong direction. Moreover, inflation remains a major political issue with elections looming in November: a recent Gallup poll found that cost-of-living was the foremost concern on the minds of voters.

The data, with CPI surprising on the upside and PPI on the downside, will complicate the Fed’s path to easing, and many are now betting heavily against a cut in the Fed’s June meeting. The Fed will be under pressure to adopt an aggressive anti-inflation stance through to November at the very least – a policy that translates into higher interest rates and a stronger US dollar. These monetary forces will also resonate outside the borders of the United States, inducing capital flight from emerging markets and increasing the servicing costs of debt-distressed states.

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Shortly after his father’s death, twenty-five-year-old Pavel Prigozhin took over the reins of his father’s company, but with limited legitimacy. Little is known of Pavel’s childhood or teenage years, except that he was pampered and traveled on private yachts and jets. He fought in Syria alongside Wagner troops, earning the organization’s “Black Cross” for outstanding military service. He also fought in Ukraine, where allegedly, his social media posts gave away his position, leading to his unit being bombed. Western sanctions have been extended to the children of Yevgeny Prigozhin, making it nearly impossible for Pavel to travel internationally.

Pavel’s age and lack of his father’s skills were ultimately his downfall, and most analysts believed the Kremlin would cut a deal to completely remove him from the picture, allowing Pavel to continue to earn money with the many other companies his father left him in a multibillion-dollar empire. Under Pavel’s leadership, Wagner began recruiting again, but then suddenly stopped. By October or November of 2023, Pavel was no longer leading Wagner. There’s no official confirmation on Pavel’s whereabouts or what happened to him. He may have been sidelined or removed from power struggles within Russia. It’s also possible he’s involved with the PMCs in a less public role. Information about the Wagner Group and its leadership is often opaque and shrouded in secrecy.

While Pavel’s role, and even if he is still alive, remain unknown, it is known that Wagner’s commercial and military interests have been divided between Russia’s numerous intelligence services and Putin’s allies. Parts of Wagner may have been absorbed into Rosgvardia, also known as the Federal Service of the National Guard of the Russian Federation. However, command over the largest part of Wagner’s overseas operations has been assumed by General Andrei Averyanov, a high-ranking officer in Russia’s military intelligence (GRU). General Andrey Averyanov, the former leader of a targeted assassination group, rose to international infamy for the failed poisoning of Russian dissident-in-exile, Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, UK in 2018.

The Defense Ministry established a number of other private military companies (PMCs) to recruit former Wagner men for operations in Africa or the Middle East. A PMC called Redut, established in 2008, has been fighting in Ukraine, while another PMC, Convoy, was established in Russian-occupied Crimea in 2022. Wagner’s Ukrainian operations now come under the name of the Volunteer Corps, while other arms-length, covert operations have been incorporated into the Expeditionary Corps. Effectively, the multibillion-dollar PMC business has been taken over by the Kremlin, with the Expeditionary Corps dubbed “Wagner 2.0.”

Russia’s strategy in using the PMCs is to undermine U.S. power and increase Moscow’s influence while maintaining plausible deniability. They provide security for foreign leaders while also offering training for their troops and sometimes engaging in ground combat, providing combat support, or conducting special operations. The PMCs aid Moscow’s foreign policy objectives by carrying out military operations, projecting Russia’s power, furthering Moscow’s political influence, gathering intelligence, and generating revenue. In Mali and Sudan, the Wagner Group was instrumental in securing gold and diamond mines, ensuring that certain local military leaders continue to benefit from them, while also transporting precious metals and stones back to the Kremlin.

Wagner was active in Libya from 2018. Russian PMCs are also fighting in Syria and Ukraine, and possibly in as many as 30 countries in total. Wagner had been propping up regimes across Africa, as well as controlling mineral extraction activity, namely in gold. Operations in Africa are continuing with mercenaries fulfilling existing contracts. The Kremlin is offering a “regime survival package” to governments in Africa in exchange for access to natural resources. The Russian government is also working to change mining laws in West Africa, attempting to unseat Western companies.

Now, those operations in Africa are continuing under the Africa Corps. Russia is negotiating with the Central African Republic to open a new military base there. The group is also active in Libya, Mali, Sudan, and Burkina Faso. The original plan was to recruit and place 40,000 Russian fighters across Africa. This target was reduced to 20,000, but by the end of 2023, even this reduced target had not been fulfilled. Consequently, the empty billets are being filled with recruits from Africa. Particularly in the Central African Republic (CAR), former fighters are finding that they are unemployable after a UN ceasefire. So, they are taking jobs with the Russian PMCs.

Another region where Russian PMCs are active is the Sahel, encompassing countries bordering the southern edge of the Sahara Desert. It has become known as the ‘coup belt’ due to a recent surge in military takeovers. Since 2020, at least five successful coups have plagued the region, including two in Mali, two in Burkina Faso, and one in Niger. The three nations withdrew from the regional bloc – The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – and created their own “Alliance of Sahel States.”

These coups all shared a similar theme: the new military leaders distanced themselves from Western powers. French troops, deployed for years to combat jihadist activity from groups like the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), were expelled or faced pressure to leave. Additionally, the juntas want the US military out of the region. It’s important to note that public dissatisfaction with government corruption and inability to address security concerns, including the rise of these terrorist groups, were also significant factors behind the coups, not just Western influence.

The United States is struggling to maintain its foothold in Africa’s Coup Belt, particularly after French troops were expelled from Mali and Burkina Faso. Washington seeks to prevent Russian PMCs from filling the security void. However, Moscow holds a certain appeal for the region’s newly established military juntas. Unlike Western powers, Russia doesn’t pressure them on human rights issues or democratic reforms. Additionally, the U.S. operates within the constraints of the international rules-based order, limiting its flexibility in negotiations. In contrast, Russia prioritizes its own interests and operates with less transparency, allowing it to deny involvement with PMCs. This opacity gives Russia an advantage, allowing them to cultivate influence in the region without directly committing troops.

The U.S. has several reasons for wanting to remain in the region. First, reports suggest the effectiveness of Russian PMCs in combating terrorism is debatable. Second, the U.S. is concerned about the potential for a detrimental economic impact on these already poverty-stricken countries. Cutting ties with Europe and facing potential sanctions could leave them economically dependent on Russia, with most of the wealth and benefits concentrated among the military rulers.

Furthermore, the coups have resulted in a curtailment of human rights and basic freedoms, with no expectation of full restoration. Unlike Western partners who would pressure for democratic reforms and respect for human rights, Russian PMCs are unlikely to exert any such influence. This lack of pressure is likely to further erode the quality of life for average citizens in these already struggling nations.

The presence of Russian PMCs is expected to expand in Africa, and with it, Russia’s influence. U.S. influence will decline unless Washington finds some way to dislodge the Russian PMCs. And unfortunately, citizens of these African countries will see a deterioration in their quality of life, standard of living, and general safety.

The post Wagner Group Post-Prigozhin: New Name, Business as Usual appeared first on Geopolitical Monitor.

This is the fourth MCA exercise conducted in 2024. The first MCA exercise was held in 2023 with the US and Philippine navies, followed by another with the Australian and Philippine navies. During the latest MCA, participating ships included the BRP Gregorio del Pilar and Ramon Alcaraz, the USS Mobile, the JS Akebono, and the HMAS Warramunga.

The Japanese Embassy in the Philippines released a separate statement outlining the scenarios involved in the MCA in greater detail, including anti-submarine warfare training, tactical exercises, link exercises, and photo exercises. During the MCA, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command (STC) announced that it was conducting joint naval and air patrols in the South China Sea on the same day, declaring that “military activities that mess up the situation in the South China Sea and create hotspots are under control.”

These latest naval exercises come after a spate of maritime confrontations between Beijing and Manila. The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) reported on April 6 that ships from the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) harassed Filipino vessels in Philippine Exclusive Exclusion Zone (EEZ) waters in the South China Sea. According to a statement posted by PCG spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela on X, the CCG ships harassed Filipino fishermen supporting ships from the PCG and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) on a mission in Rozul Reef, which is located 128 nautical miles from Palawan, on April 4. Photos of the encounters were also posted on X alongside Commodore Tarriela’s statement. This comes after a series of conflicts over the second half of 2023 centered around the Second Thomas Shoal, a contested South China Sea feature where the Philippines continues to maintain a small detachment of marines on the Sierra Madre, a light transport ship intentionally run aground in 1999.

MCA exercises are unfolding against the backdrop of new talks intended to deepen defense cooperation between Manila and Tokyo. Philippine ambassador to the US Jose Manuel Romualdez said that discussions are planned in the wake of a summit between Manila, Tokyo, and Washington DC, scheduled to be held on April 11. These talks are expected to broach the subject of establishing a legal path for the deployment of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) forces on Philippines territory on a rotational basis under a Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). If the agreement is signed, it would be the third such agreement where the Philippines established security guidelines with partner nations allowing foreign troops to be stationed on Philippine territory, with the other two involving the United States and Australia. Other issues being explored include the possible presence of the JSDF in the annual Balikatan exercises alongside American and Filipino troops, and joint maritime patrols in the South China Sea. Ambassador Romualdez said that a joint statement will be formally issued after the summit in Washington DC. As of 2024, Japan has participated with the two countries alongside American and Filipino marines through the KAMANDAG exercises via the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB).

For Japan, the MCA and upcoming summit come amid a general reorientation of its posture in East Asia, amid an evolving security environment due to threats stemming from a more aggressive Russian foreign policy posture, Chinese aircraft intrusions, and North Korean missile tests near Japanese airspace and waters. Joining the MCA is viewed by Japan as a way to bolster its reputation as a reliable security partner in Indo-Pacific countries and beyond.

As for the Philippines, recent cooperation signals a desire to set up alliances to counter Chinese incursions into Philippine waters. Participating in the MCA with the United States and later, with Australia and Japan, allows Manila to buttress rule of law in Southeast Asian waters, and especially in the South China Sea. Chinese incursions are affecting Manila’s national security, and as such, partnering with like-minded countries is viewed as a way to counter China’s encroachments.

A successful round of MCA exercises reinforces the idea that all parties have the right to safely navigate international waters, without being impeded by one state. In addition to ensuring that China respects the rule of law, the use of maritime exercises can deepen military cooperation with all the allies involved. The trilateral summit also allows the United States to become more involved in the region as a partner with direct interests in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, the MCA can serve as another forum for any and all countries in the Indo-Pacific that wish to participate, as shown by the participation of Australia and Japan when the forum was first launched in 2023.

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