Geopolitical Monitor - Energy Security

geopolitical.co.za
January 29, 2010

Summary

The African Union (AU) announced that the Executive Council of the African Union will hold its Sixteenth Ordinary Session followed by its Executive Council Meeting. African leaders face many challenges from the technological divide to the increased military involvement of foreign powers such as China and the United States.

Analysis

The following two weeks will be a busy time in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital. In an official press release (25 January) the AU announced that the Executive Council of the African Union will hold its Sixteenth Ordinary Session on 28 & 29 January.

Short on the heels of the Executive Council meeting, the Fourteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State of the African Union will take place between the 31st of January and 2 February. The theme of the 14th AU summit is “Information and Communication Technologies in Africa: Challenges and Prospects for Development.”
 
The theme of the 14th summit is not only timely, but addresses an issue, which, if nothing is done about it, will remain a critical challenge to all areas of human development in Africa. As the most powerful assembly on the continent, the AU Executive Council will have to confront the vast technological chasm that still separates much of the African continent from itself. The lack of proper communications infrastructure, and more importantly, the asymmetries in the global economy and the effect it has of dividing the world into techno-haves and digital have-nots, will have to be tackled in a substantial debate by heads of state.

The need for innovation and the development of communications infrastructures on the continent will not only aid processes of economic development. The evolution of social, political, and state institutions is by and large directly linked to the spread of logistical links like roads, rail and airports in a territory. Given the geographical challenges African states have to confront when dealing with vast territories, and the need to bring stability, services, education, health and other facilities to people, means that communications infrastructures will play an increasingly important role in institutional and social development.

But, while African leaders debate the above issues, other serious questions not on the official agenda of this summit, are also bound to pop up during informal discussions. These may include the long drawn-out process of rescuing Zimbabwe from itself; Madagascar’s political stalemate; the health of Nigerian President Yar’Adua; the state of siege in Guinea, Conakry; and the AU interventions in Somalia and Darfur. On the level of continental security issues, one can only speculate about what conversations may be taking place on the topic of the US African Command (AFRICOM).

It is good to be reminded of the watershed President Bush’s announcement of the creation of AFRICOM signified in terms of US relations with Africa. In terms of the strategic logic for creating AFRICOM, Kaplan (2008) argues that Africa is no longer a “third-rate theatre of war,” and that: “The Pentagon’s decision to stand up a war-fighting command exclusively for Africa by the end of 2008 presages a new direction for the global war on terrorism, with profound implications for the military and its relations with the State Department and other executive-branch institutions.  It also provides a way for the United States to deal with a rising China.”

Since the time of its creation, AFRICOM’s headquarters remain in Stuttgart, Germany.  As a separate combatant command directly responsible for implementation of the Pentagon’s African security strategy, it can, for obvious reasons, not remain holed-up in Germany.

The Pentagon and the White House would clearly like to see the African Command take up residence on African soil. This goal has come up against stiff resistance from African states and will surely remain a matter of intense debate. The main problem, or question, African leaders are asking in this regard is whether the continent should allow another foreign military force to settle here. If this happens, it will mean that three international forces, these being the UN, AU, and USA, are all stationed in, and active in the African security environment. Does the continent need a third international force present on its soil?

The seriousness with which US policy makers and think tanks approach its interest in playing a bigger, and more direct role, in African military and security affairs, should inspire a much more lively debate on the future not only of AFRICOM in Africa, but also the role Africa want to play in defining its own security environment(s). Many perspectives on, and reasons for, a more direct US diplomatic and military engagement in Africa exist. But, if a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) report dating from 2006 is anything to go by, the Chinese challenge looms large on the USA’s geopolitical radar screen.

A few snapshots from the CFR (2006:25) report illustrate the above point. It indicates that in order to compete effectively with China: “...the United States must provide more encouragement and support to well-performing African states, develop innovative means for U.S. companies to compete, give high-level attention to Africa, and engage China on those practices that conflict with U.S. interests.”

Important in this regard is the fact that the CFR recognises the fact that US interests are being challenged on the African continent and that a new vision for political relations will have to be forged. In this regard the CFR (2006:27) argues that: “The vision must recognize the changing playing field in which the West’s interests are being challenged, especially by a strongly competitive China and other fast-growing economies in Asia.  This vision must make clear the diversity of Africa and the positive changes taking place…” (CFR 2006: 27).

The drive for influence in African political and social development, and access to African markets may lead to unnecessary competition between international powers on the continent. China’s persistence at entering the African marketplace has already caused major controversy, especially where it concerns mining, oil, and other strategic markets. From an AU point of view, competition is not necessarily a bad thing, but if guys with guns follow in the wake of corporate interests that enter the market, alarm bells should go off. A permanent AFRICOM base may cement a new history of international competition for control over areas of interest on the continent. This leaves African heads of state and civil-society leaders with a tremendous challenge which is how to balance much needed investment and economic development, with international security and military interventions.

Daniel Volman (2009) indicates that the Obama administration’s 2010 budget for the Department of Defence includes a request of US $278 million for operational and maintenance funds for AFRICOM. In addition to the above figure it is also requesting US $263 million to provide manpower, airlift and communications support for the African Command. Given these requests it is clear that President Obama’s Africa policy is a further elaboration of the policy direction adopted by former president George Bush.  

For African leaders the establishment of AFRICOM presents an unusual challenge. The geostrategic question African leaders may ask is whether the creation of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM), which came into existence in the early 1980s, to coordinate Pentagon activities in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, can be seen as a template for the role AFRICOM will play here. Will US Central Command interventions and invasions in the Middle East become a long-term reality in Africa if AFRICOM takes root here?

But, before one succumbs to an unnecessary doomsday scenario, it should be noted that there is an alternative to yet another international power creating a military footprint on the continent. During 2004 the AU created the Peace and Security Council which is set to intervene in conflicts. Part of the blueprint of the Peace and Security Council include plans to establish an African rapid-reaction force to intervene in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity. The council will furthermore have power to authorise peacekeeping missions to prevent the escalation of conflicts.

Critics argue that the council is but an idea, and the rapid-reaction force is, at this stage, merely a paper tiger. It is true that the historical process of developing the AU as continental platform, with its attendant institutions, will take time. But, the work of creating a stable political environment in African states can in this regard not be parcelled out to international military forces pursuing their own agendas and interests on the continent. The principle to guide thinking in this regard is that no international power, be it France, Britain, Canada, China, or any other state should be allowed to station military forces on the continent except if it is part of a multinational force agreed to by the AU.

The establishment of an AFRICOM base creates a set of interlocking security and diplomatic issues for African heads of state:

1.      Some African countries like Morocco and Liberia have suggested that they are interested in hosting the base

2.      The countries directly opposed to AFRICOM, such as South Africa and SADC member states, together with Libya could invite the US to their territory.

3.      African states that receive significant US military aid, equipment, training, and security assistance could find it difficult to resist American advances.

African states will have to make a decision, possibly at the level of the AU, to adopt a total ban on the establishment not only of US military bases on the continent, but for that matter, to effect a total ban on any foreign military installation on the continent. To this end the AU may have to consider using diplomatic, economic, and political instruments with which it can punish, or isolate, those African states that do allow their territories to play host to military forces from outside the continent. The asymmetry in global economic structures, combined with the fact that Africa needs radical innovation to bridge its communications, security, and social development gaps, can in this regard be taken as a positive challenge to forge continental institutions empowered to find home-grown solutions.


References:

African Union. Addis Ababa, 22 January 2010 –14TH AFRICAN UNION SUMMIT KICKS OFF ON MONDAY 25 JANUARY IN ADDIS ABABA. Press Release. http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/index/index.htm

Council on Foreign Relations. 2006. More than humanitarianism: a strategic U.S. approach toward Africa. Independent Task Force Report No. 56.

Kaplan, D. 2008. The next frontier.  The Atlantic Online. 1 November, 2007. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200711u/kaplan-africa

Quigley, S. 2006. EUCOM leader calls for Africa global strategic imperative. American Forces Information Service. Http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2006/20060308_4428.html. Accessed – 8/15/06  

Volman, D. 2009. Africa: Obama moves ahead with Aricom. http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200912100945.html 

Tags:  Military - Politics - Africa - Ethiopia - AFRICOM